


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A HISTORY
OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION

BY
H. MORSE STEPHENS

BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD

IN THREE VOLUMES

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AMERICAN PREFACE.

[To Messrs. Scribner's *authorized* edition.]

IN the original preface to this volume, I have stated at some length the reasons which induced me to lay before the English public a new history of the French Revolution, and which will, I hope, justify its republication in America. For those reasons I beg to refer my American readers to the original preface, where they will see that I do not attempt to rank myself with the great writers and thinkers who have preceded me, with Carlyle, Thiers, Michelet, Louis Blanc, Edgar Quinet, or Hippolyte Taine, but claim rather a place with more modern workers, such as MM. Charles Vatel, Aulard, and Albert Sorel. They will there find an endeavor to classify the enormous mass of new material which has appeared upon the history of the great Revolution in recent years; material which, from its production in small magazines, local histories, proceedings of societies, and the works of specialists, is naturally inaccessible to the great majority of English and American readers. I only claim for myself that I am possessed with a great enthusiasm for my subject, which I believe to be the most fascinating in its interest and the most valuable for its political lessons in the history of the world; that I have worked at it diligently for years, to the exclusion of everything else, and that I have

striven to be impartial in my treatment of it. I have tried systematically to keep down anything like fine writing or over-elaborate description, and to be as simple as I can, and my efforts have been received with the kindest, most flattering, and most unanimous approval by the English reviewers, to whom I take this, the first, opportunity of tendering my most cordial thanks. I venture to hope that American reviewers will find it in their power to do likewise. I felt complimented when Messrs. Scribner proposed to reproduce my book in America, and take the opportunity of saying these few words about myself in the special preface which they have asked me to write for them, before I touch upon the influence of the United States of America upon the course of the French Revolution, and the reasons why the period should have a special interest for the citizens of the great Republic of the New World.

The two most striking and important events in the history of the eighteenth century are the establishment of the United States of America and the outbreak of the French Revolution. Without the successful termination of the American War of Independence, it may be doubted whether the French Revolution would have developed as it did, or whether it would have taken place at all. Had not the successful establishment of a republic across the Atlantic given, to those French leaders of thought who were discontented with the Bourbon monarchy, a more modern instance of the advantages of republican institutions than the republics of ancient Greece and ancient Rome, their inclinations would have led them to advocate limited monarchy after the English fashion rather than republicanism. These leaders of thought were

not, however, the men who established the French Republic of 1792—they only prepared the fall of the monarchy; and the men who founded the republic received their inspiration and derived their precedents from the classic histories of Greece and Rome, and not from the scanty annals of the new republic of the West. This is a curious point, and one well worth noting, that the influence of the American Republic is hardly to be seen at all among the republican leaders of the Revolutionary period, and cannot be traced in the purely republican Constitutions of 1793 and the year III (1795), while it was a factor of paramount importance in the overthrow of the French monarchy and throughout the history of the Constituent Assembly, and left its mark upon the Constitution of 1791.

The reasons for this strange historical fact are to be seen throughout the present volume. The leaders of the Left in the Constituent Assembly, the men who made the Constitution of 1791, were men profoundly influenced by the establishment of the American Republic, and the French monarchy had only itself to blame for this. When England was crippled in its fierce struggle with its rebellious daughter, France, in order to have a blow at its old antagonists, came to the assistance of the Americans, and sent them men, money, and arms. The soldiers, and still more the officers, who served there were naturally impressed by the high republican principles of Washington and his colleagues, and returned to France full of enthusiasm for their allies and of admiration for their ideas, and the French Court, which had sent them to America, could not well blame them, while French society went into raptures over Lafayette and Ben-

jamin Franklin. The young officers who had served in America became the leaders of the Left in the Constituent Assembly; they were the flower of the French nobility, and though not actually declared republicans, they wished, as they showed in the debates on the Constitution of 1791, to establish a practical republic, with the king as a sort of perpetual president. Not only Lafayette, the hero of both worlds, as he loved to be called, but the Lameths, the Viscomte de Noailles, Comte Mathieu de Montmorency, the Baron de Menou, the Comte de Custines, and the Prince de Broglie, were all admirers of the American Constitution, and had all served in America; and this brilliant group profoundly impressed the more sober lawyers, who actually drew up the French Constitution of 1791 with their ideas. That this was the case was a profound misfortune for France, and the attempt to apply the political ideas of the founders of the United States of America to France resulted in a deplorable failure. Lafayette could not see that America and France were utterly different countries; he could not grasp the great political truth that countries must be trained to self-government; and he thought that because the American Constitution was good in itself, it must be good for France. In that he showed his inferiority to the great practical statesman of the Revolution, Mirabeau. The inhabitants of the colonies of North America had long been trained to self-government, and they had the genius of the Anglo-Saxon race for representative institutions. Each State had long possessed its Colonial Assembly, and boasted of a parish and municipal organization founded on those of the mother-country; the establishment of the independence of the

States of America meant practically only the substitution, for governors appointed in England, of governors elected by the States themselves. In France there was no such machinery to build upon, and Frenchmen, instead of the Anglo-Saxon aptitude, had only the Celtic unfitness for representative institutions. The two peoples of France and of the States of America differed in laws, customs, race, and character, and yet Lafayette tried to fit the American Constitution upon the French people. Nowhere is this more perceptible than in the lengthy discussion on the Declaration of the Rights of Man; because there was such a declaration in the American Constitution, Lafayette said that there must be one in the new Constitution of France, and days, weeks, months slipped by, and great opportunities were lost, to please this ridiculous fancy of the admirers of the American Constitution.

It was no wonder then, that, after this experience, French leaders of the period which succeeded the Constituent Assembly refused any longer to follow the example of America, but followed rather their own ideas of political expediency. Manuel's scheme of making the President of the Convention a sort of President of the Republic was unanimously rejected, and the Girondins as well as Robespierre and Saint Just both labored for an ideal very different to that of Washington and Alexander Hamilton. Toward the end of their career, and after their overthrow in the Convention, some of the Girondins did support the idea of a Federal Republic, but the notion was counted to them as a crime, and never had any real support in the country. The Republican Constitution of 1793, which was chiefly the work

of Saint Just, as well as the Girondin Constitution sketched out by Condorcet, which never became law, showed no trace of the influence of the founders of the United States of America, and the Thermidorians, who, under the guidance of Siéyès, drew up the Constitution of the year III (1795), were too much occupied in providing an elaborate system of counter-checks between the executive and legislative powers, to pay much attention to precedents from across the Atlantic. In the Constitution of the year VIII, which established the Consulate, Siéyès, the "constitution-monger," also paid little attention to the American principles, and preferred once more to work out a system from his own inner consciousness.

From these few remarks it will be seen, then, that the actual influence of the American Constitution upon the ideas of the Revolution was greatest during the early years, and soon dwindled away into nothing; but the admiration of the French people for the men who had preceded them in adopting republican institutions remained undiminished. The Constituent Assembly decreed three days of public mourning for Benjamin Franklin, when he died at Auteuil in April, 1790, on the motion of Mirabeau himself; Palloy sent a model of the Bastille, made out of one of the stones of the fortress, to Washington; and Tom Paine, as one of the founders of the American Republic, was elected by no less than three departments to the Convention. The same friendly feeling existed down to the time of the Directory; Gouverneur Morris, the American ambassador at Paris, though himself disapproving of the excesses of the Revolution, yet made an arrangement for the mutual advantage

both of France and the United States, by which the money lent to the Americans during their War of Independence was repaid to France in convoys of wheat, and it was to secure the safe arrival of the largest of these convoys that the battle of June 1, 1794, was fought. In America the feeling toward France was distinctly altered by the excesses of the Terror, and many of the leading statesmen, including Washington, were unfavorably affected at this time, though what may be called the French party, headed by Jefferson, continued their sympathy to the new republic. During the Directory the relations between France and the United States were decidedly strained by Washington's treaty with England, and war was at one time imminent between the two republics, and this episode is treated at length in the third volume of this history. But the sympathy felt by many Americans for the Revolution is not so much to be seen in the conduct of their statesmen as in the behavior of many of the younger generation, who flocked to France, when she was at war with all Europe, to give her their help. The most conspicuous of these young men was Joel Barlow, whose most interesting biography has recently been published in America. Barlow even obtained an official position under the republic, and was one of the commissioners for arranging the settlement of Savoy as a department of France. There were many others, whose names appear in the French archives as having joined the French army, and it is a curious fact that most of these young Americans joined the armies on the frontiers, not as officers, but as surgeons and assistant-surgeons, and many of them rose to high rank in the medical department.

There is one more point of view from which the relations of the United States with the French Revolution may be considered. America was the home of refuge to which all the French leaders turned when they failed to carry out their ideas in France. In the great republic of the West, disappointed constitutionalists, who had sat in the Constituent Assembly and then seen the Constitution, of which they had been so proud, fail so hopelessly, established themselves in America, and waited for better times to come; among them may be noticed the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt and the Vicomte de Noailles. Dupont de Nemours there sought refuge and there died; and many of those stalwart republicans of the Terror, the great proconsuls, who did not fear to shed blood when they believed it necessary, and who ruled France with a rod of iron, while the French armies fought all Europe upon the frontiers, found safety in the United States, and ended there their most eventful lives.

This is but a mere sketch of the relations between France and the United States during that great period from 1789 to 1799, in which France passed through a series of political crises and tried a number of political experiments of paramount importance in the history of the world. I feel more strongly than any one else can feel how inadequate my labors are to tell the story of those ten years of turmoil, but I have done my best with a gigantic subject, and trust that my efforts will be as kindly received in America as they have been in England.

I have only to say, in conclusion, that I have fully authorized Messrs. Scribner to produce this republication, and

various slight corrections in the text have been made, which had been passed over in revising the proofs of the English edition; and I sincerely trust that this history of a great revolution, of which the most important portion treats of the tumultuous story of a short-lived European republic, may prove interesting to the citizens of the more stable republic across the Atlantic.

H. MORSE STEPHENS.

SAVAGE CLUB, LONDON,

26 July, 1886.

PREFACE.

AFTER such great historians as Carlyle and Mignet, Michelet and Taine, have treated the history of the French Revolution, the author of a new book upon the subject is bound to give the reasons which have induced him to place himself in competition with them. The English public is hardly aware of the vast literature which has grown up in France during the last few years upon this fascinating period, and it is with the intention of giving the substance of the new information, which has thus been afforded, that the present work has been written. English readers derive their knowledge from the marvellous work of Carlyle, and are, as a general rule, ignorant of the new facts which have been brought to light since the publication of his history. The great name of Carlyle has made men wary of seeming to tread in his path, and the mass of English readers are therefore left in ignorance of the many points in which he erred, not wilfully, but from the scantiness of the information at his disposal. To give but a single instance, the exact relations of Mirabeau with the court were necessarily unknown to Carlyle, as M. de Bacourt's volumes, which contain the correspondence of Mirabeau with La Marek, were not published until 1851, and have never been translated into English. The most valuable English works upon the period, Croker's "Essays" and Smyth's "Lectures," are both now out of date, and even G. H. Lewes' "Life of Robespierre," though

in some ways the most remarkable book published upon that statesman in any language, is often incorrect in details. In more modern days nothing very valuable upon the period has been published in England with the exception of the "Gallican Church and the Revolution," by the Rev. W. H. Jervis, Mr. John Morley's essays on Condorcet and Robespierre, and Mr. Oscar Browning's most valuable edition of the "Gower Despatches," which has however appeared too recently to be used in this volume. Scattered papers of more or less value have been published in various reviews and magazines, but no real history of the French Revolution has been published in England since Carlyle's great work.

Before giving a sketch of the various phases through which the treatment of the history of the Revolution has passed in France, and classifying in some degree the new material which has been used, it is as well at once to declare that this work does not abound in surprises. With the exception of one document illustrating the career of Marat in England, the remarkable manuscript account of the storming of the Tuileries by the Baron de Durler contained in the British Museum, and the private letters of the Duke of Dorset, the English ambassador in Paris, to the Duke of Leeds, the Secretary of State, also in the Museum, I have had no access to unknown material, but I have made diligent use of the superb collection of pamphlets in the Museum Library, which is unrivalled, even in Paris. The foundation of this collection was laid by Sir Anthony Panizzi, and it was completed by the acquisition of the Croker pamphlets. Mr. Croker for many years entertained the idea of writing a history of the French Revolution, and Murray offered him 2500 guineas if he would undertake such a work; but, though he never did write a consecutive account of the period, he collected a vast library upon the subject. On this library he wrote, in 1854, after it

had been acquired by the trustees of the British Museum, "Be so good as to tell Mr. Panizzi, with my compliments, that my collection of Revolutionary pamphlets consisted of two parts—the first part was formed by myself from various sources, of which the most copious was an old bouquiniste of the name of Colin, who had been Marat's printer or publisher, and who had in some small, dark rooms, up two or three flights of stairs, an immense quantity of volumes of the earlier days of the Revolution. He had ten, twenty, fifty, of the same pamphlet, of each of which I would buy but one of course; but I bought, I should think, many thousands of others, of which he had but single copies" (Croker's *Correspondence and Diaries*, vol. iii. p. 318). Of the source of the second part of his collection, Mr. Croker, unfortunately, says nothing in this letter, or anywhere else in his correspondence. This most valuable collection was freely used by Louis Blanc in the composition of his history, but not by Carlyle. Mr. Froude, in his life of Carlyle, says, "In the British Museum lay concealed somewhere a 'collection of French pamphlets,' on the Revolution, the completest in the world, which, after six weeks' wrestle with officiality, Carlyle was obliged to find 'inaccessible' to him. Idle obstruction will put the most enduring of men now and then out of patience, and Carlyle was not enduring in such matters" (Froude's *Life of Thomas Carlyle*, vol. ii. p. 450). The truth is that Carlyle demanded a private room in the British Museum to work in, and that when such accommodation was naturally refused, he declined to make any use of the Museum collection, and contented himself with the books which he bought, and those which were lent to him by friends, like Mill. Many of the Museum pamphlets are still uncatalogued, but the freest access and the kindest assistance have always been given to me in the use of them by the authorities of the Museum Library, and especially by Mr

Fortescue, the superintendent of the reading-room, who knows the collection better than any one else. This great collection has been used especially for Chapter I. of the present volume on the "Elections," which is based entirely upon it, but in subsequent chapters the contemporary journals have formed the groundwork of the story, though corrected and amplified by these pamphlets and by modern monographs.

The history of the French Revolution has gone through four distinct stages in France, which must be noticed successively, though the boundaries of the third and fourth stages cannot be distinctly defined. The first stage is that of contemporary histories. Though the various journals and pamphlets give the narrative of events at first hand, they were quickly followed up and made use of in regular histories. Of these the earliest in point of date is that of Rabaut de Saint Étienne, the Protestant pastor, and member of the Constituent Assembly and of the Convention, who wrote his "*Histoire de la Révolution française*" in 1792, in the happy conviction that the Revolution was all over, before it had reached the critical period in which he himself died on the guillotine. Of the numerous histories published under the Directory, the best known are those of the "*Deux Amis*" and of Lacroix, of which Carlyle made copious use. But these writers lived too close to the time of which they wrote to be able to clear their minds of prejudices or to have knowledge of the documents which could alone unravel hidden intrigues.

The period of the Empire and the Restoration was the age of memoirs. Every one, who had played any part in the stirring times of the Revolution, wrote his memoirs, and many of these are naturally apologies rather than memoirs proper. From the memoirs published before he wrote Carlyle drew much of his material, and great use he made of it, but the time had not then arrived for the sifting of the statements of

the memoir writers by the light of documents. The most valuable of these memoirs were collected and republished by MM. Berville and Barrière in their great "*Collection des Mémoires relatifs à la Révolution française*," between 1821 and 1828, but many are now extremely rare and very difficult to procure. Though the epoch of memoirs ceased after the deaths of the contemporaries of the Revolution, many have since been published from the manuscripts they left, and others are published every year. The story of some of these memoirs is very curious, none more so than that of those of Larévellière-Lepaux, the Director, who left orders in his will that his memoirs were to be printed and published. His heirs were not proud of the part the Director had played, so, after complying with the terms of his will and printing the memoirs, they destroyed the whole issue at once, and the only copy extant is the one which, in accordance with the law of France, was sent to the "*Bibliothèque Nationale*" at Paris. Excerpts from unpublished memoirs are still being published every day by specialists and in the two magazines devoted to the history of the Revolution.

The epoch of memoirs was succeeded by the epoch of complete histories, of which the greatest are those of Mignet, Thiers, Louis Blanc, Quinet, and Michelet. Mignet's account, published in 1824, is to this day the most useful manual of the history of the Revolution, and from the clear insight of the great historian into the facts of which he treated, it is certain to retain its position. Mignet's fault was in being too terse, Thiers erred in the opposite direction. No one can deny the wonderful mastery of the art of weaving up a mass of details into an interesting shape which Thiers possessed, yet his history of the Revolution is marked by the blemishes which disfigure his far greater history of the Consulate and Empire. He is often inaccurate and often unfair, and allowed his own political

hopes and fears to influence his narrative. Louis Blanc's history is also of immense length, but it is marred by being written for a political purpose, and not to give a true account of facts. Quinet's history is both shorter and more brilliant than Louis Blanc's; but it is influenced in the same way by the author's political opinions. Of Michelet's history it can only be said that it is a work of genius, of genius of the most lofty character, but that it fails, as every history written by a Frenchman, who loves his country, is bound to fail, in trying to estimate the virtues and vices of his own ancestors. With Michelet's history may be classed Lamartine's rhapsodies, which exhibit indeed the genius of the poet, but not the careful industry of the historian. It has been said that no boundary could be drawn in this rough classification between the third and fourth stages, and so this is the place to mention the histories of Henri Martin and M. Taine.

Martin's history, which is a continuation of his great "*Histoire de France*," was written in his old age, and is without doubt the weakest thing he ever did; but M. Taine's volumes deserve a longer notice. For style, vigour, and power, they are unequalled; but the same remark must be made of him as of Michelet. He cannot do justice to all the actors engaged in that terrible crisis which is called the French Revolution, and it is not to be expected from him or from any Frenchman for at least a century. Only when the results of the Revolution cease to be burning political questions, and the names of its heroes cease to be flags, round which parties rally, can Frenchmen treat the history of their Revolution with dispassionate calmness. If it is difficult for an Englishman to maintain his impartiality in discussing those stirring times, how much more so must it be for a Frenchman? And a belief that an Englishman can by his nationality treat it more impartially than a Frenchman is an additional reason why this work has been written.

These were the various stages through which the history of the Revolution passed before the influence of Ranke and the German school made its way into France, and a new school of specialists arose, who, instead of writing elaborate general histories to prove their own theories, based their work upon the right appreciation of documents, and were content to treat departments of the subject alone. It is upon the labours of these specialists that the present work is founded. It is impossible to mention in this preface all the various books which have been consulted, and all which have supplied new facts have been quoted as authorities in the footnotes; but it is advisable to point out some of the departments in which the work of specialists has been particularly valuable, as it is in these departments of the subject that many of the new facts which will be found in this history have been diligently collected.

First and most important is the department of the provincial history of the Revolution. Local history is a subject which has attracted much attention in France during the last forty years, and the works upon it have reached a high standard of excellence. The local histories of more than forty years ago, though in many respects excellent, generally closed at 1789, or if they treated of the Revolution, treated it shortly, as a sort of conclusion to their books. Good examples of these older local histories are Victor Derode's "*Histoire de Lille*," Fabre's and Boudin's histories of Marseilles, Aldeguier's "*Histoire de Toulouse*," Giraudet's "*Histoire de Tours*," Poquet's "*Histoire de Château Thierry*," Pécheur's "*Histoire de Guise*," Dusevel's "*Histoire d'Amiens*," Melleville's histories of Laon and of Chauny, Bergevin and Dupré's "*Histoire de Blois*," Cayon's "*Histoire de Nancy*," Bourquelot's "*Histoire de Provins*," Ducrest and Villeneuve's "*Histoire de Rennes*," and Viaud and Fleury's "*Histoire de Rochefort*." In more modern local histories of

great, and even of small cities, more weight is laid upon the revolutionary period, and as they are compiled with more historical power than the older annalists displayed, their information is the more valuable. Of these more modern histories may be noted O'Reilly's "*Histoire de Bordeaux*," Carro's "*Histoire de Meaux et du pays Meldois*," Coët's "*Histoire de Roye*," Levot's "*Histoire de Brest*," Fouquet's "*Histoire de Rouen*," Hector de Rosny's "*Histoire du Boulonnais*," and Fauconneau-Dufresne's "*Histoire de Déols et de Châteauroux*." The concluding portions of these general local histories are both valuable in themselves, and still more so as leading the way to local histories of towns and districts during the period of the Revolution alone. To mention all of these would be impossible, but attention should be drawn to the more important among them. The earlier of these local specialist histories deserve a mention, though they are not so valuable as those produced during the last twenty years, since the improved knowledge of the Revolution has made its way into the provinces. Of the earlier histories the most notable are Du Chatellier's "*Histoire de Bretagne pendant la Révolution dans les Départements de l'ancienne Bretagne*," published in 1836, the works of Soullier and André on the Revolution at Avignon, Balleydier's and Morin's histories of Lyons during the revolutionary period, and Sommier's "*La Jura pendant la Révolution*." Among the innumerable modern histories the following, though but a few among many, deserve notice: the numerous works of F. C. Heitz and Francisque Mège on the Revolution at Strasbourg and in Lower Auvergne, Desmasures' "*Histoire de la Révolution dans le Département de l'Aisne*," Casteras' "*La Révolution dans le pays de Foix*," Leccsne's most valuable "*Histoire d'Arras pendant la Révolution*," Seinguerlet's "*Strasbourg pendant la Révolution*," Pothier's "*Roanne pendant la Révolution*,"

Véron Réville's "Département du Haut-Rhin," the Comte de Seilhac on the Bas-Limousin, Boivin Champeaux on the "Département de l'Eure," Lallié's "District de Machecoul," Babeau's "Troyes," Duval-Jouve's "Montpellier," Ramon's "Péronne," Darsy's "Amiens," Combe's "Castres pendant la Révolution," Bouvier's "Vosges," and Duval's "Archives révolutionnaires de la Creuse." This long string of names indicates the immense amount of work that has been done of recent years on the history of the Revolution in the provinces of France; but it by no means exhausts them. Histories of special periods, or even days, in the provinces abound, and, as instances, may be quoted at hazard Labot's "Cahiers, procès verbaux, etc., du Nivernois et Donzinois," and Chancel's "L'Angoumois en 1789," Bourcier's "Essai sur la Terreur en Anjou," and Durieux' "Une Alerte à Cambrai en 1791," Barbat de Bignicourt's "Les Massacres à Reims," and Victor Modeste's "Le Passage de Louis XVI. à Meaux au retour de Varennes le 24 Juin, 1791." In addition to these books and pamphlets must be noticed the innumerable articles on the history of the Revolution in the provinces published in the great reviews, the local magazines, and the bulletins of local archaeological and historical societies and academies. Among the former may be noted d'Ochsenfeld's "La Révolution à Colmar" in the *Revue de la Révolution* and Guibert's "Le parti Girondin dans la Haute-Vienne" in the *Revue Historique*, while it would be unfair to make mention of any articles in particular in the local magazines and bulletins. The extraordinary ability of many of these local productions is a further proof of the keen interest taken by provincial France in its local history. Where all are good it is impossible to single out a few without being partial; in all valuable contributions are made to the local history of the Revolution, but special mention may be made of the *Revue de Champagne et de Brie*,

the *Revue de l'Agenais*, the *Revue d'Alsace*, the *Revue de Gascogne*, and the *Revue de l'Anjou et de la Bretagne*, and, among societies, of the bulletins of the Société academique of Laon, of the Société historique et archæologique of Soissons, of the Société d'émulation de l'Ain, and in the "Archives historiques de Saintonge et de l'Aunis," issued by the Société academique of Saintes. This enumeration of only a few of the best sources of local history will by itself bear evidence to the attention the subject has received in France, and will show from what authorities I have compiled my account of the Revolution in the provinces, which, I believe, contains much that is new to English readers.

Next in importance, as bearing witness to the industry of specialists, is the subject of the biographies of the great personages of the Revolution. All the great leaders have had their biographers, who have generally been eulogists, and though, from this fact, the value of their books as historical works is minimized, yet from the labour spent upon them, and the documents contained in them, they make it possible to give the facts of the lives of these individuals more correctly than was possible to Thiers or Carlyle, and must necessarily throw a truer light upon their careers. The most important of these biographies, both in length and in intrinsic importance, is Hamel's "*Histoire de Robespierre*," a lengthy work, which partakes of the nature of an apology, and is eulogistic even for a biography, but which is full of valuable information. Less important, but worthy of mention, is the same author's "*Histoire de Saint Just*." The life of Danton has been treated by Bougeart, and more recently by Dr. Robinet, who has devoted many books to the examination of his life. M. Chèvremont, who styles himself the "bibliographe de Marat," has spent more than twenty years in labouring upon the life of his hero, and until his numerous works were published it was

impossible to understand what was the real life and work of the most universally abused man of the whole revolutionary period. Without mentioning every biography which has been published of late years, special mention ought to be made of Vatel's "*Vergniaud*," Jean Reynaud's "*Vie et Correspondance de Merlin de Thionville*," the Comte de Pajol's "*Kléber*," Avenel's "*Anarchasis Clootz*," Victor Advielle's "*Babeuf*," Marc de Vissac's "*Romme le Montagnard*," Marcellin Boudet's "*Dulaure*," Bardoux' "*Montlosier*," and Colonel Iung's "*Histoire de Bonaparte*," which goes down to 1799, and the same author's very valuable "*Dubois-Crancé*." Before leaving this subject mention ought to be made of Von Arneth's publication of the letters of Marie Antoinette, both to her mother and her brothers Joseph and Leopold, which have entirely revealed the policy of the Queen, and of the regretted death of the Academician, Louis de Loménie, after the publication of the first two volumes of his great work "*Les Mirabeau*," from the style of which it may well be said that the greatest loss the history of the French Revolution has received for many years was the author's death before completing the life of the greatest statesman of the whole period.

A third department of special work, which deserves notice, is that of the relations between France and Europe during the revolutionary period, or what may be called the foreign policy of the Revolution. Until the publication, six months ago, of the first volume of M. Albert Sorel's masterly work "*L'Europe et la Révolution française*," which promises to be the most complete exposition of this subject from the French point of view, Bourgoing's "*Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe pendant la Révolution française*," and Masson's "*Histoire du département des affaires étrangères*," were the best French books on this subject. But in Germany much valuable

work had already been done, and M. Sorel would be the first to admit that without these German histories his own could never have been written. The most important of these works is without doubt Professor von Sybel's "Geschichte der Revolutionszeit," which is chiefly valuable from this point of view, and which has been translated into English by Dr. Perry. Of greater value, as containing a collection of the most important Austrian state papers, is Vivenot's "Quellen zur Geschichte der Deutscher Kaiserpolitik Oesterreichs wahrend der französische Revolutionskriege, 1790-1801," though not thrown into historical shape, and the same author's other works on the period, "Thugut, Clerfayt, und Wurmser," "Herzog Albrecht von Sachsen-Teschen, als Reichs-Feld-Marschall," and "Der Rastädter Congress." Other important German works on this period are Hermann Huffer's "Diplomatische Verhandlungen aus der Zeit der französischen Revolution," and Adolph Beer's "Joseph II., Leopold II., und Kaunitz," and his "Analecten zur Geschichte der Revolutionszeit." Mention should also be made of Häusser's "Deutsche Geschichte vorn Tode Friedrichs der Grossen bis zur Gründung des deutschen Bundes," and of the veteran Leopold von Ranke's "Ursprung und Beginn der Revolutionskriege," published in 1875. In this connection also a word should be said for Mr. Oscar Browning's valuable article, called "France and England in 1793," in the *Fortnightly Review* for February, 1883, and Mr. C. A. Fyffe's "History of Modern Europe," in which he has made use of the valuable despatches preserved in the Record Office.

It is not necessary to go through all the work which has been done by specialists of recent years. The most important departments have now been mentioned, but a few more books should be alluded to, if only to show the wide range over which work on the Revolution has been done in France.

First and foremost must be mentioned the publication of the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly from the archives by MM. Mavidal and Laurent, at the expense of the French Government, under the title of "Archives Parlementaires," of which twenty volumes have at present been published containing the full debates and reports of the first eighteen months of its session, which necessarily supersede the accounts, hitherto relied upon by historians, published in the *Moniteur*, and in Buchez and Roux' "Histoire parlementaire de la Révolution française." Even superior in interest to this colossal work is the "Tableaux de la Révolution française publiés sur les papiers inédits du département de la police secrète de Paris," by Adolph Schmidt, containing the reports of the spies of the police, on which he has based three volumes, called "Pariser Zustände, 1789-95." The history of the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris has been discussed by M. Campardon and M. Henri Wallon, and the revolutionary courts in the provinces by M. Berriat de Saint Prix. The question of the reforms in education and public instruction has been discussed by MM. Célestin Hippeau, Albert Duruy, Victor Pierre, Albert Babeau, and the Abbé Maggiolo. The finances of the Revolution have been treated by M. René Stourm, society, both under the Revolution and the Directory, by the brothers De Goncourt, the theatre and the almanacks of the Revolution by M. Welschinger, the prisons by M. Dauban, art by M. Renouvier, the constitutional clergy by M. Sciout, and the émigrés by M. Forneron and by M. André Lebon. Minuter subjects even have had important works written upon them, as, for instance, the history of the famous battalion of Marseillais, who entered Paris before August 10, by MM. Pollio and Marcel.

But it is not so much in books that specialists in the history of the Revolution exhibit the results of their inquiries

as in magazines and reviews. All the most important French magazines contain valuable articles every year upon the subject. In such work the *Revue des Deux Mondes* holds, of course, the pre-eminence, and only recently it had the honour of publishing M. Albert Sorel's important articles on Dumouriez. The *Revue historique*, *Revue critique*, *Revue des Questions historiques*, and *Contemporain* are not far behind it, and often contain valuable contributions on different revolutionary subjects. But naturally the two monthly magazines devoted solely to this history contain the most valuable articles of all, though they are edited from different standpoints. *La Révolution française* was started in July, 1880, to prepare the minds of the French people for the centenary of the Revolution in 1889, under the editorship of M. Auguste Dide and the management of a committee including the name of Henri Martin. It is written from a revolutionary point of view, its editor and contributors believe profoundly in the Revolution, and very much valuable work has been done by it, and very valuable articles published in it. The *Revue de la Révolution* was established to all appearances to combat the *Révolution française*. It is also published every month, under the editorship of MM. Charles d'Héricault and Gustave Bord, and is bitterly hostile to the Revolution. Yet the work it does in publishing documents is very great, and many most valuable documents and memoirs would probably never have seen the light but for its existence. It is not only, however, in the various monthly magazines, that articles appear upon the Revolution, but in three important Parisian newspapers a weekly article appears upon some subject connected with the history of the Revolution. In the *République française* a weekly article was some years ago started by Georges Avenel, whose place is now taken by M. Marcellin Pellet, the author of the "Curiosités révolution-

naires." A similar article is likewise published every week in the *République radicale* by M. Jean Bernard, and in the *Justice* by the brilliant writer who signs himself "Santonnax."

This rapid sketch of the special work lately done upon the Revolution in France will justify me, I hope, in undertaking a new history of the Revolution. But the fact that so much has been published which is unknown to English readers would not be sufficient excuse of itself, if I had not a yet stronger conviction that the history of this important period is imperfectly known in England. It is without doubt the most important period in modern history. Modern Europe is utterly different from the Europe of 1789, and the French Revolution marks the beginning of the change. Not only, however, are its results important, but its history is most dramatic. It is full of a living interest, as the history of a great people passing through a great crisis, and it is almost impossible to be impartial in treating it. I have tried consistently to treat the men, who played a part in it, as men, and neither to over-praise nor over-depreciate. It is hardly possible for a Frenchman, whose grandfather must have taken some part in it, to be impartial; it is possible for an Englishman to be so, and my hope is that in my endeavour not to write a partisan history I have not destroyed all the dramatic interest of the story. There is, however, a yet further reason. In the history of the great French Revolution, can be read great political lessons. It was not only a period of destruction, but a period of construction, and at a time when democracy is evidently going to have its say in English politics, it is useful to study the period of its development in France. Nearly every expedient, whether socialistic or purely democratic, which has been proposed of recent years for benefiting the condition of the people, was tried between 1789 and 1799, and, if history has any value at all, it is this period which ought to be examined

before any other, in order to learn the political lessons which it teaches.

Last of all, I must express a few words of thanks to all who have helped me in my work, and say that I hope the second volume, carrying the history down to the death of Robespierre, will be published in the summer, and the third volume, completing it down to the end of the Directory and the assumption of power by Bonaparte, next winter. To the third volume a complete index will be added. To my wife I owe my hearty thanks; and also to F. Clift, LL.D, as well as to my old schoolfellow, James Gay, of Thurning Hall, Norfolk, without whose aid this volume could not have been completed.

H. MORSE STEPHENS.

LONDON, 1886.

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PROLOGUE.

Distinction between the causes and the history of the French Revolution
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THE causes and the history of that great political and social movement which is universally known as the French Revolution form two distinct subjects. The historian has to describe the events as they occurred, and to try to account for the changing phases of the eventful period which elapsed between the first meeting of the States-General in May, 1789, and the seizure of supreme power by Napoleon Bonaparte in November, 1799. It is the task of the philosopher to analyze the causes. To do so it would be necessary to make a careful survey of the whole political history of France, in order to trace the growth of the centralizing process which concentrated all power in the hands of the king, and to examine the administration of the finances at different times, the false principles which determined the incidence of taxation, and the increase of the enormous deficit which directly led to the summons of the States-General. An investigation would also have to be made into the effect of the political and financial condition of the country upon the material well-being of all classes, and into the intellectual and moral state of every grade of society, from the gay courtier and wealthy farmer of the taxes down to the humblest artisan in the great cities, the poorest labourer,

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whether among the cornfields of Picardy and Artois, or the vineyards of Guienne and Burgundy, and to the very beggar upon the high-roads. This last inquiry would be the most difficult of all, for it would entail an estimate of the influence upon the minds of the people of the Jansenists and the Jesuits, of Rousseau and Voltaire, of the Encyclopædists and the Physiocrats, and also of the different systems of education pursued in the great colleges, both of the religious orders and of royal foundation, and even in the village schools. Interesting as the result of such an extended inquiry into the causes of the great Revolution in France would be, it lies outside the province of the present work. It would be necessary to go over the whole political, financial, and literary history of France in order to account satisfactorily for the causes of the events which are to be narrated, and in that case the introduction would be nearly as long as the narrative. Nevertheless, it is necessary to say a few words upon the occurrences which directly led to the convocation of the first States-General since 1614, and to examine carefully the elections to it, in order to see how the men who were first to touch the administrative, political, military, and religious edifice which had been erected by Richelieu and Louis XIV. were chosen, and what manner of men they were.

At the close of 1786, only three years before the king and queen became practically prisoners in the Tuileries, there was no immediate prospect of a revolution; the king was much despised, and the queen much hated and slandered by the courtiers, but to all outward appearance the monarchy was as powerful as it had ever been. The only weak point was the management of the finances; for, though the people were cruelly taxed, there was an estimated yearly deficit of over 125,000,000 livres. The controller-general of the finances, Charles Alexandre de Calonne, son of a president of the Parlement of Douai, and formerly a judge there himself, had obtained office through the influence of the Comte de Vergennes, the Foreign Minister, and had for three years managed to blind the court and the country to the state of the finances. His plan was to make a great show and to borrow money on the strength of it; and, in

pursuance of that plan, the queen had purchased the palace of Saint-Cloud, and the king Rambouillet, and the estates of the Prince de Rohan Guéménée and other impoverished noblemen, while Calonne had raised loans to the extent of 800,000,000 livres. But Calonne was too shrewd not to know that he could not go on borrowing for ever; and, after three years of lavish expenditure upon the noblesse of the court, he believed himself strong enough to advise the king to summon an assembly of the Notables of the kingdom, and to ask them to sanction the abolition of the privileges of the noblesse in matters of taxation, and the imposition of a general land tax upon all landed property alike.

On February 22, 1787, the Assembly of Notables met. It consisted of 144 members, divided into eight bureaux or committees, each presided over by a prince of the blood, and only contained eight or nine individuals who did not belong to the two privileged orders, the clergy and the noblesse. Before the Notables Calonne made a great display of reforming zeal; he proposed to them to sanction most of the great reforms which Turgot had formerly propounded, including representative assemblies in the provinces, the abolition of internal custom-houses, and above all, a general land tax. But the Notables were not to be deceived; the lavish distribution of money among the courtiers had no effect upon them; they unanimously demanded a statement of Calonne's accounts, and in one bureau, that presided over by the king's younger brother, the Comte d'Artois, the Marquis de Lafayette was heard to demand that the States-General, the old representative assembly of France, should be summoned. His demand passed almost unnoticed at the time, for the struggle against Calonne occupied all thoughts. The people of Paris, who disbelieved in Calonne's sincerity, vehemently applauded the action of the Notables, and it was with universal joy that the news of his dismissal, on April 17, was hailed all over the country. On May 3 his successor was appointed, and it was with some surprise that the Parisians heard that Mgr. Loménie de Brienne, the Archbishop of Toulouse, had been selected to fill Calonne's

place, on the recommendation of the Abbé Vermond, who had originally been sent to Vienna to teach the Archduchess Marie Antoinette French, and had had great influence with her ever since. The Notables consented to all Calonne's reforms, except the general land tax, when proposed by Loménie de Brienne, well knowing that their sanction could not have the force of law; and were dismissed on May 25, when Brienne was left to face his difficulties by himself. But before any new tax could be levied or any new law made, the royal edict had to be registered by the Parlement of Paris, and the new minister was aware that a struggle with this power was inevitable.

The Parlement of Paris dated from the fourteenth century, when the kings of France used to decide all political affairs with the advice of the Grand Council, and all financial matters in the "Chambre des Comptes," and consulted the Parlement of Paris, sitting in three chambers, the "Grand Chambre," the "Chambre des Enquêtes," and the "Chambre des Requêtes," before doing justice. By 1344 the Parlement had grown in numbers and power, and administered justice by itself under the sanction of the king, and it then consisted of three presidents and seventy-eight counsellors, of whom forty-four were ecclesiastics and thirty-four laymen. Louis XI., the politic king, made one great reform in the constitution of the Parlement of Paris on October 21, 1467, when he decreed that the counsellors should be irremovable, except by forfeiture for high treason, in order that he might get a better price for seats in the Parlement, which he always sold. This great change finally determined the history of the Parlement of Paris. It became a permanent body of resident counsellors in Paris, administering justice and registering new laws, while the States-General only met occasionally, when specially summoned by the king. Francis I., who had no affection for such an elected body as the States-General, favoured the growth of the power of the Parlement, and it was to the Parlement of Paris, and not to the States-General, that he applied when he desired to annul the Treaty of Madrid in 1527. Throughout the sixteenth century the Parlement of Paris increased in influence, and it even began

to venture to deliberate on the royal edicts, which were sent down to it to be registered before they became laws. The lawyers knew well and acknowledged that they could not refuse to register an edict, if the king came down in person and held a "lit de justice" and ordered them to do so, but at the same time they were well aware that, in such times of dissension as the end of the sixteenth century, the king would not like to incur their enmity by forcing them to register an edict of which they disapproved. Richelieu, however, disregarded them, and forced them to register whatever edict he pleased; and the disturbances of the Fronde, when they made their greatest pretensions, led to the destruction for a century of their claim to a right to deliberate on edicts laid before them, for Louis XIV. was far too imperious a monarch to permit any discussion of his measures. The Regent Orleans made use of the lawyers of the Parlement to upset the will of Louis XIV., and then again confined them most sensibly to their old functions of registration and administering justice, and Louis XV. continued his policy. When they interfered in the struggle between the Jansenists and the Jesuits, the king exiled them from Paris in 1753, though he consented to the suppression of their enemies the Jesuits in 1762; and in 1770, on the advice of Maupeou, he abolished the old Parlement altogether, and established the Parlement Maupeou. Louis XVI., on his accession to the throne, had recalled the former counsellors, and Loménie de Brienne was to find, in 1787 and 1788, that their spirit was as mutinous as ever, and that they would not be satisfied to merely register the royal edicts without discussing them, as they had done in the reign of Louis XIV. The Parlement of Paris was further strengthened in the country by the existence of provincial parlements in all the chief provinces, which, though they had no actual connection with the Parlement of Paris, yet invariably made common cause with it in all the struggles with royalty. These provincial parlements were twelve in number, and were stationed at Toulouse, Grenoble, Bordeaux, Dijon, Pau, Metz, Besançon, Douai, Rouen, Aix, Rennes, and Nancy.

To the Parlement of Paris Loménie de Brienne sent his edicts, one by one, to be registered. On June 17, 1787, the edict for internal free trade was registered, on June 22 that for the establishment of provincial assemblies, and on June 27 that permitting the redemption of the *corvée*, or right of exacting forced labour, by a money payment; and then there came a pause before the great struggle which the archbishop knew would follow the suggestion of the general land tax. On July 16 the Abbé Sabatier de Cabre, a clerical counsellor of the Parlement, rose and remarked that only the States-General could register a perpetual edict or grant a subsidy. The counsellors of the Parlement hardly knew what to make of this suggestion; all mention of the old representative assembly of France had been tacitly avoided for one hundred and seventy-three years, and they were afraid at first of the very idea. Nevertheless, after due consideration, the counsellors began to approve of the Abbé Sabatier's proposition. They did not believe for a moment that the king would consent to summon the States-General; but the suggestion of such a measure would make them popular and the king unpopular, and it would be a good excuse for refusing the hated land tax, which would affect their own incomes. On July 30, therefore, after a long debate, in which the Abbé Sabatier, Robert de Saint-Vincent, an old Jansenist who remembered the struggles of the former reign, Duval d'Esprémesnil, an ambitious supporter of the powers of the Parlement, Adrien Duport de Prélaville, and Fréteau de Saint-Just distinguished themselves, the Parlement of Paris refused to register two fresh edicts which had been sent down to it, for the establishment of the general land tax and of a new stamp tax, and demanded the convocation of the States-General. The news of this opposition was hailed with delight by the people of Paris, who now began to talk of nothing but the States-General; but the king promptly had the decrees registered in a "*lit de justice*" on August 6, and then exiled the whole Parlement to Troyes. The action of the Parlement was enthusiastically approved all over France; the "*Cour des Aides*" and the "*Cour des Comptes*" both ratified

its opposition, and the Court of the Châtelet and the provincial parlements protested against the action of the king.

The counsellors of the Parlement soon tired of life in Champagne and longed for the gay capital, and in September a compromise was arrived at. The Parlement registered an edict for the collection of two vingtièmes or twentieths, which were to be levied on all property alike, and were recalled on September 21. This could not do much to restore the balance between income and expenditure, and on November 19 Loménie de Brienne again came down to the Parlement with the king and all his court, and asked that the Parlement should register an edict for raising large loans for the next five years, and promised vaguely in the king's name that the States-General should be speedily summoned. The same leaders opposed the edict for the loans as the land tax, supported on this occasion by the Duke of Orleans, who was sitting as a duke and peer, and the king abruptly turned the sitting into a "lit de justice" and ordered the edict to be at once registered, which was done. The next day the Parlement protested, but the king tore out their protest, and declared that he would summon the States-General for July, 1792.

Loménie de Brienne had, however, no real desire to meet the States-General; he only wished for popularity and for time to prepare a new blow against the Parlement. This was no less than the entire suppression of the parlements all over France, and the establishment of a "Cour plénière," to consist of certain great nobles, officials, and lawyers named for life, who were to have the registering powers of the parlements, while in the various bailliages of France small law courts were to be appointed to administer justice. The States-General was to be summoned for January, 1791, and various reforms, based, like those of Calonne, on Turgot's suggestions, were to be propounded. That some great scheme was being prepared was well known, and when it was reported in the month of April that the royal printing-press at Versailles was working night and day under a guard of soldiers, consternation was general among the counsellors of the Parlement of Paris. The

chief leaders assembled daily at the house of Adrien Duport, and it was in his salon that a young counsellor, named Goëslard de Montsabert, read a copy of the complete scheme of Brienne, which had been thrown to him by a workman out of a window of the printing office, on the evening of May 2. On May 3 Goëslard read out the secret scheme to the Parlement, and on May 5 both he himself and D'Esprémesnil were arrested by a captain in the Gardes Françaises, the Marquis d'Agoult, and sent by lettres de cachet to the prisons of Mont St. Michel and the Chateau d'If. This exposure of his secret profoundly irritated Loménie de Brienne, who nevertheless persevered, and on May 8 the edicts for the suppression of the parlements and the establishment of the "Cour plénière" were registered in a "lit de justice."

The May edicts created a storm of opposition; the Parlements of Rennes, Rouen, Grenoble, and Bordeaux protested, on which the counsellors were exiled to their country estates, and the people of France began to show their affection for their parlements by riots and even by open insurrection. The only manner in which to appease their wrath was to make serious preparations for the summons of the States-General, and Loménie de Brienne, believing that it would approve of his abolition of the parlements, began to issue edicts, which indicated that the day of meeting was at hand.

CHAPTER I.

THE ELECTIONS TO THE STATES-GENERAL.

States-General summoned for May, 1789—Affairs in Dauphiné—Mounier—Historical pamphlets—The “Résultat du Conseil”—Political pamphlets—Affairs in Brittany and Franche Comté—The règlement of January 24—The primary assemblies—Process of election—Local disputes—Supplementary règlements—The noblesse—The clergy—The bishops—The monks and chapters—The curés—The elections of the clergy—Primary elections in villages and towns—The elections of the tiers état—Malouet—Other deputies of the tiers état—Election of Mirabeau—The elections in Paris—Bailly—Siéyès.

THE Marquis de Lafayette had, in the year 1787, recommended the convocation of the States-General as the only measure which could save France from immediate bankruptcy; but when Lafayette and afterwards the lawyers of the Parlement of Paris suggested that the old representative assembly of France should again be summoned after a lapse of 173 years, they little suspected that its meeting would bring about a great political revolution; and when the king promised to carry out the suggestion, he never conceived that he had sealed the fate of his dynasty. No one exactly knew what the States-General was, or how it was composed; but men of every class and of every shade of opinion at once agreed that it, and it alone, could save the country. The king believed that he would be able to shift the responsibility of the heavy burden of financial embarrassment on to the shoulders of others; Loménie de Brienne hoped for everlasting fame and a long tenure of office as the convener of the States-General; the lawyers of the Parlement of Paris thought that an

elected Assembly would as surely overthrow Brienne as the Notables had overthrown Calonne; and the mass of the people, both educated and uneducated, expected that they would at last have some voice in the spending of the taxes which they paid, and that those taxes would be modified, and levied equally on all classes alike.

Every one knew that the States-General was not to meet till 1791, yet every one at once began to discuss, in salon and in tavern, in books and in pamphlets, in what manner the States-General was to be elected, and what was to be the extent of its powers. Brienne's incapacity, and the independent spirit of the Parlement of Paris, became more and more visible, while the finances fell into greater and greater confusion, until the king, in despair, determined to hasten the day for the meeting of that assembly which was to cure all ills; and on August 8, 1788, the very same day on which the establishment of Brienne's "Cour plénière" was suspended by a royal edict, the States-General was summoned to meet at Versailles on May 1, 1789.

These decrees of the king, and the retirement of Brienne, which followed their promulgation, were not only due to general causes, but more especially to a movement in a corner of France, which was taking the shape of downright rebellion, and might soon be imitated in other provinces. The events of 1788 in Dauphiné had an influence on the elections to the States-General which it is impossible to overestimate. But for the movement there, the problems offered by the new idea of election in France might have been differently solved, and the great part of the nation, which longed for political, social, and financial reforms, would have been left without organization. The assembly of Dauphiné became the court of appeal in every electoral difficulty; its liberal noblesse encouraged, with precept and example, the liberal noblesse of other provinces; its curés warned the curés of all France against electing dignitaries of the Church, and thus determined the character of the Estate of the clergy; the burghers of Grenoble dissuaded those of other towns from attempting to

form a distinct order; the entire assembly warned the provinces to think of the interests of France before the interests of locality; and its secretary, Jean Joseph Mounier, became the most influential man in France, and the recognized leader of the tiers état throughout the country. The disturbances in Dauphiné arose primarily because the lawyers of the Parlement of Grenoble had been ordered into exile on their country estates for protesting against Brienne's May edicts, and began with an informal assembly of the notables of Dauphiné, who, by the pen of Mounier, their secretary, demanded the return of their Parlement, and the convocation of their provincial Estates, and threatened that, if not immediately summoned, the provincial Estates would meet without royal letters of convocation. The threat was carried out, and on July 21, an irregular assembly of 397 deputies of Dauphiné, 49 of whom were representatives of the clergy, 160 of the noblesse, and 188 of the tiers état, met at the château of Vizille, the residence and cotton factory of a wealthy bourgeois of Grenoble, named Claude Perier, the father of the celebrated statesman, Casimir Perier.¹ The assembly constituted itself without any interference from the Maréchal de Vaux, who commanded the forces in the province, elected Mounier its secretary, demanded the immediate summons of the States-General, and adjourned. This was simply an act of rebellion, and as such Brienne desired to treat it. He prepared to send more troops down to Dauphiné, and issued a lettre de cachet against Mounier, the heart and soul of the whole movement. But the king shrank from such extreme measures; he saw clearly that any attempt to crush the movement by force would drive, not only Dauphiné, but also the neighbouring province of Provence, to arms, and it was on account of these disturbances that he suspended the operation of Brienne's May edicts, and accepted the resignation of Brienne himself. The astute archbishop took care to be well rewarded, and received an enormous pension and his nomination to the cardinalate; but he never forgot his abrupt

¹ *Histoire du Dauphiné*, by Jules Taulier, p. 293. Grenoble : 1855.

dismissal, and his subsequent conduct proved alike his own incapacity and his desire for revenge. The king then decided to follow his own impulses, and once more appointed Necker his minister, on August 27, with full powers to treat the assembly at Vizille in whatever way he liked, so long as he avoided civil war. Necker tried to save the royal honour by issuing royal letters of convocation for a new assembly in Dauphiné; but the device failed, and in the new assembly, which met at Romans on September 10, the same deputies appeared who had been present at Vizille, and at once re-elected Mounier to be their secretary. The victory was obvious to all France, and it was no wonder that, in their own electoral difficulties, the other provinces turned for advice to Dauphiné, to Grenoble, and to Mounier.

Jean Joseph Mounier,¹ who had practically overthrown Brienne, and headed a successful and at the same time a bloodless revolution, was born at Grenoble, in 1758. His father was only a small shopkeeper, but was sufficiently prosperous to send his son to the Collège Royal Dauphin, and, when his abilities became manifest, to the University of Orange, where he took the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1776. In 1779 he was admitted an advocate at Grenoble, and in 1783 purchased the office of juge royal, one of the two criminal judgeships of his province. Having then comparative leisure, Mounier began to examine the science of politics, and learnt English in order to study English institutions, of which he became a profound admirer. The influence of English institutions upon the chief leaders of the French Revolution was extremely varied. Every Frenchman who had been in England brought away different impressions, according to the medium through which the English constitution had appeared to him. Marat, who had been mixed up with the popular societies, saw with their eyes the evils of the unreformed House of Commons, the

¹ *Notice historique sur Jean Joseph Mounier*, printed in the edition of his *Essai sur l'influence attribuée aux philosophes, aux franc-maçons et aux illuminés sur la Révolution française*, published at Paris in 1822.

immense influence of the Crown from its wealth and the bestowal of honours, and the rapacity of the great families; Mirabeau, who had been intimate with the Marquis of Lansdowne and others of the new Whigs, saw with them the power of expansion which makes the English constitution so admirable; Lally-Tollendal admired it with the admiration of his friend Burke; and the Duke of Orleans perceived that politics did not at all trouble his friend, the Prince of Wales, and concluded that the English constitution must be very liberal to debauchee and pleasure-loving princes.

Mounier, however, had had no such practical experience of its workings, and regarded English institutions as theoretically good in themselves. He had carefully studied Blackstone and De Lolme, and looked upon the English constitution as a whole, without understanding that it had been the growth of centuries of compromise, and that it was in many points both more practical and less logical than his authorities stated.

Confiding in his knowledge of political theories, Mounier had boldly taken the lead both at Vizille and at Romans, and had won the greatest political reputation in France; but the vanity of the man, and the incurable narrowness which always distinguishes a theoretical politician, prevented him from becoming a leader at Versailles. The part he played there was important for a few months, but he soon resigned his seat in disgust, when he saw himself surpassed, not only by deputies from other provinces, but also by a pupil of his own, who had begun his political career under his own auspices at this very period in Dauphiné—a young, enthusiastic, and eloquent advocate of Grenoble, Antoine Pierre Joseph Marie Barnave.

Mounier had overthrown Brienne, and it was left to Necker to make preparations for the elections to the forthcoming States-General. On July 5, 1788, the king had issued a decree, ordering all corporations and public bodies to examine their archives, and to send up to him any information as to the previous meetings of the States-General which they could procure. He also appealed to learned individuals,

and more especially to the members of the Academy of Inscriptions, to help him. This appeal produced a flood of historical treatises¹ and pamphlets throughout the autumn months of 1788, of which the most remarkable were the "*Recueil des États-Généraux*," in eighteen volumes; the "*Recueil des pièces historiques sur la Convocation des États-Généraux*," by the Comte de Lauraguais; "*Observations sur la forme des États de 1614*," by the Abbé Morellet; "*Essai sur la formation des Assemblées Nationales*," by Servan; and "*L'histoire, le cérémonial et les droits des États-Généraux*," by the Duc de Luynes. The very titles of these works show by themselves the nature of these historical investigations, which clearly proved that every former States-General had more or less differed from its predecessors, and that the old rules and customs were utterly inapplicable. It soon became obvious that new methods of election must be invented, and that two great political problems must be solved—whether the tiers état should have double representation, that is, be represented by as many deputies as both the other Estates, the noblesse and the clergy, put together; and whether in the States-General the votes should be taken "*par ordre*" or "*par tête*"—that is, whether all the deputies of the three Estates should sit in one chamber and vote together, or the deputies of each Estate should sit in a separate chamber, when the majority in two Estates could overrule the majority in the third. To propose a solution of these difficulties the Notables of 1787 were again summoned in November, 1788; but they did not do much to assist the king, and the majority among them showed conclusively that they regarded the coming States-General as affording a favourable opportunity for consolidating the privileges of the noblesse and the clergy.

All men now looked to Necker as the arbiter of the situation, and his want of ability as a statesman appears clearly in his "*Rapport au Roi*," or "*Report to the King*,"

¹ For a list, see *Le Génie de la Révolution*, by C. L. Chassin, vol. i.; *Les Elections de 1789*. Paris: 1863.

which was printed as a supplement to the "*Résultat du Conseil*," published on December 27, 1788. In this report Necker dwelt on three points. Firstly, he declared that it would be simply absurd, although the Notables had recommended it, to copy the old States-Generals exactly, and to ordain that every royal bailliage and sénéchaussée should return the same number of deputies, because at that rate the great bailliage of Poitou with 694,000 inhabitants, and that of Vermandois with 774,000, would only have the same number of representatives as the little bailliages of Gex and Dourdan with but 13,000 and 7800 respectively. He next treated the question of the double representation of the tiers état, and in spite of historical traditions, the advice of the princes of the blood and of the majority of the Notables, and the example of the provincial estates of Brittany, Burgundy, and Artois, he preferred to follow the example of Languedoc, Provence, Hainault, and the new assembly in Dauphiné, and, in compliance with innumerable petitions from the whole kingdom, recommended that the tiers état should have as many representatives as the other two orders put together. Finally, he was of opinion that the different orders need not necessarily elect members of their own order—a provision which he thought was necessary, to enable the tiers état to elect members of the liberal clergy and noblesse among their deputies. On this report was based the "*Résultat du Conseil*," which decreed that the coming States-General should consist of a thousand deputies, elected in proportion to their population by the different royal bailliages and sénéchaussées, in two hundred and fifty deputations of four deputies each, namely, one for the order of the noblesse, one for the clergy, and two for the tiers état. No party was satisfied with Necker's decision, for not a word was said as to whether voting was to be "*par ordre*" or "*par tête*." The privileged orders regarded vote "*par ordre*" as the real key-stone of the difficulty, and the tiers état perceived that their double representation was of no use, if their deputies were merely to form one of three chambers with equal powers.

The publication of the "*Résultat du Conseil*" altered the current of electoral literature. Historical disquisitions were no longer needed, and place was given to a flood of pamphlets of a more abstract and, at the same time, of a more revolutionary character. Of these new pamphlets the most successful were "*Les États-Généraux*," by Target, who on Gerbier's death had become the leader of the Paris bar; "*Des conditions nécessaires à légalité des États-Généraux*," by Volney; "*De la députation aux États-Généraux*," by Rœderer; "*Considérations, recherches et observations*," by Carra; "*De la France et des États Unis*," by Brissot de Warville, a veteran pamphleteer, and Clavière, a Genevese exile; "*Vues générales sur la constitution française*," by Cerutti, an ex-Jesuit; and "*Qu'est-ce que le Tiers État ?*" by the Abbé Siéyès. These pamphlets, amongst hundreds of others published at Paris, had an immense circulation all over France, and contained the most revolutionary proposals with regard to the privileged orders, if they refused to acquiesce in the vote "*par tête*." Still more curious and interesting are the pamphlets which issued from the little printing-presses in every important provincial town, not only from their contents, but because many of those leaders, whose names were afterwards famous throughout the length and breadth of France, won their local reputations as pamphleteers. To mention but a few of the more famous names, Rabaut de Saint-Etienne and Larevellière-Lepaux, Lanjuinais and Boissy d'Anglas, Pétion and Robespierre, issued their little pamphlets for local circulation only at the provincial printing-presses of Nîmes and Angers, Rennes and Annonay, Chartres and Arras. The publication of the "*Résultat du Conseil*" had concentrated public discussion on the great question of vote "*par ordre*" or vote "*par tête*;" innumerable pamphlets dwelt upon it, and the course of events in different provinces ought to have taught Necker that it was necessary to decide this question at once.

Dauphiné immediately proceeded with its elections without awaiting further instructions from Versailles. In its assembly at Romans, on January 2, 1789, the ten leading liberal

noblemen were elected deputies for the noblesse of the province; the popular and liberal-minded Archbishop of Vienne was elected for the clergy, while the other clerical elections were referred to the diocesan bureau, which elected four abbés; and fifteen deputies were elected for the tiers état, including Mounier, who was chosen by acclamation, Pison du Galand, Charles Chabroud, and Barnave.¹

But although everything passed harmoniously in the newly organized assembly of Dauphiné, very different news came from Brittany and Franche Comté. Brittany was at this time one of the most populous and wealthy provinces in France. Though its rural districts were badly cultivated, it abounded in rich and prosperous cities. Nantes, according to Arthur Young, was a wealthy and intelligent provincial city which took an enlightened interest in politics, and possessed many fine public buildings; Rennes was the seat of government, and boasted of a particularly famous law university; Brest, Lorient, Saint Malo, and Quimper were all considerable ports. The Bretons were peculiarly tenacious of their provincial customs, and extremely proud of the self-government guaranteed to them at the marriage of Louis XII. with Anne of Brittany. The Estates of Brittany² had always adhered to their ancient constitution, and sate in three distinct chambers. The Estate of the noblesse included every man of noble birth who was eighteen years of age, and formed an unwieldy and unruly chamber³ of some thirteen hundred members, many of whom had no wealth, but their ancient descent. The chamber of the clergy consisted of the highest dignitaries of the province, and that of the tiers état of a few merchants and lawyers elected by the corporations of certain important towns. The Estates were held in great

¹ Taulier's *Histoire du Dauphiné*, p. 298.

² *Les États de Bretagne et l'administration de cette province jusqu'en 1789*, by the Comte de Carné, 2 vols., Paris, 1868, originally published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* during 1867.

³ For the character and the turbulence of the Breton Estate of the noblesse, see Chateaubriand, *Mémoires d'outre Tombe*, vol. ii., who describes the session of 1788, at which he was present.

respect by the whole population, and they had increased their popularity by their bold and almost rebellious demand for the convocation of the States-General in 1788. But when the news of the "Résultat du Conseil" reached the province, the Estates found that a new spirit had grown up among the people. When they heard that Brittany, like the other semi-independent provinces of France, was to be split up into bailliages for electoral purposes, and that its deputies were not to be elected, as in former times, by the provincial Estates, the Estates appealed, as did the Parlement of Rennes, to their ancient customs, and declared that the Estates of Brittany alone could elect representatives for Brittany to a States-General. At these protests a cry of disgust was raised throughout the province. The educated Bretons of the tiers état, and especially of the great city of Nantes, had imbibed the spirit of Dauphiné, and they on their side publicly declared, in numerous meetings and in pamphlets, that they would never submit to be represented in the great Assembly, which was to do so much for France, through the antiquated machinery upheld by the Estates. The Estates and the Parlement, instead of being beloved, were now hated, and daily riots took place in the streets of Rennes.¹ Foremost among the opponents of the Estates were the law students of the university, who banded together, and had violent battles in the streets with the young nobles and their retainers, and eventually besieged them for two days, January 26 and 27, in the Convent of the Cordeliers. These students were commanded by a young man, who was afterwards to be one of the greatest generals France ever produced, and yet to die in arms against her—Jean Victor Moreau. He had been for many years a law student, but though quite competent to take his degree and settle down in practice, he pre-

¹ *Les Origines de la Révolution en Bretagne*, by Barthélemy Pocquet, Paris, 1885; *Histoire de la Révolution dans les Départements de l'Ancienne Bretagne*, by A. R. Du Chatellier, Paris and Nantes, 1836, vol. i.; *La Bretagne Moderne*, by Pitre Chevalier, Paris, 1860, chapter v.; and Carné's *Les États de Bretagne*, vol. ii. chapter x.

ferred, like Gambetta in later times, to live among the students, and air his political theories in their societies and debating clubs. To help the law students of Rennes marched the young men of Nantes,¹ and the students of Angers,² encouraged by their mothers and wives and fiancées,³ prepared to follow their example, so that civil war seemed imminent when the final règlement for the elections reached Brittany, and shortly afterwards the advice of the leaders in Dauphiné. The tiers état of Brittany determined to follow this advice, and to elect their deputies, as the règlement directed, without further dispute; while the Breton curés also followed the advice of their brothers of Dauphiné,⁴ and, disregarding the absence of their bishops, met together and elected curés alone to the States-General. Meanwhile the noblesse and the clerical dignitaries of Brittany held to their ancient customs, and since they were not allowed to elect their deputies in the provincial Estates, none of their representatives ever appeared at Versailles.

If the course of events in Dauphiné and Brittany had not taught Necker the power of the tiers état and their determination not to be controlled by the privileged orders, he might have learned the lesson from what happened in Franche Comté,⁵ where the coming struggle at Versailles was exactly foreshadowed. In exceedingly bold language, by the mouth of the Président de Vezet, Marquis de Grosbois,⁶ the Parlement of Besançon had demanded the convocation of the ancient

¹ *La Commune et la Milice de Nantes*, by Camille Mellinet, vol. vi. pp. 7-21. Nantes : 1841.

² For the excitement in Angers and the preparations of the students, see *Mouvement Provincial en 1789 et Biographie des Députés de l'Anjou*, by M. Bougler, vol. i. pp. 105-121.

³ See their declaration in British Museum, F. 420 (2.); and in Dougler's *Mouvement Provincial en 1789*, vol. i. p. 120.

⁴ *Le Génie de la Révolution*, by C. L. Chassin, vol. ii. ; *Les Cahiers des Curés*. Paris : 1882.

⁵ *Histoire Parlementaire de la Révolution Française*, by Buchez and Roux, vol. i. pp. 285-287.

⁶ *Le Président de Vezet*, by L. Pingaud, in the *Revue Historique* for November, 1882.

provincial Estates of Franche Comté, and also of the States-General, in 1788. To this demand Necker had assented, and the Estates of Franche Comté met in November, 1788, at Besançon, and assembled in three chambers. A struggle at once arose on the burning question. The tiers état demanded vote "par tête," the noblesse assumed the legality of the vote "par ordre," and the Estate of the clergy was divided. Eventually the chamber of the clergy refused to act, the curés siding with the tiers état, and the dignitaries with the noblesse, and the Estates broke up in confusion. Riots became common in the streets of Besançon, and the nobles were hooted and assaulted. On the arrival of the règlement for the elections to the States-General, the Parlement of Besançon protested, like the Parlement of Rennes, that the right of election was vested in the provincial Estates, and the houses of its leaders were sacked by the populace.

This règlement,¹ which met with such strong opposition, was the necessary complement of the "Résultat du Conseil," and made elaborate regulations for the procedure of the elections. It was issued on January 24, 1789, and concerned only that part of France known as the "pays d'élection." It treated the obsolete administrative divisions of France, known as royal bailliages in the north and royal sénéchaussées in the south, as units for electoral purposes, and by subsequent règlements the semi-independent provinces, or "pays d'état," such as Brittany, Languedoc, and Burgundy, were split up into corresponding divisions. The règlement of January 24 for the "pays d'élection" was the model for the others; by it the grand bailli or grand sénéchal in every royal bailliage or royal sénéchaussée was directed to convoke all the noblemen of his division in person or by proxy; all the dignitaries of the Church and beneficed clergy, with delegates from every chapter, monastery, and convent; and all the electors of the tiers état,

¹ For the règlement and the whole question of the elections of 1789, the great authority is *Le Génie de la Révolution*, by C. L. Chassin, vol. i.; *Les Elections de 1789*, Paris, 1863, in which the whole period is thoroughly and completely treated.

who had been previously elected in every village and town; to meet at the cathedral or chief church of the principal city of the division on a stated day. Notice of this day of meeting was to be sent round to every nobleman and clerical dignitary at his own expense, while the proclamation of the règlement with this notice attached, and the fixing of a copy on the door of every parish church, was to be of itself a sufficient warrant for the attendance of the inferior clergy, and for the holding of the primary assemblies in every town and country village.

These primary assemblies were differently composed in the towns and country villages, owing to the fact that in the towns the guilds and corporations of the various trades and professions were recognized as electoral bodies as well as the body of the tax-paying inhabitants. The guilds of *arts et métiers*, such as the butchers and bakers, weavers and dyers, were to elect one elector, if less than one hundred persons were present at the primary assembly, two for between one hundred and two hundred, and upwards in the same proportion; while the corporations of *arts libéraux*, such as the physicians and notaries, as well as the tax-paying inhabitants of every parish, assembled in the parish church, were to elect two electors if less than one hundred persons were present, four for between one hundred and two hundred, and upwards. Each of these primary assemblies of guilds, corporations, and tax-paying inhabitants was to draw up a cahier, or petition of grievances, containing complaints of grievances and recommendations for reform. Many of these special cahiers were very elaborately drawn up, notably those of the grocers,¹ stocking-makers,² and wholesale merchants in beer and cider³ of Rouen, and that

¹ *Cahier des Épiciers de la Ville de Rouen*, 1789, 42 pp., numbered in British Museum, F.R. 40. (3.)

² *Articles arrêtés par les maîtres et agrégés de la communauté des marchands fabricants de Bas de la ville, fauxbourg et banlieue de Rouen pour servir d'instruction aux deux Députés qui doivent la représenter à l'Assemblée du Tiers État*. B.M.—F.R. 31. (23.)

³ *Cahier de la Communauté des Marchands privilégiés en gros de Cidre et Bière de la Ville de Rouen*, 34 pp. B.M.—F.R. 40. (2.)

of the College of Physicians at Chartres¹; and it is worthy of remark that many of those local politicians, who had made a local reputation by their pamphlets in the previous months, employed themselves in drawing up these special cahiers, and that, for instance, Robespierre² drew up the cahier of the *cordonniers mineurs*, or cobblers, of Arras. The successful candidates at these primary assemblies formed the assembly of the tiers état of the town, which, after discussing the special cahiers, drew up the cahier of the town, and then elected as many electors to the preliminary assembly of the tiers état of the bailliage as had been prescribed by the règlement. In the rural parishes the process was a little more simple. All taxpayers, even the unemancipated serfs of the abbey of Sainte-Claude on Mount Jura,³ were to assemble in the village church, and, after drawing up their cahier of complaints and grievances, were to elect two electors, if the village contained less than one hundred houses, three for between one hundred and two hundred, and four between two hundred and three hundred houses. As might be expected, the village cahier was practically drawn up by the most educated man in the parish, generally the village priest, the village lawyer, or the village doctor. Some of these village cahiers were printed at the time, when the compiler was proud of his handiwork and wished to publish his ideas of reform; such as the cahier of Chevannes,⁴ which was drawn up by Dupont de Nemours, the political economist, of Coustretort,⁵ which elected two avocats of Chartres, of Saint-Germain-en-Laye,⁶ Clamart-sous-Meudon,⁷ and Villiers-le-Bel.⁸ Most of them are really political pamphlets, and are too full of general schemes of reform to be interesting; but only a very small proportion were thus printed, and the remainder, which contain only

¹ *Cahier du Collège des Médecins de Chartres*. B.M.—F.R. 26. (1.)

² *La Jeunesse de Robespierre et la Convocation des États-Généraux en Artois*, by Auguste Joseph Paris. Arras: 1870. M. Paris, who discovered this cahier, has given a curious facsimile of it in his valuable book.

³ *L'Église et les Demiers Serfs*, by C. L. Chassin. Paris: 1880.

⁴ B.M.—F.R. 26. (10.), 78 pp.

⁵ B.M.—F.R. 26. (21.)

⁶ B.M.—F.R. 39. (15) ⁷ B.M.—F.R. 26. (12.) ⁸ B.M.—F.R. 40. (12.)

a simple statement of the village grievances, and give a very vivid picture of village life under the old régime, are in many cases still preserved in the archives of the chief city of the bailliage, and are occasionally printed in local histories. The electors from the towns and villages formed the preliminary assembly of the tiers état of the bailliage or sénéchaussée, which met in the appointed city, and there reduced themselves to one-fourth of their number, who were then recognized as the electors of the deputies of the tiers état to the States-General.

On the appointed day the noblesse, summoned in person, the beneficed clergy, with representatives of the monasteries, convents, and chapters, and the electors of the tiers état, all assembled in the cathedral or chief church of the principal city of the bailliage or sénéchaussée and heard mass. After mass the grand bailli d'épée or grand sénéchal solemnly asked those present whether they would remain united and draw up their cahier and elect their deputies together, or separate into three assemblies, according to their orders. With the three important exceptions of Langres,¹ Péronne,² and Montfort l'Amaury,³ the orders always decided to separate, and the noblesse, clergy, and electors of the tiers état departed to different places, generally to the governor's house, the bishop's palace, and the town hall, where, under the presidency of the grand bailli or grand sénéchal, the bishop, and the lieutenant-general of the bailliage, the separate cahiers were drawn up, and the deputies elected. When this was done the general assembly of the three orders once more met in the cathedral, where, after hearing mass and long speeches from the bishop and grand bailli, the elected deputies swore before their con-

¹ *Procès-verbal de l'Assemblée de l'Ordre de la Noblesse du Bailliage de Langres*, 34 pp. B.M.—F.R. 29. (10.)

² *Procès-verbal de l'Assemblée de l'Ordre de la Noblesse du Gouvernement de Péronne, Montdidier et Roye*. B.M.—F.R. 32. (21.); and *La Révolution à Péronne*, by Gustave Ramon, which contains the cahiers of the bailliage.

³ *Cahier des Trois Ordres réunies des Bailliages de Montfort l'Amaury et de Dreux*. B.M.—F.R. 30. (26.)

stituents to bring the complaints and suggestions, contained in the cahiers entrusted to them, before the States-General, and to obey the directions to themselves, or *mandats*, implicitly. This system of election was entirely satisfactory so far as concerned the privileged orders, which could elect directly, but the extreme elaboration and complexity prescribed for the elections of the tiers état, which was intended to secure fair representation, was only puzzling and calculated to promote intrigues. These arrangements, too, were often further complicated by the existence, especially in Lorraine, of numerous secondary or subordinate royal bailliages;¹ for the same elaborate process was adopted for the election of deputations to the principal bailliage as to the States-General itself.

The local excitement caused by the règlement in every district was immense. The idea of the election was a new one in the "pays d'élection," where there had been no elections since the States-General of 1614, and most individuals thought more of their cities, districts, and provinces than of their country. The first result of the publication of the règlement was, therefore, an outburst of local jealousies. The bailliage of Aunis claimed to be independent of Saintonge;² the royal bailliage of Nivernais³ asserted that it included the ducal bailliage, and the old quarrel between Upper and Lower Auvergne⁴ again broke out. Similar rivalry appeared between the cities of Riom and Clermont-Ferrand,⁵

¹ Lorraine contained no less than thirty-four royal bailliages, which were grouped for electoral purposes into the four principal bailliages of Nancy, Mirecourt, Sarreguemines, and Bar-le-Duc.

² *Histoire de La Rochelle*, by M. Dupont, p. 549, La Rochelle, 1830; *Histoire des Rochelais*, by L. Delayant, vol. ii. p. 194. La Rochelle: 1870.

³ *Convocation des États-Généraux et Législation Électorale de 1789; Cahiers, procès-verbaux, etc., du Nivernois et Donzinois*, by A. Labot, pp. 205-228. Paris: 1866.

⁴ Consult the various works of Francisque Mège, the distinguished local historian of Auvergne, published as *Chroniques et Récits de la Révolution dans la ci-devant Basse-Auvergne, Département du Puy de Dôme*.

⁵ *Mémoires de Malouet publiés par son petit-fils, le baron de Malouet*, 2nd ed., vol. i. ch. ix. Paris: 1874.

each claiming to be the capital of the bailliage of Lower Auvergne; and between the towns of Clermont-en-Argonne and Varennes¹; Chateauneuf-en-Thimerais² asserted that it was a royal bailliage, and not dependent on Chartres; and Metz raised such murmurs about its being an imperial city, like Strasbourg and Valenciennes, and about its being swamped by country voters in the general assembly of the bailliage, that it obtained an additional deputy to the tiers état for itself.³

(The whole question of the separate representation of cities was raised, and might have resulted in the establishment of a fourth Estate, had not the burgesses of Grenoble, in answer to an application from the municipal authorities of Montauban, Clermont-Ferrand, Châlons, Orleans, Tours, Besançon, Dunkirk, and Saint Quentin, and the Chambers of Commerce of Picardy, Saint Malo, and Lille, advised most solemnly and earnestly against any attempt to weaken the harmony of the tiers état.⁴ As it was, the cities were hardly adequately represented, although many of them had a very large number of electors assigned to them in the electoral assemblies of their bailliages, From the number of these electors the comparative size and importance of the different provincial cities in France, in 1789, may be estimated. Lyons was allowed 150 electors in the electoral assembly of its bailliage; Bordeaux and Marseilles, each 90; Rouen, 80; Nantes and Toulouse, 50; Toulon, 40; Amiens, Lille, Orleans, and Versailles, 36; and Aix, Angers, Brest, Caen, Clermont-Ferrand, Nîmes, and Rheims, 30. Paris, as the capital, was ordered to elect 10 deputations—that is, 40 deputies of the three orders—directly to the States-General. Strasbourg, the ten imperial cities of Alsace, and Valenciennes each returned two deputies of the tiers état; and Metz, by its importunity, obtained a deputy to itself in March, 1789.

¹ Supplementary règlement of March 15, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 26. (13.)

² For its request, see B.M.—F.R. 26. (5.), which is granted by a supplementary règlement of February 19, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 25. (35.)

³ The request of Metz was granted for these two reasons by a supplementary règlement, dated April 6, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 30. (17.)

⁴ B.M.—F.R. 29. (2.)

These quarrels between city and city and bailliage and bailliage, together with the discovery of mistakes in the first règlement, owing to the novelty of the idea of election and ignorance of the comparative population of different bailliaiges, caused the Government to issue a great number of supplementary règlements for special cases during the spring of 1789. More important than these supplementary règlements were those regulating the elections in the "pays d'état," which had not been included in the règlement of January 24, and which granted twenty-two deputations to Brittany,¹ twenty to Languedoc,² sixteen to Burgundy,³ eleven to Provence,⁴ nine to Lorraine,⁵ seven to Franche Comté,⁶ and six to Dauphiné⁷ and to Alsace.⁸ Other supplementary règlements greatly increased the total number of deputies at the States-General, for Maine was granted five deputations instead of four,⁹ Nîmes¹⁰ and Paris extra muros,¹¹ or without the walls, four instead of three, Saint-Flour¹² three instead of two, and the duchy of Albret¹³ and the Angoumois¹⁴ two instead of one; while Chateaufort-en-Thimerais¹⁵ was granted a separate deputation from Chartres, and the eight deputations originally granted to the Vermandois were increased to nine, and redistributed among the four principal bailliaiges of Rheims, Laon, Troyes, and Vitry-le-Français.¹⁶ The inhabitants of the pays de Soule were allowed a separate deputation,¹⁷ because the little kingdom of Navarre had refused to be treated as a bailliage and elect deputies; and the Basques,¹⁸ who had unanimously declined to obey the summons of the grand

¹ March 16, 1789. B.M. 28 d. 2. (6.) ² February 7, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 29. (17.) ³ February 7, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 25 (19.) ⁴ March 2, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 38. (6.) ⁵ February 7, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 29. (35.) ⁶ February 19, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 27. (8.) ⁷ April 7, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 28. (18.) ⁸ February 7, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 22. (5.) ⁹ March 15, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 30. (1.) ¹⁰ March 8, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 28 d. 1. (23.) ¹¹ May 2, 1789. B.M. 28 d. 1. (32.) ¹² February 15, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 22. (21.) ¹³ B.M.—F.R. 22. (2.) ¹⁴ B.M.—F.R. 22. (6.) ¹⁵ February 19, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 25. (35.) ¹⁶ March 2, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 29. (5.) ¹⁷ February 19, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 34. (27.) ¹⁸ March 28, 1789. B.M.—F.R. 22. (34.)

sénéchal of Bayonne, were similarly gratified. The inhabitants of the Quatre Vallées were also allowed a special deputy to the tiers état,¹ because the sénéchaussée of Auch had refused to receive their cahier, and since the people of Couserans had not been able to get to the electoral assembly of Comminges on the appointed day, they were granted a unique deputation of three members, consisting of one deputy of each order.² Sometimes the Government seemed to act very capriciously, for the utterly irregular elections in Dauphiné were not quashed, while those at Orleans³ and Senlis⁴ were declared illegal, because the electors had not been reduced to one-fourth before the opening of the general assembly of the three orders. Further difficulties were caused by the obsolete characteristics of the bailliages. The offices of grand bailli d'épée and grand sénéchal were often hereditary, and conferred so little authority or prestige, that many of these functionaries had never assumed their office; and, for instance, it was not until January, 1789, when he was eighty-five years of age and had been grand bailli for more than forty years, that the Comte de Mesgrigny-Villebertain was sworn in as grand bailli d'épée of the bailliage of Troyes.⁵ In many provinces there were no grand baillis, and the king had to supply their place by others; thus, the Governors of Artois and the Cambrésis, the Commander-in-chief in Corsica, and the Captain-General of Roussillon were appointed to act in their respective provinces, and in Alsace three noblemen, the Baron d'Andlau, the Prince de Broglie, and the Baron de Schwembourg d'Heilishheim, were specially nominated. A last curious electoral question was the question of suppléants. For some reason the various electoral assemblies, with some few exceptions, had, after electing their deputies, elected certain *députés suppléants*, who were to supply the place of the original deputies in case of accident.

¹ May 2, 1789. B.M. 28 d. 1. (33.) ² April 26, 1789. 28 d. 1. (49.)

³ March 12, 1789. 28 d. 1. (28.) ⁴ March 8, 1789. B.M. 28 d. 1. (24.)

⁵ *Troyes pendant la Révolution*, by Albert Babeau, vol. i. p. 107. Paris: 1873.

This was probably due to the desire of every man to be mixed up in the States-General in some way or another, if not as a deputy, as a deputy *suppléant*, or even as an elector. On May 3, by a special decree, the election of deputies *suppléants* was recognized, and they were ordered to replace the deputies of their bailliage in case of death, illness, resignation, or absence from the realm. There can be no doubt that the system of *suppléants* was a bad one, for it prevented the Government from taking advantage of a vacancy in the representative body to test the opinion of the country by a fresh election in a particular district or city.

It is very interesting to examine the behaviour of the three orders during the electoral period; for the reactionary tendencies of the majority of the noblesse, and the sympathy of the higher clergy with them, the unselfish policy and generous ideas of the minority of the noblesse, the leaning of the inferior clergy towards the people, and the mixture of shrewdness and selfishness, fear and over-expectation of the bourgeois and peasants, appear as clearly in the various accounts of the elections all over France as in their cahiers.

The noblesse of France was in 1789 far less of a caste than has been popularly believed, for nobility could always be obtained by the purchase of an estate, bearing a title of nobility with it, or by holding one of the innumerable offices under the Crown for a sufficiently long time, and the descendants of such new noblemen became noble in blood in the fourth generation, if they had not in the meantime "derogated" by engaging in trade. Nevertheless, between the old seigneurs, or noblesse of the sword, and this new noblesse, which had won its nobility by administrative, judicial, or municipal office, or by money, the line was clearly drawn; and it is noteworthy that the former were extremely liberal in their ideas, like Montmorency, La Rochefoucauld, and Lafayette, while the latter were most tenacious of their newly got privileges. Further, it may be noticed that but few of the noblesse had titles in the English meaning of the word, though they showed their nobility by assuming the

name of one of their estates with *de* before it instead of their patronymic; thus, for instance, out of the eighty-four noblemen who met at the electoral assembly of Troyes, only fourteen bore the title of duc, marquis, comte, vicomte, baron, or chevalier.¹ The system of proxies in the elections to the States-General, which not only allowed the great lords and princes of the blood to send their representatives to the assemblies of every bailliage in which they possessed property, but also provided for the representation of minors and noble ladies, seemed to indicate that the Estate of the noblesse at Versailles was to represent landed property held by noble tenure. Yet, on the other hand, any nobleman of proved nobility, if of sufficient age, was permitted to vote in person or by proxy, and thus the Duke of Richmond, though an Englishman who owned no property in France, was permitted to vote by proxy in the electoral assembly at Bourges, as Duc d'Aubigny, a title inherited from his ancestress, Louise de Querouaille.² The result of this wide interpretation of the word "noblesse" to include both the noble by blood and the owners of "noble" property was, that in many places the old and the new noblesse quarrelled to the final victory of the latter from their numbers, and that in some instances the nobles holding fiefs decided to exclude those noble only by blood, which caused Mirabeau's rejection by the noblesse of Aix. Arguments were freely drawn on this question from a book recently published by Chérin, the learned genealogist, who was to be the intimate friend of Hoche, and to die a republican general on the field of Zurich, but who now wrote an elaborate treatise in favour of the exclusion of the new noblesse from the electoral assemblies.³ In nearly all of the electoral assemblies of the noblesse there appeared a decided

¹ Babeau's *Troyes pendant la Révolution*, vol. i. p. 164.

² *Procès-verbal de l'Assemblée de la Noblesse du Berri tenue à Bourges en 1789*. B.M.—F.R. 24. (5.)

³ *Abrégé Chronologique d'Édits, Déclarations, Règlements, Arrê's et Lettres Patentes des Rois de France de la troisième Race, concernant le fait de Noblesse, précédé d'un Discours sur l'origine de la Noblesse*, by L. N. H. Chérin. 12mo. Paris: 1788.

determination on the part of the majority to hold firmly to all their privileges, except those in matters of taxation, which they felt to be untenable; but in many instances their cahiers contained more liberal ideas than they had adopted, for while young and enthusiastic noblemen were generally elected to draw up the cahiers, men of the most conservative and reactionary ideas were elected deputies. Yet there were some few exceptional elections where the liberal noblesse were entirely successful. At Langres, indeed, one of the only three bailliages, where the three orders had agreed to act together and draw up their cahier in common, the credit was due to the bishop, but at Montfort l'Amaury the unanimity was entirely the work of the grand bailli d'épée, the young Comte Mathieu de Montmorency, who even succeeded in persuading the three orders to recommend vote "par tête" in their cahier.¹ The course of the election at Chateaufort-en-Thimerais was in many respects a typical one. The noblesse and the electors of the tiers état agreed to draw up their cahier together, and found themselves in accord on general principles, and all promised to go well, until the electors of the tiers état proposed a clause in the common cahier, condemning the game laws, at which the noblesse took exception, and the dispute ended in the separation of the two orders.² At Péronne,³ where Alexandre de Lameth was the guiding spirit of the noblesse, the three orders agreed to act together and to draw up a common cahier; but eventually only the noblesse and the electors of the tiers état acted together, because the clergy, after drawing up a very liberal cahier under the inspiration of the Abbé Maury, had to disperse early, in order to perform Sunday mass in their separate

¹ *Cahier des trois Ordres réunis des Bailliages de Montfort l'Amaury et de Dreux, précédés des Arrêtés insérés dans le Procès-verbal de l'Assemblée générale des dits trois Ordres du 16 Mai, 1789, et autres arrêtés postérieurs.* B.M.—F.R. 30. (26.)

² *Procès-verbal de l'Assemblée de la Noblesse de Chateaufort-en-Thimerais* B.M.—F.R. 41. (1).

³ Ramon's *La Révolution à Péronne*, bk. ii. p. 132.

parishes. At Senlis,¹ the noblesse, under the presidency of the Duc de Lévis, was ready to act with the electors of the tiers état, and the same spirit appeared at Nevers,² but in both instances the clergy refused their consent and concurrence. But these elections were purely exceptional, for as a rule the noblesse held superciliously aloof from the electors of the tiers état, and more than once, as in the case of the would-be reformer of the army, the Comte de Guibert, at Bourges, treated with the greatest indignity all supporters of liberal ideas among themselves.³ Great estates, long-proved nobility of family, royal descent, or tenure of the highest offices in the State, did not ensure success at the elections of the noblesse: the Maréchal Duc de Noailles, and the Duc d'Ayen, the heads of the great house of Noailles, were rejected; the Duke of Orleans, though proposed in five provincial bailliages, was only elected in two, Crépy-en-Valois and Villers-Cotterets; and Calonne was not only not elected, but even unanimously refused admission to the assembly of the noblesse of the bailliage of Bailleul.⁴ In many bailliages, notably at Bordeaux,⁵ the liberal noblesse protested and abstained from concurring in the elections; but it was only in Artois that the reactionary noblesse felt it necessary to protest. At Vesoul, the capital of the bailliage of Amont⁶

¹ *Procès-verbal et cahier de la Noblesse du Bailliage de Senlis.* B.M.—F.R. 39. (21.)

² Labot's *Cahiers, etc., du Nivernois et Donzinois*, p. 341.

³ B.M.—F.R. 24. (5.), and *Mémoires du Comte Miot de Melito*, vol. i. p. 3. Paris: 1876.

⁴ *Discours prononcé le premier Avril, 1789, par M. Vanpradelles, écuyer, Lieutenant-Général du Bailliage royal de Flandres à Bailleul, président le tiers état, à l'ouverture de l'assemblée, suivi de la délibération du tiers état, et de la résolution prise par le Clergé au sujet de la voyage de M. de Calonne à Bailleul.* B.M.—F.R. 22. (2.)

⁵ *Déclaration faite par une partie de la Noblesse de Guienne, adhérant aux principes de la déclaration faite par un de nous [Lafon de Ladebat] à l'Assemblée générale hier 6 Avril, 1789, signed by twenty-eight noblemen and eleven proxies headed by Duc de Duras.* B.M.—F.R. 40. (5.)

⁶ B.M.—F.R. 22. (2.) and 22. (3.); Pingaud's *Président de Vezet*, in the *Revue Historique*, November, 1822, pp. 300-302.

in Franche Comté, there was a double election. The supporters of the rights of the provincial Estates, headed by the Président de Vezet, had refused to assemble, as the règlement had directed, and in their absence the liberal noblesse elected liberal deputies, including the Marquis de Toulangeon and Bureaux de Pusy. The conservative noblesse then saw the advantage they had given their adversaries, and met of their own accord, and elected conservative deputies, headed by De Vezet, and this double election gave rise to many a long debate after the meeting of the States-General at Versailles. In some bailliages parties were very evenly balanced, and at Blois, where the great chemist Lavoisier was secretary,¹ and Alexandre de Beauharnais was elected deputy, forty-three noblemen were found to support vote "par tête," against fifty-one in favour of vote "par ordre."² Yet, in spite of the liberal ideas of the minority, the nobles of 1789 showed their consciousness of their rank in their universal and unanimous protest in nearly every bailliage against the punishment inflicted upon the Cardinal de Rohan for his share in the scandal of the diamond necklace, and against the arbitrary dismissal of the Comte de Moreton-Chabillant from the command of his regiment. On the whole, the elections of the noblesse exhibited a marked opposition to any constitutional reforms, although in the electoral assemblies the order almost universally promised to abandon its privileges in taxation; but it was nevertheless certain that the Estate of the noblesse would contain a few noblemen conspicuous for their liberal ideas. Their acknowledged chief was the Marquis de Lafayette, the friend of Washington, who had been elected at Riom, and whose services in America had already associated his name with the idea of revolution. Many of the young officers, who had served under him or with him

¹ It was at this time that Lavoisier, on coming to Blois for the elections, lent the city fifty thousand francs without interest, and thus saved it from famine, for which loan he was made a citizen of Blois. *Histoire de Blois*, by L. Bergevin and A. Dupré, vol. i. pp. 170, 171. Blois: 1846.

² B.M.—F.R. 25. (8.)

in America, had imbibed the same ideas, and several of them were elected to the States-General, including the Vicomte de Noailles, the Duc d'Aiguillon, the Prince de Broglie, the Vicomte Alexandre de Beauharnais, the Comte Mathieu de Montmorency, and the eloquent brothers, Charles and Alexandre de Lameth.

The clerical elections¹ are far more interesting than those of the noblesse, for in them first appeared the signs of what has been called "the insurrection of the curés." The unequal division of the wealth of the Church in France is fairly shown by the fact that, out of its income of two hundred and twenty-four millions of francs, the curés received but thirty-six millions, and the dignitaries of the Church expected to have in the electoral assemblies an influence proportionate to their wealth and rank; but they were to be greatly disappointed, for, acting under the advice of the curés of Dauphiné, the inferior clergy in nearly every province utterly disregarded their spiritual chiefs. In this behaviour they were encouraged by their numbers, for the règlement allowed every beneficed curé or vicaire—as long as he returned himself, or could find a substitute, to sing mass on Sunday, if a Sunday intervened during the course of the elections—to be present at the electoral assembly and to vote in person, while even the wealthiest monasteries and chapters might only send single representatives, and the bishops had only their own votes. Besides the "insurrection of the curés" against their bishops, a strong feeling of dislike towards the monks on the part of the curés is as clearly perceived in the course of the electoral period. This feeling had showed itself very early in the reign of Louis XVI., and may be attributed in part to the suppression of the Jesuits, whose place, as teachers of the inferior clergy, had been taken by the Oratorians, who held distinctly Jansenist opinions. It was a result of their education also that the curés differed from their bishops in their

¹ The whole question of the clerical elections and the insurrection of the curés is thoroughly worked out in Chassin's *Le Génie de la Révolution*, vol. ii., *Les Cahiers des Curés*. Paris: 1882.

leniency towards Protestantism and even towards rationalism; for, while as recently as January, 1788, the bishops in conclave at Paris had solemnly and emphatically protested against the very moderate concessions made to the Protestants, and had always condemned Rousseau, the country curés lived on good terms with the Protestant pastors, and knew by heart Rousseau's "Confessions of a Savoyard Vicar."

The character of the bishops and dignitaries of the Church, from the very mode of their appointment, could hardly be expected to be particularly moral, or their sentiments particularly liberal. They were usually younger sons of wealthy noblemen or ministers of state; for, in order to maintain the family property undivided, it was the custom for only one son of a noble house to be allowed to marry, while the others either took orders or became knights of the order of St. John of Malta. It was not necessarily the eldest son who was chosen to carry on the family stock; and Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, for instance, the witty Bishop of Autun, whose career was to be so long and varied, had been sent into the Church, although the eldest son, because of his feeble health. Such bishops, and so chosen, could not be expected to be in sympathy with either their curés or the people. They lived at Paris, and regarded their dignities merely as sources of income, and were incessantly mixed up in court intrigues in order to procure their translation to richer sees. To such an extent had the court obtained absolute power over the Church, that, out of the 131 archbishoprics and bishoprics in France in 1789, only five were given to men of roturier birth, and these were the five poorest of all. It is strange rather that so many good and liberal-minded bishops were produced under this system than that there were so many of immoral life and narrow-minded ideas. For liberal-minded bishops did exist; and, though the majority of the bench held by the order from which they sprang, and declined to admit the necessity of reform, a great part was played during the electoral period and the early months of the States-General by such tolerant statesmen as

the Archbishops of Vienne and Bordeaux, and the bishops of Blois, Langres, and Nancy. Most of the bishops and high dignitaries of the Church, as in Brittany, were disgusted with the clause in the règlement, which threw supreme power into the hands of the curés, and protested vehemently against it; and, had it not been for Necker, whose Protestant faith made him incline favourably towards the parochial clergy, it may be doubted whether the Estate of the clergy would not have consisted, as in former times, of bishops and abbés alone. Yet the bishops, as a body, played a more important part in the elections than they did in the States-General, for Necker could not help appointing them *ex-officio* presidents of the electoral assemblies of the clergy. This did not always ensure their election as deputies; but, as a rule, the bishop or one of the dignitaries of the bailliage was elected with one, two, or more curés; and, when the elections were completed, it was found that the Estate of the clergy would be represented at Versailles by 42 bishops, 55 abbés, and 7 monks, together with no less *fewer* than 205 curés.

The unpopularity of monks and friars with the parochial clergy is easily accounted for by the fact that, in nearly every parish, the greater tithes, and often the larger portion of the lesser tithes, were exacted for the benefit of some distant monastery, which did nothing for the parish, while the curé had to do all the work for a mere pittance. Most of these monasteries were extremely wealthy, and, as the number of monks had steadily declined for more than twenty-five years, it followed that the abbots and priors were richer than ever before. These appointments had fallen, like the bishoprics, under the control of the court, and were generally filled by cadets of noble families on their way to a bishopric, or held by them with a bishopric. The wealth, superciliousness, and absenteeism of the abbés and prieurs made monks in general unpopular; yet the individual monks, who formed the communities, had often as much reason to complain of their superiors as the curés or the people in general. The despotism which these superiors exercised over the members of their monas-

teries is well illustrated by a curious electoral episode. According to the règlement, each monastery was to elect a representative, but the prior of the convent of Carthusian monks at Bellary, in the Nivernois, refused to allow his monks to elect, and said that he would himself go to the electoral assembly of the clergy as their representative. The monks, however, elected their sacristan in a secret meeting, and having no money, they then wrote a curious letter to Necker, begging him to send a remittance for their deputy's expenses to a certain notary in the village for fear of the prior.¹ The convents of nuns were nearly as rich as the monasteries, and as much detested as impropiators of tithes; they generally sent their father confessors as their representatives to the electoral assembly of the clergy of their bailliage, and in more than one instance these proxies were elected to the States-General. The chapters of canons were in the aggregate not nearly so rich as the monasteries, but each individual canon was far richer than each individual monk, because the income of the chapter was equally distributed amongst its members, and there was no rich abbot or prior to take the lion's share. As usual, whenever a chapter was excessively rich, like those of Lyons or Saint Denis, care was taken that every canon should be of noble birth, and the same precaution was generally observed by the bishops in appointing their vicars-general, and the clergy of their cathedrals. Exception must be made from the general detestation in which the regular clergy were held by the curés in favour of the teaching brotherhoods, and especially of the Oratorians.² This body had obtained and deserved an immense influence over the minds of the clergy, and, since the suppression of the Jesuits, had almost monopolized the education of the clergy. That they were worthy of the

¹ Labot's *Cahiers, procès-verbaux, etc., du Nivernois et Donzinois*, pp. 233-240.

² For the condition of the brethren of the Oratory in 1789 and their attitude towards the Revolution, see the monograph of Père A. Ingold *L'Oratoire et la Révolution*, in the *Revue de la Révolution* for April, June, July, and September, 1883.

esteem in which they were held is proved by the general excellence of the provincial curés in both morals and ability. Some of the greatest and most pure-minded of the revolutionary leaders came from among their own ranks; and, since they could boast of Daunou and Lakanal, the Oratorians need not be ashamed of the more able and more unscrupulous men who had been for some years teachers in their college at Juilly¹—Fouché and Billaud-Varenne.

The curés, as has been said, were generally, from their excellent education, inclined to Jansenist opinions or else to a broad-minded toleration, and the absence of any effectual supervision on the part of their bishops had made them extremely independent, and accustomed them to think for themselves both in questions of politics and theology. By birth the country curés generally belonged to the very poorest class, and were therefore in entire sympathy with their flocks, over whom their education, which had very often been given to them by the liberality of the seigneur or a subscription from the village, gave them an immense ascendancy. They were, as a rule, too poor ever to leave their parishes, and their remuneration consisted in certain small tithes paid in kind, which afforded barely enough to sustain life. As early as 1776 the country curés of Dauphiné had leagued together to obtain a small portion of the greater tithes, which were appropriated by the monasteries, and in 1782 they had succeeded in obtaining a small additional income, which brought up the average stipend of a country curé to about £32 a year. A much better position was held by the parochial clergy in the towns, who were generally of at least bourgeois birth, and were much more adequately paid, but they somewhat resembled the gay abbés of Paris, and had far less influence over the shrewd bourgeois and intelligent artisans, who formed their congregations, than their rural brethren had over their simple flocks. It must be remembered, too, that the power of eloquence or great literary ability often raised curés of the very humblest

¹ *Histoire de l'Abbaye et du Collège de Juilly*, by Charles Hamel. 8vo. Paris: 1868.

birth to positions of importance, or conferred upon them a great influence over their brethren. The rich abbey of Lions, or Lihons, was conferred upon Jean Siffrein Maury, the son of a cobbler of Valréas, by the king himself, at the request of the Parlement of Paris, as the reward for a single sermon preached before that body in the Sainte Chapelle, and Henri Grégoire, the curé of Embermesnil, who was to be chief founder and supporter of the constitutional Church established in France in 1790, first made his name famous by his literary efforts. In 1775 he had won the prize offered by the Academy of Nancy for an essay on poetry, and, later, one offered by the Academy of Metz for an essay on the regeneration of the Jews; and it was this literary reputation which enabled him, not only to take the lead of the curés assembled in his own bailliage of Nancy, but of all the curés in Lorraine, by means of his "Circulaire imprimée," and his "Nouvelle lettre aux Curés," published in 1788 and 1789, in which he remarked that, if a Church only possessed Spanish bishops and French curés, it would be perfectly administered. The great number of able men which time proved to be contained among the curés of France in 1789 is very noticeable; not only Grégoire, but Massieu, Thomas Lindet, Jean Baptiste Royer, and Jean Pierre Saurine, were all curés at that time, while the monasteries could only reveal unscrupulous intriguers like the Capucin François Chabot, or half-witted enthusiasts like the Carthusian Dom Gerle.

It will be remembered that the representatives of the clergy of Dauphiné had been chosen, with the exception of the Archbishop of Vienne, by the diocesan council of Grenoble, which had elected four abbés; but, to avoid similar mistakes, the curés of Dauphiné earnestly counselled the curés of Brittany and of all France to beware of leaving the elections in the hand of their superiors. In Brittany itself, when the dignitaries of the Church refused to act, the curés, or, as they are locally called, the recteurs, met by themselves in accordance with the règlement, and the clergy of that province were represented in the Estate of the clergy at Versailles by twenty-

four recteurs. A curious instance of the poverty of the clergy and of their attitude towards the wealthy abbés appears in an account of the elections of the bailliage of Chaumont, in which there was no bishop's see, where Dom Raucourt, the rich abbot of Clairvaux, was elected president of the electoral assembly of the clergy, because he alone could entertain the whole body at dinner.¹ He kept open house in vain, for when the day of election came he was passed over, and two curés were elected deputies. In most bailliages, however, there was a bishop's see, and the great question was whether the bishop, who presided *ex-officio*, should be elected a deputy or not. They generally presided with great vigour, and made many long sermons and harangues; indeed, one prelate, the Bishop of Nevers, who attempted to preside at two elections, at Nevers and Saint Pierre-le-Moustier, with but a slight interval between them, died of over-exertion.² But nevertheless, less than one-third of the total number succeeded in securing their election. The good influence of Mgr. de la Luzerne, Bishop of Langres, in maintaining the unanimity of the three orders at Langres, has been mentioned, and the Bishops of Nancy and of Blois attempted to act in a similar manner. Mgr. de Thémines, indeed, the Bishop of Blois, propounded ideas of reform of a most thorough character, and published a most curious and interesting electoral pamphlet, under the title of "Instructions et Cahier du hameau de Madon."³ A typical election was that at Évreux, where the Bishops of Évreux and Lisieux were both present.⁴ After the general assembly, the curés collected together in the crypt of the cathedral and decided on whom their choice should fall. They selected one extremely wealthy curé, who had private property, M. de la Lande, curé of Illiers l'Évêque,

¹ *Histoire de Chaumont*, by E. Jolibois, 1836; *Mémoires du Comte Beugnot*, vol. i. p. 109, 2nd edit. Paris: 1868.

² Labot's *Cahiers, procès-verbaux, etc.*, du Nivernois et Donzinois, p. 318.

³ Published at Blois, 1789. In British Museum, 910 b 1.

⁴ *Notices historiques sur la Révolution dans le Département de l'Eure*, by Boivin-Champeaux, pp. 24-28. Évreux: 1868.

and one poor parish priest, Thomas Lindet, curé of the church of Sainte-Croix at Bernay, who was afterwards the first constitutional bishop of Évreux, and whose brother, Robert Lindet, though then only a poor notary at Bernay, was in four years to be one of the rulers of France. When, therefore, the assembly of the clergy proceeded to the election of its deputies to the States-General, the two bishops were surprised to find that they were rejected, and that these two curés were at once elected by a large majority. The cahiers of the clergy contained many complaints of the wealth of the bishops and the monasteries, and showed but little respect for the sanctity of their superiors; for the curés all seemed to have acknowledged the truth of the remark, which the curés of Dauphiné made to the recteurs of Brittany, "The bishops are but citizens as you are;" and further, some of the clerical cahiers even contained a recommendation for the toleration of all religions. The cahiers of the laity were even more decided on matters of Church reform, and Jerome Pétion did not hesitate, in his "Avis aux Français," to demand the immediate abolition of the celibacy of the clergy.

If the course of the elections in the provincial assemblies of the noblesse and the clergy, and the cahiers drawn up in them, exhibited the signs of the times, still more was this the case with the tiers état. From the smallest village, as well as from the largest city, came demands for absolute political freedom, which prove how universally the ideas of Voltaire and of Rousseau had permeated through every class.¹ The cahiers drawn up in the primary assemblies, or adopted by them from some printed pamphlet or one of the innumerable "Modèles de Cahier," have already been mentioned; but the cahier of the village of Asnan,² which has been recently

¹ There are seven volumes of cahiers of the bailliages published as vols. 1-7 of the *Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860*, printed by order of the National Assembly, and edited by MM. Mavidal and Laurent (Paris: 1868-75); and a list of the printed cahiers to be found in the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Archives is published in Chassin's *Le Génie de la Révolution*, vol. i. pp. 361-365.

² Labot's *Cahiers, procès-verbaux, etc., du Nivernois et Donzinois*, pp. 251-262.

printed, is far more interesting than they are, for it gives an authentic picture of village troubles in 1789. The little village only contained 135 houses, and yet it could boast of six procureurs, six notaries, and four huissiers or officers of the law courts, and possessed eight inns, besides beer-houses. The village taxation was entirely in the hands of the procureur fiscal, who was therefore dreaded by the villagers, and every year elected to the office of syndic or village magistrate. The baker made bad bread, and there was no redress; the curé had but £40 a year, while a certain Benedictine monastery managed to procure £1000 a year from the tithes of the parish. In this particular parish the syndic was elected with another lawyer to represent the village at the general assembly of the tiers état of the balliage at Nevers, and that the election was typical is proved by the immense number of country lawyers, generally syndics of villages, who appeared not only in the electoral assemblies, but in the States-General itself. It was fortunate for the destinies of France that these lawyers, however grasping in their villages, were yet men, who had studied their Rousseau, and who were therefore far more conscious of their rights of citizenship, and far more fit to combat the influence of the court and the privileged orders than the down-trodden agricultural labourers, who might otherwise have been elected. The primary elections in the cities and towns do not exhibit the same paramount influence of the lawyers, for the bourgeois had been for generations accustomed to assemble in their guilds to transact business, and the artisan class were entirely omitted in the règlement, and had no votes unless they happened to be householders. The urban primary assemblies consisted, as a rule, entirely of shopkeepers and small employers of labour, who, with the proverbial selfishness of the French bourgeois, looked after their own interests and neglected the grievances of their poorer fellow-citizens. At Lyons, the wealthiest manufacturing city of France, the great manufacturers all voted in the assembly of the noblesse, as having been ennobled by holding municipal office; and the

elections of the tiers état were chiefly influenced by a bookseller named Perisse Duluc and a printer named Milanais,¹ who were both enthusiastic believers in the mystical doctrines of St. Martin, and the Martinists managed to elect among the deputies for the bailliage of Lyons the great Parisian avocat Bergasse, who was a native of Lyons and a leader among the illuminati of Paris.

The higher standard of education in the towns naturally caused a great difference between the electors of the towns and of the country districts in the electoral assemblies of the tiers état, a difference which sometimes led to blows. From their numbers the country lawyers were able to command the issue of the elections, and many were the protests sent in by the greater cities that they would not be adequately represented at the States-General. This struggle is well illustrated in the elections of the bailliage of La Montagne, where Frochot, afterwards Napoleon's préfet of the Seine, and then a country notary at Aignay-le-Duc, combined the country electors and persuaded them to elect deputies from their own number.² Maxmilien de Robespierre, too, who had only been chosen fourteenth elector for the city of Arras, recognized the importance of the country electors, and it was by their votes that he was elected fifth deputy for Artois.³ There is also, in an account of the elections at Soissons,⁴ a curious protest against the interference of the maréchaussée, or police, which is extremely noteworthy. The very presence of a provost of police at the first general assembly of the electors caused a riot in the cathedral of Soissons, which was with difficulty suppressed, and a similar riot took place at Chaumont,⁵ where certain of the grand bailli's guards knocked

¹ *Histoire politique et militaire du Peuple de Lyon pendant la Révolution Française 1789-1795*, by A. Balleydier, vol. i. p. 5. Paris, 1845, 1846 ; *Histoire de Lyon depuis la Révolution de 1789*, by Jérôme Morin, vol. i. p. 23. Paris and Lyons, 1845.

² *Frochot, Préfet de la Seine*, by Louis Passy, p. 5. Évreux : 1867.

³ *Arras sous la Révolution*, by E. Lecesne, vol. i. pp. 40-59. Arras : 1882.

⁴ *Les Procès-verbaux et Cahiers du Bailliage de Soissons 1789*, published in vol. xx. of the *Bulletins of the Société historique et archéologique* of that city.

⁵ Beugnot's *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 108.

down some of the electors. The want of practice of the French people in elections was to be seen the moment the electors of the three orders separated to draw up their cahiers and elect their deputies. Étienne Dumont¹ mentions that when he was travelling from London to Paris with Duroveray, another Genevese exile, in March, 1789, they stopped at an inn at Montreuil-sur-Mer, and found that the general assembly of the bailliage had just met, and that no one knew how to proceed. The two Swiss radicals accordingly delayed their journey, instructed the electors of the tiers état what to do, and kindly drew up their cahier for them. In certain instances, as when Frochot had combined the country electors of La Montagne, or Malouet prepared the way at Riom, all went smoothly; but generally, as might have been expected in a mixed assembly of lawyers and labourers, bourgeois and country doctors, confusion reigned supreme. The first point always was as to who should be elected to draw up the cahier in the name of the assembly, and it was in drawing up the cahiers that the men most worthy to be elected deputies generally showed their capacity. In a few instances comparatively unknown individuals were at once elected deputies from the number of their friends among the electors, and there was always an attempt to elect the lieutenant-general of the bailliage, who presided over the assembly of the tiers état, *ex-officio*, whether popular or unpopular. He was generally elected unless there was some specific reason alleged against him, as when M. Cagniard de Rotoy was rejected at Laon for having wished to hang over again a woman who had recovered after her execution.² Family connections, however distant, had also some weight; for instance, at Évreux a young and unknown avocat, named Buzot, was elected a deputy for the tiers état merely because he had married a

¹ *Souvenirs sur Mirabeau*, by Étienne Dumont, pp. 21, 22. London : 1832.

² *Les Elections de 1789 aux États-Généraux pour le Bailliage de Vermandois, publiées par la Société Académique de Laon, avec Notice par E. Fleury.* Laon : 1872.

distant connection of Barentin, the keeper of the seals.¹ The cahiers of the general assemblies of the tiers état were, like those of the primary assemblies, in many instances copied from one of the numerous printed models which had been circulated throughout France with a few additions of local grievances. These grievances arose chiefly from the extended influence of the guilds in the towns and the unfair weight of taxation in the villages, and very often from the recently concluded treaty of commerce with England. This treaty, though most advantageous to the wine-growers of southern France, and extremely popular at Bordeaux and the wine centres, had nearly ruined the northern provinces, and many were the demands from Normandy, Picardy, and Artois that it should be at once annulled. In some instances, as at Chaumont and Nemours, the affection of the electors for the parlements, which they somehow regarded as the guardians of their liberties, was curiously displayed. At Nemours, when Dupont, the economist, wished to insert in the cahier a clause demanding the abolition of the parlements, his colleagues on the committee for drawing up the cahier tried to throw him out of the window, and would have succeeded if he had not made them laugh by catching hold of a very fat man to act as his pillow; while a similar proposition secured the rejection of Beugnot at Chaumont.² The article which Necker had inserted in the "Résultat du Conseil" allowing the assemblies of one order to elect individuals belonging to another, was not much acted upon by the tiers état, but it may be remarked that the Marquis de Rostaing, a friend and comrade of Lafayette, was elected by the tiers état of the bailliage of the Forez, assembled at Montbrison,³ and that the Comte de Chambors, who was elected both by the tiers état and the noblesse of Couserans, preferred to be deputy for the former Estate.⁴

¹ Boivin-Champeaux, *La Révolution dans le Département de l'Eure*, p. 30.

² Beugnot's *Mémoires*, vol. i. pp. 118, 120.

³ *Roanne pendant la Révolution*, by Francisque Pothier, p. 17. Roanne : 1868.

⁴ *Histoire de la Révolution Française dans le pays de Foix et dans l'Ariège*, by Paul de Casteras, p. 64. Paris : 1876.

Very few members of the tiers état made their names known beyond the limits of their provinces during the electoral operations; chief amongst those who did was Malouet, who was the only man, besides Mounier, who was elected a deputy by acclamation, and who obtained a great reputation during the elections at Riom in Auvergne.

Pierre Victor Malouet¹ was the only son of the bailli of the little village of Oliergues, in Auvergne, and was born there in 1740. In his youth he had lived a gay life in Paris as a second-rate poet, and had then accompanied the French Ambassador to Lisbon as his secretary. In 1760 he had entered the commissariat, and in 1762 the colonial service, and spent some years in French Guiana and San Domingo. On his way home, in 1778, he was taken prisoner by an English cruiser, and spent a year in England as a prisoner of war, during which he had an opportunity for studying English institutions. In 1781 he had been appointed intendant to the fleet at Toulon, and in 1788 he determined to obtain a seat in the States-General. Neither he himself nor the Government service were particularly popular at Toulon, so he went down to his native province and offered to use his influence with the Government in asserting the rights of Riom to be capital of Lower Auvergne against Clermont-Ferrand. His conduct at Paris in upholding the cause of their city had made him very popular among the citizens of Riom, and he had no difficulty in becoming the leader of the tiers état there. He had accumulated some wealth in the public service, which he found of great use in enabling him to issue numerous pamphlets, to keep open house, and to make a personal canvas. His pamphlets spread beyond the limits of Auvergne, and his popularity also; and when the electoral assembly met, a cahier, which he had drawn up, was at once accepted as the cahier of the bailliage, and he was elected by acclamation first deputy for the tiers état of Riom, and he then tried to rival Mounier as a leader of the tiers état of France.

Besides Mounier and Malouet, several of the deputies

¹ Malouet's *Mémoires*. Paris: 1874.

elected by the tiers état were men whose names were to become universally famous. Some, like Merlin of Douai, Maximilien de Robespierre, Barère, Pétion, Defermon des Chapellières, Rewbell, Salicetti, Thouret, and Le Chapelier, owed their elections to their popularity as *avocats* or *procureurs* in the cities of Douai, Arras, Toulouse, Chartres, Rennes, Colmar, Bastia, Rouen, and Nantes; Goupil de Préfeln was judge-royal at Alençon; Lanjuinais was a professor of law at Rennes; Blin and Salle were doctors at Nantes and Nancy; Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, as the Protestant champion, was elected at Nîmes; Garat, the writer of "*Éloges*," and professor of history at the Lycée of Paris, at his native place, Labour, although he had never been there since he left home, a poor boy, to seek his fortune at Paris; Dupont, the economist, at Nemours; and Bergasse, as has been said, at Lyons.

But the greatest gain of the tiers état in the elections was that it was at this time that Mirabeau threw in his lot with them. He was the only man of real political ability who had yet appeared. Beside him, Mounier, Malouet, and the rest were mere theoretical politicians and visionaries; and it was to no deep-laid scheme, but to mere chance, that he owed his election to the Estate of the tiers état. It would be idle to consider what might have been the course of the French revolution if Mirabeau had been elected by the noblesse of his bailliage; but their haughty rejection of a man of bad character, on the ground that he was not in possession of a fief, when he claimed to enter their assembly, made him turn to the tiers état as the only class which could give him the political opening he had so long wished for, and for which he was so well fitted. With constitutional energy he threw himself into the strife, and secured his election both at Aix and Marseilles.

But his triumph was more than his own personal victory; it embodied the great principle of the election of the fittest. Almost unknown at Marseilles, and not known favourably at Aix, his character had not been such as to win esteem or affection from the bourgeois of those cities, but when once he had spoken, the hot-headed people of the south recognized their

born leader. Whether or not he set up a draper's shop at Marseilles to qualify himself as a member of the tiers état is a matter of no importance; but he identified himself as much as if he had with the commercial classes, and not only with them but with the populace of the great city also, over which he at once obtained an enormous influence, which assisted his election even more than his popularity with the bourgeois. While the elections were being held, riots caused by the dearth of bread and the hard times broke out all over the city of Marseilles, and Mirabeau, by his voice alone, was able to pacify the excited people when the presence of the troops was of no avail, and to save the lives of the bishop and of the contractor, whom the populace had attacked.¹ On this occasion he showed that hatred of anarchy which was his guiding political principle through life, and managed to quell the riots without being hooted by the rioters. His double election gave him double strength; he felt himself not merely deputy for Marseilles or for Aix, but the representative of the whole tiers état of France. His election caused more enthusiasm than any other individual election in all France. From Marseilles he was escorted to Aix, for which city he had preferred to sit, by five hundred bourgeois on horseback, three hundred carriages, and a vast crowd on foot; and the citizens of Aix, not to be behindhand in enthusiasm for their deputy, entertained the whole expedition in a field without their walls.² It was this enthusiasm which gave Mirabeau strength to despise the cold attitude of his fellow-deputies when he took his seat in the States-General, and to assume the leadership of the tiers état at Versailles, when Mounier and Malouet failed in the hour of difficulty.

If the progress of the elections at Marseilles and all over France deserve to be studied with attention, the elections at Paris were the most important and most noteworthy of all.

¹ Despatch of the Duke of Dorset, English Ambassador at Paris, to the Marquis of Carmarthen, Secretary of State, March 28, 1789.

² *Histoire de Marseille*, by Augustin Fabre, vol. ii. p. 420. Marseilles: 1829.

For in Paris at that time, more than in any other capital in the world, was concentrated all that was best and worst, all that was richest and poorest, all that was most cultivated and most ignorant in the whole country. Paris was allotted no less than ten deputations, or forty deputies; its elections began far later than those of the rest of France, and were followed with breathless interest by the newly elected deputies from the provinces, who had already assembled in the capital.

The noblesse of Paris began by electing 208 electors in the sixty districts, into which the sixteen quarters of the city had been divided for electoral purposes, who, with ten owners of fiefs within the walls, formed the general assembly of the noblesse of Paris, upon which attention was at first fixed. But as soon as it was known at Versailles that the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre¹ had been elected president, and M. Duval d'Esprèmesnil and the Comte de Lally-Tollendal secretaries of the assembly, there was little doubt but that most of the deputies would belong to the liberal nobility. Nevertheless, the electors decided to draw up their cahier separately by 195 votes to 21,² and the committee of twelve appointed for that purpose included two of the Duke of Orleans' chief friends, Adrien Duport, and the licentious novelist, Choderlos de Laclos, as well as the Duc de la Rochefoucauld, the Marquis de Condorcet, secretary to the Academy of Sciences and biographer of Turgot, the Marquis de Montesquiou, and Hugues de Sémonville. When their work was done, the election of the ten deputies was proceeded with. They were headed by the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre, and included the Duc de la Rochefoucauld, the Comte de Lally-Tollendal, Dionis de Séjour the astronomer, Adrien Duport, Lepeletier de Saint-Fargeau, and the Marquis de Montesquiou. The Duke of Orleans was himself elected, but preferred to sit for Crépy-en-Valois. The ten deputies suppléants included the Marquis de Beauharnais, the Vicomte de Ségur, Hugues de Sémonville, the Comte de

¹ Duke of Dorset's despatch of April 29, 1789.

² *Procès-verbal de l'Assemblée des Citoyens Nobles de Paris.* B.M.—F.R. 36. (12.)

Montholon, and the Comte de Puget de Barbentane; but it is to be remarked that neither Condorcet nor Choderlos de Laclos, although they had assisted to draw up the cahier, were included among them.

The clergy of Paris did not exhibit the same liberal ideas as the noblesse,¹ and Bailly remarks in his "Memoirs," that while during the primary elections the assembly of the tiers état of his district received many messages from the primary assembly of the noblesse, it received none from the clergy. The ten clerical deputies, as might have been expected from this conduct, were all of conservative tendencies, and were headed by Antoine Leclerc de Juigné, Archbishop of Paris. They included the Abbé de Montesquiou, Mgr. Chevreuil the chancellor of the cathedral, Mgr. Dumonchel the rector of the university, only two curés, those of the parishes of St. Nicholas de Chaudmont and of St. Gervais, and only one monk, Dom Chevreux, general of the monks of St. Maur.

The primary elections of the tiers état in the sixty districts of Paris are minutely described in their procès-verbaux, which were generally published; but the most interesting account is that contained in Bailly's "Memoirs."² He left his home at Chaillot before eight o'clock on the morning of April 21 and when he entered the church of the Feuillants, the headquarters of his district, "he breathed a new air." The people collected there refused to allow the king's agent to preside, and elected Bailly in his stead; they then occupied themselves in verifying the titles of those present to be members of the assembly, and at 7 p.m. elected a committee of seven, including Bailly and Marmontel, the novelist and academician, to draw up the district cahier. This was done by 10 p.m., and the assembly then spent the rest of the night in electing seven electors to the general assembly of the tiers état of Paris, amongst whom were Bailly, Marmontel, and Dusaulx, the translator of Juvenal. On the next day Bailly went to the Hôtel de

¹ *Cahier des doléances et rémontrances du Clergé de Paris intra muros*
B.M.—F.R. 36. (23.)

² *Mémoires de Bailly*, ed. Berville and Barrière, vol. i. p. 9.

Ville, where he found the electors hard at work verifying their powers. On April 23 the general assembly of the three orders met under the presidency of the provost of Paris, and the tiers état expressed its desire that the three orders should draw up their cahier in common. But the privileged orders thought otherwise, and on April 26 the assembly of the electors of the tiers état met separately,¹ and, after refusing to allow the lieutenant-civil of the city to preside over them, elected Target, the greatest lawyer in Paris, to be their president, and the Jansenist Camus as second president. Bailly himself was elected secretary, with Dr. Guillotin as his assistant. The 405 electors of the tiers état of Paris were found to contain 183 lawyers, 10 academicians, 36 doctors and surgeons, 10 financiers, 7 architects, 4 soldiers, 93 shopkeepers, of whom 11 were drapers, 10 printers and publishers, and 9 grocers, and 50 individuals classed simply as bourgeois.² On April 27 a committee of thirty-six—including the men of letters, Marmontel, Lacretelle, Bailly, and Suard, the lawyers Camus, Target, and Desèze, Dr. Guillotin, the publisher Panckoucke, and the manufacturer Réveillon—was chosen to draw up the cahier of the tiers état of Paris, who spent a week in drawing it up, and another in reading it over to the assembly. On May 8, Target announced to the electors the news of the suppression of Mirabeau's journal, and a vote of censure was passed with only one dissentient voice, that of Marmontel, who thus lost his chance of becoming a member of the States-General. On May 12, eight days after the opening of the States-General at Versailles, the electors of the tiers état proceeded to their most important duty, and elected Bailly first deputy for Paris. The elections occupied more than a fortnight, and, when completed, the deputation consisted of nine lawyers, including Camus, Tronchet, and Treilhard; six tradesmen,

¹ *Procès-verbal de l'Assemblée du Tiers État de la Ville de Paris intra muros*, 104 pp. B.M.—F.R. 37. (15.)

² *Tableau des 405 Electeurs du Tiers État, nommés par les Votans des 60 Districts des 16 Quartiers de la Ville et Fauxbourgs de Paris*. B.M.—F.R. 33. (13.)

namely, two drapers, a grocer, a printer, a jeweller, and a wine-merchant; the receiver-general of finances Anson, the academician Bailly, the censor-royal Desmeuniers, Dr. Guillotin, and the Abbé Siéyès.¹ Of this deputation, by far the most important men, and those who played the greatest part in the history of the Revolution, were the first and the last elected, Jean Sylvain Bailly and Emmanuel Joseph Siéyès.

Jean Sylvain Bailly² was the only son of Jacques Bailly, keeper of the royal pictures in the galleries of the Louvre, and was born at Paris in 1736. He was educated by his mother at home, and when only sixteen wrote two long tragedies, which were promptly condemned by the actor Lanoue, a friend of his father, who convinced the boy that he was not a poet. At that time a well-known geometer, named Moncarville, offered to give him lessons in geometry in return for drawing lessons to be given by Jacques Bailly to his own son. In the study of geometry Jean Bailly found scope for his peculiarly retentive memory and inexhaustible patience, and after a thorough training his attention was directed towards astronomy by an acquaintance with the great astronomer Lacaille. With Lacaille he observed the transit of Venus in 1761 and the comet of 1762, and in recognition of his reduction of the 515 stars observed by Lacaille in 1760 and 1761, he was elected a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1763. He then patiently observed the satellites of Jupiter from a little garret on the roof of the Louvre for eight years, and established his reputation as a practical astronomer. In 1773 he became a candidate for the office of coadjutor to the secretary of the Academy of Sciences, but though supported by Buffon, he was defeated by the young Marquis Caritat de Condorcet. Bailly now turned from the practice to the history of his favourite science, and between 1775 and 1787 published, in five volumes,

¹ *Tableau des 20 Députés, et des 20 Suppléants du Tiers État, nommés par les 405 Electeurs des Districts de Paris.* B.M.—F.R. 37. (14.)

² The best biography of Bailly is that by François Arago, published in 4to, 1852, and reprinted in vol. ii. of the *Mémoires biographiques* in Barral's complete edition of Arago's works.

his histories of ancient, modern, and Indian astronomy. The style of this work was universally admired, and in 1783 the author was elected a member of the Académie Française, and in 1785 of the Academy of Inscriptions, for his researches into ancient astronomy and his letters to Voltaire on the Atlantis of Plato. He was thus a member of all three academies, an honour only attained before by Fontenelle. But high as his reputation as an astronomer and a graceful writer stood, it was not as a man of science or a man of letters that Bailly was best known to his fellow-citizens, but as the secretary and reporter of two famous commissions. In 1784 he had drawn up and published the report of the committee which had been appointed by the Academy of Sciences to examine into the miraculous cures alleged to have been effected by Mesmer and Deslon. The committee included such famous men as Franklin and Lavoisier; the subject excited the greatest interest in France, and Bailly's report, in which he disproved the existence of the miraculous power claimed by Mesmer, was universally read. He had further become favourably known as a philanthropist by his report on the horrible mismanagement of the Hôtel Dieu, the chief hospital of Paris. In it he showed in glowing language the utter neglect of the patients and the absence of all sanitary precautions, and his personal popularity was at its height when he walked up from Chaillot to the primary assembly of the district of the Feuillants. In his modesty he did not expect to play any important part, and his astonishment may be believed when he found himself elected first deputy for the tiers état of Paris. But his nomination brought no good fortune to himself or to France, for without administrative experience or political knowledge he was suddenly called upon to fill a great and difficult position in public life. Like all other Frenchmen of the period, he did not believe in the necessity of any apprenticeship to politics, and his unfortunate administration of Paris and his pathetic death were directly due to the delusion that, because he was an amiable and a learned man, he was therefore fitted for public duties. The fault was not his alone; the

people of France could not trust the servants of the old despotism; new administrators had to be found, and it was Bailly's misfortune rather than his fault that he was forced into a conspicuous position when strength of character and experience were needed, and in which he found that knowledge of the stars had not taught him knowledge of men.

Emmanuel Joseph Siéyès,¹ the twentieth and last deputy of the tiers état of Paris, but yet the man who had more influence on the course of the Revolution than any of the rest, was born at Fréjus on May 3, 1748. He was educated at the Sorbonne for the Church, and there studied the works of Locke, Condillac, and other political and metaphysical thinkers, in preference to theology. His reputation for learning soon obtained him a canonry in Brittany, and he then became vicar-general and chancellor of the diocese of Chartres, and a member of the Council of the Clergy in France. In 1788 he published three political pamphlets, which were circulated through the length and breadth of France by the money of the Duke of Orleans, of which the most famous, "Qu'est-ce que le Tiers État?" has been already mentioned. His answer to the question which he put was, "Everything!" "What has it been hitherto?" was his next question. "Nothing!" "What does it desire?" "To be something." He had afterwards published the model of a cahier and a plan of deliberations, which had had a large sale and great influence in the provinces; but from the very principles he professed he had failed to be elected to the States-General by his own order. He would certainly have been left without any seat whatever in the great assembly, whose composition he had so much affected, had he not been remembered by the electoral assembly of the tiers état of Paris when it was proceeding to the election of its last deputy. Even then some question as to whether they should

¹ The best biography of Siéyès is that contained in Mignet's *Notices historiques*, vol. i., Paris, 1853; and consult also the *Étude sur Siéyès*, by E. de Beauverger, printed at the end of his *Tableau historique des Progrès de la Philosophie politique*, which was favourably reviewed in an interesting article by Sainte-Beuve in the *Causeries du Lundi*, vol. v.

elect an abbé was raised; but the memory of his great services to their cause, and his high reputation as a patriot and a supporter of the tiers état, procured his triumphant election, though only as twentieth deputy.

(Bailly and Siéyès were the two most distinguished deputies of the tiers état of Paris, and if a knowledge of political theories and a belief in political ideals were to characterize the deputies of the tiers état, there would have been little hope that that Estate could have striven successfully against the two privileged orders; but, fortunately for France, Provence had sent to Versailles a much greater man, one more competent to guide their deliberations aright, who would soon make the tiers état what Siéyès wished it to be—"everything."

CHAPTER II.

THE MEETING OF THE STATES-GENERAL.

Want of union among the deputies of the tiers état—Introduction to the king—The Bishop of Nancy's sermon—Opening session of the States-General—Policy of the Tiers État until June 10—The Tiers État declare themselves the National Assembly—Oath of the Tennis-Court, June 20—The Séance Royale, June 23—Mirabeau—Union of the orders—The Breton Club—Mounier and Malouet lose their influence—Camus—Rabaut de Saint-Étienne—Grégoire—Concentration of troops—Dismissal of Necker.

THE elections in Dauphiné had been completed as early as January 2, 1789, while the elections in Paris had lasted far beyond the day appointed for meeting. Between these dates the whole of France had been busied with electoral operations, and all France, in the beginning of May, 1789, turned eagerly to Versailles, to see how far the deputies who had been elected with such high hopes and such enthusiasm would be able to enforce the demands for reform contained in the cahiers. But chiefly was the mind of the French people stirred with the great question of vote "par ordre" and vote "par tête." On this question the privileged orders and the tiers état were in direct opposition: every cahier of the tiers état demanded vote "par tête;" every cahier but one of the noblesse demanded vote "par ordre." When, therefore, the deputies of the tiers état began to assemble in Paris in the course of April, 1789, this question was in all their thoughts; but as yet among these men of different races, different classes, and various education there existed no common bond and no organization, which would enable them to combine and consider how best to accomplish their ends.

The noblesse were better organized; many of them had served in the army or held court appointments, and were personally acquainted with each other; the liberal party met in the salons of their ladies of fashion, and recognized Lafayette, or Lameth, or the Duke of Orleans as their leader; the noblesse of the robe naturally united at the houses of the leaders of the various parties in the Parlement of Paris, while the majority knew well that, upon the question of voting, the privileged orders were bound, if they believed in their own separate existence, to be united. This want of a common centre and of any organization among the deputies of the tiers état must have led to their complete failure, if the ministers, the court, or the leading members of the majority of the noblesse had taken any trouble to divide them by personal solicitation. Fortunately, however, for the future of the tiers état, men were very far from foreseeing what a struggle was about to arise, and, full of a foolish complacency, the nobles of the court neglected to make friends of the poor country deputies, who were thronging into Paris and Versailles. The conduct of the wealthy dignitaries of the Church was very different: as soon as they perceived that their order would be represented by no less than 205 curés to 101 bishops, monks, and canons, they began to make friends of the curés in whose hands the power of the estate of the clergy so evidently lay. *Mirabeau* at once understood the disadvantages of the want of union among the deputies of the tiers état, and in order to bring about some cohesion he issued the prospectus of a new journal, to be entitled *Les États-Généraux*, which should lay down a plan of operations. For it must be remembered that the deputies to the tiers état of the States-General, unlike those returned to the subsequent political assemblies, were simply men of local reputations and local ambitions. There had been no general conference for the selection of candidates and no electoral organization, such as exists in every country in which representative assemblies have been the custom, and the deputies of the tiers état resembled rather members of an English Parliament in the reign of

Edward III., when the constituencies were bound to elect local men.

Differing entirely in character, age, and degree, the deputies of the tiers état remained scattered about in Paris until they received an order to appear, on May 2, in black coats, waistcoats, knee-breeches, and stockings, with white bands, at the palace of Versailles, to be introduced to their king. Louis XVI. received them with all the kindness of his nature; but the insolence which they met with from the hands of the court officials, who kept them waiting, admitted them only by side doors, and even proposed that they should fall on their knees before his Majesty, according to the ancient precedents of the fifteenth century, caused them to feel a common sentiment of resentment against the court on the very first occasion of their being collected together, and formed them into a body united by disgust at common insults. Social feeling has always had very great influence amongst Frenchmen, and a little courtesy or a little forbearance of their social privileges would have enabled the court and the noblesse to win the affection of the tiers état, and perhaps to obtain great political advantages. On the morning of May 4 the deputies of the three orders marched in procession to the great Church of St. Louis, at Versailles, to hear mass and listen to a sermon from the Bishop of Nancy, and thus prepare for their duties. Mgr. Anne Louis Henri de la Fare, Bishop of Nancy, who has been mentioned as one of the distinctly liberal prelates, and who was to spend twenty-four years in exile, become a cardinal and Archbishop of Sens, and eventually preached the sermon at the coronation of Charles X., in 1826, directed his sermon against the weight of taxation upon the poorest class, and dwelt with eloquence upon the poverty of the people; and his conclusion, "All this is done in the name of the best of kings," was received with loud applause from all parts of the church, in spite of the sacred character of the place and of the presence of the king and queen. That sanctity, indeed, had been already violated before the commencement of the service by an unseemly squabble between the deputies of the noblesse

and those of the tiers état, caused, according to a member of the noblesse, by the insolent desire of the tiers état to share the seats allotted to their betters in the nave of the church, instead of humbly going into the aisles.¹ The tiers état had headed the procession, and as they entered the church had seated themselves in the nave, and Larevellière-Lepaux, one of the deputies for Anjou, had absolutely refused to move at the request of the master of the ceremonies, the Marquis de Dreux-Brézé, until persuaded to do so by other deputies of his order, in order to avoid an open disturbance.² The applause which had greeted the bishop's attack upon the existing system of taxation encouraged the king to believe that his great aim of consolidating and reorganizing the finances of France would receive immediate attention, and he at least returned to his palace from the church with a happy and contented heart.

On May 5 the whole of the States-General, with the exception of the deputies of the tiers état of Paris, who had not yet been elected, assembled in the hall of the king's "lesser pleasures," where the twelve hundred deputies were ranked according to their orders. In marked contrast to the sombre black dress which had been declared the official costume of the deputies of the tiers état, appeared the clergy on the right of the throne, in their vestments, and the noblesse on the left, in their magnificent doublets, studded with jewels, after the fashion of the reign of Henri Quatre, the cost of which, amounting to at least thirteen hundred livres, seriously impoverished the poorer deputies of the order.³ The galleries were filled with the foreign ambassadors, among whom shone out conspicuous the English representative, the courtly Duke of Dorset, with the great ladies of Paris, dressed after the latest Paris fashions, and with visitors from all parts of the world,

¹ *Journal du Baron de Gauville, député de l'Ordre de la Noblesse aux États-Généraux*, p. 5. 12mo. Paris : 1864.

² Passage cited from the only copy of the printed but unpublished *Mémoires* of Larevellière-Lepaux, in the *Révolution Française*, for November, 1883.

³ Gauville, *Journal*, p. 5.

including very many Englishmen. When the king entered, accompanied by the queen, with her ladies-in-waiting and maids of honour, by the great officers of the royal household, and the body-guards in their splendid uniforms, with all the pageantry which makes a court, he was received with enthusiasm, and all waited expectantly to hear his wishes. M. de Barentin, the Keeper of the Seals, was heard with indifference and impatience, through a series of platitudes; but when Necker arose, all was silence. As his speech proceeded, blank amazement came over the faces of the black-robed deputies who sat directly opposite to him, when they heard no word of great constitutional reforms, no allusion to the establishment of a representative government, no hint of an attempt to remedy the poverty and misery of the labouring classes, but only heard that the king's treasury must be filled, and that the deficit, which the extravagance of the court had caused, must be met by them with still further taxation. This was not what the tiers état had expected. They had hoped from their "good King Louis," the father of his people, as the peasants of the provinces termed him, and from Necker, the great reforming minister, something better than this. They had heard in their country homes that the king loved his people and wished to relieve their burdens, and now they were told that he desired only to increase them; and, above all, they were filled with consternation that no mention was made of the great question of which their hearts were full—whether they were to be but one order, outvoted on every question by the noblesse and the clergy, or whether they were to have their fair weight in regulating the taxes which they had to pay. The king, on the conclusion of Necker's speech, moved away with his court; the noblesse flaunted out; the clergy slowly retired, though many of the curés cast longing looks towards their brothers of the tiers état; the galleries were emptied, and the black-robed deputies were left alone to find their way out of the hall as best they could.

The very next day appeared the first number of Mirabeau's new journal, and the day after an edict for its sup-

pression. The excitement caused by that suppression among the electors of Paris has been noticed, and Mirabeau, who had been shunned by his fellow-deputies upon May 5, began to be ranked amongst their leaders. On May 7 the tiers état found themselves alone in the great hall of the "lesser pleasures," and the question arose whether they were to constitute themselves at once, and thus recognize that they formed but one of three orders, or not. They determined to do nothing which would imply this separation, and to wait passively until the deputies of the other two orders should join them. But while the tiers état were prepared to await the course of events, the clergy and the noblesse at once organized themselves, and elected as their presidents the Cardinal de la Rochefoucauld, Archbishop of Rouen, and the Duc de Mailly. In both Estates a motion was brought forward in favour of a union with the tiers état, but while the clergy only decided against union by 133 votes to 114, the motion of Lafayette in the chamber of the noblesse to the same effect was rejected by 188 to 47, and the noblesse began verifying individual elections, hearing election petitions, and forming committees. To their vigour was opposed the obstinacy of the tiers état, and for more than a fortnight this deadlock continued. By that time it had been decided by the king that a conference should take place between commissioners of the three orders, to see if any compromise could be arrived at, and sixteen commissioners of the tiers état were elected, with Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, the Protestant champion, at their head, including Target, who had taken his seat for Paris *extra muros*, Le Chapelier, Mounier, Thouret, Volney, Garat, Bergasse, Salomon, and Barnave. The conference led to no result, and on May 26, Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, Target, and Mounier reported the failure of the attempt to come to an understanding. About this time Mgr. de la Luzerne, Bishop of Langres, proposed, as a solution of the difficulty, that the deputies of the two privileged orders should combine and form one chamber, on the analogy of the English House of Lords. This wise and temperate proposal was

simply ignored by the king, who ordered that the conference between the commissioners of the three estates should be renewed in the presence of Necker, Barentin, Montmorin, and the other ministers; but their influence could effect no compromise, and, on June 1, Rabaut de Saint-Étienne reported the fresh failure. At last, on June 10, on the motion of Siéyès, whose title to lead was generally recognized, the tiers état sent a final invitation to the clergy and noblesse to join them, and declared that if they refused, they themselves would at once verify their own powers as the States-General of France, not as a separate order.¹

Meanwhile public opinion in Paris had been watching the silent struggle with the utmost interest. On June 12, Bailly, the first deputy for Paris, who had acted as dean of the tiers état since June 3, was elected provisional president and the deputies of the different bailliages were called over in alphabetical order, when no deputies of either the clergy or the noblesse answered the call. However, on June 13, three curés of Poitou, named Lecesve, Ballard, and Jallet, had the courage to break away from the Estate of the clergy, and thus acknowledge that the three orders formed but one assembly, and then popular feeling showed itself in tumultuous applause from the Parisians, who filled the galleries of the hall. But if the tiers état was not any longer a single Estate, was their assembly a meeting of the States-General of France? This question was raised on June 15, in the arguments of Mounier and Malouet, who were both terrified at the boldness of the proposed measures; but the deputies, after being excited by the eloquence of Barnave and Mirabeau, declared themselves, by an immense majority, to be the National Assembly of France. They followed up this step by declaring all taxes hitherto exacted illegal, but ordered that they should continue

¹ The opinion of the Duke of Dorset, the English Ambassador at Paris at this time, is worth noting. He writes in a private letter to the Duke of Leeds, the Secretary of State, on June 11, "The ministers seem to have no plan whatever, and are letting themselves be bullied by a few hot-headed lawyers of the Tiers État." Leeds Correspondence in British Museum; Add. MSS. 28064, p. 126.

to be levied for the present. Their rapid progress was noted with dismay by the court. The queen, indeed, in the depth of her mourning for the Dauphin, who had died on June 4, did not interfere, but the friends of the Comte d'Artois, the king's younger brother, loudly demanded that an example should be made of these insolent provincials. The tiers état were, therefore, ordered to suspend their sitting until a "séance royale," or royal session, which was fixed for June 22, should be held.

But the tiers état would not obey. On June 20, when the deputies found themselves unable to enter their hall, they ran in a crowd to the largest building they could find in Versailles, namely, the tennis-court. There, in the tennis-court, under the presidency of Bailly, the newly elected president of the National Assembly, they swore that they would never separate until a constitution had been drawn up. The oath was all but unanimous, and the one deputy who opposed it, Martin of Auch, was permitted to state his opposition by the universal respect held for liberty of opinion. The oath of the tennis-court had now given to the National Assembly that bond of cohesion which it had hitherto lacked. The deputies were no longer an assembly of provincials, without a knowledge of each other and with no fixed aim, without leaders and without experience; they had now, by their serious opposition to the commands of the king, formed themselves into a body of rebels—rebels who would not fail to be punished if they did not hold together.

On June 22, after hearing that the séance royale had been adjourned, the National Assembly met in the Church of St. Louis, because the tennis-court had been engaged for a game at tennis by the Comte d'Artois; and here, in the church where the Bishop of Nancy's sermon had been preached, 149 of the deputies of the estate of the clergy, headed by the Archbishops of Vienne and Bordeaux, and the Bishops of Chartres and Rhodéz, as well as two liberal deputies of the Estate of the noblesse of Dauphiné—the Marquis de Blaçons and M. d'Agoult—joined the tiers état, and acknowledged the

existence of the National Assembly. Yet the king and his advisers could not perceive the serious consequences of this union, and on June 23, at the *séance royale*, Louis XVI., after promising, "of his own goodness and generosity," to levy no further taxes without the consent of the representatives of the people, nevertheless stated that the financial privileges of the noblesse and the clergy were unassailable, and finally directed that the three orders should continue to deliberate apart. When the king and the majority of the noblesse and the minority of the clergy had left the hall, the scene was very different to the scene which had taken place in the same hall on May 5. No longer were the deputies of the tiers état conscious that they were disunited. They were now the National Assembly of France, and felt their powers redoubled by the applause of the galleries, and they determined never to retreat. There was one moment in which the Assembly might have given way, but Mirabeau and Siéyès thrust themselves into the breach. Mirabeau imperiously stated to the Marquis de Dreux-Brézé, grand-master of the ceremonies, that "the commons of France would never retire except at the point of the bayonet;" while Siéyès declared to the Assembly, "Gentlemen, you are to-day what you were yesterday." On Mirabeau's motion the persons of the deputies were declared inviolable, and the National Assembly of France was at open issue with the king and the court. That so much had been done was due, more than to any other man, to Honoré Gabriel de Riqueti, Comte de Mirabeau. He was the one man who showed himself a statesman, who had seen that retreat was impossible, and had thus assured the formation of a new French constitution, and the power of the National Assembly.

Honoré Gabriel Riqueti¹ was sprung of no ancient Florentine race, as he proudly believed, but descended from a wealthy bourgeois family of Digne and Marseilles, which had purchased

¹ For the family of Mirabeau, see *Les Mirabeau*, by Louis de Loménie, 2 vols., Paris, 1878; for his life, see the *Mémoires de Mirabeau*, published by Lucas de Montigny, his adopted son, in 8 vols., 1834; and the article on him in the 9th edition of *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

the domain and castle, and with them the title, of Mirabeau from the family of Barras. His family had been famous for three generations for violent passions and great abilities, and the quarrels of Mirabeau with his father, and of his father with his mother, were of world-wide notoriety. It is not necessary to go through the record of his early transgressions, for it was not until they had been expiated by years of imprisonment that he began to show himself the great man he really was. He was born in 1748, and, after serving for a short time in the army, he succeeded by his excesses in being frequently imprisoned by "lettres de cachet." It has been customary to blame his father, the Marquis de Mirabeau, for this severity against his son; but if lettres de cachet were at all justifiable, there certainly could be no man who more thoroughly deserved his punishment by them than Mirabeau himself. The period of his reformation may be dated from 1781, when he left the prison of Vincennes after three years' confinement. There he seems to have at last worn out the grossness of his passions, and there he wrote his first valuable work on the subject of lettres de cachet. In this book first appears that union of hot enthusiasm, eloquence, and vast historical learning with a practical purpose, which is the key-note of his political greatness. When he left Vincennes he formed a connection with a Dutch lady, Madame de Nehra,¹ which sweetened his life and raised it from the depths into which he had sunk. He had now some one to work for, and up to the time that the French Revolution commenced he had steadily improved in power and political knowledge. He spent the first months of this period in England, where he was introduced by an old school-fellow, Sir Gilbert Elliot,² who was then a leading Whig and a member of the House of Commons, to many of the most distinguished English politicians of the time. They were nearly all Whigs of the type of Sir Gilbert Elliot, and the greatest of

¹ *Mirabeau et Madame de Nehra*, by Louis de Loménie, published in his *Esquisses historiques et littéraires*, 1879.

² *Life and Letters of Sir Gilbert Elliot, first Earl of Minto*, 3 vols., 1874. See particularly pp. 87 and 88, vol. i.

them were Lord Lansdowne and Samuel Romilly. It was in London that he first studied practical politics. It was in England also that he learnt that perfection was impossible in governments, and that the great faults to be avoided alike in constitutions and administrations were narrowness and unyielding rigour, for Lord Lansdowne was the first of the new Whigs, who looked upon the English constitution as leaving room for improvement, and recognized that its power of being improved was its finest quality. With Romilly he lived in greater intimacy, and for many months saw him nearly every day; and Romilly, in a passage in his "Memoirs," declares that the reports of his immorality were greatly exaggerated by his enemies, and adds, "I have no doubt that, in his public conduct as in his writings, he was desirous of doing good, that his ambition was of the noblest kind, and that he proposed to himself the noblest ends."¹ After some months in London, Madame de Nehra made his peace at Paris, and he returned to France, with the hope of obtaining employment from the French Foreign Office, which was then in the hands of an able statesman, M. de Vergennes. Mirabeau was not disappointed, and in 1786 was sent on a secret embassy to Berlin, when he showed conclusively his want of capacity as a diplomatist, for he had none of the self-restraint necessary in one who is to examine the thoughts of others and not reveal his own. After his return from Berlin he gave the greatest evidence of his literary power, and at the same time of his untrustworthy character, by the publication of his great work on the "Prussian Monarchy" and of his "Secret Letters from the Court of Berlin." The first of these books was chiefly composed by a Prussian, Major Mauvillon, who had accumulated a quantity of valuable statistics, which Mirabeau treated in such a manner as to throw interest into the driest details by his literary power. But whatever literary fame he might have acquired by this great work, he lost in reputation by the publication of his private letters from Berlin, which was a

¹ *Memoirs of the Life of Sir Samuel Romilly, written by himself*, vol. i. pp. 78-85. London: 1840.

distinct breach of faith with the government. Some notice, too, must be taken of his numerous financial writings. After his return from England he got mixed up with a certain shrewd speculator, named Panchaud, who represented to Mirabeau that stock-jobbing was the source of the financial embarrassment of France and the ruin of many families. A Genevese exile, named Clavière, supplied him with facts, and Mirabeau boldly attacked, not only the whole practice of stock-jobbing, but particular companies, such as the Banque de St. Charles, and individual stock-jobbers. There is, of course, no real value in these pamphlets, but they exhibit Mirabeau's courage in attacking institutions and individuals, however rich or powerful, when he believed such attacks to be justified. He was brought into a controversy with Beaumarchais, which degenerated into violent personalities, in which Beaumarchais did not get the best of it.¹ Mirabeau's libellous language made it necessary for him to fly beyond the frontier, but nevertheless he presented himself as a candidate for the post of secretary to the Assembly of Notables in 1787, and in 1789 he hoped to become a deputy to the States-General for the noblesse of his native place, Aix. But the noblesse refused to admit into their assembly a libeller of bad character, at issue with his father, separated from his wife and hated by his brother, and, on the plea that he was not the owner of a fief or a proxy, refused to listen to him. Outraged by this rejection, he had secured his election both at Aix and Marseilles, as much from the enthusiasm felt for his person by the populace of these cities as from the influence of his eloquence over the educated bourgeois. It was with high hopes that he had been present on May 5. Any man of less confidence in himself than Mirabeau would have been daunted by the murmur of reprobation² which met him when he appeared among his fellow-deputies, and by the manner in which he was shunned; but he felt within himself a power of eloquence which made him

¹ *Beaumarchais et son temps*, by L. de Loménie, vol. ii. pp. 371-381. Paris: 1856.

² Étienne Dumont's *Souvenirs sur Mirabeau*, p. 34.

confident that the men who hooted him now and cheered Mounier would eventually follow him and reject the guidance of theorists. And so it was; hardly had he uttered a single speech when he was felt to be a leader of men, and his position as the greatest of the deputies in the Assembly, in eloquence, in courage, and in political knowledge, was finally established by his memorable answer to the Marquis de Dreux-Brézé on June 23.

The courage of the Assembly won the victory. The king, with no real statesman to advise him, gave way. On June 25 forty-seven members of the liberal noblesse, headed by the Duke of Orleans, joined the Assembly, and, by the king's command, the rest followed two days later. The majority of the noblesse very unwillingly obeyed this command, and pretended, even in the hall of the common assembly, to sit as a separate order, with the Duc de Luxembourg, their president, at their head. Still more consistent was the conduct of the Baron de Lupé, deputy for the noblesse of Auch, who continued to sit by himself in the former chamber of the noblesse, and, when that was closed against him, to walk up and down the corridor outside it for a certain number of hours a day.¹ The majority of the clergy, the minority of the noblesse, and the tiers état began at once to make preparations for drawing up a new constitution for the kingdom, and a committee was appointed, of which Mounier was the chief spirit, to arrange an order of procedure for the discussion of the proposed new constitution; and, at the same time, the members of the Assembly began to get better known to each other, and to combine into clubs, and to form sections, which afterwards became important parties.

The club of the greatest importance was that known as the Breton Club. After the election of the Breton deputies, a committee of correspondence had been elected in all the cities of Brittany, in order to correspond with their chosen deputies at Versailles. These deputies, for the purpose of more easily drawing up their correspondence and reporting political events

¹ *Souvenirs d'un page de la cour de Louis XVI.*, by the Comte d'Hézecques, p. 295. Paris: 1873.

to their constituents, formed a small society. From the distinguished character of Lanjuinais, Defermon, and Le Chapelier, the society was soon joined by others who had similar duties to perform, and on June 9, Boullé, deputy for Ploërmel, wrote to Pontivy, "Our salon has been every evening for some days the rendezvous of all good citizens."¹ From the Breton Club finally arose the Jacobin Club, and from the correspondence and from the keenness of the provinces to receive this correspondence, arose the affiliated Jacobin clubs.

As early as June 23 Mounier had lost that great influence which he naturally expected, and which all France believed would belong to him. Great as he had been in Dauphiné, and invaluable as had been his services during the electoral period, he failed from a want of courage when face to face with a national crisis; and the leadership of the Assembly had left him, and had fallen to Mirabeau. He perceived this quickly enough, and refused at once to follow any man's lead, and above all Mirabeau's. However, his vanity made him conceive that the power which Mirabeau by his eloquence had won from him would be regained by his political knowledge in drawing up a constitution; but he looked on the idea of a new constitution as a pedant might, full of elaborate theories and ideas of logical sequence, and hoped to make his name as famous as those of the first leaders in the United States of America. Around him were grouped a few theorists, overawed by his great reputation; but he was unable, from want of persuasiveness, to form a party. Malouet, the other chief leader of the tiers état during the electoral period, also failed at this crisis. He could not get rid of his natural feeling of respect for the government in whose service he had been for so many years, and was shocked at the daring proposition of the deputies of the tiers état to form themselves into a National Assembly. Many felt as he did, especially the numerous lieutenants-civil and lieutenants-general, who had been elected, and who believed the administrative edifice to

¹ Philippe Muller, *Clubs et clubistes du Morbihan*, in the *Revue de la Révolution*, March, 1885, p. 234.

be too strong to be divided and too valuable to be overthrown. Yet, though the germ of a party of reaction among the deputies of the tiers état itself was to be seen in Malouet and his immediate friends, the party was at present of no real importance. Mounier and Malouet having dropped from the position of leaders, their places were taken by Mirabeau and certain other more courageous deputies, among whom the chief supporters of Mirabeau were, besides Siéyès, Camus, Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, and the Abbé Grégoire.

Armand Gaston Camus,¹ the recognized leader of the Jansenists in France, was born in Paris in 1740. He became an avocat in Paris, but first established his reputation as the translator of Aristotle's "Natural History," which had secured his election to the Academy of Inscriptions. He was then appointed avocat-general for the clergy, who, as has been mentioned, were much influenced by Jansenist opinions, especially since the suppression of the Jesuits. The influence of the Jansenist² party has often been overlooked, but a study of the social condition of the wealthy bourgeois classes shows that its only rival influences were the mystic ideas of the Martinists,³ and the still more incredible doctrines of Mesmer,⁴ St. Germain, and Cagliostro. The Parlement of Paris and most of the provincial parlements had been infected with Jansenism as early as the reign of Louis XV., and in the struggle with the Jesuits the lawyers of the Parlements began to hold Jansenist tenets, rather from political than from religious causes. The sound morality and sober garb of the Jansenists,

¹ *Éloge de M. A. G. Camus*, by the Comte Toulangeon, printed in the edition of his *Lettres sur la profession d'avocat*, published in Paris, 1818.

² The most interesting account of Jansenism and its development is contained in Sainte-Beuve's *Port Royal*, published in 5 vols. Paris: 1840-61.

³ *Saint-Martin, le philosophe inconnu, sa vie et ses écrits*, by Jacques Matter. Paris: 1862.

⁴ For the trifling political influence possessed by these enthusiasts, see Mounier's *Essai sur l'influence attribuée aux philosophes, aux franc-maçons et aux illuminés sur la Révolution française*. Paris: 1882.

which made them appear the Puritans of the Roman Catholic Church, suited well the quiet character of the richer members of the bourgeoisie, and that there were such quiet bourgeois cannot be denied, though memoirs and letters are chiefly filled with the lives of their gayer brethren. But this Jansenist party, though not obtrusive, though not striving to make converts, or, for the matter of that, holding extremely strong religious convictions themselves, were yet a very great power in the greater cities of France. Camus was a typical Jansenist. Strictly moral, not so much by conviction as by temperament, quiet and self-controlled, and extremely laborious, not gifted with eloquence or quickness of apprehension, but making his influence felt by quiet industry rather than by brilliant achievements, he was exactly the man to have great influence among the richer bourgeoisie of Paris. He was, therefore, elected second president of the assembly of the electors of the tiers état of Paris, and had been chosen a deputy for the capital on the next day to Bailly. Just as Bailly had been elected first president of the National Assembly on its constituting itself, so Camus had been chosen its first secretary. In that capacity he had acted at the tennis-court, and had immediately afterwards been appointed archivist to the Assembly—an office which he held until his death, in 1804. His services were at this time invaluable to Mirabeau, whom he generally supported, for his honourable character gave him a personal influence with many more moral members, which Mirabeau could not expect otherwise to obtain.

Jean Paul Rabaut de Saint-Étienne¹ was the recognized champion of the French Protestants. He was born at Nîmes, the chief centre of French Protestantism, in 1742, and his father was a very famous wandering and persecuted Huguenot preacher. He himself had been educated in Switzerland, and had become a Protestant pastor, and, after showing literary ability in numerous published sermons and poems, became

¹ *Notice sur la vie de Rabaut de Saint-Étienne*, by his colleague in the Constituent Assembly, Boissy d'Anglas, in the edition of *Le vieux Cevenol*, printed at Paris in 1846.

intimate with Boissy d'Anglas, and made the acquaintance of Lafayette. He had won still greater popularity by the publication of "*Le Vieux Cevenol*," in 1780. This novel described, in the wandering life of a Protestant pastor, the persecutions which had been for many years and were still undergone by the Protestants in France. The excitement it caused enabled him to demand from the king civil rights for his persecuted religion, and in 1787, chiefly through the influence of Lafayette, the king had granted the ordinary rights of citizenship to the Protestants. Rabaut was thus the hero of the French Protestants, and had also become well known, when at Paris, to Bailly and many others of those with whom he was now to co-operate. In 1789 he was naturally elected at the head of the poll by the tiers état of Nîmes, and had published, just before his election, a pamphlet on the rights and duties of the tiers état. He was, next to Mounier and Camus, the most important deputy of the tiers état at the conference with the representatives of the other Estates, and was the most inflexible of them all in insisting on the supreme power of his own order. He was at this time more radical in his ideas than any other deputy, and upheld a wide programme of reform, including liberty of the press and liberty of conscience, which he hoped to succeed in carrying. To Mirabeau he was, like Camus, of the greatest assistance, for, though from his religion he had not the personal influence of Camus, he had a much greater power of oratory, and nearly as much industry. Throughout the session of the National Assembly he played a very important part, but was towards the end eclipsed by younger orators and more radical thinkers. He was not only a frequent speaker, but a hardworking journalist, and was to the last day of his life a contributor to the *Moniteur* and other journals. His courageous behaviour in the Convention and his sad death present him in a very different light; but at this time he was not only a man of great distinction, but a leader of great importance.

Henri Grégoire¹ was at this time recognized as the

¹ *Notice sur la vie de Grégoire*, by Hippolyte Carnot, in his edition of

typical representative of the curés, as Camus was of the Jansenists, and Rabaut de Saint-Étienne of the Protestants. He was born near Lunéville, in Lorraine, in 1750. He had been educated by the Jesuits at Nancy, and distinguished himself, when hardly of age, by his wonderful eloquence. The curés of Lorraine were, he states in his "Memoirs," of a much higher type than other provincial curés; but whether that was so or not, it is certain that they produced a very large number of distinguished men during the Revolution. Nancy, which had been for many years the capital of the independent duchy of Lorraine, where Stanislas Leczinski held a little court, abounded in literary society, and Grégoire, whose eloquence was at this time extremely florid, became one of the shining lights of the local Academy. His early sermons resemble those of the English preachers of the reign of Charles II.; the principles insisted on are but few, but morality is dwelt upon in every variety of flowery speech. That Grégoire was a man of few religious principles does not imply that they were not very deep; he was a sincere Christian, but not a bigoted ultramontane Roman Catholic. His travels from his little country parish of Embermesnil, in 1784, 1786, and 1787, had given him a wider knowledge of the world than most curés possessed, and his literary reputation from his essays, which had won prizes from the Academies of Nancy and Metz, had made him quite a leader among them. The part he played in drawing up the civil constitution of the clergy is the most important passage in his life; but he was now the influential leader of the country curés, who had to show their sympathy with the people in the National Assembly as they had done in the separate chamber of the clergy. Though not the first to join the Assembly, this was due, not to lukewarmness of opinion, but a successful attempt to bring others with him. As a leader of the curés, he might have won a great position and great wealth from the bishops, who did all they could to bribe

Grégoire's *Mémoires*, published in 2 vols., Paris, 1857. See also *Grégoire, ein Lebensbild aus der französischen Revolution*, by Paul Böhringer, Basel, 1878; a short but interesting study.

the Estate of the clergy to follow them; but Grégoire was more of a patriot than a Churchman, and in these early days it is as a patriot alone that his influence has to be considered.

These were the men who helped Mirabeau in his uphill task of guiding the inexperienced and excitable Assembly, and these were his chief coadjutors in helping him to face a yet greater crisis than any which had yet arisen; for the court had at last worked upon the king to act more violently than he had formerly done, and while Mounier was preparing the basis of a constitution, and the rest of the Assembly receiving petitions and answering congratulations, troops, and generally foreign troops in French pay, were being concentrated from all parts of France upon Versailles, and no one could fail to perceive that it was by the help of these troops that the king intended to crush the newly born liberties of France. The excitement at the approach of these troops was as great in Paris as at Versailles. The Parisians feared a repetition of former sieges; the Assembly feared the immediate arrest of all its leaders; and at this very moment, when apprehension was in every heart, the news suddenly arrived, on July 12, that Necker had been dismissed from the ministry, and was already on his way towards the frontier. An old courtier, the Baron de Breteuil, had been appointed Minister of the Household, and the Maréchal de Broglie Minister of War and marshal-general commanding the troops round Paris. Breteuil had been Minister of the Household under Calonne, and was the very last man from whom the French people could expect any assistance. At this time it was again Mirabeau who led the Assembly, who called upon it to send a deputation to the king, demanding the withdrawal of these foreign troops, who did not fear to utter words which might cost him his life, and who had no idea of retiring from the great position he had won. Even at this time he might have sold his services to the court, who would have paid him a great price, which he sorely needed. But he proved himself to be a great and courageous statesman as well as an eloquent speaker, and kept the Assembly true to itself and to France. Yet no amount of

personal courage could have protected the Assembly against the foreign troops of De Broglie, had not the Parisians struck a blow which secured for ever, not only the independence of the Assembly, but the political liberty of France, on the great day of July 14. But if the greatest fame is due to the citizens of Paris, the front of unyielding firmness shown by the Assembly and its great leader must not be left unrecognized as an important factor at this crisis of the history of France and of the French Revolution.

CHAPTER III.

THE COURT AND THE MINISTRY.

The king—Necker—Montmorin—Why were they unsuccessful?—The Comte de Provence—The Duke of Orleans—The friends of Orleans and his party—The queen—The Comte d'Artois and his policy—The Maréchal de Broglie—Concentration of troops—Mirabeau's speech—The new ministry—The first emigration.

OF all the enthusiastic hopes which had greeted the summons of the States-General, none were more sincere and more confident than those of the king. He had ever wished to deal justly and fairly with his people. He felt the burden of financial distress as keenly as the meanest of his subjects, and he possessed all those qualities of economy, courtesy, and kindness which would have made him an admirable king under a settled and representative government; and this good disposition manifested itself in spite of the most adverse circumstances in his education. Louis XVI. was born in the year 1757, and had been brought up without any preparation for the high office which he was one day to hold. He could not boast of a Fénelon, or even of a Fleury, as his political tutor, and his constitutional ideas arose from his own sensible nature. In his grandfather's lifetime and reign he had been regarded as a simple nonentity until his marriage, in 1770, with the Archduchess Marie Antoinette. He did not at once succumb to her influence, as has been commonly believed, but, on the contrary, her gaiety and liveliness were in the early

years of his marriage most distasteful to him.¹ Previous to his grandfather's death he had been content to live entirely aloof from political parties, and had amused himself with hunting and lock-making, and on his accession he had no personal friends, or favourites whom he wished to benefit. His opposition to the wishes of his queen was shown by his refusal to recall the Duc de Choiseul, the friend of the Austrian alliance, who had negotiated the marriage of Marie Antoinette, to the ministry, though he so far yielded to her wishes as to dismiss the ministry which Madame Dubarry had set up. The queen's influence was always of this nature with him. She was able by fear, and later by persuasion, to make Louis act contrary to his own wishes, but not to make him adopt her views. He was, directly after his accession to the throne, chiefly influenced by his aunts,² who persuaded him to make the Comte de Maurepas his first Prime Minister, and Maurepas called Turgot to his counsels. M. Turgot was overthrown by the queen for his attempt to reduce the expenditure of the court, but left office with the sympathies, not only of the whole people, but of the king himself. Necker's first administration inspired the king with a strong belief in his financial abilities, but Necker too had to give way before the opposition of the queen and the court. The subsequent ministers, especially Calonne and Brienne, were by no means favourites with him, but he submitted to them, and did obediently whatever they required of him. It was only after the birth of his first son that he became personally attached to the queen, who, however, laughed at her good-natured and uxorious husband, whose slowness of intellect and awkward gait excited her ridicule. Though slow to study and understand the signs of the times,

¹ *Marie Antoinette: Correspondance secrète entre Marie Thérèse et le Comte de Mercy-Argenteau, avec les lettres de Marie Thérèse et de Marie Antoinette, publiée avec une introduction et des notes*, by the Ritter von Arneth and M. A. Geffroy (Paris, 1874, 3 vols.), the great storehouse of facts for the early married life of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette.

² *Mesdames de France, Filles de Louis XVI.*, by Édouard de Barthélemy, chap. xi. Paris: 1870.

Louis had read the story of Charles I. of England, and determined that, whatever might happen, he would never run counter to the wishes of his people, and never engage in a civil war. Beyond this he was easily satisfied with the gratification of his enormous appetite and with his favourite amusement of hunting, and would not share in the gay, frivolous pleasures of the queen. So devoted was he to the chase, that when the council of ministers were discussing before him what city should be selected for the meeting-place of the States-General, he at once decided, "It must meet at Versailles, because of the hunting,"¹ a decision which influenced the whole course of the Revolution. When the States-General met, he was ready to agree with the representatives of the people in establishing a new form of government; but here again the wishes of the queen prevented him from carrying out the whole of his programme. Good-natured and amenable to advice, he preferred a quiet life even to doing what he knew to be right, and the chief blame which can be attached to him, throughout the course of the later years of his life, was that of seeking his own personal ease and comfort before the prosperity of his country. Yet he was a true Frenchman at heart, and an adherent to the hereditary Bourbon policy of enmity with Austria, and he had ever opposed the queen's desire of a close political alliance with her brother, the Emperor Joseph, especially with regard to the scheme of exchanging the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria.² In the recall of Necker, in August, 1788, the king had exercised his own will, and when the States-General met he was thoroughly satisfied with Necker's ministry.

Jacques Necker³ was born at Geneva, in 1732, and had made a colossal fortune as managing partner in Paris of the

¹ Bardoux, *Comtesse de Beaumont*, p. 107.

² *Le Département des Affaires étrangères pendant la Révolution*, by F. Masson, chap. ii. Paris, 1877; *L'Europe et la Révolution française*, by Albert Sorel, p. 300. Paris, 1885.

³ *La vie privée de M. Necker*, by Madame de Staël, 1804; article in the 9th edition *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

great bank of Thelusson and Necker, of London and Paris. He had no thought of mixing in politics until his marriage, in 1764, with Suzanne Curchod, the daughter of a Swiss pastor at Lausanne, who had been engaged for some years to a pupil of her father's, Edmund Gibbon, the historian.¹ She was an accomplished and ambitious woman, and, after making Necker give over his share in the bank to his brother Louis, induced him to take an active part in the management of the French East India Company, and also to oppose Turgot's free-trade schemes in his "*Essai sur la législation et le commerce des grains*" and his "*Dialogue sur les blés*." His success in improving the financial position of the company led men to believe that Necker could deal as successfully with the finances of the country. But he was too apt, by his early training, to treat the revenues of the country like the affairs of a company or bank. He could not comprehend that larger interests than the mere consolidation of a deficit into a national debt were involved in the prosperity of a great country. That he had a great idea of a representative government and the advantages of the system being applied to France is shown in the measures which he took for the convocation of the States-General. But he was no statesman. He failed to perceive that some responsibility must be incurred by a responsible minister, and he was too apt to leave things to work themselves out. Had he originally decided in favour of vote "*par tête*" when he prepared to summon the States-General, the wrangling, which embittered the months of May and June, and the subsequent combination of the whole of the tiers état into a league which found it necessary to force the king into measures of which he really approved, might have been avoided. Necker had not acted in compliance with his own convictions, and preferred that other people should bear the responsibility of failure, and to this want of courage must be attributed the downfall of his second ministry and the loss of his popularity. He had, like Choiseul, a great idea of consulting public opinion, of entertaining and making friends of

¹ Gibbon's *Autobiography*.

the chief literary men of his time, and in this he was aided by the abilities of his wife, and of his yet more famous daughter, Madame de Staël. When the States-General was summoned, Necker must have known that it would wish to proceed to great and radical reforms; yet he preferred to lay before it only the financial difficulties of the country, and did not see that, by so doing, none of the popularity of initiating reforms would revert to the king. His moral ideas were sound, but narrow; and, as will be seen later, he refused to co-operate with Mirabeau on account of the latter's bad character, which lost him a fair opportunity for establishing a truly representative government. His colleagues—De Paule de Barentin, who had succeeded Lamoignon de Basseville as Keeper of the Seals and practical Minister of Justice, owing to the exile of Maupeou, the old Chancellor; Laurent de Villedeuil, Minister of the Household, who was really Minister of the Interior; the Comte de Puységur, War Minister; and the Comte de la Luzerne, brother of the Bishop of Langres, Minister of the Marine,—with the exception only of the Comte de Montmorin, Minister for Foreign Affairs, were all nonentities. In the council of ministers, Barentin, Villedeuil, and Puységur formed the conservative section, and had opposed the double representation of the tiers état, while Necker had been supported by La Luzerne, Montmorin, and the Comte de Saint-Priest, who had been admitted into the council of ministers without portfolio in December, 1788.

Armand Marc, Comte de Montmorin-Saint-Hérem¹ had far more influence over the mind of the king than Necker himself, not only because he was a French nobleman, but because he had been gentleman-in-waiting to Louis when Dauphin. Montmorin had been educated for the career of diplomacy, and had spent some years as French Ambassador at Madrid, when he was suddenly summoned to the government of Brittany, and

¹ *Pauline de Montmorin, Comtesse de Beaumont: Études sur la fin du XVIII^{ème} siècle*, by A. Bardoux, Paris, 1884, which contains a defence of Montmorin's policy; and Masson's *Département des Affaires étrangères*, etc., chap. ii.

in 1787 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the death of the Comte de Vergennes. Vergennes was a foreign minister of peculiar and exceptional ability. He had caused France to play a great part in continental politics, in spite of her financial distress and the bad condition of her army, and had successfully concealed her weakness from all Europe. Never had France appeared greater than at the close of the American War of Independence, and proportionately difficult was Montmorin's task in succeeding Vergennes. He had none of Vergennes' ability, but had inherited his skill in concealing the real condition of France; and, though the part played by France in the Dutch troubles of 1788 could not be called glorious, war had been avoided, and the French party in Holland only overthrown by English diplomacy and a Prussian army. He was a devoted admirer of Necker's policy in home affairs, and echoed his words and thoughts, and it was through his Minister for Foreign Affairs that Necker himself maintained his influence over the king.

Louis XVI. and Necker were in every way ready to accept a new constitution, and, had either of them been men of sufficient strength of will to take the initiative in proposing a representative assembly and certain necessary reforms, the Revolution might have been a bloodless one. But there were reasons why they could not do as they wished; for two great parties, headed by the Duke of Orleans and by Marie Antoinette, were both opposed to anything like peaceful concessions, and some notice must also be taken of the position of the Comte de Provence, who, though he showed no very great interest in political affairs and formed no party, yet hoped eventually to sit upon the throne of France.

Louis Stanislas Xavier, Comte de Provence,¹ and next brother to the king, commonly known as Monsieur, had for many years been heir presumptive to the throne, and his disappointment at the birth of two sons to the king was manifest

¹ *Vie de Louis XVIII.*, by Alphonse de Beauchamp, 1832; and *Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette et le Comte de Provence en face de la Révolution*, by L. P. Todièrè. Paris: 1863.

to all the court. He had been from the very first the declared enemy of the queen, and, with his friends, had spared no pains to destroy her reputation as a woman, and to diminish her influence with the king. He believed that it was yet possible for himself to come to the throne, and hoped that, even if the king died leaving issue, he might be able to form a junction with the new constitutional party and obtain his nomination as regent, if not as king. His character was quiet and inoffensive, cautious but malicious, and he possessed great influence with his brother, Louis XVI., because their temperaments were very similar. He, too, feared civil war as the greatest disaster which could befall France, and was not disinclined to let things go on without interference from himself. His sole object of hatred was the queen, who laughed at his quiet, pedantic ways and his ugly wife. His one consolation was Horace, whose maxims on the uncertainty of human affairs and the capriciousness of fortune he was to find well justified in the varied events of his own life. That he really had statesmanlike ideas was shown afterwards in his being the medium through which the plans of Mirabeau for saving the court from the results of its folly, and securing the permanency of monarchy in France, were first communicated to the king. The very words he used to Mirabeau after submitting his plan showed the small opinion he had of the king's stability. He said, and truly, that to persuade the king to be steadfast in any course of action was like "trying to hold a number of oiled billiard balls steadily together." He cannot be reckoned a dangerous enemy of the king and Necker, but he was perfectly ready to take advantage of any mistake which the queen might make to put himself forward as a candidate for the throne or for the regency.

The most dangerous declared opponent of the king and his ministry was the Duke of Orleans, whose party was determined to prevent a peaceful termination to the existing excitement. The duke had in early life been a debauchee, and he still remained an intimate friend of the Prince of Wales. He had brought back from London the worst traits of English

society. He it was who set the fashion of Anglomania to the young noblesse of France : he introduced English jockeys, English gambling, English horse-racing, and English drunkenness ; and wished that he could enjoy a similar position in France to that of the Prince of Wales in England. He knew how often the English Parliament had paid the debts of the Prince of Wales, and would have liked to be a constitutional monarch to enjoy a similar advantage. His party pursued a regular plan, by which they hoped he might become King of France. This plan was to force the king into such opposition to the National Assembly that he should be deposed, and by lavish expenditure to secure the election of Orleans as a constitutional king. This scheme was highly approved by his sycophants, of whom the leaders were the Marquis de Saint-Huruge and Choderlos de Laclos, but were hardly formulated even in his own mind. "The Duke was a man of pleasure," writes Mrs. Elliott, "who never could bear trouble or business of any kind, who never read or did anything but amuse himself. I am certain that he never at that time had an idea of mounting the throne, whatever the views of his factious friends might have been. If they could have placed him on the throne of France, I suppose they hoped to govern him and the country." ¹ By their advice he had offered himself as candidate in no less than five bailliages, but had only succeeded in securing his election at Crèpy-le-Valois, Villers-Cotterets, and Paris. It was his wealth at this period which proved of the greatest use to the popular leaders, for it was by his means that the works of Siéyès were circulated throughout France, and he showed himself ready to assist in the circulation of even much more revolutionary cahiers. It would have been of no advantage for these schemes for him to be regarded as a public leader in the States-General, as long as the king maintained his personal popularity, and to destroy that yet more treacherous means were used. There is little doubt that it was in accordance with the wishes, if not with the direct orders, of the party of Orleans that

¹ *Journal of My Life during the French Revolution*, by Grace Dalrymple Elliott, pp. 27, 28. London : 1859.

many of the riots in Paris broke out. Whether they hired bands of brigands to raise disturbances in the provinces or to attack the manufactory of Réveillon is indeed most improbable; but they certainly did not disapprove of these outbreaks of popular feeling. At a later period it was suspicious, to say the least of it, that Saint-Huruge was always at the head of every Parisian riot. But if the duke trusted to Saint-Huruge to make the king's position more difficult by riots in Paris, it was the counsellor of the Parlement of Paris, Adrien Duport, who was his most trusted adviser, and who led his party in the National Assembly.

Adrien Duport was a leader of the Parlement of Paris in the struggle with Brienne, and had been early attached to the service of Orleans. He it was who suggested to the duke the idea of becoming a constitutional king. He himself expected to be Prime Minister under the new régime, and if he was ignorant of the behaviour of Saint-Huruge, there can be no doubt that he approved of its results. He had first formed a small party in the Assembly, of whom the most distinguished members were Barnave and the two Lameths, who believed him when he told them that the Duke of Orleans was ready and willing to be a constitutional king. Even Mirabeau was communicated with by this profound intriguer; but Mirabeau, though for a moment tempted by the idea, was too true a statesman to wish to involve France in a civil war, consequent on a disputed title to the throne. Saint-Huruge was a partisan of a very different type.¹ He was an admirable leader of a street mob. With an enormous frame and a bawling voice, which gave him the nickname of "Bull" Huruge, he was able to direct popular excitement in whatever direction he wished. In every important riot throughout the first years of the Revolution, Saint-Huruge was at the head of the rioters. Noisy and debauched, he could not be called a politician, but made a most useful servant, and if much odium fell on the party of Orleans through his conduct, he was never-

¹ Anatole de Gallier, *Les Émeutiers de 1789*, in the *Revue des Questions Historiques*, July, 1883, pp. 131-134.

theless invaluable to it. Choderlos de Laclos was of yet another stamp.¹ As the author of "*Les Liaisons dangereuses*," one of the most licentious novels which has ever been written, he was of course welcome at the Palais-Royal, and had a great reputation among the dandy debauchees, who assembled there. After the meeting of the States-General he filled the same position at Paris as Duport did in the Assembly, and his greatest services to the party of Orleans were performed in the Breton and afterwards in the Jacobin Club. He was a fluent speaker and a ready writer, but his licentious character kept his power from being real, and though his aid was not to be despised, yet, had Orleans had as able a leader as Duport to conduct his cause in Paris, a much more formidable party might have been formed among the bourgeoisie of the capital.

All these satellites of Orleans were men who were not likely to arouse any real enthusiasm, but their influence in discrediting the honest endeavours of the king and Necker to bring about reforms must not be underrated in considering that unpopularity of the king which ensured his downfall. It may be thought strange that any weight could be attached to such a man as the Duke of Orleans, but it was rather his wealth than his character which made him of political importance, and that great wealth being lavishly dispensed helped to increase Necker's difficulties at the most critical period. The contemporary writers and contemporary journalists attributed too much, no doubt, to the intrigues of Orleans, to whom every riot, every public demonstration, and every boisterous petition was always assigned. The man was so vain that a little flattery on the part of the queen, who would not conceal her contempt for him, or a little evidence of favour from the king, might easily have turned his hostility into real friendship, which, though it might not have contributed any moral support to the Crown, would yet have neutralized a most powerful source of opposition, for it was the Palais-Royal, rather than the Duke of Orleans, which possessed real political important-

¹ Anatole de Gallier, *Les Émeutiers de 1789*, in the *Revue des Questions Historiques*, July, 1883, pp. 131-134.

ance. To its salons were attached all those who had won fame in the Assembly by their eloquence, like Barnave ; or reputation by their pens in Paris, like Camille Desmoulins ; while in its garden were held those public meetings, which often resulted in bloodshed and disorder. But if the Comte de Provence and the Duke of Orleans were obstacles to any peaceful solution of the difficulties of the time, still more was the great body of the courtiers under the guidance of Marie Antoinette and the Comte d'Artois.

Marie Antoinette¹ was born on the day of the great earthquake of Lisbon, November 2, 1755, and had been destined from her cradle by her mother, the Empress-Queen Maria Theresa, to be Queen of France. It was a part of the Empress Maria Theresa's policy to establish her daughters all over Europe as supporters of the Austrian alliance. Thus Marie Caroline had become Queen of Naples, Marie Amélie Queen of Sardinia, and Marie Charlotte Duchess of Parma, while Marie Christine, the eldest daughter and Duchess of Saxe-Teschen, governed the Austrian Netherlands with her husband. With these daughters, as well as with Marie Antoinette, the empress-queen kept up a continuous correspondence, and always tried to keep them Austrians at heart, of whatever nationality they might have become by marriage. Marie Antoinette had been married to the Dauphin of France when but a child of fourteen years old, and had since then had nothing to direct her but her own wishes and caprices, the solemn advice of her first lady-in-waiting, the Duchesse de Noailles, whom she nicknamed Madame Etiquette, and the numerous letters which she received from her mother and her brother Joseph. Though not of a bad disposition, from too early indulgence of her own will she had become unable to exercise self-control. When she first came to France

¹ For a list of works on Marie Antoinette, see *La vraie Marie Antoinette*, by M. de Lescure, 1863. Many of the letters in the published collections of Comte d'Hunolstein, 1864, and M. Feuillet des Conches, 1865, are forged, but the various works of Von Arneth can be depended upon. See also the article upon her in the 9th edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

she was entrusted to the care of the experienced Austrian ambassador at Versailles, the Comte de Mercy-Argenteau,¹ and his first complaints of her behaviour are to the effect that she would not clean her teeth and would lose large sums of money at the gaming-table. These faults may be trivial enough in themselves, but they showed the want of self-repression which ruined her character. She exhibited no affection for her foolish but loving husband, and made no attempt to overcome his early indifference to her, until her mother and brother persuaded her to feign affection for their own political purposes. The presence of Mercy and the affection she felt for her brother Joseph kept her always Austrian at heart. This alone would have ensured her unpopularity in France, but her recklessness was used to condemn her still more strongly. Though in all probability faithful to her marriage vows, she yet took undisguised pleasure in flirtation, and was often caught in equivocal positions. The marked favour she showed to handsome young foreigners like Count Fersen, Lord Strathavon, afterwards Marquis of Huntly, and Count Esterhazy, was interpreted to her disadvantage by the Comte de Provence and his ugly wife, who both hated her. Her extravagance was also commented upon; but the immense sums she squandered at the gaming-table, or in buying palaces which she did not want, were rather the result of utter thoughtlessness than of deliberate wastefulness. It is unfair to lay weight upon her low standard of morality, considering the age in which she lived and the manner in which she had been educated, but even such excuses fail to palliate her delight in licentious jests and in loose conversation, and her having an obscene novel bound up in the covers of her missal.² Her choice of friends, too, cannot be commended, for women of worse character than the Polignacs could not have been found at court, and her persistent kindness to them and payment

¹ Von Arneth and Geffroy's *Correspondance secrète entre Marie Thérèse et le Comte de Mercy-Argenteau*.

² *Lundis Révolutionnaires*, by Georges Avenel, 1873. The book is still preserved in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris.

of their debts not unnaturally reacted against herself. That her reputation was so bad throughout France must be attributed to the many enemies she had made at court. She broke down the old barriers of etiquette, which offended the old courtiers who held to the traditions of Louis le Grand, and substituted instead a careless licence, which was unfavourably contrasted with the polished debauchery of Louis XV. Her wild night-drives to Paris, her appearances incognito at masked balls, her persistence in the society of unworthy friends, all contributed to make the people of France believe, after the scandalous affair of the diamond necklace, that she would have yielded, for a present of jewels, to the solicitations of the Cardinal de Rohan.¹ With such caprices Marie Antoinette could not have been expected to show the strength of character she did at trying periods of her life. Yet it is hard to blame her, for her faults arose from the position in which she had been placed; and if the queen must be blamed, who preferred her pleasures to the love of her husband and the esteem of her adopted country, the little princess must be pitied, who had received no education to teach her better, and who at times showed the real generosity of a noble nature. Capricious as the queen was, she had the power of attaching to her any one whom she wished—a power ever indicative of a strong nature. The devotion felt for her by such men as the Count Fersen² and the Baron de Batz, the hearty respect with which she inspired Mirabeau, and the devotion which a single interview could breathe into Barnave, all are proofs that she must have been a woman of singular charm. It was natural that she should fail to understand her husband's feelings of responsibility, and should think that the world was made for her pleasure rather than that she had duties to perform in it. Much of this feeling had been encouraged by her

¹ For the affair of the necklace, see Carlyle's *Miscellaneous Works*, vol. v., and *L'Affaire du Collier*, by E. de Campardon, 1877.

² *Le Comte de Fersen et la cour de France: Extraits des papiers du Grand Maréchal de Suède, J. A. de Fersen*, by R. M. de Klinckowström, 2 vols. Paris: 1878.

unfortunate intimacy with the king's young brother, the Comte d'Artois.

Charles Philippe, Comte d'Artois, whose life was to be the most chequered in modern history, was at this time a young selfish dandy, with good looks but hardly any other good quality. He had not even, to relieve his selfishness, the occasional bursts of generosity which occurred during the life of Marie Antoinette. He had been brought up to despise his elder brothers, and wished to have himself regarded as a leader of fashion in Paris. Besides his selfishness, he possessed great obstinacy of character, and, without any idea of the responsibility of princes or any fear for the future, thought that the world was bound to go on as it had done hitherto. In such an idea he was encouraged by the young courtiers who surrounded him, and who looked upon the movement for reform as a passing nuisance, and regarded the king and Necker as weak fatalists in yielding to it. They themselves had no doubt that the movement for reform could be easily crushed by force of arms, and that at the appearance of the army, or even of the noblesse, the rabble, as they termed not only the populace of Paris and the provinces but also the respectable bourgeoisie, would disperse and beg for mercy. This dependence on the army, and belief in its power to repress discontent, Artois inspired into the queen. She had often heard of the devotion shown to her mother by the Hungarian nobility, and even by the fierce soldiery of the numerous states of Austria, and did not seem to understand that the bulk of the French army were but Frenchmen, and thought of her as other Frenchmen did. When the States-General first met, the queen and the Comte d'Artois were satisfied with laughing at its ideas of reform; but when the queen was plunged into grief by the death of the dauphin, the Comte d'Artois began to take things more seriously, and at the advice of his young companions persuaded the queen, even in the midst of her maternal grief, to influence the king to use the army against the Assembly. The contempt shown by the court noblesse towards the deputies of

the tiers état appeared in the Church of St. Louis as early as May 4, and still more so on May 5, and perhaps most of all in the occupation of the tennis-court for a game on the day after the famous oath of June 20. But when they heard that the king had given in and had ordered the noblesse and clergy to join the tiers état in one assembly, and thus sanctioned the vote "par tête," then laughing contempt changed into fear and dislike, and they loudly cried for open repressive measures. The Comte d'Artois persuaded the queen that if she wished her son ever to possess the same power as his father, she must act promptly at all hazards upon Louis, and insist upon the dismissal of Necker, the arrest of the leaders of the Assembly, and the defeat of the malcontent population of Paris by force of arms. Almost without the king's consent, and certainly against his wishes, the queen then directed the old Maréchal de Broglie to concentrate upon Paris all the troops he could collect.

Victor François de Broglie, the second duke of that title, was descended from the Italian family of Broglio, and both his father and grandfather had attained the rank of Marshal of France. He was just seventy years old when he was summoned by the Comte d'Artois to take the lead of the reactionary party, and had first seen service in Italy in the War of the Austrian Succession in 1734. He had been made colonel of the regiment of Luxembourg in 1735, and had distinguished himself in leading the storming-party at Prague, with Chevreuil, in 1742. Throughout the war of 1742-48 he distinguished himself, and after serving at Roucoux, Lauffeld, and Maestricht, had become a lieutenant-general in 1748. In the Seven Years' War he played a great part, and won the only important victories gained by the French during the war with Frederick. His victory at Berghem, on April 19, 1759, with 28,000 Frenchmen over 40,000 Prussians and Hessians, won him the rank of Prince of the Empire, and after conducting the retreat of the French after the defeat of Minden, he was made a marshal of France at a younger age than any one since Gassion, the companion of the great Condé. Then

came his command in Germany with Soubise, his disgrace to save Soubise, and the immense popularity which followed his disgrace. His brother, Count Charles de Broglie, was a far abler man than himself, and had for many years directed the secret policy of Louis XV., and he had impressed the marshal with his own dislike of England. During the reign he had mentally stood still, and with extreme self-confidence, in spite of the entreaties of his son, the Prince de Broglie, and his nephews, Charles and Alexandre de Lameth, he accepted Artois' invitation to court, and became the queen's nominee for the command of the army round Paris. The old marshal had been a great general and a great soldier in his earlier years, but he had not understood how the world had progressed. He believed the soldiers now encamped on the Champ de Mars were as devoted to the king as the soldiers who had fought under him at Berghem, and that the officers were as trustworthy; he still believed implicitly in the monarchy, and thought every one else was as loyal as himself; and so, expecting an easy victory, he surrounded himself with a large staff, and rejoiced in his promised title of Marshal-General, which had not been conferred on any French marshal since Marshal Saxe.

De Broglie, when summoned to court by the queen, at once directed the foreign troops, which were chiefly stationed in the frontier provinces of France, to march upon Paris; and on every side cavalry, artillery, and infantry were set in motion. De Broglie, in spite of his prejudices, could not help recognizing that there would be some danger in using French soldiers against the French populace, but believed that the Swiss and German troops in the service of France would feel no such repugnance. The concentration was skilfully directed, and almost before the Parisians knew what was happening, a large and increasing camp of foreign soldiers was stationed on the Champ de Mars; and when they did recognize that there had appeared a guiding mind among their opponents, they were smitten at first with an indescribable terror. The situation was indeed critical. The National Assembly was quite unguarded; the populace of Paris was quite unarmed; and though any

violent measure must have driven France to instant rebellion, it would at first have paralyzed the progress of the Revolution.

At this crisis Mirabeau, be it said, alone retained his courage and presence of mind, and displayed as much fearlessness as that shown by his grandfather, Mirabeau Silverstock, at the battle of Cassano, where a Broglie had commanded. When every deputy feared to speak, in a raised voice, of the concentration of troops, Mirabeau startled and delighted them by a great speech, in which he asked, Why were these troops assembled in the vicinity of the National Assembly, and whether the majesty of the people was to be attacked? and demanded that one hundred deputies should instantly bear a petition to the king, requesting the withdrawal of the soldiers. The motion brought matters to an issue. The king, whose feelings had been worked upon by the queen, and who did not feel his former confidence in Necker, was persuaded to return but vague answers to the deputation, and after doing so was at last harassed into consenting to dismiss Necker and part of his ministry.

The news of the dismissal was received with joy by the court noblesse. De Broglie, as Artois had desired, was appointed Minister of War, Marshal-General, and Commander-in-Chief of the troops before Paris; Breteuil, Calonne's Minister of the Household, succeeded De Villedeuil; Laporte and the Duc de la Vauguyon were appointed to succeed La Luzerne and Montmorin, but hardly took up office; Barentin retained office; and Foullon, a particularly obnoxious official, who, it was said, had declared that the people could live on grass, was nominated in the place of the popular idol, Necker. Such was the new ministry which the queen and Artois had set up. Could it by any possibility have been successful in retarding the course of the Revolution? The question is unanswerable, for De Broglie never had a fair chance. He might, with his artillery, have played the part of a Bonaparte in the streets of Paris; or he might, like the great Condé, have wasted his strength and his army before the obstinacy of the capital. But

he was not given the opportunity, for the Assembly, by its firmness and calmness, daunted the king and even Artois, while the people of Paris answered with their greatest contribution to the restoration of French liberty by the capture of the Bastille. The result of that act was the immediate fall of the Broglie ministry and the recall of Necker. But that fall not only signified the final failure of the policy of open resistance, but also that no other attempt, not based on secret intrigue, could be made to stay the progress of the Revolution.

The failure of De Broglie acted in very different ways upon the queen, and upon Artois and his friends. The Comte d'Artois and the court noblesse fled instantly¹ from France, and established themselves in an angry coterie at the court of Turin, where they breathed nothing but impotent hatred against France, and contempt for the French deputies, which only inflamed the French people the more against the court. But the queen could not so easily escape the result of her scheme; she could not, and she would not, leave the king and her children; she had to stop and bear the brunt of the unpopularity and the hatred which fell upon the court for its attempt to obstruct the wishes of the French people. If, before the convocation of the States-General, she had been regarded as the chief support of the Austrian alliance and of a German despotism, still more was she so when left to bear the concentrated blame for the attempt against the Assembly, which fell entirely upon her. Of De Broglie there is little more to be said. The old marshal attempted to raise the provinces and to test the fidelity of the garrisons, and then, discouraged by his failure, he left France and lived in exile. But his family was to pay a bitter tribute to the Revolution in the person of his son, the accomplished young Prince de Broglie, who was to perish on the guillotine, as a sacrifice for the behaviour of the old marshal at this crisis.

¹ The first emigration is called the "émigration joyeuse" by H. Forneron, *Histoire générale des Émigrés*, vol. i. pp. 211-217. Paris: 1884.

CHAPTER IV.

PARIS—THE WORKSHOP OF THE REVOLUTION.

Paris before the Revolution—Journalism—The publishers, Panckoucke, Prudhomme, Lëjay, Momoro—Types of journalism—Mirabeau as a journalist—Volney—Barère—Brissot—Loustallot—Reporters: Lehoudey and Maret—The royalist, ministerialist, Orleanist, revolutionary, literary, and scientific salons—Clubs—Popular societies—Assemblies of the districts—The Palais-Royal—The Gardes Françaises—Political views of the farmers-general, the lawyers, and the literary and scientific men—The bourgeois—The working classes—The charities of Paris—Politics of the poor—Causes of riots—Sack of Réveillon's house—Mutiny in the Gardes Françaises—The news of Necker's dismissal.

It was the city of Paris which foiled the well-laid schemes of the Maréchal de Broglie, and which, by a stroke of audacity, succeeded in causing the withdrawal of the troops encamped upon the Champ de Mars; and the origin of its patriotic enthusiasm, which was of a far more unselfish nature in Paris than even in the great provincial cities, must be attributed to the exceptional position which Paris had always held with regard to France. As early as the time of the Hundred Years' War with England, Paris had attracted to itself all that was most ambitious and most patriotic in France, and the process of centralization had been fostered by the policy of Louis XIV. and his ministers. To Paris had always flocked every youth who conceived that he had any capacity to gain literary, scientific, or political fame; from Paris had issued the innumerable pamphlets of the time of the Fronde; in

Paris were written the biting satires against the despotism of Louis XIV. and the debauchery of Louis XV., though they were mostly printed, for fear of the censure, in the capitals of free countries, such as London and Amsterdam. The literary activity of Paris had been particularly productive during the eighteenth century, when it had become the literary capital not only of France but of Europe. Side by side with the life of pleasure which Paris has always afforded to voluptuaries of every age, clime, and station, there had existed a crowd of literary and scientific men, who laboured to gain their fame in garrets, and who, when they had gained it, became powerful in the salons of wealthy ladies and foreign ambassadors. The literary life of Paris, which culminated in the production of the *Encyclopédie*, and the circle of great writers which that enterprise assembled, had been favoured by the deliberate policy of the king himself. Louis XV. believed that if men were allowed to speak and to write freely, they would not desire to act. The literary energies of the encyclopædists had not been immediately directed to the political reformation of France. They had described in glowing terms the constitutions of Greece and of Rome; they had analyzed and praised the constitution of England; they had admired the progress towards freedom of the United States of America; they had even published many utopian theories of representative governments; but whether from fear of the censure or a belief in the impossibility of change, they had never deliberately schemed to upset the French despotism. The political economists, who formed an important group about the middle of the eighteenth century, went out of their way to praise, not only in their books but in their journals, the rule of a benevolent despot, as being best fitted to advance the prosperity of a nation. It is, therefore, no wonder that when the electoral excitement had found its way throughout France, the old literary heroes of the time, instead of assisting, looked with pessimistic eyes on the ideas which they saw promulgated around them. The most daring pamphlets of that period were nearly always the work

of new men—young men who had been educated in the ideas of the encyclopædists, and who longed to apply those ideas to their own country. And when the States-General had actually met, these new writers felt, as if by one single impulse, that the time for pamphlets had gone by and that the time for journals had arrived.

Journalism has always particularly flourished in times of political excitement; and it was during the period of the Fronde that the *Gazette de France*, the oldest journal in France which had been founded under the patronage of Richelieu, first became of importance. At that epoch Renaudot,¹ who had a patent for the *Gazette*, accompanied the court to Saint-Germain, and left his son to publish another journal, the *Courrier François*, in Paris, showing even at that early time the tendency of owners of political journals to be on both sides at once. The period of despotism which followed the Fronde was not propitious to the establishment of new journals or to the development of journalism. The chief journal of the reign of Louis XIV. was the *Mercure*, which was, until the days of the Revolution, rather of a literary than a political character. The reign of Louis XVI. and the approach of the Revolution had caused the production of pamphlets rather than of journals, of which latter the best known was the *Annales Politiques et Littéraires*, rather from the character of its editor, Linguet, the prisoner of the Bastille, than of its own contents. Linguet was a born political journalist, and his description of his frequent imprisonments in the Bastille had given him a European reputation. Another curious enterprise was the *Courrier de l'Europe*, which was published simultaneously at London and Boulogne, and which was chiefly edited by Brissot de Warville, and was an attempt to familiarize the English mind with French politics, and France with English constitutional ideas. But it was the actual meeting of the States-General which first brought forth an abundance of important journals, of which the first in

¹ *Théophraste Renaudot d'après des documents inédits*, by G. Gilles de la Tourrette, 1884.

point of date was Mirabeau's *Les États-Généraux*, a title which was altered, after the royal edict of suppression, to *Lettres à mes Commettants*.

These journals could not have been started had there not been a powerful class of publishers, printers, and booksellers in existence, and also a numerous constituency of readers and purchasers. The most noted publishers of this date were the great Panckoucke, Lejay, Momoro, and Prudhomme.

Charles Joseph Panckoucke came of an old publishing family of Lille, where his father had issued many topographical works. He was born there in 1736, and came to Paris in 1754, where he married an extremely accomplished woman, whose sister was the wife of the academician Suard. His first investment in journalism was the purchase of the *Mercure*, the oldest literary journal in France, and before 1789 his chief interest was in literary, not political, affairs. He published the works of Buffon and other naturalists, and filled his journal with scientific gossip. The approach of the Revolution, in which he, and more particularly his wife, took a very great interest, made him decide to enter upon political journalism. He transferred the editorship of the *Mercure* to a Genevese exile, named Mallet du Pan, who was afterwards the medium between the reactionary party in Paris and the émigrés in Germany. But the *Mercure* could never succeed as a purely political journal, and Panckoucke therefore purchased the old *Gazette de France*, and, in order to stand well with the authorities, appointed Jean Gaspard Dubois-Fontanelle, a writer of obscene plays, who was extremely popular at court, to be its editor. A little later, but not until after the capture of the Bastille, the shrewd publisher started the famous *Moniteur*, but without changing the editorship of the *Gazette de France*, and so managed to make money out of both sides without definitely pledging himself to either.

Louis Marie Prudhomme was a publisher of very different character, who did not watch events with a mere business view, but threw himself heart and soul into the great political strife on the popular side when it was at its weakest.

He was born at Lyons in 1752, and had begun life in his native city as a bookseller's boy. He had, like Panckoucke, come up to Paris when a mere youth, and had risen from being a bookbinder to become a bookseller, and finally a publisher. His political principles determined the nature of his business, and between 1787 and 1789 he had published no less than fifteen hundred revolutionary pamphlets, and, had the Revolution not succeeded, he was marked out for imprisonment and persecution. At the time of the meeting of the States-General his "Resumé des Cahiers," which emphasized the revolutionary demands of the various electoral assemblies, was seized by the police; but he had confidence in the cause, and on July 12 appeared the first number of his famous weekly journal, the *Révolutions de Paris*, which was the model of the yet more famous journals of Marat and Camille Desmoulins.

Lejay was a publisher of no importance in himself, but his wife had formed a liaison with Mirabeau, and procured the publication of his works for her husband; indeed, it had been through her instrumentality that the secret letters from Berlin had been given to the world. In this capacity Lejay had published the suppressed *États-Généraux*, and his shop became the meeting-place of all those who wished either to see the great orator himself, or hear his political views. Momoro, who was destined to go further than them all on the democratic side, and to be sent to the guillotine as an enraged Jacobin, was not in 1789 as fervent in the cause as Prudhomme, and, previous to July 14, utterly refused to publish Camille Desmoulins' "La France Libre," for fear of the consequences. Though these were the most important political publishers in the summer of 1789, it must not be thought that they monopolized the trade. On the contrary, the Palais-Royal abounded in small speculators, who issued floods of pamphlets, generally with the simple inscription, "Aux arcades de bois" (in the wooden arcades), of whom Gattey, Desenne, Denné, and Devaux appear to have done the largest business with Baudouin, an elector of Paris

and printer to the National Assembly, and Méquignon in the Palais-Marchand.

The first journalists were of three distinct types. Some, like Mirabeau, Volney, and Barère, were deputies to the National Assembly, and wished to support their opinions outside its walls; others, like Brissot and Loustallot, were professional politicians; others, again, like Lehodey and Maret, were simply reporters of the debates in the Assembly.

Mirabeau's journalism was, like his oratory, based upon the efforts of others. He was never ashamed to use other men's labours, and would have endorsed Molière's remark, "Je prends mon bien, où je le trouve." But though he made use of other men, he directed and transformed their work by the power of his own genius. The first number of the *États-Généraux*, as well as of the *Lettres à mes Commettants*, and probably of the *Courrier de Provence*, was entirely his own work; but as other journals were established, and his principles were likely to be canvassed by others without its being necessary for him to advocate them in the press, he left his journal to some of his coadjutors, such as the Genevese exiles Duroveray and Étienne Dumont. Duroveray, who was a man of ability, did not care to be simply Mirabeau's mouth-piece; but he speedily found that when he wrote without the authorization and sanction of the great man, the sale of the journal went down to zero. The *Courrier de Provence* remained, therefore, to the end of his life the exponent of Mirabeau's political ideas, and it is easy, in looking over its volumes, to see which articles he inspired, and which Duroveray himself compiled.

Constantin François Chassebœuf de Volney¹ had made himself famous by a single book, namely, the "Voyage en Syrie," published in 1785, to obtain the materials for which he had travelled in the East. His reputation as a journalist and pamphleteer stood very high, and through it he had secured his election for the tiers état of his native place, the

¹ Mignet, *Notices historiques*, vol. ii.; Bougler's *Mouvement Provincial* en 1789, vol. i. pp. 150-170.

ancient city of Angers. His chief journalistic enterprise dated from 1788, when he established himself secretly at Rennes and started the *Sentinelle du Peuple*. He afterwards set up his press in the ruined Château de Maurepas, which was believed to be haunted, and sent his sheets into Rennes every morning.¹ This journal had had an enormous influence in Brittany and Anjou during the electoral period; but when Volney came to Paris he confined himself to literary contributions to the *Mercure* and political ones to the *Chronique de Paris*.

Bertrand Barère de Vieuxac,² who was to commence his long and much-maligned career during the Revolution as a journalist, was born in Tarbes in 1755. He came of a legal family, and was called to the bar of Toulouse, where he won great fame for eloquence both as an *avocat* and as a member of the Academy of Toulouse, the "Jeux Floraux." He had paid a visit to Paris in 1788, when he had been welcomed to the revolutionary salons, and had in the following year been elected deputy for Bigorre to the States-General. On June 17, when the debates in the Assembly were attracting universal attention, he started a daily journal, called the *Point du Jour*, which contains the best contemporary reports of the proceedings of that period in the Assembly. He had not shown at the first any republican sentiments, but upheld rather the ideas of constitutional monarchy. His journal was largely read in the south of France, where his name had first become known, and where he was venerated and loved to the day of his death. David, in his famous picture of the "Oath of the Tennis Court," has made an error in introducing Barère as transcribing for posterity the proceedings of that famous day; but the mistake is trivial, and expresses a great truth, when it shows a member of the National Assembly occupied in describing its own proceedings. The interest of the

¹ Pitre Chevalier's *La Bretagne Moderne*, ed. 1860, p. 185.

² Notice on his life by Hippolyte Carnot, prefixed to the first edition of his *Mémoires*, published 1836. Macaulay's review has no historical value, because, though it exposes many errors in the *Mémoires*, it unjustly condemns the man.

journals conducted by deputies, however, lies rather in their authors than in their contents; and to understand contemporary opinion outside the walls of the Assembly it is necessary to consult the labours of the more professional journalists.

Of these, without doubt the foremost in point of influence and of time was Jean Pierre Brissot.¹ This important politician was born at Ouarville, which he always spelt "Warville," a village in Normandy, in 1754. His father was a wealthy innkeeper, who sent his son up to Paris, where he became a pamphleteer, and where, in 1780, he published his "*Théorie des Lois Criminelles*." This book caused him to be imprisoned in the Bastille, and after his release he travelled in the United States, and finally settled in England. There he lived in Pimlico, which he describes as a "healthy suburb," and lived on terms of intimacy with Marat, and many Frenchmen who had been exiled for advanced political opinions. There it was that he had established the *Courrier de l'Europe*, with Swinton and Thèveneau de Morande. This journal had great success, but it was not so much to it as to his establishing, in the year 1788, the "Société des Amis des Noirs" that he owed his political reputation. This society was founded in Paris for the purpose of procuring the emancipation of the negroes in the West Indies, on the model of the more famous "Society for the Abolition of Slavery" started by Wilberforce and his friends in London. The same spirit of philanthropy which had made the question of negro slavery of importance in England operated also in France. Brissot's "Société" was joined by men of every type of opinion, and included Mirabeau, Lafayette, Clavière, and Volney. Its importance as a political club appeared later; but Brissot was not contented with such influence alone, and had projected, in the April of 1789, a daily political journal. One number was published in May, but it was suppressed, like Mirabeau's *États Généraux*. Brissot did not despair, but produced his journal regularly after July

¹ *Mémoires de Brissot*, published by his son, and edited by F. de Montrol. Paris: 1830-32.

28. The *Patriote Français*, as his journal was called, is of very great importance, as showing the course of political opinion in Paris and the provinces among that part of the intelligent bourgeoisie which was to form the party of the Girondins. The leading ideas of Brissot, as of the Girondin party, were those of humanity and philanthropy towards men of every description and of every colour. Their philanthropy was far-reaching. Brissot preached against barbarous punishments, against unfair trials, against slavery, against forced conscription, and from the very first advocated the social equality of all men as his leading tenet. The unpractical quality of his mind, and those of his supporters and admirers, appeared from the very first. They considered that, if a course of action were justified, it must be pursued without regard to consequences, and were profuse in declarations which embarrassed the cause of good government, but advanced their own wishes. Besides this, Brissot could boast of an extended knowledge of one subject which was generally neglected by the politicians of France; he had a very competent knowledge of foreign affairs, and the state of foreign countries. His sojourn in the United States had familiarized him with republicanism, and he has been called the first republican of the Revolution; while his residence in London had taught him that the people of England were not so free as their neighbours supposed them to be, but were heavily trammelled by their aristocracy and the terms of their constitution. This knowledge became of greater importance when Brissot had to take a share in the duties of government; but even at this period his acquaintance with England and America and other countries made the foreign correspondence in his journal peculiarly interesting.

Elysée Loustallot,¹ the youngest and perhaps the greatest of the journalists of this period, was never able to carry his ideas, as Brissot did, into active political life. He was born at St. Jean d'Angély in 1761; his father was syndic of the avocats there, and young Loustallot became himself an avocat

¹ *Notice sur Elysée Loustallot*, by Marcelin Pellet, 1872.

at Bordeaux. While there he was suspended for six months for attacking the local government, and had then entered himself at the Paris bar at the beginning of 1789. In the capital, however, he obtained no practice, but occupied himself in writing pamphlets for Prudhomme, translating English books, and frequenting public debating clubs. Prudhomme was the one publisher whose democratic ideas made him in the eyes of his colleagues appear extremely rash; and when he decided, in conjunction with a literary hack, named Tournon, to establish a weekly political journal to advocate his own views, he selected Loustallot, whose merit and principles he knew, to be his chief contributor. Loustallot had had none of that practical experience in journalism, and none of the extended knowledge of foreign countries and foreign constitutions possessed by Brissot, but he was far superior to him both as a writer and a publicist. His articles are certainly the most interesting to read of any published between July, 1789, and his lamented death in September, 1790. While a sincere democrat and lover of freedom, he showed much of that perspicacity which distinguished Mirabeau, and had he ever been able to feel the responsibility of office, might have made a very great statesman. As it was, his irresponsibility often made him violent when his youthful eloquence was not curbed by his publisher. It was to Loustallot's influence that the establishment of Desmoulins' journal was due; it was from Loustallot that the orators of the Palais-Royal learnt their arguments; and it was from his articles that the provinces learnt what Paris was thinking and doing. The *Révolutions de Paris* had an enormous success; its sale rose to nearly two hundred thousand copies a week, which, when its price is considered and the difficulty of transport to the provinces, seems almost miraculous. Loustallot was a journalist pure and simple, belonging to no particular party, but represented the views and extent of knowledge possessed by the average Frenchman, who read the *Révolutions de Paris* and felt his own opinions expressed in it. He was the embodiment of the party of movement, and his early death is more to be regretted than that of any of the band of youthful

writers whose names and names alone have been reported to posterity.

The fact that two of the leading deputies owned and edited journals has been noticed, but even in them, and still more in the ordinary Paris journals, the reports of the proceedings in the Assembly were confined to mere descriptions of striking incidents, or occasionally to the more salient traits of famous speeches; yet when all eyes were turned to the Assembly something more than this was felt to be necessary, and to meet the desire for a faithful report of each sitting, two journals, or rather series of reports, were founded.¹ The earliest in point of date was the *Journal des États-Généraux*, of which the first number was published by Lehodey on June 1. This journal pretended to give a strict transcript of all that passed. At first, accuracy was impossible; but in time Lehodey organized a band of writers, who, without knowing shorthand, copied down, word for word, every sentence spoken in the Assembly, and eventually became very expert. In January, 1791, Lehodey changed the title of his reports to the *Journal Logographique*, which however retained, like its predecessor, the colourless accuracy of the modern Hansard in England. Accurate certainly these reports are, but they do not describe the interruptions, the excitement, and harangues on points of order which give life to the reports in the *Moniteur*.

It has been said in England that every great judge has produced a great reporter, and similarly the debates in the first great National Assembly of France produced a spirited and faithful transcriber in Hugues Bernard Maret,² who was born at Dijon in 1763. His father was secretary to the provincial academy there, which had had the honour of awarding a prize to Rousseau when still an unknown man. In 1785 he had come to Paris, where his compatriot Vergennes was Minister for Foreign Affairs. Maret was by him intended for

¹ This subject has been most thoroughly and competently treated by M. F. A. Aulard, in his *L'Éloquence Parlementaire pendant la Révolution : Les Orateurs de l'Assemblée Constituante*, pp. 15-24. Paris : 1882.

² *Vie du Duc de Bassano*. by the Baron Ernouf, 1878.

a diplomatic career, and studied international law under Professor Koch, at Strasbourg, with students from many different countries, including Lord Elgin. He was on his way to Germany for further study when his patron, M. de Vergennes, died in 1787. He then returned to Paris, where, through his father's large acquaintance with men of letters, he found many friends. He was proposed for the Lycée, a select literary club, by Buffon, Lacépède, and Condorcet, but chiefly associated with younger men of letters, among whom Marie Joseph Chénier, the future dramatist, was his greatest friend. He became a very regular attendant at the chief literary salons, and was particularly well known at Madame Panckoucke's. When the States-General met, he made up his mind to attend regularly at its sittings, and every evening wrote from memory a complete description of what had passed. These first bulletins he used to read aloud in the various literary salons of Paris, and they became so popular that on July 1 he published his first *Bulletin de l'Assemblée Nationale*. This work was extremely hard. He took a garret close to the meeting-place of the Assembly, and, after noticing carefully all that went on in the sitting, went home and wrote his description from memory. He did not attempt an accurate report of every speech, but gave with great vivacity the movement and excitement which prevailed. When he had begun his publication, he met an able assistant in Méjan, and attempted with him to copy Woodfall's well-known reports of the proceedings in the English Parliament, which were for many years written by Samuel Johnson. He aimed at describing scenes rather than giving a colourless report, and between Lehodey and Maret it is possible to trace accurately the first proceedings of the National Assembly. His *Bulletins* had gained such popularity that in October, on the motion of a deputy, he was voted a special seat in the body of the Assembly, and in January, 1790, his friend Panckoucke persuaded him to merge his separate publication in the newly founded *Moniteur*, of which, however, Maret refused the editorship. It is strange to think that the Duc de Bassano,

the diplomatist and Foreign Minister of Napoleon, should have begun life as the reporter of the debates in the Constituent Assembly.

But if public opinion is depicted in the journals, and the proceedings of the National Assembly transcribed in the reports, public opinion was created and events criticized in social groups of all classes, from the highest to the lowest. The meeting-places of the higher classes were the famous salons of the French ladies. The salon had become an institution in France in the reign of Louis XV. Before that time, indeed, and even before the Fronde, well-known literary ladies like Madame de Rambouillet and Ninon de Lenclos had entertained in their salons men famous for talent and wit. These literary coteries had grown in importance until they formed the chief attraction of Paris in the days of Horace Walpole; but the literary ladies who entertained the academicians and the authors of the *Encyclopédie*, gave way at this period of public excitement to politics. The various fashions which chased each other through the years previous to 1789 are marked by the various complexions of different salons. Political economy drove out literary style; Rousseau succeeded political economy; electricity and mesmerism next monopolized ladies' minds; and in 1789 politics became the ruling fashion.

The two ladies who collected round them the shining lights of the court and the reactionary party, were Madame de Chambonas¹ and Madame de Sabran. In the rooms of the former there met to gamble, as much as to mock at the deputies of the tiers état, all the wits who were most in favour. There Rivarol and Champcenetz drank and played and composed epigrams, while the Comte de Tilly confined himself to losing heavily at the gaming-table. Of a more intellectual type were the friends of Madame de Sabran.² The

¹ For Madame de Chambonas' salon, see *Rivarol et la Société Française pendant la Révolution et l'Émigration d'après des Documents inédits*, by M. de Lescure. Paris : 1883.

² *Correspondance du Chevalier de Boufflers et de Madame de Sabran*, by De Magnieu and Prat. Paris : 1875.

chief stars of her salon were the Chevalier de Boufflers and the MM. de Ségur. Boufflers, although an ecclesiastic and a canon, was suspected of having cast eyes of too warm an admiration on the queen, and had been, to the regret of court circles, named governor of Senegambia, Senegal, and Goree. On his return he had presided, with his usual wit and tact, as grand bailli of Nancy at the electoral proceedings there, and had succeeded in getting himself elected a deputy of the noblesse. His wit was of a finer and more delicate character than that of the authors of the *Actes des Apôtres*, and he was the chosen favourite of every fashionable circle. Philippe Comte de Ségur was not only a wit, but a politician of some experience and much ability. He came of a famous ministerial family. His father had been Secretary for War, and he himself had in early life been appointed ambassador to the court of St. Petersburg. His handsome person and polished wit had attracted the attention of Catherine of Russia, who had chosen him to accompany her in her famous progress to the Crimea, and he had secured the predominance of the French over the English interests at St. Petersburg. Flushed with his diplomatic success, and, like many other of the young liberal noblesse, full of generous ideas, he had returned to France, utterly ruined by the expenses of his embassy, in the course of 1789, and at once became an habitué of Madame de Sabran's salon, where his brother Alexandre, Vicomte de Ségur, was an established favourite. The Vicomte was not so distinguished a statesman, but he was a well-known writer of society verses and little comedies, and was a favourite among the ladies of Paris. With such guests among them, the frequenters of the salon of Madame de Sabran were not so violently royalist as those of Madame de Chambonas, and maintained a polished rather than a coarse opposition to the Revolution.

The friends of the ministers naturally assembled in the salon of Madame Necker,¹ of which the chief ornament was the young Madame de Staël. Madame Necker, herself a

¹ *Le Salon de Madame Necker*, by the Vicomte d'Haussonville. 2 vols. Paris : 1882.

woman of great ability, was a sincere Protestant, and, like most Swiss, an admirer of republicanism. But she admired her husband more than Protestantism or republicanism, and made friends of all who believed that the presence of Necker at the finances was all-important to France. Madame de Staël had not yet begun her literary career, but she was already versed in politics. Her marriage had been the subject of much diplomacy, and the Baron de Staël-Holstein had only won her hand on the condition that the King of Sweden would make him Swedish Ambassador at Paris.¹ In Madame Necker's salon three distinct groups of friends were generally to be found: distinguished foreigners, especially from the Protestant nations of England, Prussia, and Sweden; literary celebrities who were much sought after, and much attracted by the wit of the daughter of the house; and the great financiers of France, who naturally met at the palace of the Minister of Finance, who had been originally but one of themselves. From Madame Necker and Madame de Staël men of these different groups imbibed a belief in the ability of Necker, and the necessity of maintaining him in office. To attack him or his ideas was tantamount to treason. It was here that Mirabeau was denounced, not for his immoral life, but because he opposed the great Necker; here that the king was praised because he was said to love the minister, and the queen despised and lampooned because of her distaste for him. It is strange that Madame Necker, knowing the importance of the good opinion of the National Assembly to her husband, did not do more to attract its leading members to her salon; but she was afraid to admit any possible rival, and satisfied herself with the frequent attendance of the Abbé Siéyès, the phrase-maker of the Revolution, and of the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre, the first deputy of the noblesse of Paris, and the leader of the party which desired a constitution after the English pattern.

¹ *Correspondance du Baron de Staël-Holstein*, published by Léouzon Leduc, Paris, 1881; *Gustave III. et la cour de France*, by M. A. Geffroy. 2 vols. 1867.

As Madame Necker entertained the ministerialists, so did Madame de Genlis¹ the friends of the Duke of Orleans at the Palais-Royal. The notorious governess of Pamela and the children of the duke had seen herself surpassed in his affections by many successors, and at this period was eclipsed by Madame Buffon, the one real love of the debauchee prince, and she now only maintained her intimacy with him as lady of honour to the Duchesse de Chartres, his daughter-in-law. She had turned Christian and moralist, and maintained a severe tone, which was hardly congenial to the duke's most intimate friends. In her blue-and-gold salon Saint-Huruge was not so much at home as in the drinking-shops of the Palais-Royal; but Laclos often brought with him young writers who could help the ambition of Orleans, and among them might early be perceived Camille Desmoulins. Madame de Broglie in like manner made her salon the rendezvous of Barnave, the two Lameths, the Vicomte de Noailles, the Duc d'Aiguillon, and other friends of her husband, the young Prince de Broglie; and it was there that was formed the famous triumvirate, of which Barnave was said to be the mouthpiece. Mirabeau was not a great attendant at ladies' drawing-rooms, but was generally to be found in Lejay's back parlour; and if he did go abroad, it was more often to the house of Adrien Duport, who was at this time trying to win him over to the cause of Orleans, than to any lady's abode.

Three ladies were at this time the hostesses of the politicians and journalists of the extreme revolutionary party. At the house of Madame de Beauharnais² were to be seen the survivors of the Encyclopædists, who were of her age and time. Foremost among the habitués of her salon were the dramatists of a bygone era, Dorat, Collé, and Crébillon, who did not despise the good suppers given by the hissed authoress of the "Fausse Inconstance." With them used to assemble

¹ *Mémoires of Madame de Genlis; Histoire de la Société Française pendant la Révolution*, by E. and J. de Goncourt, 3rd edit., p. 11. Paris: 1864.

² De Goncourt's *Société Française pendant la Révolution*, pp. 8-11.

Bailly, the Abbé Mably and Dusaulx, with Mercier the author of the popular "*Tableaux de Paris*," Vicq d'Azyr the queen's physician, and Rabaut de Saint-Étienne. More remarkable still were Dorat-Cubières, who used to act as host; Alexandre de Beauharnais the deputy, whose creole wife, Josephine, was destined for an extraordinary career; and the Prussian baron, John Baptist Cloutz, who was to deny his nationality, and become laughable rather than famous as Anacharsis Cloutz. At the house of Madame Julie Talma,¹ the wife of the famous actor at the Théâtre Français, were to be found the young men of literary ability who were now beginning to mingle in politics with old admirers of her husband's talents. There was to be seen Joseph Marie Chénier, pressing his new tragedy, "*Charles IX.*," on the notice of the influential actor of the Français; Roger Ducos with a criticism; and Ducis with a new translation of an English play; together with the painter Greuze and the great chemist Lavoisier, who were both sincere admirers of the stage. But they all talked of politics as much as the theatre, and among them was often to be seen a friend of Chénier's who was to win fame on a greater stage than the Théâtre Français, the great orator, Pierre Victorien Vergniaud. The third meeting-place of the revolutionary deputies was the small house of Mademoiselle Théroigne de Méricourt. This beautiful Liègeoise, Anne Terwagne of Méricourt, near Liège, was at the head of the demi-monde of Paris. She had in early life been deceived by a young nobleman, and had been driven from her father's house. After a melancholy career, first in London and then in Paris, she had adopted extremely revolutionary ideas, and made her house a free-and-easy meeting-place for the revolutionary deputies after their labours in the Assembly. At her salon used to assemble Mirabeau, when the jealousy of Madame Lejay allowed him to leave her side, Pétion the avocat of Chartres, Target, and Populus, whom the royalist journals were fond of twitting as Théroigne's favoured lover on account of his name; and there, too, occasionally went the young society poet and deputy for Artois, Maximilien

¹ De Goncourt, p. 14.

Robespierre. Théroigne's share in the Revolution was far more active than that of any other woman whose name has been mentioned; and her pathetic career was one marked by traits of heroism, which made her for a time the idol of the poorer women of Paris. She was not only, as will be seen later, a leader of the demi-monde, but starving mothers were ready in the month of October to follow her to Versailles. A last revolutionary salon must be mentioned, rather from the fact that it was established by an English nobleman than from the importance of its frequenters. The Duke of Bedford¹ had warmly espoused the cause of reform in France, and partly from an old rivalry with the Duke of Dorset, the English Ambassador, but chiefly from a desire to show the sympathy of the English Whigs with the new ideas, he had established himself in Paris, and spent a portion of his great wealth in sumptuous entertainments. The regular attendants of his salon consisted only of the rank and file of the revolutionary party, with such ladies of doubtful reputation as Madame de Saint-Amaranthe, and the Englishwoman Grace Dalrymple Elliott, who had been brought to Paris by the Duke of Orleans, but at his splendid balls met all the great revolutionary leaders of every section, and ladies of every rank.

Besides these regular political salons must be mentioned the two chief meeting-places of literary and scientific men, where, as Arthur Young says, politics had taken the place of literature and science. The home of the *littérateurs* was naturally the house of Madame Panckoucke,² the wife of their chief publisher. At her Thursdays always appeared Marmontel, Sédaine, La Harpe, Suard, and Garat, who were all contributors to her husband's journal, the *Mercure*. Thither, too, came Barère, the editor of the *Point du Jour*; Maret, who was to help in the foundation of the *Moniteur*; Condorcet, Mallet du Pan, Fontanelle, and all the other literary men who had business relations with Panckoucke. More interesting to men of science and philosophers was the home of the widowed Madame Helvétius³ at Auteuil, from its historical associations. There she had in her

¹ De Goncourt, p. 16.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

husband's lifetime assembled Diderot and the Encyclopædists; there Franklin had been a frequent guest; and there were now to be seen all the most thoughtful and philosophical writers in France—Volney, Bergasse, Cabanis the chemist, and chief of all, though his name was yet hardly known to metaphysicians, Antoine Destutt, Comte de Tracy, deputy to the States-General for the noblesse of the Bourbonnois.

The place of salons among the upper was filled by clubs and popular societies among the middle and lower classes. The fashion of clubs had been introduced into Paris by the admirers of English social customs, but previous to the Revolution they had been chiefly literary, and the most important were the "Lycée," where Condorcet often presided, and the "Société des Amis des Noirs," which Brissot had founded. Both these clubs had now become political. The Lycée soon became unimportant, but at the meetings of the "Amis des Noirs" were present all the chief writers and orators of the time, who, though nominally met together to prepare public opinion for the emancipation of negro slaves, really occupied themselves in general political discussions. The usefulness of this society to the revolutionary cause suggested a further development of the club-system, and small clubs sprang up among the bourgeois all over Paris. These clubs were rather debating societies than anything else, and did not last long; for when the Breton Club, which at first consisted solely of deputies, came to Paris with the National Assembly in October, 1789, and, after establishing itself in the Jacobin convent, decided to admit others besides deputies to take part in its debates, the smaller clubs were soon absorbed by it. Nevertheless, even such clubs as these were not intended for the lower classes, however much they might be frequented by the bourgeois, who liked to think they had a share in governing public opinion.

Their place was taken among the lower classes by the popular societies, whose meeting-place was the wineshop or the street, which abounded in the poorer faubourgs. Sometimes a group of women might be seen in the street listening to the impassioned harangue of one of their own sex against

the queen, the king, and all established authorities; workmen assembled in their cabaret would be exhorted to exact by threats better pay from their employers; the sacking of the bakers' shops was openly preached; and many of these popular societies were attended by speakers of a higher class, who used to try to enrage the half-starved and discontented work-people for the profit of their own particular clique or party. The meetings of these popular assemblies usually ended in drawing up violent resolutions to be presented by certain of those present to the assembly of their district.

These assemblies of the districts had their origin in the electoral operations of the months of April and May. The citizens of every district had assembled to choose their electors and draw up their district cahier, and after they had done this, instead of dispersing, as the *règlement* had directed, they continued to meet in order to watch over the conduct of their representatives. Many of these district assemblies in the richer quarters of Paris consisted almost entirely of bourgeois, and their importance afterwards became manifest; but in the districts of the poor faubourgs of St. Antoine and St. Marceau they became centres of popular discontent. In these assemblies only those qualified to vote had a right to appear, but it was not long before any discontented man, inhabitant or not, found his way there. In them the mob learned who were to be their leaders; before them the delegates of the popular assemblies laid their demands for bread and arms; and from them were issued many revolutionary manifestoes to encourage the radical deputies in the National Assembly. The districts of the Faubourg St. Marceau especially found a convenient centre in the newly formed club of the Cordeliers, which had grown out of the primary assembly of the district Théâtre Français in that faubourg by the addition of non-voters and the influence of the popular lawyer Danton.

Besides the streets and the assemblies of the districts, a more commodious meeting-place was afforded by the gardens of the Palais-Royal, which had been thrown open to the people by the Duke of Orleans, when, to recruit his finances, he let out

the ground floor of his palace for shops in 1783. Here, from the month of May, were assembled workmen out of work, young avocats without practice, and political agitators of every description, to give vent to their feelings and listen to their chosen orators. In the Palais-Royal from morning till night, from night till morning, there was always an immense crowd, largely supplied by the surrounding cafés and wineshops and gambling hells. Here there were frequent disturbances, especially when an unfortunate police agent or a servant wearing the livery of some hated courtier was seized and ducked in the fountain. Here all the journals were sold, and most of their publishing offices were under the wooden arcades which surrounded the gardens. Here, above all, was the appointed rendezvous of the agents of the Duke of Orleans. To the Palais-Royal was brought, by their means, the first news of everything which happened at Versailles. In its gardens men felt encouraged by their numbers to say aloud the most treasonable things and to pass the most treasonable resolutions, and it was recognized as the centre of political opinion in Paris. From a rendezvous of Orleanists, it became a general gathering-place for all who wished to hear the news, discuss it, or hear it discussed. Previous to the Revolution it had been the centre of dissolute Paris, and many are the allusions in the royalist journals to the former abandoned character of the chosen head-quarters of the revolutionary party in Paris. The disturbances in the gardens often led to fighting, and it occasionally became necessary for the Gardes Françaises who had to maintain order in the capital, to enter it and clear it of every individual.

Order was maintained in Paris, as in every other capital in Europe at the time, by the troops, and the police of Paris consisted only of spies and a few officers of the law-courts, for the idea of an organized force for the preservation of order had not then occurred to any statesman. By old prescription the garrison of Paris consisted of a force of three thousand men, known as the Gardes Françaises, who were Frenchmen by birth and generally Parisians. They had distinguished themselves in

many campaigns, but when the Revolution broke out had not left Paris for more than twenty-five years, and the men forming the battalion had naturally deteriorated by living so long in a gay capital without seeing active service.¹ They did not hold exactly the same position as the brigade of Guards in London; for the king always lived at Versailles, and was surrounded there by his household troops of the palace, which did not include the Gardes Françaises. At the same time commissions were always eagerly sought in the battalion from its being always stationed in Paris, and were considered next in honour to commissions in the body-guard. Being in close personal relation by birth and marriage with the people of Paris, no force could be less depended upon to act against them, and yet the government made the fatal mistake of incensing the guardians of order. The officers, like those of the Guards in London, lived away from their men, and the maintenance of discipline was entrusted to the non-commissioned officers, who were a particularly fine body of soldiers, in entire sympathy with their men, and amongst whom there served the future generals Hoche, Friant, and Hulin, and the future marshal of France, François Joseph Lefevre.

It has been seen how opinions as to the great political events passing at Versailles were formed in Paris, and how they were fostered by the growth of political journalism, but it remains to be seen with what preconceived views different classes in Paris might be expected to look upon the progress of the Revolution.

The aristocracy of Paris was essentially an aristocracy of wealth and ability. The old court noblesse chiefly dwelt at Versailles, or, if they lived in Paris, regarded themselves rather as being in the capital than of it, while it was the pride of the great financial and legal families, and of the men of letters and science, to be true Parisians. The great wealth accumulated by the financiers was chiefly due to the

¹ *Vie de Hoche*, by Rousselin Saint-Albin, p. 13, ed. 1795, who describes how Hoche, when a grenadier in the Garde Française, used to draw water for the gardeners and dig to get money to buy books.

practice of letting out the taxes to farm. At a very early date the farmers of the revenue became of extreme importance to the government. Under the regency M. Law, the Scotch adventurer, whose speculations caused an excitement equal to that of the South Sea Bubble in England, had attempted to buy them out, and in the memoirs of the Cardinal de Bernis the dependence of the unfortunate minister on the brothers Pâris-Duverney and Pâris-Montmartel is laughably shown. To get money for the war which had been determined on by Madame de Pompadour, the minister had to spend hours and days in the ante-rooms of these great princes of finance, and, to quote his own words, "to lose twenty-four hours in the week in coaxing one of them, and in begging him for the love of God for money for the king."¹ The wealth of the farmers-general had not decreased during the tenure of office by successive ministers. They had practically made themselves indispensable by advancing enormous sums to the king, who always forestalled his revenue by at least three years. In exchange for ready money, the king and his ministers were ready to mortgage the whole revenue of the nation, and the collection of all the taxes fell into the hands of the farmers-general. Looking on the taxes rather as security for their personal advances than as the hard-earned property of the people, they could not fail to be harsh in collecting them. Many of the farmers-general were as individuals men of a kindly and charitable disposition. Helvétius the philosopher, and Lavoisier the great chemist, were both of them farmers-general, and neither of them in private life cruel or avaricious men. It was the system, rather than the men which was to be blamed; but it cannot be wondered at that the people, who had to pay, could not make so clear a distinction. Their great wealth was generally misused, and their unpopularity cannot be wondered at. Their daughters often made great marriages both with the court noblesse and the legal families; but the sons who succeeded their fathers as members of the company of farmers-general

¹ Sainte-Beuve, *Causeries du Lundi*, vol. viii., p. 26.

had and used every opportunity to indulge in the gay and licentious life of Paris. The way in which these young and generally ill-educated men had raised the price of all Parisian luxuries was bitterly satirized by the older noblesse, but there were never wanting some to favour projects of charity and assist deserving individuals. As a body they could not be expected to look upon the revolutionary movement with favour; but individually they knew, none better, that with a free and representative government men of wealth would find far greater scope for the employment of their money than under an absolute monarch. Necker himself knew that confidence and credit were necessary for the success of any commercial speculation, and knew, too, that capital could never be safe in a country where revolution was imminent and riots of daily occurrence. Safety and good administration are necessary for the development of individual and national resources, and therefore the great French financiers were individually favourable to a scheme of responsible government. Necker knew that his old Swiss associate, Thelusson, had made a far larger fortune in London than he had been ever able to make in Paris, and understood that before France could hope to rival England, or even supply herself with necessities, capitalists must be able to use their capital without undue restrictions and with confidence. Besides, Necker and the financiers saw clearly that if matters were allowed to go on as they had done, national bankruptcy must be the result; and who could suffer more from such bankruptcy than the great companies which had lent the government such immense sums? It is therefore only fair to say that although the financiers felt that their great gains must cease with the establishment of a new form of government, they knew also that a change was necessary, and the sooner and more peacefully a new system could be established, the sooner they would be able to obtain, if not such immense gains, at least safe and profitable investment for their money.

If the great financiers formed one class of the aristocracy of the city of Paris, the lawyers formed another, and in their

own opinion the chief section. The legal profession in France, and especially in Paris, had, in the absence of political life, been more favoured in producing great men than any other. The French lawyers, ever since the time of Cujas and L'Hôpital, had been world-famous; the French law universities were known to possess the most learned professors, and the pleadings at the Paris bar were studied all over Europe. And this fame was not undeserved. Since the days of L'Hôpital there had always been great lawyers in France, and at the outbreak of the Revolution the acknowledged chief of the Parlement of Paris, Lamoignon de Malesherbes, well sustained their reputation. The influence of the great provincial parlements, and the affection in which they were held, has been noticed when discussing the elections to the States-General, and will be further examined when the later history of the Revolution in the provinces is considered, and the provincial parlements had often produced great thinkers and great men—greatest of all Montesquieu, president of the Parlement of Bordeaux. The Parlement of Paris had at the time of the Fronde attempted to make itself a political power, and was filled with a mixed desire to imitate the privileges and obtain the same power as the English Parliament, and to act on the same principles as the Senate at Rome. The lawyers of the Fronde had claimed great privileges; they declared that though places in the Parlement were either hereditary or purchased, they were yet to be regarded as the representatives of the people of France. The claim was of course untenable, but the recollection of the Fronde had nerved the lawyers of Paris during more than one struggle with the court. In the reign of Louis XV., when most lawyers were Jansenists, they had been constant in attacking the Jesuits, and had been at last successful; yet towards the end of his reign they had been banished, and an attempt made to abolish the existing system. Maupeou, who at this time, though in exile, was still Chancellor of France, had planned to abolish for ever the hereditary parlements, and to establish new courts of law, the judges of which were to be nominated by the king. From the point of

view of affording greater facility and speed in the administration of justice, the change would have been of advantage to the suitors; but the people of France were not prepared to look calmly upon the abolition of their old courts by the king and Maupeou. The popularity of the parlements had increased during the reign of Louis XVI. Having either inherited or purchased their offices, the counsellors felt that they had a freehold right in them, and were not afraid to beard the king and his ministers. When they did so they always gained popular applause, and were not only regarded, but regarded themselves, as the real representatives of the French people. Their popularity was shown in the failure of the attempt to forcibly eject Dupont, the economist, when drawing up the cahier of his bailliage, and Beugnot had lost his election for a similar reason.¹ Yet this very belief in their popularity was a source of danger to the parlements of France. They had often petitioned for, and had at last obtained, the summons of the States-General without foreseeing that it would effectually deprive themselves of the position they claimed to hold; but when the States-General met, and the tiers état proclaimed itself the National Assembly, the Parlement of Paris began to protest. Duval d'Esprémesnil, who had been imprisoned for protesting against Brienne's decrees, and who had then been the hero of the populace of Paris, had now become a chief leader of the noblesse, and his example was followed by others of the leaders in former parliamentary struggles. The lawyers believed that a States-General of the old form would simplify matters of government, and then retire for another century and leave the Parlement possessed of its old and many new privileges. But when the States-General was turned by the victory of the tiers état into a National Assembly, and claimed a right to draw up a new constitution for France, and even showed a disposition to interfere with the administration of justice, the lawyers thought things had gone too far. The feeling, therefore, among the old legal families and the judges of the Parlement at this time was

¹ Chapter i. p. 44.

one of undisguised surprise and hostility—surprise at the temerity, and hostility to the success, of the reformers in the Assembly. It must always be remembered that the judges in France are not recruited, as in England, from the bar. Most of the counsellors of the parlements were noble either by office or by tenure, and very many of them sat in the Estate of the noblesse; while the avocats and procureurs, who seldom had such wealth and hardly ever such position, formed the bulk of the tiers état. These avocats and procureurs looked by no means with favour on the ancient administration of justice; they believed that a new system would lead to an increase in their fees, and increased facilities for the practice of the law. In Paris, therefore, while the leaders of the Parlement, such as D'Esprémesnil, were in open opposition to the revolutionary movement, the avocats, who included among them such men as Danton and Camille Desmoulins in Paris, and Robespierre and Pétion in the provinces, were at the head of every movement towards further and more complete reform.

The new generation of literary men, who had great influence in the society of Paris, were nearly in a body in favour of the new ideas. From the example of England they ought not to have been so, for when political life is open, the people are apt to think more of their politicians than of their writers. On the other hand, the literary men of France could not have been in a more enviable position. When not persecuted by the court, they made great incomes, not so much by the sale of their books as in their pensions from their own and foreign monarchs. Voltaire had made large sums as an army contractor, and had died Marquis de Ferney; Rousseau's wants were supplied by ladies of all ranks, and pensions were freely given to every man of letters of any standing. Science was equally protected, and the thinkers of England had good cause to be jealous of the position and influence of the thinkers of France. Nevertheless, with exception of the older men, the learned classes were in favour of reform. Bailly, the astronomer and member of the three academies, was president of

the National Assembly; Condorcet was an elector of Paris; Marmontel might have been a deputy for Paris; and it seemed as if in future times the new French government would be largely composed of great writers and savants of established reputations. The number of them who contributed to the numerous journals has been mentioned, and those who did not were as enthusiastic as those who did. Exception must be made of a few wits about the court. Men of wit love a court, for their sallies, even if not of the most refined kind, always meet acceptance there. Rivarol, though but the son of an inn-keeper, was as great a supporter of the divine right of the King of France as if he had come of the ancient family to which he pretended to belong. Certain court poets were similarly impressed into the service of absolute monarchy; but as a class it may fairly be said that every writer or thinker of any note, except a few of the former generation, was a warm and hearty supporter of the revolutionary movement at its beginning.

The middle class, who formed the bourgeoisie in France, whose fortunes had been made in trade, had and always have had far more of a class feeling than in any other country. Their numbers in French towns are always great, for habitual thrift makes it possible for large numbers of shops and manufactories to exist, yielding but very small profits. This class in Paris was particularly large, for its tradesmen had not only to supply the demands of a large population and an extravagant court, but to send all over Europe *articles de Paris*; and this class was still further increased in numbers by the great desire possessed by every Frenchman to retire when he shall have made a sufficient competency. Among the 405 electors there were, with 183 lawyers and 93 shopkeepers, no less than 50 bourgeois, who had simply made their little fortunes in trade and sold their shops. The bourgeoisie, especially the portion of it which had retired, had plenty of time for political speculations, and formed an important factor to be considered in the future government of Paris. Fairly well educated, they were nearly all enthusiastic for a representative system of government in which they believed they must have

the greatest weight. In the elections in Paris and all the great towns, by the very terms of the règlement the bourgeois had the preponderating influence. It was the offshoots of the bourgeoisie who became avocats and formed the majority of the six hundred deputies of the tiers état. The bourgeois of Paris were proud of the bourgeois deputies, and were ready to do all in their power to assist them in gaining their cause. It may be said that the whole movement, from the year 1789 to the year 1791, was a movement of the bourgeois against the court and the aristocracy. The movement of the people was yet to come. But yet, if the bourgeoisie of Paris and the provincial towns was anxious for the establishment of a popular government, which would give them not only a share in the elections but the chief influence in future assemblies, they wished yet more ardently for something else, the safety of their little properties. To this must be ascribed the establishment of the Garde Nationale, their organization in municipalities, their sincere support of a reorganization of the finances; but to this, too, must be ascribed that selfishness which made them and their leaders fail when the crisis of the Revolution arrived. Many great men sprung from this class. Of all the leaders of the Revolution not more than one or two can be said not to have belonged to the bourgeoisie; but yet as a class they failed to be equal to those great sacrifices which the attempt to win a victory for a great cause must always entail. Before the taking of the Bastille, all the bourgeois of Paris were expecting great things from the action of their deputies at Versailles, and believed that a triumphal period had arrived for them. What, therefore, was their consternation and surprise, when they heard that Necker was dismissed, and that the dissolution of the National Assembly would shortly follow! Yet it was not the bourgeois who took the Bastille and stayed the progress of reaction, but the ouvriers, or working men of Paris.

The condition of the working classes in Paris before the outbreak of the Revolution is most difficult to describe. Records they left none; memoirs speak of them either as brigands or poor starved creatures; and the chief means by

which to gauge their condition is to examine the price of food and necessaries at that period. In most towns such an examination satisfactorily fixes the condition of the working classes, but in Paris an exceptional state of affairs existed. Not only were there many thousands of working men employed regularly or irregularly in the various trades and manufactures of Paris, but to Paris flocked unemployed workmen from the whole of France. It was quite possible, as is shown in the sketch of her early life by Madame Roland,¹ for a workman, if he knew his trade, to live fairly comfortably throughout the eighteenth century, and occasionally by industry to raise himself to the position of a bourgeois. The members of the guilds were at least always able to live; the very existence of trade guilds, which dated in many instances for centuries back, assured the existence of certain fixed wages. Every employment, even down to the water-carriers and flower-sellers, was carefully regulated by statute, and the numbers of guild brothers and sisters were carefully kept down to such numbers as could be certain of fair wages and of employment. But this interference with natural economical laws must necessarily have increased the amount of unemployed and badly remunerated labour. Every man could not be a guild brother, and for his free labour he could obtain no fair salary, and often he could obtain no employment at all. He was not allowed to undersell a guild brother, or to obtain employment in opposition to him. Turgot had seen that the abolition of guilds was one of the things most necessary before the establishment of a happy and prosperous industrial class. It might reduce the wages of the guild brothers, but it would fix the remuneration of all labour at its proper rate. The existence of guilds, then, was the chief cause of the waste of labour in France, and this had recently been increased by the conclusion of the commercial treaty with England. Side by side with the importation of cheap English goods came the introduction of English machinery, and a similar war against machinery to that which was then going on in England was beginning to break out in

¹ *Mémoires de Madame Roland*, ed. Dauban, p. 3. 1864.

France. The unemployed workmen, whether from the guild system, the treaty with England, or the introduction of machinery, all flocked to Paris, where they could obtain no work, and where they had to beg. These crowds of able-bodied beggars, who had every inclination to work, increased the danger of riots in Paris; and it must never be forgotten that where there is poverty among those strong enough to work, there must be still greater distress amongst those who, from their sex, age, or infirmity, are still less able to find work. It was this mass of unemployed labourers who supplied the rioters of the Palais-Royal and the conquerors of the Bastille. It was the thought of the starving wives and children at home which drove them to madness, riot, and insurrection. These were the men who received the pay of Orleans and listened to Saint-Huruge's harangues. These were the men who sacked Réveillon's factory and murdered Foullon. The distress in Paris had particularly increased in the spring of 1789. Bad harvests and a curiously bad system of taxation had raised the price of bread enormously high, so that even labourers in regular work found it difficult to live. How much worse, then, was the condition of those who had no chance of getting work! For these starving masses the only resources which existed were charity and the royal prisons.

The organization of the charities of Paris was at that time extremely good, as it is still. The various almanacks for the year 1789 contain, at the end of their lists of the deputies to the National Assembly, the patronesses of the various charities of Paris. The ladies, as, for instance, Madame Necker and Madame Lavoisier, alternated the gaiety of their salons and the pleasures of the theatre with very real labour amongst the poor and suffering. Nor were the men behind them. Santerre in particular, the wealthy brewer of the Faubourg St. Antoine, gained his popularity before the convocation of the States-General by his liberality to all the poor about him. But if private charity did much to alleviate the distress, government did very little. True, there were many establishments and

hospitals provided, but they were generally so badly administered that the advantages they offered gave but little relief. At the famous Hôtel Dieu, which was supposed to be the most splendid building in Europe for its purpose, the advantages were minimized and the chances of cure very slight, owing to the filthy condition of the wards and the scarcity of attendance. The best-managed hospital of all was that of the "Enfants Trouvés," managed by the Sisters of Mercy, whose administration was seldom, if ever, complained of. The government spent its energies rather in taking measures to expel the unemployed from Paris, to send them to prisons or impress them into the army, than in assisting them by superintending its own charitable institutions.

Side by side with all the wealth and gaiety of Paris existed a depth of misery which has never been exceeded. In the very worst days of the Revolution some sort of employment could be obtained, but in 1789 every chance of earning bread seemed to be closed against the starving ouvrier. It was no wonder, then, that political events moved them deeply. It was true that the ouvrier was entirely omitted from the *Règlement du Roi*, and that he had no vote for the deputies who were to regenerate France. Yet, like the peasant, he expected all good things from the Assembly, and, like the peasant, he was ready to give up his life, which indeed could be of little value to him, rather than that the Assembly should be hindered in its work. The Assembly was to give the ouvriers bread, was to give them work. They cared little for the franchise, yet it was easy to stir them up to a riot by a whisper that the king was going to dissolve the Assembly. Next to the Assembly, Necker and Mirabeau were their idols. Necker was in their eyes the good minister who had called the Assembly, and would make the king and the queen give them bread; Mirabeau was their "little father" Mirabeau, who loved the people, and preferred to sit amongst their representatives than with his own order. Even when craving for food, the promise of it from some mob orator was better than being hunted from the city; and though they had little

but hope to live upon, yet that little hope they would not be deprived of by any nobleman or aristocrat in Paris.

Granted a discontented class of *ouvriers* in Paris and riots there, is there any need to look for a further link? It has been asserted that the Duke of Orleans paid the ringleaders of the riots, and there is no doubt that his satellite, Saint-Huruge, was popular among them and frequently their leader; but it may be safely asserted that he rather pointed out what objects they should attack than originated the outbreaks themselves. No doubt Saint-Huruge did pay, and pay well, those who distinguished themselves in popular riots, but if the duke had paid at ever so low a rate all the rioters, his large fortune would not have lasted long. The hired brigands, against whom the court always directed its proclamations, did not exist, and had there been no Duke of Orleans, similar popular movements would have taken place, even though their direction might have been slightly altered.

The first riot of importance, with regard to which the word "brigand" was mentioned, was the attack upon the manufactory of one Réveillon, an elector for Paris. On April 28, the day of the fashionable races at Longchamps, an attack was made on a manufactory of wall-papers, the proprietor of which was at the time sitting as an elector at the Hôtel de Ville. It was said that Réveillon had declared that there was no starvation among the people, and that three sous a day was quite sufficient for a man to live upon. Enraged by such reports, the populace of St. Antoine, headed by certain "brigands," attacked the manufactory and completely sacked it. The unfortunate proprietor complained to the electors of Paris, who sent Santerre, whose influence and popularity was well known, to attempt to quell the riot. The Gardes Françaises were also ordered out, but their officers deemed it prudent not to attack the rioters, because they could not trust the disposition of their own soldiers. This riot, which seems to have arisen solely from disgust at the reported heartless speech of Réveillon, was declared to be the work of the Duke of Orleans. This is in every respect improbable,

and still more that the radical leaders had any share in it. The time was not yet come when a riot would assist the cause of Orleans, and the electors of Paris were sure enough to return deputies of advanced opinions without being threatened by the fear of riots. From the point of view of expediency it was far more likely that the court might have stirred up the riot to enlist the bourgeoisie on the side of order. The simplest explanation is here probably the correct one. A crowd of hungry workmen hear of a speech which seems to mock their poverty, and try to wreak their vengeance on the wealthy mocker. The success of the Réveillon riot and the unwillingness of the Gardes Françaises to act, proved to the popular leaders how much could be done at a crisis by a riot and its important political effect. The ouvriers felt that their numbers gave them strength, and that if they determined to act, nothing existing could stop them. They therefore met in the Palais-Royal and in the streets with renewed hope, and they openly said that if the National Assembly could not help them, they should help themselves, and during the first sessions of the States-General the working classes were with difficulty prevented from going to the help of the deputies at Versailles, but refrained from a belief that the good king meant well towards his people.

There might formerly have been some fear felt of the Gardes Françaises, but this speedily vanished after the mutiny in that regiment. The popular societies, which were being established all-over Paris in the months of May and June, saw the importance of gaining over the soldiers, and a popular club had been formed among the Gardes Françaises themselves, with the help of one of their captains, the Marquis de Valady. Most of the officers lived apart from them, and the society had made considerable progress when an attempt was made to check it on June 30 by the unpopular colonel, the Duc du Châtelet, who arrested eleven of the chief members, and sent them to the prison of the Abbaye. But the mischief had gone too far; the Gardes Françaises knew their strength, and broke out of barracks, and, after being joined by a crowd in the

Palais-Royal, forced their way into the prison, and, amid popular rejoicings, released their comrades.¹ The news of the mutiny was received with delight by the habitués of the Palais-Royal, who fêted the Gardes Françaises and were fêted by them in return, and all hope of the soldiers being an effectual police in Paris quite disappeared.

The more sagacious leaders of the National Assembly also saw their advantage, and knew that they could count upon Paris to back them up in the last extremity. Such was the situation of Paris, when, on July 12, a young man covered with dust rushed into the gardens of the Palais-Royal, and reported from Versailles that Necker had been dismissed.

¹ *Relation de ce qui s'est passé à l'Abbaye Saint-Germain le 30 Juin au soir.* B.M.—F. 838. (17.)

CHAPTER V.

THE TAKING OF THE BASTILLE.

The news of Necker's dismissal—Camille Desmoulins—July 12—The electors at the Hôtel de Ville—July 13—The morning of July 14—The Hôtel des Invalides—The Bastille—The storming of the Bastille—Release of the prisoners—Incidents at the Hôtel de Ville—The Assembly on July 12 and 13—Lafayette vice-president—The king visits the Assembly—The fifty deputies at Paris—Preparations—The king enters Paris—Lally-Tollendal—The first emigration—Bailly's troubles—The National Guard—Lafayette—Murder of Foullon—Measures of the Assembly—The Assembly wastes time—The session of August 4—How the provinces imitated Paris.

THE 12th of July was a Sunday, and the crowd at the Palais-Royal was therefore greater than usual. In addition to the workmen out of work and the usual loungers, were assembled the better fed and better clothed individuals of the prosperous bourgeois and ouvrier class. But all alike were excited by the news; and when the young man leapt upon a table in the gardens of the Palais-Royal, and harangued the holiday crowd and the frêquenters of the wineshops and gambling-houses on the subject of the dismissal of Necker, the whole crowd became animated by one impulse, and that was a desire to show their strength. They declared it was no longer possible to expect their good king to carry out reforms, or to foster the designs of the Assembly, because the queen and the courtiers had determined once more to establish the old despotic and tyrannical system. The young man who had

set alight the flame of resentment burning in every heart was one who had to play a great yet pathetic part in the future history of the revolution. It was Camille Desmoulins.

Benoît Lucie Simplicie Camille Desmoulins¹ was the type of the young *avocats* out of work, who had at present only recruited the ranks of journalism and the popular clubs, but who were to form the nucleus of the great band of the leaders of the Convention. In every respect, in disposition and in real genius, Camille differed from the group of young *avocats* who were to form the bulk of the Girondin party. His wit was keen enough to see through the utopian theories of Brissot, and of his old college friend Robespierre, and it allied him in later life to Danton, the great practical statesman of the second period of the Revolution. He was born at Guise in 1760. Guise was a small provincial town, the capital of certain domains of the Prince de Condé, and his father held the post of lieutenant-civil of the town, and was in fact local agent for the princely owner. But the emoluments of his office were not great, and had it not been for a relative, named Defieville des Essarts, also an *avocat*, but a very rich one, Camille would not have had the education which enabled him to make his mark as an author. As it was, M. des Essarts obtained for him a bursarship or scholarship at the great college of Louis le Grand at Paris. It was there that he made the acquaintance of Maximilien Robespierre, who was also a scholar, and struck up an intimate acquaintance with him. Camille is a good example of one side of the influence of the education given in the old seminaries on the ideas of the future great men of the Revolution. The mode of teaching pursued at such colleges as preserved the tradition of the Jesuits was entirely based on the study of the classics. The classical languages were not only studied by mastering the meaning of authors, but in the practice of composition. These compositions, which were called *conciones*, were very different from the Latin prose in modern

¹ *Camille et Lucile Desmoulins, d'après des documents nouveaux ou inédits*, by Jules Claretie, 1875; and *Œuvres de Camille Desmoulins*, ed. by Jules Claretie. 2 vols. 1874.

English public schools.¹ Instead of writing a translation or a theme upon some given subject, the pupils had to read or speak harangues after the manner of Cicero; and it is from the practice of writing such compositions in imitation of the flowery style of Cicero, and speaking them aloud, that the florid style of eloquence which prevailed in the Convention was learned. But Camille not only mastered a fine style of Latin eloquence, like many of his contemporaries, but had studied with more care than was usually bestowed certain of the less florid and more instructive writers. Tacitus seems to have been his favourite classical author, and it was from Tacitus that the most eloquent passages in the "Vieux Cordelier" derive their inspiration. Camille was, of course, destined for the bar; but he showed no desire to settle down in the provinces, and determined to try his fortune at the bar of Paris. There he made the acquaintance of Danton, but failed hopelessly as an *avocat*. His stuttering and stammering were so greatly against him as to win him a nickname among his intimates; but at the great crisis of his career, on July 12, all traces of his infirmity seemed to have disappeared, and he must have spoken clearly, distinctly, and eloquently, to guide the mob as he did on that occasion. Though he had failed at the bar, literature was still open to him; but Camille had none of the laborious industry which had won fame for Camus. He preferred to wander about in the Palais-Royal, or by the banks of the Seine, dreaming of a new era for France, or else in the gardens of the Luxembourg, hoping to see again the face of the girl he loved but was too poor to marry, Lucile Duplessis. He was to be the greatest journalist of the Revolution, and indeed the greatest journalist France had ever produced; but the censure of the press was too heavy before 1789 for him to find his career. On the news of the summons of the States-General he had hurried back to Guise, and probably written one or two electoral pamphlets there, and had taken very great interest in the local elections. Guise was the headquarters of a secondary bailliage, dependent on the grand

¹ Aulard's *Les Orateurs de la Constituante*, p. 6.

bailliage of Laon. At the head of the poll in the tiers état was elected Camille's father ; but the elder M. Desmoulins had no desire to cut a figure at Paris, and though unanimously elected, refused the honour of representing his bailliage at Laon. In his place M. des Essarts was returned as first deputy, and Camille himself was elected twenty-fourth elector for Guise out of seventy-five who were to go to Laon. There M. des Essarts was elected second deputy to the States-General, and bitter are the complaints of Camille that his father had not sufficient ambition to accept such an honour. On his return to Paris his discontent was increased, when he heard from every bailliage of the number of young avocats who had been elected deputies, and especially that his old college friend Maximilien de Robespierre had been elected deputy for Artois. Nevertheless, the electoral operations had increased Camille's chance of public employment. M. des Essarts was a man of influence, and Camille could sign himself "Elector of Laon." Under this title he published a short "Ode to the States-General," of which neither the poetry nor the sentiments are particularly remarkable. During the months of May and June he was getting more and more excited over political affairs, but knowing no publisher like his friend Loustallot, he was unable to publish his opinions on public affairs. The very day before the July 12, which was to make him a public character, he had offered Momoro, "the first printer of liberty," and future Hébertist, the manuscript of "*La France Libre*," but Momoro had not sufficient confidence in liberty to venture to print the strong language of Camille Desmoulins. Eloquent, with more wit than industry, and a facile power of expression in charming and well-chosen words, Camille Desmoulins was a born journalist, and his career as a pamphleteer and journalist was short, but very remarkable ; but at present he was a pamphleteer with a pamphlet in his pocket only, and a journalist with the idea of a journal in his head ; which makes it the more remarkable that a provincial avocat, with a provincial accent and a stutter, should have been able to make so deep an impression upon the mob of the Palais-Royal upon July 12.

As Camille finished his harangue, some one shouted to him, "What colours shall we wear?" which he answered by tearing down a green bough from a neighbouring tree, and his example was followed by all the crowd present. The memorable Sunday ended by attacks upon various shops, gunsmiths and bakers alike; but previous to these attacks there took place a solemn procession through the streets, and the crowd, led by Camille, thronged to the shop of Curtius, No. 20, Boulevard du Temple. Curtius was a Swiss doctor of Berne, whose beautiful anatomical studies in wax had attracted the attention of the Prince de Conti when in Switzerland.¹ The prince persuaded him to come to Paris, and to set up as a modeller in wax. Under such patronage he soon became fashionable, and made a good income by his busts, and by buying and selling pictures of the old masters. His niece, who afterwards became Madame Tussaud, had also learnt to model, and had for some months lived at court while she taught Madame Elisabeth, and it was from his shop that she brought to London the models which formed the basis of her famous collection. Curtius himself, like all the Swiss, was a sturdy radical, and his shop was full of busts of all the popular leaders. The three busts selected by the people to be carried in procession were those of the king, Necker, and the Duke of Orleans. The king was still regarded by the starving population of Paris as willing to help them if his court would permit him; Necker was the great minister who was to find the people food; Orleans was the liberal owner of the Palais-Royal. The three idols of July, 1789, were all to be detested by those very people who wished now to carry their busts in triumph. Necker was to fall from power unregretted; Orleans was to follow Marie Antoinette to the guillotine; and the king to fall a sacrifice for the sins of his ancestors.

Curtius readily gave the leaders of the mob two busts of Necker and Orleans, but as he had only a full-length model of the king, he was afraid it would fall to pieces, and refused to

¹ *Memoirs and Reminiscences of Madame Tussaud*, edited by F. Hervé. London: 1838.

lend it.¹ The procession, with the two busts carried before it, marched through the streets without opposition until it arrived at the Place Louis XV. In that square the people found drawn up a German cavalry regiment, the Royal Allemand, under the command of the Prince de Lambesc, a descendant of the house of Lorraine, with orders to protect the statue of Louis XV. from insult. The mob pressed round the troopers, and, after insulting words, began to stone them, when suddenly Lambesc ordered his men to advance at a trot and disperse the procession. At the advance of the troopers towards the Tuileries gardens, where respectable bourgeois were walking and their children playing, the mob fled; the busts were smashed, and several of the crowd, particularly one old man, were badly hurt by cuts from the sabres of the soldiers. The charge was suddenly stopped by a number of the Gardes Françaises falling in and preparing to receive cavalry, and on seeing this readiness for civil war, Lambesc feared to go further without specific orders, and galloped slowly back to the rest of the army encamped on the Champ de Mars.

But the procession had only occupied a portion of the seething populace, and that Sunday night saw many sections of the mob banded in different directions. One section, the more patriotic, sacked the shops of the gunsmiths and seized arms; others regarded the opportunity as a good one for pillage, and sacked first the bakers' and butchers' shops, and then the taverns. A third section attacked the barriers, at which octroi duties on all imports into Paris were levied, under the leadership of an octroi clerk, Jacques René Hébert. The bourgeois saw who would suffer by this pillaging of the shops, and, as if by magic, patrols of armed bourgeois appeared in the streets, without orders, uniform, or commanders, but in sufficient force, especially in the streets of the rich shops, the Rue Richelieu and the Rue Vivienne, to overawe the rioters. The night of July 12 was one long remembered in Paris. It was the first of many a terrible night which the Parisians were to pass through during the next ten years. It was a night of sleep-

¹ Madame Tussaud's *Memoirs*, p. 85.

lessness for all in Paris, while the smoke rose from the burning barriers, and perpetual encounters between armed pickets and drunken rioters were heard. But with morning came a determination that Paris should never again be subjected to such scenes, and the official government of the city having shown its incapacity to maintain order, it was for the citizens to discharge that duty for themselves.

In the early morning of the 13th, the electors of Paris, by one common accord, flocked to the Hôtel de Ville. They had been elected, as has been said, by the sixty districts for the purpose of electing deputies to the States-General, and ought then to have dispersed. But this they refused to do, and when Paris seemed to be without any recognized government, the chosen electors of the districts took the responsibility on themselves. The provost of the merchants, M. de Flesselles, welcomed the assistance of the electors, and the municipal officers seemed glad to have somebody they might obey. During July 13 the electors were entirely occupied with forming the National Guard of Paris. This National Guard was to consist primarily of two hundred volunteers from every district in Paris, which was to be eventually increased to eight hundred, or, in round numbers, twelve thousand men, to be increased to forty-eight thousand. The first twelve thousand were to elect their officers in every district, and make arrangements for patrolling the streets, to maintain order, day and night. They had as yet no head-quarters, no officers, no legal status, no royal patronage, but were the spontaneous creation of the citizens of Paris, created to maintain order when the government failed.

The 13th passed, according to a writer of the time, very quietly, considering what a storm it had followed and what a storm was to follow it; but it was the calm, not of quiet, but of preparation. Throughout that day the agents of Orleans, St. Huruge at their head, were busy organizing plans for the morrow; and there can be no doubt that the chiefs of the revolutionary party of Paris, such as the members of the Club of the Cordeliers, were as busily engaged. Both Orleans and

the revolutionary party saw that the government must be frightened, and that, if fright did not succeed, there must be civil war. Throughout the 13th leaders were being chosen, pikes were being forged, guns were being distributed, and every preparation made for some great stroke upon the morrow, though no man knew what that stroke might be. The troops in the Champ de Mars were the natural resource of the court when they heard of the riots in Paris, but De Broglie began to fear for his well-laid schemes when he heard from the Baron de Besenval, whom he had appointed commandant of the camp without Paris, that not even the foreign regiments could be trusted, and that in particular the Swiss regiment of Château Vieux was disaffected. For this disaffection he had only himself to blame. He had made no efficient regulations for feeding the assembled soldiers, and not only did purveyors have leave to come to the camp, but soldiers might come into Paris. The result was, that the soldiers of every regiment were profoundly influenced by the Gardes Françaises, and could not be trusted to act against the Parisians. Nevertheless, De Broglie ordered Besenval to risk making one effort at least to put down the mob.

But the mob on July 14 was of very different composition to the undisciplined multitude which had followed Camille on the 12th. On the 13th, preparations had been made in three different directions. The troops on the Champ de Mars had been got ready for action; the revolutionary party, under the agents of Orleans and of the popular clubs, had also been prepared; and the electors at the Hôtel de Ville had formed a powerful body of bourgeois into a Garde Nationale for the maintenance of order. This body had been augmented by many of the rioters of the night of the 12th, who now enlisted themselves as maintainers of order; and the hopes of the bourgeois for good order were proportionately raised. There remained only the three thousand Gardes Françaises, who had been of old the police of Paris. These men had been imbued so deeply with the ideas of the Revolution that they could not be trusted again by the government. Anything like a return

to the old system would inevitably bring punishment on themselves as mutineers. They were, therefore, fully committed to the cause of the Revolution, and supplied many of the leaders who were to conduct the mob to victory on the 14th.

The night of the 13th is described by witnesses as one presenting sights strange to every Parisian eye and sounds new to every Parisian ear. From the perpetual countersigns, from the steady march of the patrols, Paris might be believed to be occupied by a military force. From the sacked shops and ruined barriers, Paris might have been a recently captured city after a hard-fought siege. But the glowing faces alike of patrols and of every poor labourer showed Paris was not a conquered city, but rather one about to conquer its own liberty.

At daybreak on the 14th the tocsin was heard ringing from every church tower. The shops were closed, and something, men knew not what, was going to happen. Did the populace themselves know? Certainly not. The wildest ideas were floating about the city. Some said the populace and the National Guard were going out to fight the troops on the Champ de Mars—a ridiculous bravado which could only have ended in failure; others were heard to say that the people would march to Versailles and reinstate Necker by main force; others, again, were even heard to whisper that the king must be deposed, and Orleans must be King of France. But one thing all agreed upon, that there must be no communication between Paris and Versailles for fear of treachery. The people in the streets turned back every one who tried to leave the city. Not even the messengers from the electors at the Hôtel de Ville could reach the gates, and the electors themselves, the people's chosen, were suspected of betraying the people's interests. They were closely surrounded in the Hôtel de Ville, where they had sat all through the preceding day and night, by a tumultuous mob, which allowed none of them to leave the building. While one mob yet hemmed in the electors, and individuals were preventing any one leaving Paris, two mobs of well-led and stout rioters were on their way in two distinct directions. But their inten-

tions this time were not pillage. July 14 was not soiled by the sacking of bakers' shops. On the contrary, the wishes of the mob were now political; and while the starving workmen were surrounding the Hôtel de Ville, the disbanded Gardes Françaises, the young avocats, and many of a yet higher rank and position, swelled the throngs which were marching on the Hôtel des Invalides and the Bastille. Nor were they without the countenance of the Church. The curé of St. Étienne du Mont led his parishioners in the throng which was marching to the Hôtel des Invalides. The march of both parties was uninterrupted by the soldiery, for Besenval dared not risk his troops in opposition to the excited mobs. The edifices on which these well-organized bands of the populace were now advancing had been built at very different dates and for very different purposes. Seeing that both were now approached for the same reason, it is a mistake to assert that an attack upon the Bastille had been projected on the day before. If there was any plan in the minds of the chief leaders, it was to advance upon Versailles. They did not know that their purpose would be as well advanced in Paris itself. The two attacks upon the Bastille and the Invalides were both subservient to the main design, and it was intended only to force their respected commandants to distribute the store of arms collected in their arsenals to the people.

The Hôtel des Invalides had been built in the Faubourg St. Germain between 1670 and 1674, after the designs of Libéral Bruant, by Louis XIV. It was a large building, of the regular character of the buildings of Mansart, and had indeed been completed by J. H. Mansart himself, whose style corresponded to the pseudo-classical style which was made fashionable in England by Christopher Wren and Inigo Jones. The buildings of this period were all designed for appearance rather than for defence, and the Hôtel des Invalides was no exception. It had been built by the direction of Louvois, the famous Minister of War, and is one of the chief monuments of his great organization of the French army. Louvois had been the first to form a standing army. He had supplied that

army with a corps of engineers, artillery, etc., and he had established the Hôtel des Invalides for old soldiers, and the order of St. Louis for officers. But, like all other French institutions, its original intention had been corrupted during the eighteenth century, and, until the vigorous ministry of the Comte de Saint-Germain, it had become a convenient almshouse for the retired footmen of the nobility rather than a hospital for disabled soldiers. At this period the building was garrisoned by a few old invalids, under the command of the Comte de Sombreuil, a veteran officer. Against the Hôtel des Invalides, which was believed to contain 28,000 stand of arms, moved a powerful mob, under the command of M. Ethys de Corny and the curé of St. Étienne du Mont. When they reached the Hôtel, Sombreuil refused to surrender the arms, and a collision might have occurred had it not been possible for the rioters, by the very architecture of the building, to break in by many back ways and windows, and take peaceful possession of the arms they required. Hardly had they been successful when this mob, which had come chiefly from the Faubourg St. Marceau, received news that their brothers of the Faubourg St. Antoine had been refused arms and admission to the Bastille, and they at once rushed to their assistance.

The Bastille was a monument of a very different epoch to the Hôtel des Invalides. It did not commemorate the glories of Louis XIV., but rather the tyranny of his ancestors. It was a fine type of the ancient castle, and had been originally built to command the city of Paris. Similar castles had existed near every great town of France, and it is one of Mazarin's titles to fame as a destroyer of feudalism that he caused the destruction of the greater part of these castles in the provinces. But while the provincial castles, with a few exceptions, like the Chateau d'If, near Marseilles, had been destroyed, the Bastille had become, by the time of the Fronde, a yet more important fortress. The city of Paris had outgrown its ancient limits, and the Faubourg St. Antoine had grown up without the gate which the Bastille commanded. Around its portal had been fought one of the fiercest battles of the

Fronde. Turenne had driven Condé from the suburb of St. Antoine, and his soldiers would have entered the city pell-mell with those of Condé, when the Grande Mademoiselle, the daughter of Gaston of Orleans, herself pointed the guns of the Bastille against the pursuing enemy. Since the time of the Fronde the Bastille had heard no sound of war, and had been used only as a state prison. Under lettres de cachet prisoners of every rank and every kind had been imprisoned, and many accounts are extant of the régime practised in it. One of the most entertaining is in the memoirs of Madame de Staal Delaunay,¹ who was imprisoned there for some months, as a confederate in the conspiracy of the Duc and Duchesse de Maine. Since her time Latude had made his famous escape; Lally had been beheaded within its walls for failing in India, and many a pamphleteer had languished there. The famous work of Linguet² on the Bastille had made the state prison notorious to all Europe, and though it was not so badly managed as many a prison in other countries, and certainly far better than the English prisons of Newgate or the Fleet, it had attained a peculiarly detestable reputation. The prisoners consisted chiefly of two classes,³ prisoners of state and those imprisoned by lettres de cachet. The prisoners of state were nearly all pamphleteers, and it became a title of honour to a political opponent of the government to have been in the Bastille. Not only Linguet, but also Brissot, had spent some months there, and many a more obscure author had died there. At present it contained but seven prisoners, together with poor Réveillon, the paper-manufacturer, whose factory had been sacked, and who was now living within the fortress for safety. The garrison consisted of eighty-two invalids, two


¹ *Mémoires de Madame de Staal Delaunay*, in vol. i. of Barrière's series of *Mémoires*.

² *Mémoires de la Bastille*, published 1782; and also *La Bastille dévoilée*. 9 parts. 1789-90.

³ See the *Archives de la Bastille*, by F. Ravaisson, Paris, 1866-83; and the complete list of all prisoners confined in the Bastille during the reign of Louis XVI., with their offences, published by Gustave Bord, in the *Revue de la Révolution*, March-November, 1883.

REFERENCE.

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| A. Entrance to the Bastille. | Q. The Terrace. |
| B. Outer Court. | H. The Second Drawbridge. |
| C. The Arsenal Gate. | K. The Great Court. |
| D. The First Drawbridge. | M. Court "du Puits." |
| E. The Governor's Court. | S. The Outer Wall. |
| F. The Governor's House. | |



THE BASTILLE IN 1789.

gunners, and thirty-two men of the Swiss regiment of Salis Samade, under the command of M. de Launay, governor of the castle.

Such was the condition and history of the fortress which the men of St. Antoine, led by certain Gardes Françaises, and old soldiers, had approached to ask for arms.¹ De Launay had been for some time expecting such a visit, and had been informed by Besenval that a reinforcement was under orders for him, and that he was to hold the fortress at all costs. After the late riots he had made every preparation for resistance, and had mounted and loaded the guns of the fortress. These preparations had terrified the peaceful inhabitants of all the houses within range of the guns of the Bastille, and the assembly of the district of St. Louis de Culture sent one of their electors, an avocat of some reputation for eloquence, M. Thuriot de la Rosière, to the governor, begging him to at once dismount the guns. He was accompanied to the first drawbridge through the outer court, which was always left unguarded, by a large crowd, who waited somewhat impatiently for the return of their elector, and on his absence began to murmur that he had been seized and imprisoned. Thuriot's interview was a long one. The governor at once positively refused to comply with the request of the inhabitants of the neighbouring houses, and when Thuriot protested that he also represented the electors of Paris, De Launay refused to acknowledge their competence to command him, and felt justified in this course by a letter from M. de Flesselles, provost of the merchants of Paris, who had bidden him to temporize until he should receive reinforcements. Thuriot was civilly dismissed to go to the electors at the Hôtel de Ville, and to ask if they could and would hold the governor blameless if he complied with their demands. As Thuriot was passing out of the Bastille over the outer or advanced drawbridge, exhorting the people to be patient while he went to the

¹ For the taking of the Bastille, see the *Mémoires sur la Bastille*, in Barrière's series of *Mémoires*; *La Prise de la Bastille*, by Gustave Bord, 1881; and *La Prise de la Bastille et ses anniversaires*, by Georges Lecocq, 1881.

Hôtel de Ville, an unarmed but angry crowd rushed across the drawbridge, demanding arms, into the governor's court of the fortress. The drawbridge was raised, and a heavy fire opened on the defenceless crowd in the courtyard. The sound of firing, and the shrieks of the wounded in the courtyard, roused the wrath of the men outside the walls and moat, who made impotent attempts to scale the fortress, whilst it summoned to their help many a Garde Français and national guard, and also a contingent of the men of St. Marceau, who had just armed themselves with the arms they had taken from the Hôtel des Invalides. These men were not long in recognizing their leaders. The mass who could not know by instinct how to handle their arms only made a clamour, while the old soldiers, the Gardes Françaises and a few daring spirits who understood how to obey and when to attack, collected round two soldiers, named Hulin and Élie, opposite the outer drawbridge, and proposed to obey their orders. When the drawbridge had been raised, a plank had still been left across the moat, and across it dashed two old soldiers, Louis Tournay, late of the Régiment Dauphin, and Aubin Bonnemère, late of the Régiment Royal-Comtois, who soon newed down the ropes supporting the drawbridge, and, assisted by daring men, attacked the heavy door. During this attack there was a momentary cessation of the general clamour round the fortress, when Thuriot, accompanied by two of the electors from the Hôtel de Ville, brought a message from the electors, and waved a white flag from the roof of a neighbouring house. But De Launay, by firing three distinct shots, refused to negotiate, and the struggle began again, vaguely in most parts, but with stern determination at the great gate by the drawbridge. The assailants soon broke down the gate. Hulin and Élie, Tournay and Bonnemère, closely followed by Humbert, Réole, Marceau, Rossignol, Arnè, and Cholat, rushed into the governor's courtyard of the Bastille.

This first conquest was signalized by an act of mercy. Some of the mob in the governor's courtyard had seized a young girl, Mademoiselle de Monsigny, and, believing she

was De Launay's daughter, were about to burn her, when Aubin Bonnemère, merciful, like all brave men, snatched her from the hands of the mob, and saved her life at his own imminent peril. But the Bastille was not yet taken, for the second drawbridge was up, and the towers were all capable of long defence, and De Launay was determined to fight to the last. The defection of his soldiers overthrew his last hope; an officer was seen to wave a piece of paper from the walls, and Stanislas Maillard, a young man of singular bodily activity, ran across a narrow plank over the inner moat and took it from him. The paper contained the unconditional surrender of the garrison. The inner drawbridge was let down, and the conquerors of the Bastille occupied the great court of the fortress. The first to enter were Humbert, Hulin, Élie, and the handsome young president of the Parlement of Paris, Hérault de Séchelles, whose father had been a gallant soldier, and died at the head of his regiment at Minden. With theatrical earnestness the defenders of the fortress and its assailants fell on each other's necks, when suddenly a few shots were heard; cries of vengeance for treason arose on all sides, and in a few minutes three officers and four soldiers were murdered. More murders would have followed had not Élie, with stentorian voice, demanded that "there should be no blood upon our laurels, and that the prisoners should swear fidelity to the nation, not to the king." Élie had more difficulty in saving the life of the governor, De Launay, who had been seized by Arnè, Cholat, and Maillard, after being frustrated in his scheme for blowing up the castle by his own garrison, but was at last successful in forming his "conquerors of the Bastille" into a compact body, and leading off the prisoners to the Hôtel de Ville. In the governor's court of the Bastille were left eighty-three dead, and fifteen of the assailants afterwards died of their wounds.

While De Launay and his fellow-prisoners were being taken to the Hôtel de Ville, the rest of the mob round the Bastille swarmed over the fortress and released the prisoners, who were but seven in number. One of them, Tavernier, a

natural son of the financier, Pâris Duverney, had been imprisoned for thirty years, for no reason that he was aware of, and another, named Whyte, had lost his senses from his prolonged imprisonment, and had to be taken straight to the lunatic asylum of Charenton. Before carrying the released prisoners in triumphal procession round the city, they were taken to the house of the popular brewer of St. Antoine, Santerre, who had been wounded in the attack, and there regaled with such dainties as they had not tasted for years. The wrath of the populace then gave place, in most quarters of Paris, to wild rejoicing, and the day ended in singing and drinking "à la nation."

Meanwhile the square in front of the Hôtel de Ville had been filled with starving workmen and those drégs of the populace who had not joined in the attack on the Hôtel des Invalides or the Bastille. Many of them had forced their way among the electors themselves, and the electors were in terror of their lives. In the interval between the different attacks on the fortress the electors had tried to communicate both with the governor of the Bastille and the leaders of the crowd without. M. de Flesselles, the provost of the merchants, who was the chief municipal officer of the city, had been ordered to write to De Launay, bidding him surrender the fortress; but it was asserted that he had added a postscript ordering the governor to resist to the very last, for help was coming. This treachery had caused a terrible outcry in the square, and the name of De Flesselles was greeted with shouts and hooting. The deputation from the Hôtel de Ville had been headed by Thuriot de la Rosière, the popular lawyer. He reported that he had not been permitted to enter the Bastille a second time, but from a neighbouring roof had waved a white flag, and tried to obtain a truce. And now came the news to the excited mob around the electors of the success of the attack, and the news, too, that the governor and the garrison were being conducted as prisoners of the people to the Hôtel de Ville. Whether the news pleased the electors may be doubted, for they felt that their lives might have to

answer for the success of the people; but it was unsafe to show any fear. So they received Élie and his prisoners with a show of rejoicing and with acclamations. But Élie had not been able to bring them all safe to the electors. On the road, De Losme, the major of the fortress, had been seized and murdered; and on the very steps of the Hôtel de Ville, a cook of the name of Dénot, who alleged he had been kicked, murdered the unfortunate governor, M. De Launay.¹ This act of vengeance was followed by another. M. de Flesselles was forced, by those of the mob who had got within the precincts of the hall, out upon the steps, where he was shot dead, and his head was immediately carried in triumph on a pike, with those of De Launay and De Losme. These acts of wild justice or of vengeance done, the occupants of the square began to disperse, and scattered themselves over the city; but not to pillage, for the national guards who had been embodied, though they did not attempt to check the movement of the people against the Bastille, took good care to protect their own shops. A few isolated instances of pillage there may have been, but on the whole the great day of the capture of the Bastille was not signalized by the pillage which had disgraced July 12. The capture of the Bastille caused great excitement in other prisons, and though no criminals were released, the prisoners for debt at La Force and the Châtelet, including one Irish lord, the Earl of Masse-reene, who had been for half his life a prisoner, broke out and regained their liberty.² So closed July 14, and the capture of the Bastille was the great news to be communicated to the king when he returned from hunting that evening. "Why," said the king, "this is a revolt." "No, sire," answered the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, a nobleman of blameless character who had been expelled from court for refusing to acknowledge the Du Barry. "No, sire; it is a revolution."

¹ Claretie's *Camille Desmoulins*, p. 63.

² *Histoire de trois ouvriers Français*, by the Baron Ernouf, pp. 68, 69, 1867; and for Lord Massereene, the *Gentleman's Magazine* for July and August, 1789.

The news of the dismissal of Necker on July 12 had been received with dismay by the members of the National Assembly, but they were too deeply involved in the struggle with the court to be able to recede. The dismissal of Necker was to be followed, they were informed, by the arrest of the leading deputies and the dissolution of the Assembly. To guard against this they declared that the new ministers were responsible to the country for any harm that might ensue; that the national debt was guaranteed by the country; and that the resolutions of June 17 and 23 remained unaltered. Necker had thus for a moment gained a peculiar popularity even with those who despised him, and Mirabeau himself was not slow to perceive this. The Comte de Lally-Tolendal, who had established a reputation in the Assembly for pathetic eloquence, lamented in set terms over the fall of Necker and the virtues of the minister; but the members of the Assembly could not think at first of any decisive step it might be necessary to take. The news of the riots on July 12 filled them at once with hope and with dismay. It filled them with hope, in that they felt they might be able to make armed opposition to the court. But something more than a mob—an army and a general—would be needed by the people to fight the armies of the court. To supply the army the favourite plan of the Garde Civile, or Garde Bourgeoise, was discussed at length; and on July 13, when the electors of Paris were actually forming a Garde Civile, the Assembly were discussing the advantages of establishing such Civic or National Guards all over France. The question of National Guards introduced the question of the establishment of free municipalities, but in their present excited state this was too vast a subject for the deputies to enter upon. But how to find a general? The general officers and all the marshals of France were loyal to the court, and there was but one man who had made a name as a republican general, and that was Lafayette.

The Marquis de Lafayette had won his first laurels by the side of Washington in America, and he was expected by his

countrymen to win fresh fame in France. He had shown advanced liberal opinions in his native province in the provincial assembly of Lower Auvergne in 1787, and still more in the electoral period of 1789, and had first suggested the summons of the States-General in the Assembly of the Notables. The cahier which he had drawn up for the noblesse of Lower Auvergne had been freely copied by the young nobles of the neighbouring districts. But nevertheless it had abounded in sententious maxims rather than in projects of practical reform. But now the deputies, even Mirabeau, felt that Lafayette was the only man who had a reputation sufficient to obtain for him the command of a volunteer army. The project could hardly be mentioned without suspicion of treason; but the Assembly proceeded to create the office of vice-president of their body, and to elect Lafayette to fill it. This gave at once a mark of their own confidence in him, and pointed him out to the people of Paris as the military representative of the Assembly.

July 13 was a day of comparative calm and preparation in Paris; but it was one of anxious expectation both to the court and to the Assembly at Versailles. At court the queen and Artois urged the king to complete his blow. "It was not enough to dismiss Necker," they cried; "the Assembly must be dissolved, and its leaders imprisoned. It would be no more difficult than the arrest of the leaders of the Paris parlements in the old times." On the other side, the Assembly knew that such advice was being given, and in an attempt to prove themselves on the side of order, they issued a proclamation to the people of Paris, begging them to make no more disturbances, and to keep the peace. But the leaders of the Assembly felt sure that their proclamation would have small effect, and possibly did not desire it to be strictly obeyed, for they decided to sit permanently day and night and wait the issue of events. What the events of that great July 14 were has been described; and at the news both king and Assembly were violently affected. The king determined immediately that he would try no more to check

the public feeling which had been so markedly expressed in Paris, and De Broglie, after reporting to the queen that it was impossible in any way to count upon the army, sent in his resignation. While the court was thus giving way, the Assembly was in a state of terror lest the revolution in Paris should be put down to their account, and their fear was justified by the knowledge which many of them possessed, that some of their most conspicuous leaders, such as Adrien Duport, had, instead of trying to check the revolution, been engaged in it. Nevertheless, they determined to send a deputation to the king, to request him to recall Necker, and to promise him that they would do their best to procure the restoration of order. But while the deputation was being named, the news arrived that the king himself was coming down to the Assembly. His appearance was now very different from that of the haughty monarch who had annulled all that the deputies had done, and bidden them discuss the subject of finance. He now came humbly and submissively to say that he would give in to the wishes of his faithful people, and reinstate Necker and the other dismissed ministers, and in fact do whatever he was wished. Such a triumph the leaders of the Assembly had never expected, for they had thought the queen would have made a longer struggle. They did not recognize the fact that Louis could be obstinate on occasion, though generally his obstinacy came too late to repair the damage he had done by his temporary compliance with the wishes of the queen. All fear from the side of the court being removed, the problem of excited Paris was now to be faced, and on the morning of the 15th, fifty deputies were ordered by the Assembly to proceed to Paris and to report upon the state of things there.

The fifty deputies hardly recognized the city. It was over burnt barriers that they had to advance into the streets. Everywhere they saw entrenchments thrown up, and preparations for street-fighting. All shops were closed, and had been for three days. No carriages, no individuals even, were permitted to leave the city. Four travelling Englishmen who had been stopping at an hotel in the Palais-Royal during July 14

made three different attempts to leave the city, but though armed with a passport from the electors at the Hôtel de Ville, and accompanied by two agents of police, they were three times taken back, and were not permitted to depart until July 19, and then only after a thorough search had been instituted, and all their pistols and other weapons had been confiscated.¹ Through streets filled with excited men, breaking into houses and searching for arms, but where there was some order kept by bodies of civic guards, not yet in uniform, but easily distinguishable from their attempt to maintain order, the deputies proceeded to the Hôtel de Ville. There they found the unfortunate electors, who had not left the great hall since the 13th, so tired out that many of them were sleeping upon the benches, and surrounded by a crowd of starving workmen and half-naked ruffians, who threatened them with all sorts of penalties if they did not immediately find them bread and arms. The electors who were awake were chiefly trying to appease the crowd, by issuing orders for bread which could not be obeyed, and by voting laurel crowns and other rewards to the conquerors of the Bastille. The Bastille itself they had ordered to be destroyed, and had in vain demanded its keys, which, however, now lay in the house of Santerre, the popular elector and brewer. In spite, or perhaps because, of his wound, Santerre was the most popular and most powerful man in Paris at this time. Not only had the civic guard of the Faubourg St. Antoine elected him their commandant, but the whole mob of that faubourg would have followed him, if he had ordered them to sack the city, kill the electors, and advance on Versailles. But Santerre was not a mere brigand. He knew the value of order, and used his great influence to appease rather than to excite the people. The arrival of the deputies was greeted with shouts from the crowd in the square before the Hôtel de Ville, and the shouts were mingled with cries of "Long live the National Assembly!" and "Where is the king?" The electors declared there could

¹ *Dr. Rigby's Letters from France in 1789*, edited by his daughter, Lady Eastlake, pp. 76-84. London: 1880.

be no real order in Paris unless the king himself came to the capital, and showed that he did not intend to punish the city for its recent behaviour. With heavy hearts the deputies returned to Versailles, for they never expected that the king would trust himself in the excited city, and indeed they thought it doubtful that he would ever come out again if he did venture to enter his own capital. Such was the report which was read to the Assembly on the night of July 15. It was determined to beg the king to make the desired entrance into Paris, and also that a hundred members of the Assembly should accompany him, to throw over him the safeguard of their popularity. The king consented, and July 17 was fixed for the public entrance of the descendant of Henry IV. into the capital. The whole of the next day the deputies were busy in making arrangements for the maintenance of order. The National Guards were legalized, and ordered to be established in every district of France. A decree for the regulation of new municipalities was proposed, and a committee was appointed to inquire into the question of the price of bread and of food in general.

On the same day, July 16, Montmorin, Puységur, and La Luzerne were installed once more in their old offices, and Barentin and Laurent de Villedeuil, who had always shown reactionary tendencies and had adhered to the plans of Breteuil and De Broglie, were dismissed. Their successors were, however, not yet appointed, and it was not until after the return of Necker, that Mgr. Jérôme Champion de Cicé, Archbishop of Bordeaux, and one of the four prelates who had headed the majority of the Estate of their Clergy in their reunion with the tiers état, was made Keeper of the Seals in succession to Barentin, that the Comte de Saint-Priest was made Minister of the Household, or Interior, and that the Marquis de la Tour du Pin was made Minister for War in succession to Puységur, whose health did not permit him to continue in office.

In the early morning of the 17th, the king, who was not wanting in personal courage, took the sacrament and made his will, and, in spite of the entreaties of his wife, set out for Paris. He was accompanied by the hundred deputies who had been

appointed by the Assembly as escort, and by a very few of his body-guards. At the head of the procession was Bailly, the president, and the other deputies of the tiers état of Paris, Lally-Tollendal, Lafayette, and all those who had won a name in the recent discussions except Mirabeau, who was prevented from attending by the death of his father during the previous week.¹ The journey to Paris was very slow, and more than once the friends of the king feared that some accident might have befallen him, and it was rumoured among them that Orleans had plotted that some ruffian in the crowd should kill the king, and make way for the appointment of himself as regent. But there was no such plot, and the king reached Paris in safety. Through the streets of Paris he was accompanied by shouts of "Welcome!" up to the square of the Hôtel de Ville. Round him, instead of angry he saw smiling faces; for the populace of Paris believed that in some unexplained way the presence of the king would bring them food, and the leaders in the recent events looked upon his presence as a guarantee of their own personal safety. When he reached the Hôtel de Ville, the old company of merchants, with their provost at their head, were not there to meet him, but instead the new informal body of the electors of Paris. Around him everywhere he saw the tricolour cockade; for Camille's proposition of green as the national colour on July 12 had been rejected on the next day, when it was remembered that green liveries were worn by the servants of Comte Artois.² The deputies who accompanied Louis were

¹ Passy's *Frochot*, p. 55.

² Many theories have been propounded as to the origin of the tricolour cockade as the national emblem of France, and especially of revolutionary France. The colours red, white, and blue were used in both the French army and the French navy, as in the English navy until a recent date, as the special insignia of certain regiments or certain ranks. Thus all the regiments of which the king was colonel wore red facings, and admirals hoisted red, white, or blue flags according to their ranks. "Dans tous les cas," says Susane (*Histoire de la cavalerie française*, vol. i. p. 309), "l'emploi simultané des trois couleurs blanche, rouge et bleue est aussi vieux que la France. . . Le drapeau blanc est né en 1793 après la mort de Louis XVI." There are many stories as to the origin of the tricolour cockade. One is that the new National Guard of Paris assumed

not to be satisfied with a simple progress, but were determined that some step of political importance should be taken. The great question of municipalities and National Guards must be settled from the king's own mouth. At first, with a smile, he fastened in his hat the cockade which had been handed to him, and then, appearing on a balcony, muttered a few inaudible words to the vast crowd in the square. But if his own words were inaudible, those of Lally-Tollendal were not. The young Irishman had now his day of triumph; for it was he who carried off the palm of oratory, he who beguiled the unwilling king into the recognition of a free municipality of Paris, and he who obtained the nomination of Bailly as first mayor of Paris, and of Lafayette as commandant of the National Guard. His concluding words, "that once a king had conquered Paris, but now Paris had conquered her king," were received with shouts of enthusiasm; and if the poor king wished himself in the place of his great ancestor, he was careful not to express that wish, even in his countenance. The words of Lally-Tollendal put every one into a good humour, and when he declared that Paris should no longer be ruled by a provost of the merchants, but by a mayor—as great, maybe, as the Lord Mayor of London—cries of assent were heard from every side; and when he turned his expressive face towards Bailly, a universal shout of "Bailly, first Mayor of Paris!" arose, and Jean Sylvain Bailly found himself elected by acclamation to the new office. A question then arose as to the city colours, red and blue, and that it was a bicoloured cockade which Bailly presented to the king, and which became tricoloured by his placing it on his own white cockade. Another derivation, the one adopted by Littré in his dictionary, is that the tricolour represented the union of the three orders, the red for the people, the white for the noblesse, and the blue for the clergy. Lafayette, in his *Mémoires*, asserts that he suggested the bicolour, because red and blue were the colours of Orleans as well as of the city of Paris (*Mémoires*, vol. ii. p. 267), and it is possible that white also formed part of the duke's livery; for Mrs. Swinburne on July 16, the day before the king's entrance, writes to her husband, "They have taken the colours of the Duke of Orleans' livery for their cockade,—blue, red, and white" (*The Courts of Europe at the close of the last century*, by H. Swinburne, vol. ii. p. 89).

who was to command the new National Guard ; and Lafayette was similarly appointed, and received with cheers by the crowd. Lafayette then said, in returning thanks, that it was not a Civic, but a National Guard, which he was going to command, and a few days later he made his famous remark that the tricolour cockade should make the tour of the world. These appointments were very real political advantages, and were the first great results of the capture of the Bastille. These appointments confirmed, the king attended mass in the Church of Ste. Geneviève, where he heard an eloquent abbé, Claude Fauchet, preach a funeral sermon in honour of those who were slain on the 14th, and then returned slowly to Versailles, delighted with his reception and not understanding that he had established two powers which were to overthrow his throne.

Trophime Gérard, Comte de Lally-Tollendal, who was the real hero of the day, had won fame by his eloquence and filial affection before July 17. He was the grandson of Sir Gerard Lally, an Irish Roman Catholic, who called himself Baron of Tullendally, and who had entered the service of Louis XIV. with his cousins, the Dillons, after James II. had been driven from Ireland in 1689. His father, the Comte de Lally, after winning the battle of Fontenoy with the Irish brigade, had nobly supported the reputation of France in India, but failed in re-establishing her power there from want of money and of reinforcements, and had been executed for that failure in the Bastille in 1766. The son had only learnt his father's name the day before his execution, and had spent the years of his early manhood in striving to obtain the reversal of the sentence which had condemned that father as a traitor. He had first to prove his own legitimacy, and then to fight the case against D'Esprémesnil, the grandson of Dupleix, before the Parlements of Paris, Rouen, and Dijon. His eloquence had been successful, and the sentence had been reversed in 1778 ; but Lally-Tollendal had not relied on oratory alone to gain his cause, and had spent much time in England collecting evidence in favour of his father. In England he had lived chiefly with Pitt and Burke, and had imbibed a sincere

admiration for the English constitution. Instead of studying it in books alone, like Mounier, he had studied its workings on the spot; and when he heard that a new States-General had been summoned, and that a new French constitution would probably be drawn up, he had determined to use his utmost efforts to make it an imitation of that in England. He had been rejected by the noblesse of the little bailliage of Dourdan, though he had there effected some alterations in their cahier,¹ but had been elected in Paris as some requital for his services as secretary to the electoral assembly of the noblesse of the capital. He had not at first any opportunity of declaring his political views at length, but the fame of his eloquence preceded him to the States-General. In the chamber of the noblesse at Versailles, he had taken his seat by the side of the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre, whose political views resembled his own, and had accompanied him, with the rest of the minority of the noblesse, to the National Assembly on June 23. There his emotional eloquence had had a great success on the question of the dismissal of Necker; and now, on July 17, he had reaped the fullest reward that eloquence can obtain—the sympathy of a whole city—at the Hôtel de Ville of Paris. But he had done more. He had not only moved the people; he had not only made a memorable speech; but he, and he only, had made Bailly Mayor of Paris, and Lafayette commander of the National Guard, and thus taken the first step towards the establishment of a limited monarchy.

The laurel wreath which Lally-Tollendal had won had not yet faded when he reported to the Assembly the great events of the day. The Assembly was rejoiced that it had passed over without bloodshed, and gladly confirmed the nominations of Bailly and Lafayette. But if the Assembly was rejoiced, the court was filled with consternation. The queen could no longer conceal from herself how intensely unpopular she had made herself by her recent proceedings, and the Comte d'Artois knew that his life was in peril. The recall of Necker and the visit of the king to Paris were the signals for a general stampede

¹ *Gauville's Journal*, p. 3.

out of France, which may be called the first emigration. Turin was the meeting-place of these first exiles, and there arrived in quick succession the Comte d'Artois, the Prince de Lambesc, and the Prince de Conti. The queen, though she did not fly herself, yet advised her intimate friends, the Polignacs, to leave France as quickly as possible, for she had heard that they were marked out for the vengeance of the people.¹ She had many reasons to regret her intimacy with them. The Duchesse Jules de Polignac and the Comtesse Diane de Polignac were both women of very bad character, and had more than once been threatened with expulsion from court, but on each occasion the queen had forced the king to pay their enormous debts. It was no wonder that the exasperation of the people was more loudly expressed against the unworthy favourites than against the queen herself; and had it been in her nature to alter her course of action and adopt the ideas of her husband, her own previous behaviour would only have been punished in the punishment of her friends. But though Artois and many of his friends had fled, there were yet plenty of youthful noblemen and old courtiers left about the court to encourage the queen in the idea of further resistance to her husband's wishes.

The news of the first emigration was received with delight by the journalists and the populace of Paris. "The rats were leaving the sinking ship," they cried, "and victory was assured." Paris could not cool down at once after the excitement of the last few days, and it was only by slow degrees that it began to recover its usual tenor of life, and that it did so recover was mainly due to the efforts of Bailly and the National Guard. Bailly's position was a most difficult one. He was Mayor of Paris, but there was no legally constituted municipality. Madame Bailly and he went to live at the Hôtel de Ville, and on him alone fell the whole responsibility of the government of the city. The electors of the tiers état were tired of the responsibility which had been thrust upon them, and open murmurs that their powers were illegal were to be

¹ See note, p. 168.

heard on all sides. But Bailly had not only the reluctance of the electors to face; he had to answer the thousands of petitions presented to him from all the sixty districts of Paris, and from most of the innumerable clubs which had sprung up. These petitions were nearly all for food, and what could Bailly do? As chairman of a committee "des subsistances," established at the Hôtel de Ville, he sent out agents to buy corn, and sold it at a reduced price to the bakers, in order to lower the price of bread;¹ but such an expedient could not last, and Bailly earnestly begged his friends in the National Assembly to devise some way to assist him. Had he been a man of strong character, or in any way accustomed to administration, he might at this time have achieved a great success; but he was essentially a stay-at-home man of science, and did not understand that if his position was to give him any power whatsoever to alleviate the general distress, he must have the supreme control of the National Guard, which was to form the police of Paris. The National Guard and its commandant, the Marquis de Lafayette, were the greatest thorns in the situation of the first Mayor of Paris.

When, upon July 13, the electors had issued orders that two hundred men in every district of Paris should take arms and patrol the streets to maintain order, there was no intention that a bourgeois or class guard should be established. As the numbers of the new Civic Guard increased during the next few days, many old soldiers and many workmen out of work gladly enlisted themselves on the side of order, and were ready to help to disperse the men whom they had assisted on the night of the 12th. The Civic Guard was, indeed, merely the expedient for a troubled time. There had been no attempt at organization further than the election in every district of a commandant to direct the patrols. But, on July 17, the civic guard had been changed from a temporary expedient to a permanent force, and a powerful National Guard was tacitly sanctioned by the king, and a commander-in-chief elected in the person of Lafayette. Lafayette understood the institution of the National Guard in a very different sense

¹ Bailly's *Mémoires*.

from the electors of Paris. He regarded the maintenance of order, as they did, as the most important duty of the new force, but he had further political ideas; and if the new force was primarily to maintain order in Paris, it was intended by its new commandant to combine eventually all the National Guards in France, and so form a powerful volunteer army to support the reformers in the National Assembly. It was this intention of Lafayette's which changed the whole character of the National Guard of Paris. He made no attempt to establish only as small a police force as should be necessary for the maintenance of order. On the contrary, it was his plan to swell the numbers of the National Guard in Paris to the greatest possible extent. It was hardly necessary to have sixty thousand men to maintain order in the city, and yet that was the number of men which Lafayette desired to have under his command. Further, he desired that this new National Guard should be drawn from one class. He had noticed that it was the bourgeois who had hitherto been most keen in the desire of a new constitution, and also that they were chiefly interested in the maintenance of some form of constitutional monarchy. He had no sympathy whatever with the proletariat. The starving workmen he regarded as socialists in embryo, and socialism he detested as much as he did tyranny. If the proletariat were to take up arms and form the nucleus of the new National Guard, he felt sure that his own term of command would be but a short one. It was to the bourgeois, therefore, that he appealed, and on the bourgeois that he relied. It was impossible for him to state these ideas, but he ensured their being adopted by making such an expensive uniform indispensable for a member of the National Guard that a poor man could have no power to purchase one. He further adopted a very military organization. Up to a certain grade the officers were to be elected, but the staff of what may be called the army of Paris was nominated by himself, and consisted either of young nobles who had served with him in America, or representatives of the wealthy bourgeois class who liked the idea of playing at soldiers. In order to get his volunteer army more en-

tirely under his control, he proposed the incorporation of the Gardes Françaises into a paid battalion of the National Guard, who were to be subjected to military discipline and under his own immediate command. The bourgeois acquiesced in this proposition, for they did not want to have three thousand unpaid and disbanded Gardes Françaises wandering about the city, and ready to take the lead in every desperate enterprise. Besides this paid battalion of the National Guard, Lafayette formed a regiment of volunteer cavalry, of which every private had to provide his own horse and arms, which closed the ranks to all but decidedly wealthy men ; and this regiment he hoped also to have under his immediate influence. When once he had organized his powerful army, his policy was to get it thoroughly devoted to himself ; and this he did in many ways. He never failed to support any member of the National Guard in every possible way against Bailly, or the attacks of any journal or pamphlet. He was always ready to be present at their social gatherings ; he stood godfather to their children, and drank their healths, and lost no opportunity of ingratiating himself with the rank and file. He possessed two qualities which specially fitted him to command a body of bourgeois volunteers. He was able to use fine language in addressing them about the service they rendered to the city and the cause of freedom, and they liked to be told that they were the saviours and regenerators of France. At the same time he never failed to remind them that they were also the supporters of order, and that, if they did not implicitly obey him, the proletariat would make short work of their rich shops and well-furnished houses. He earnestly devoted himself to this work of winning the hearts of the bourgeois National Guard, and entirely did he succeed ; but in all his measures, all his speeches, and all his ideas appeared the incurable vanity of the man.

Marie Jean Paul Roch Yves Gilbert du Mottier, Marquis de Lafayette,¹ was descended, as the number of his names might

¹ There is no good biography extant of Lafayette ; the best appreciation of his character is that contained in Sainte-Beuve's *Portraits Litté-*

indicate, from one of the oldest families in France. The men of the family had always been soldiers, and so many of them had been killed on the field of battle that their ill luck had passed into a proverb. His father had not belied the proverb, for he was killed at the battle of Minden, at the head of the Grenadiers de France, when his son was only two years old. Gilbert du Mottier, Marquis de Lafayette, was born at the château of Chavaniac, in Auvergne, on September 6, 1757, and had been educated there by his paternal grandmother and an aunt, Mdle. du Mottier. In his boyhood he had shown a taste for deeds of chivalry, and had desired to hunt down the monster of the Gevaudan, a fabulous beast, with the same legendary history as the dragon of Wantley. In 1768, when only eleven years old, he was sent to his mother, who lived at Paris with her father, the Marquis de la Rivière, and was educated for four years at the Collège du Plessis. While still at school he entered the Mousquetaires in 1770, and was married to a granddaughter of the Maréchal-Duc de Noailles in 1771. In 1773 he inherited an income of some £5000 a year from his grandfather, and then began the regular life of a young officer in the army. He burned to distinguish himself in war, and was in garrison at Metz when he heard of the rebellion of the American colonies against Great Britain. His chivalrous imagination was stirred by this rebellion of a few poor colonists against a wealthy nation, and he determined to offer them the assistance of his sword. The French government did not wish to get embroiled with England, and attempted to prevent his departure. But he escaped their vigilance, and chartered a merchant vessel, which took him safe to America. He was received with open arms by Washington, who regarded him as the harbinger of substantial help from France, and was, on July 3, 1777, made a major-

raires, vol. ii. For his life, see *Souvenirs sur la Vie privée du Général Lafayette*, by Jules Cloquet, Paris, 1836; *La Famille, l'enfance et la première jeunesse de Marquis de Lafayette*, by Henri Doniol, Orleans, 1875; and, above all, the fragment of autobiography contributed by Edmond de Lafayette to the number of *La Haute Loire* for September 6, 1883.

general in the American army by Congress. If his birth and wealth and natural disposition had not made him vain, the reception he met with in America would have been enough to turn any young man's head. Though he was but twenty, and without a fragment of military experience, Washington entrusted him with most important commands, but always took care to send with him one of his more experienced officers, who did the work for which the young French nobleman received the glory. He exhibited great personal courage on more than one occasion, but gave no signs of any military ability. The policy of Washington, to win the active help of France, was on every occasion to couple Lafayette's name with his own, and he thus acquired as much fame, not only in America, but in Europe and in France, as Washington himself. When, therefore, he returned to France in 1779, to beg for the assistance of a French army, he found himself regarded as a great hero, and was given by the king the command of the Royal Dragoons. He then returned to America more conceited than ever, served through the last campaigns there, and was in command at the capitulation of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown. On his second return to France, after the conclusion of the war, he found himself regarded as a great soldier and a great general. He was flattered at court, received with loud acclamations in the streets and the theatres of Paris, and worshipped in the salons; and, regarding this flattery as his due, he became so conceited as to impair his judgment, which was never of the best. He wished even to be considered a leader of the gay young French nobility, as well as a great general, and a good story is told of him which illustrates this form of vanity. One day he had managed, with great exertion, to get drunk, and his last words, as he was being helped into his carriage, were, "N'oubliez pas de dire à Noailles comme j'ai bien bu." ("Do not forget to tell Noailles how well I have been drinking.")¹ The convocation of the States-General had, he believed, opened a way for him to become "the liberator of both worlds," as he was afterwards grandiloquently styled; but, to his disgust

¹ *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et la Marck*, vol. i. p. 48.

and surprise, he did not at first find himself so great a man as he expected. In the electoral assemblies of Auvergne he had, indeed, been paramount, but the Estate of the noblesse at Versailles considered him a traitor to their cause. Nevertheless, he struggled for some time with the majority of his Estate, and at last headed the minority of the noblesse, forty-seven in number, when it joined the National Assembly on June 23. In the Assembly he proposed a Declaration of the Rights of Man, after the American fashion, on July 11; but he did not think his merits had been sufficiently appreciated until the struggle with the court was at its height, when, as has been said, his reputation as a general caused him to be elected vice-president of the Assembly. Now, on July 17, had come the opportunity for which he had longed, when he was proclaimed, by acclamation, commandant of the National Guard. His schemes were great, his self-confidence greater, and he hoped to win for himself the greatest power in France. The first step towards this eminence was to secure for himself the affection and obedience of the National Guard, and the measures which he took to make himself popular have been described. To analyze his political aims is impossible, for he himself hardly knew what he wanted; but anyhow, his paramount desire was to be the most powerful man in France. He had a vague idea that he would like a limited monarchy, under which he should be a sort of mayor of the palace; a constitutional monarchy established by him, saved by him, and subservient to him. On the other hand, he was certainly desirous that there should be no great democratic development. He did not care about the political wishes of the lower classes, and felt certain that they would not be ready to follow him. But if he had no positive plans in his head, he had certain very positive dislikes. A great statesman should have no preconceptions which might endanger the attainment of his end. Mirabeau knew this; Lafayette did not. The men whom Lafayette most thoroughly disliked were Mirabeau himself and the Duke of Orleans. Mirabeau had outshone him in the Assembly—an unpardonable offence; and

further, he was a man of terribly bad character, whom the moral Lafayette would hardly recognize as an acquaintance. The character of the Duke of Orleans was as bad, and whispers had gone abroad that the liberator of America had been actually laughed at in the salons of the Palais-Royal. It may be said that the most positive inclinations he had at present were to induce the Assembly, by his power in Paris, to pass such measures as he wished, and draw up such a constitution as he approved; to induce the court to recognize its saviour and the king to welcome his advice, and follow it on every occasion; and to foil all the hopes of Orleans, and all his plans for becoming regent, or constitutional king. Such were the ideas of the Marquis de Lafayette; such was the vain character of the man whom circumstances had invested with the greatest power in France. How he failed; how by his vanity he missed his opportunities; how the career, which seemed to have been so great in America and might have been so great in France, dwindled away into a typical career of failure, affords one of the most instructive lessons in the history of the first three years of the French Revolution. Had he been able to think of France, or of Paris, before himself and his own glory, he might have obtained as great fame as George Washington did in America. No man with such great opportunities used them so ill; while of Mirabeau, his rival, it may be said that no one with so few opportunities used them so well.

The work of organizing the National Guard could not be completed in a moment, and the temper of the mob of Paris was to be displayed on yet another memorable day. On July 21, while Bailly was trying to do something to lower the price of bread, and while the electors were listening to all sorts of petitions, which they could not understand and did not answer, the news arrived that Foullon, the temporary successor of Necker on July 13, who had declared that the people might eat grass, had been seized at the country house of M. de Sartines, the ex-minister of police, and was being brought to Paris for judgment. The unhappy old man was dragged into the Hôtel de Ville, to the great embarrass-

ment of the worthy M. Bailly ; and soon after Foullon's son-in-law, M. Berthier de Sauvigny, the intendant of Paris, was brought to join him. Again the great square was filled with an angry and hungry crowd. If the mayor and the electors could not give them food, at least they could give them the lives of these evil counsellors. Bailly stood aghast at the idea of being turned into a judge ; the electors refused to share the responsibility ; Lafayette was conveniently out of the way, and the few national guards on duty were quite indifferent. Bailly stammered out some syllables about the unfortunate captives being taken to the Abbaye and being judged by the proper courts. But Bailly had not yet learnt the temper of the people. No court of law could satisfy their revenge ; and before his very eyes, and after clinging to his knees, the two unfortunate scapegoats of the people's hunger were dragged out into the great square before the Hôtel de Ville and hung on the lamp-irons. The deed done with all the ferocious cruelty of a mob, the heads of the victims were struck off, and with grass in the mouths were paraded on pikes up and down the streets of Paris.

The dismay which the news of these murders caused in the Assembly can hardly be imagined. Lally-Tollendal and many another had thought that every one in Paris would be quite satisfied now that they had a mayor and a National Guard, and the king felt that the vengeance of the people was brought very near to him. In this extremity the Assembly determined to strengthen Bailly's hands with a legally elected municipality instead of the body of electors. A proclamation, bidding the Parisians refrain from such outbreaks, was again issued, and Lafayette was ordered to do whatever he thought right to prevent such enormities for the future. To his credit be it said, that Lafayette, though he had not interfered to protect Foullon and Berthier, had yet saved, by his great personal popularity, more than one certain victim of the popular fury—chief among them the Baron de Besenval, who had commanded the troops in the Champs de Mars, and whose trial and condemnation were eagerly demanded. On July 31 the municipal elections took place, and three hundred

municipal councillors were elected from the sixty districts of Paris, who at once appointed two or three committees, particularly a new committee "des subsistances," to assist Bailly in obtaining food for Paris. Lafayette, not to be outdone in energy, and not without some feeling of his old animosity towards Orleans, ordered the gardens of the Palais-Royal, the focus of all disturbance, to be cleared at sunset and its gates guarded all night by pickets of the National Guard. These measures of Lafayette's, and the establishment of the new municipality, restored some appearance of order to Paris; but it was only an appearance. The causes of the outbreak, in which the Bastille had been taken, were still at work, and if food and employment could not be found for the starving masses, a riot of yet greater importance than that of July 14 was to be expected, in spite of Bailly and Lafayette, town councillors and national guards. If starvation was not enough, new journals were daily springing up, which inflamed the minds of the populace with more advanced political ideas than any which had been broached. The tranquillity of Paris was merely temporary; the fire of the revolution was still unquenched; the same causes were still at work; and it rested not so much with Bailly and Lafayette, as with the National Assembly, to determine what measures should be taken to quiet the minds of the people.

The members of the National Assembly, with the exception of one single man, did not recognize the gravity of the situation. They had had far greater power thrown into their hands than they could ever possibly have expected. The king had been publicly foiled in an attempt at reaction, and the Assembly was obviously able to do whatsoever it would; but, great as the opportunity was, no use was made of it, and the people of Paris saw clearly that the Assembly would never do what it was wanted to do until it sat in Paris and acted under the eyes of the Parisians. For what was the Assembly doing at this period, when Paris was waiting in expectation, and the capture of the Bastille was being imitated all over France; when châteaux were burning, and nobles flying into

exile; when there was positive civil war in many a district, and anarchy in every province? Why, the Assembly was discussing whether or not the new constitution of France should be prefaced by a Declaration of the Rights of Man. In the discussion of this extremely important question were wasted the precious days which followed July 17. The first question was, Should there be any Declaration of the Rights of Man at all? All who admired the American constitution said that, of course, there must be one, and that no respectable constitution could be possibly drawn up without an elaborate declaration prefixed to it. "What about the duties of man?" was remarked by Grégoire and Camus. "The duties of man are obvious," was the reply; "the rights of man must be defined." Only one man spoke out clearly during these foolish discussions. This was Mirabeau. He said, "If you must have a declaration of the rights of man, put it at the end of your constitution; proceed at once to business, for you are wasting precious time." But the Assembly was full of theorists; they did not understand what practical legislation meant; they thought, when the country was in a state of anarchy, and famine was rife everywhere, when there was no authority able to suppress the riots which are the inevitable result of famine, that men would be satisfied by learning that they had certain defined rights.

The complacency of these theorists was rudely shaken on August 4, when Salomon read to the Assembly the report of the Comité des Recherches, or Committee of Researches, on the state of France. A terrible report it was. Châteaux burning here and there; millers hung; tax-gatherers drowned; the warehouses and dépôts of the gabelle burnt; everywhere rioting, and nowhere peace. Even wranglers, who wished their declaration of the rights of man to be framed according to the supreme ideas of Diderot or Voltaire, Rousseau or Montesquieu, could not but be moved at what they heard was happening in their homes in the provinces. Among those who listened to the clear and forcible report of Salomon were certain of the young liberal noblesse who had just been dining

with the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, a wise and enlightened nobleman. At their head was the Vicomte de Noailles, a young man of thirty-three, who had distinguished himself at the head of his regiment under his cousin, Lafayette, in America. By his side sat the Duc d'Aiguillon, son of the friend and minister of the Du Barry, who now strove to compensate for the evil his father did by a true nobility, which stamped him of the family of Richelieu. Close by were Comte Mathieu de Montmorency, the Vicomte Alexandre de Beauharnais, Charles and Alexandre de Lameth, the Baron de Menou, and the Duc de Lévis, and their hearts burnt within them when they heard of the evils under which France was suffering. The Vicomte de Noailles was the first to rush to the tribune. "What is the cause of the evil which is agitating the provinces?" he cried; and then he showed that it arose from the uncertainty under which the people dwelt, as to whether or not the old feudal bonds under which they had so long lived and laboured were to be perpetuated or abolished, and concluded an impassioned speech by proposing to abolish them at once. One after another the young liberal noblemen, and then certain deputies of the tiers état, followed him with fresh sacrifices. First the old feudal rights were abolished; then the rights of the dovecote and the game laws; then the old copyhold services; then the tithes paid to the Church, in spite of a protest from Siéyès; then the rights of certain cities over their immediate suburbs and rural districts were sacrificed; and the contention during that feverish night was rather to remember something or other to sacrifice than to suggest the expediency of maintaining anything which was established. In its generosity the Assembly even gave away what did not belong to it. The old dues paid to the pope were abolished, and it was even declared that the territory of Avignon, which had belonged to the pope since the Middle Ages, should be united to France if it liked; and the sitting closed with a unanimous decree that a statue should be erected to Louis XVI., "the restorer of French liberty." Well might Mirabeau define the night of August 4

as a mere "orgie." Lally-Tollendal, who was then one of the secretaries of the Assembly, saw to what excesses enthusiasm was leading the deputies, and sent a note to the president, "Nobody is any longer master of himself; adjourn the sitting." But the president, Le Chapelier, was one of the Breton deputies, who were all distinguished for their advanced opinions, and he encouraged rather than restrained the enthusiasm of the Assembly. Noble indeed were the intentions of the deputies. For republican historians to assert that it was not difficult to give up what Salomon's report showed had been already lost, is extremely ungenerous. Legally, the fact that a lord's dovecote had been burnt did not affect his right to maintain one. Yet the results of this night of sacrifices were bad rather than good. As Mirabeau pointed out, the people of France were told that all the feudal rights, dues, and tithes had been abolished that evening, but they were not told at the same time that there must be taxes and other burdens to take their place. It was of no use to issue a provisional order that all rights, dues, and taxes remained in force for the present, because the poor peasant would refuse to pay what was illegal, and would not understand the political necessity of supporting the revenue. The waste of time in the Assembly, and the senseless verbosity of many of the deputies, had caused them to pass in a few hours important resolutions which ought to have been discussed for whole days. The question of the abolition of tithes is very typical. "Why," said the Abbé Siéyès, "you are making a present of seventy millions of francs to the landowners of France." But the Assembly was far too heated to care for Siéyès' well-turned phrases, and hurried on in its wild career of abolishing everything that was suggested to it. This ill-considered mass of resolutions was what was thrown in the face of France in a state of anarchy to restore it to a state of order.

For at this moment all France was expectant; the people were waiting for something to be done, though they knew not what. Paris had frightened the court into submitting to the will of the people. What was now going to be done for the

people, and who was there to satisfy the people's expectation? The National Assembly had proved itself incompetent to suggest practical remedies, and was to prove its want of readiness on many other occasions.

The poor king had no administrative power, and Necker was a theorist of the theorists. Necker's panacea for satisfying France was to raise an immense tax of one-fourth of all incomes, to put an end to the financial embarrassment of the Treasury; but starving people could hardly be expected to see how the surrender of one-fourth of their incomes would help them to buy bread. Not only Paris, then, but all France, was expectant; for while the Parisians had stormed the Bastille, the people of France had in nearly every district stormed their local Bastilles, and struck their blow for freedom. The whole of France was tingling with the news of the capture of the Bastille, and if at first that news and that example led to unparalleled anarchy, yet it must be seen how that anarchy was faced, and how the innate spirit of order in man reasserted itself, and how without help from the Assembly, and of course without help from Necker, a new state of things was established, which proved that, if not interfered with, no body of police can maintain order so certainly as a law-loving people. In the provinces the taking of the Bastille had as great results as in Paris itself; for if Paris led France on the road of revolution, each district and each town has its own revolutionary history, interesting in itself, and interesting also as showing that a great country, divided into many provinces, speaking different tongues, and having no common origin, had been welded together more by the excitement of revolution than they had been by centuries of despotic government and irresponsible tyranny.

A curious instance of the popular feeling against the Polignacs is given in a letter from Mr. Trevor, the British Minister in Switzerland, to the Duke of Leeds, dated July 31: "Unluckily for Mrs. Trevor, she was taken at Besançon for Madame de Polignac, and was kept a prisoner some hours at the inn. Her courier was carried to the Hôtel de Ville to be examined, nor was it until her passports had been read aloud to the people that they could be satisfied, and would allow her to continue. She arrived safe and well on the 28th."—Leeds MSS.—B.M. Add. MSS. 28064, p. 192.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PROVINCES IN 1789.

Eagerness for news in the provinces—Effect of Necker's dismissal—De Broglie's ride—War against the châteaux—Land tenure in France—Métayer tenure—High price of bread—The "great fear"—Establishment of National Guards—Suppression of the peasants by the bourgeois—Classification of riots—Riots at Troyes, Caen, Rouen, Strasbourg, and Vernon—Federations of National Guards—Re-establishment of local authorities—Incapacity of the Assembly—Ouvriers—Lyons.

THE great events which had been happening at Paris and Versailles had excited the keenest interest in all the provinces of France; but, as during the time of the elections, that interest was more intelligent in the great cities and towns than in the rural districts. The citizens, who had generally received a fair education, and who had some ideas as to politics from their study of the classical historians in their school days and of more modern authors, were better fitted to comprehend what was happening than their rural neighbours. The peasants, indeed, as they showed in their primary elections, entertained the wildest hopes. They believed that the States-General was to make them full proprietors of their farms, to free them from taxes, and generally improve their position. To this difference between the mental attitude of citizens and peasants must be attributed the different course of the events in different provinces which followed the news of the storming of the Bastille. From May to July the citizens in every city had made a practice of assembling to listen to the news of what was happening at Versailles and Paris. The struggle which had ended in the union of the three orders into the National

Assembly had been narrated to them in the numerous journals which were springing up in Paris, and they had followed each step with breathless interest. Many special journals were established for this express purpose of keeping the inhabitants of the provincial towns well informed as to the course of events. It was with this idea that Mirabeau changed the title of his journal from *Lettres à mes Commettants* to the *Courrier de Provence*, while Barère and Volney specially edited their journals with a view to their circulation in Languedoc and Anjou. It is noticeable, however, that no attempt was at first made to supply the rural villages with news, and it was not till October, 1790, that Cerutti and Condorcet started their enormously successful *Feuille Villageoise* for this express purpose. In many cities besides those of Brittany corresponding committees had been formed, generally consisting of the deputies suppléants, and chief electors, to correspond with their deputies at Versailles, and these committees formed in nearly every case the nucleus of the popular societies, which were eventually to be affiliated to the Jacobin Club at Paris. It is a curious and interesting fact that the *Journal des Débats* originated in the daily correspondence of the deputies of Clermont-Ferrand with their constituents in that city.¹ On the arrival of the daily letter from their deputies, all the people of Clermont-Ferrand rushed to the theatre, where they were read again and again to different audiences, "who," writes Dr. Monestier, in a letter of the time to Gauthier de Biauzat, the deputy, dated August 7, "listen to these reports with far more interest than they had ever shown in the masterpieces of the French drama." "Indeed," writes the same correspondent, "the public would rather go without food for forty-eight hours than miss their daily news-letter from Paris. No one thinks of supping till he has heard the latest news." It is most necessary to comprehend this absorbing interest in public affairs in order to rightly understand the events in the provinces which followed the news of the capture of the Bastille.

¹ *Les fondateurs du Journal des Débats en 1789*, by Francisque Mège, Paris, 1865.

The great news of the dismissal of Necker caused different expressions of opinion in different towns. At Grenoble,¹ the capital of the province of Dauphiné, which had struck the first note of the success of the revolution in its assemblies at Vizille and Romans, the burghers collected in the great Church of St. Louis, and there passed a solemn resolution that they would pay no more taxes if any attempt were made to dissolve the Assembly. At Rennes,² the turbulent law-students, led by Moreau, at the news of Necker's dismissal, which arrived on July 13, stormed the barracks where the arms were kept, and armed themselves. The Comte de Langeron, the commandant, ordered his troops to fire on the students; but they fraternized together, and their conduct might have proved to the king, even if the behaviour of the troops before Paris had not done so, that he could not depend upon his army to oppose the wishes of his people. At Brest, the mob, assisted by 2,000 sailors and rope-makers, occupied the neighbouring forts.³ In the Forez the electors of the three orders assembled at Montbrison and swore "to spend all their property and the last drop of their blood to repress the abuses of authority."⁴ In many towns the dismissal of Necker was hardly known before the news was followed by the greater and more startling news of the capture of the Bastille. Such was the fear of the new ministry that there would be a popular rising in the city of Troyes,⁵ that they sent, by special courier, copies of the king's declaration of July 15, in order to undo the effect of the news of Necker's dismissal there as soon as possible. At Lyons⁶ the news of the minister's fall had united all the

¹ *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. ii. p. 139.

² *Relation de ce qui s'est passé à Rennes lors de la nouvelle du renvoi de M. Necker*. In B.M.—F. 833. (4.)

³ *Révolution authentique et remarquable arrivée à Brest en Bretagne avec la prise du fort de l'Amiral, du Recouvrance, et du fort Gonête*. B.M.—F. 941. (6.)

⁴ Pothier's *Roanne pendant la Révolution*, p. 29.

⁵ Babeau's *Troyes pendant la Révolution*, vol. i. p. 192.

⁶ Balleydier's *Histoire du Peuple de Lyon pendant la Révolution*, vol. i. p. 7. Morin's *Lyon depuis la Révolution*, vol. i. pp. 62–65.

citizens, both bourgeois and ouvriers, in one common act of protestation. There had been great popular fêtes at Lyons on July 2 and 3 to celebrate the union of the three orders, which ended, as such fêtes commonly did, in riots and attacks upon the barracks. These riots had caused the formation of a civic guard of eight hundred young bourgeois, who called themselves the Garde Bourgeoise, and who were called by the people the "Muscadins," from the scent they used—a term which was to have a more extended application at a later date. In other cities the formation of National Guards followed, not preceded, the news of the capture of the Bastille. At Lons-le-Saulnier¹ the news of the minister's dismissal had collected nearly three thousand citizens before the Hôtel de Ville on July 19, and was followed, on July 22, by the establishment of a National Guard. But fortunately for the king, who did not wish to see his whole people in rebellion against him, the news of the capture of the Bastille had so quickly followed the news of Necker's dismissal, that loyalty, if not order, speedily reappeared.

The Maréchal de Broglie, though beaten at Paris, could not believe that the troops would fail everywhere, or that the soldiers of the different garrisons would be as strongly declared in favour of the revolution as in Paris. He therefore started off at once towards the eastern frontier, and, though his servants were reviled on the way and his carriages attacked, he reached Sedan before the great news from the capital. In the middle of the night of July 16, M. Pilard,² a wealthy bourgeois of Sedan, was roused by a loud knocking at his hall door. Madame Pilard, with the curiosity of her sex, told her husband to go at once and find out what was the matter. He was informed that two strangers, evidently of high rank, had just arrived at the fortress, and that the chief barber of the town had that moment gone to wait

¹ *Histoire de la Révolution dans le Jura*, by A. Sommier, pp. 22-25. Paris : 1846.

² *Souvenirs d'un vieux Sédanais*, by C. Pilard, part i. p. 7. Sedan : 1875.

upon them. With certain other curious bourgeois, M. Pilard awaited the return of the barber, who informed them with pride that he had just had the honour of trimming the beard of a marshal of France. On the morning of the 17th the inhabitants of Sédan were ordered to bring all their arms into the old castle; but most of the bourgeois refused to obey the order, and M. Pilard, for instance, hid his musket in a tall hall-clock. On the evening of the 17th a rich jeweller from Paris brought the news of the capture of the Bastille, and declared that the marshal, who had been issuing these orders, was really a fugitive. At this news the people of Sédan collected together and attacked the castle. They soon forced their way in. The soldiers of the garrison shouted, "Vive le tiers état," and the marshal owed his escape to the clever assistance of the wife of one of the officers. Broglie seeing that the events of July 14 at Paris were repeated on the 17th at Sédan, went on to Verdun, and tried to make the citizens surrender their arms; but Verdun was even more revolutionary in its sentiments than Sédan, and, the troops once more failing him, the castle of Verdun was seized, and Broglie was for a short time in danger of his life, until he was rescued by the courage of some of the old city militia. From Verdun he went on to Metz, his old head-quarters, but the troops there refused even to admit him, and finding there was no hope of a counter-revolution in the provinces, the old marshal crossed the frontier and retired into exile at Luxembourg.

The example of the people of Sédan and Verdun in seizing their castles had its parallel in nearly every other garrison town in France. Mazarin had destroyed the feudal castles in very many towns, and his work was now completed in many more by the action of the people. Everywhere the soldiers fraternized with the people, and showed how thoroughly they sympathized with the classes from which they sprung. This first patriotic movement of imitation of the capture of the Bastille in the towns was soon soiled by an imitation in the country districts of the murders which had accompanied

the famous Parisian revolt. For it cannot be said that the rural populations stormed and destroyed the châteaux of their lords from purely patriotic motives. They understood that a great castle had been destroyed in Paris, and to every peasant his lord's château seemed a little Bastille. Whether this universal "guerre aux châteaux" was organized in Paris, or whether it was a simultaneous rising of peasants all over France, can never be certainly ascertained, but its very universality seems to prove the truth of the simpler hypothesis. Yet some traces exist of an attempt among the Orleanist party in Paris to organize such a movement, and at the time, Adrien Duport, the trusted counsellor of Orleans, was thought to be at the bottom of this peasants' revolt. In the *Journal de la Correspondance de Nantes* there is an item of news which, though unconfirmed elsewhere, shows the general opinion of the time at Paris. It is to the effect that a courier had been arrested at Rouen, bearing over three hundred letters which incited the peasants to burn their lords' châteaux.¹ But the movement was too universal, too simultaneous, and might have had too natural causes for it to have been necessarily caused by any intrigue. In most, if not in all, instances the attacks on the châteaux were not directed by any feelings of revenge or hatred against the lords and ladies who inhabited them. On one occasion, when a body of riotous peasants heard that the lady of the château was ill in bed, they contented themselves with seizing and burning the court-rolls in the château, and then quietly departed. It was against these court-rolls that the movement was chiefly directed, and, to understand the reason, it is necessary to describe the general system of land tenure in France before 1789.

That the great subdivision of France into small estates was not caused by the revolution, has been conclusively proved by De Tocqueville,² and is even more clearly shown

¹ *Le District de Machecoul*, 1788-1793, by Alfred Lallié, p. 77. Nantes : 1869.

² *L'ancien Régime et la Révolution*, by A. de Tocqueville. Paris : 1856.

for one very poor province in the discussions of the Agricultural Society of Limoges in 1775, when that society protested against the existence of the innumerable small farms, a protest fully adhered to by Turgot.¹ Yet the holders of these small properties were not really peasant proprietors. They only held by a tenure somewhat resembling the English copyhold. The farm was theirs to all intents and purposes; they could sell it; they could mortgage it; they could bequeath it to their children; but every minute subdivision of land was accompanied by some small duty, often infinitesimal in itself, to be paid by the tenant to the lord. Sometimes the duty was only to pay a fowl or a pound of cheese to the lord on the death of the owner, or the marriage of the lord, or the birth of his eldest son; but if this trifling duty were neglected, the lord had generally some sharp agent, who would take advantage of the omission to confiscate the peasant's little property which he and his ancestors might have spent years in improving. These small vexatious duties, which just prevented the peasant-proprietor from being undisputed possessor of his land, were regarded by him as cruel and unjust taxes levied on his industry; and though the lord may seldom have pressed his rights to entire confiscation, yet he always demanded a heavy fine when they were neglected. The origin of these duties had been so entirely forgotten that they were regarded as exactions of the lord unjustly wrung from the real owners of the land. But, in fact, they were the almost nominal conditions which had in past centuries been imposed by the lord on his serfs when he granted them some of his land. Of a similar nature were those services of keeping the frogs quiet while the lord slept, and of *la première nuit*, which have been so noisily insisted on by a certain class of writers. It has been proved in many instances that the inhabitants of a village had often gained considerable advantages on the nominal terms, which in old days implied no excessive degradation, that they should all go out on one specified night of the year, and beat the

¹ Seilhac's *La Révolution en Bas-Limousin*, p. 101.

marshes to keep the frogs quiet. But by 1789 the lands and the other advantages were regarded by the peasants as their own property, and the duties and services demanded were regarded as unjust exactions and cruel insults on the part of the lord. All over France the peasants held their land by this sort of copyhold tenure, and when they heard that the people of Paris had stormed a city fortress and subdued a stronghold of oppression, they thought that they were justified in attacking the châteaux of their lords and burning the obnoxious court-rolls, which contained the records of the services they had to perform. From this point of view the insurrection of the peasants in 1789 closely resembles the peasants' revolt in England in the reign of Richard II. It was against the court-rolls rather than against the châteaux that the peasants waged their war. But the one involved the other; for the lords refused in most instances to quietly surrender their family papers, or rather the title-deeds of their lands, and resisted the peasants, and their resistance led to bloodshed and pillage. In every instance where the lord or his steward surrendered the papers—and there is more than one instance of their doing so—the château was left unhurt.

If the insurrectionary movement of the tenants who held by copyhold can be thus explained, it is far easier to account for the excitement among those who held as *métayers*. By this tenancy the tenants were provided by their lords with stock and seed, and had, instead of rent, to pay a certain proportion of the produce of their farms. *Métayer* tenancy always produces poverty. The farmer has no interest in improving his land, and no capital with which to improve it if he desired to do so; and further, as he was not owner of the farm, he had no security on which to borrow capital. The tenants who held as *métayers* thought, by a natural but illogical course of reasoning, that they ought to have as much property in their farms as copyholders. It is only by insisting on these points that it is possible to understand the "war against the châteaux." The movement was not directed by patriotic feeling, and, except in a very few instances, it was

not directed by any desire for revenge, or any personal hatred against the lords. It was simply a manifestation of the common desire which has been felt by farmers in every land and at all times, that they should own the farms on which they worked. This feeling of the injustice of rent is clearly shown by an inscription placed on a gallows, erected just outside the gates of the Château de Lissac, in the Limousin, "Here shall be hung the peasant who pays any rent, and the lord who receives any rent."¹ At this date no political ideas seem to have filled the peasants' minds, but there is a trace of the hatred of social distinctions in the burning of the church pews. It had been the custom for the lord to have an elevated pew for himself and his family in his parish church, and the peasants, from their comfortless benches, resented the ease of the lord at mass, and showed their resentment by burning miscellaneously the lord's comfortable pew and their own hard benches.² In this they did not always succeed; and M. de Malseigne, for instance, frightened his vassals out of his church on one occasion by drawing his sword, and praying aloud, "Pardon me, O Lord, for the blood I am about to shed."³

Side by side with these agrarian and social causes for insurrection, the peasants had yet more powerful incentives in their poverty and in the high price of food. This was shown by their frequent attacks on cartloads of provisions on their way to the cities, and even on the government convoys to the garrison towns, which were always strongly guarded by soldiers.⁴ The leaders in these attacks were rather the agricultural labourers than the small peasant-proprietors; but in 1789 both classes were equally poverty-stricken, because the famous hailstorm of July 11, 1788, had done

¹ *Scènes et Portraits de la Révolution en Bas-Limousin*, by the Comte de Seilhac, p. 112. Paris: 1878.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 109 and 113.

³ *L'Armée et la Garde Nationale*, by Baron C. Poisson, vol. i. p. 252 (note). Paris: 1858.

⁴ *Pilard's Souvenirs d'un vieux Sédanais*, part i. p. 12.

such immense damage that in very many districts there had been no harvest whatsoever. Yet the evils of the high price of food were even more perceptible in the towns than in the country districts, and it was in the towns that the most serious food-riots broke out.

The months of July and August may be called the months of the "great fear." Men were afraid, both in town and country, of they knew not what. How this universal feeling of terror arose cannot be proved, but it was actually deemed necessary in some districts for a distinct denial to be published to the report that the king had paid brigands to rob the people.¹ It was said at the time that these rumours of brigands were spread by Mirabeau; but spreading rumours costs money, and Mirabeau had not at this time enough money for his own personal wants, much less for political agitation. This "great fear" was generally expressed in the words, "The brigands are coming." Who the brigands were, whence they came, or whither they were going, nobody knew; but that the brigands were coming, nobody doubted. Possibly the idea of these brigands arose from the existence of bands of robbers and smugglers who infested the great forests and the mountains, and of bodies of beggars and starving peasants who sacked convoys and upset private carriages; but that there was any organized army of brigands wandering about France may be certainly denied. This terror of brigands was felt intensely in solitary country houses and convents, and the poor abbess of the convent of Notre Dame des Prés, and her eleven nuns, were so terrified by their own imaginations that in the very middle of the night they tramped all the way to Troyes, and arrived there in the early morning covered with mud.² But it was in the towns that this strange terror was most keenly felt. In the town of Guéret,³ July 29, 1789, was known for years after

¹ Sommier's *La Révolution dans le Jura*, p. 26.

² Babeau's *Troyes pendant la Révolution*, vol. i. p, 199.

³ *Archives Révolutionnaires du Département de la Creuse*, by L. Duval, p. 45. Guéret: 1875.

as the day of the "great fear." Suddenly, at about five in the afternoon of that day, a rumour arose that the brigands were coming. The women rushed out of the town and hid themselves in the thickets and ditches; while the men assembled at the Hôtel de Ville, and hastily formed themselves into an armed force to assist the town militia. Several notables of the town took their seats with the municipal officers, and formed a committee, which sent despatches to all the neighbouring towns and villages for aid, and ordered the bakers to bake all night so as to have bread ready for their expected allies. These allies, to the number of 8000 to 10,000, flocked into the town, and were regaled at its expense; and when it was found that the brigands did not come, they all went home again. At Chateau-Thierry¹ news arrived, on July 28, that 2500 "carabots," or brigands, were marching along the Soissons road; the tocsin rang, and the bourgeois marched out to meet them. On their way a miller told them that the brigands had just sacked Bouresches, which was in flames; but when the partisans of order arrived there, the flames were found to be only the reflection of the sun upon the roofs of the houses. Then the brigands were described in the act of crossing the Marne at Essommes; but when the tired pursuers came up, they found that these new brigands were the women of Essommes, who had been scared at their appearance, and who believed them to be the real brigands. At Chaumont² a man covered with dust appeared, and reported that the brigands were close at hand, though he could not tell when or where he had seen them. Nevertheless, the tocsin was rung, and great preparations were made to receive the unknown and non-existent enemy. At Brive the report was that the English were coming from Bordeaux; at Tulle, that it was the Austrians who were coming from Lyons; and the citizens of Tulle, together with several thousand peasants, marched out patriotically to meet the foe, but only caught

¹ *Histoire de la Révolution dans le Département de l'Aisne*, by Alfred Desmasures, pp. 86-89. Vervins: 1869.

² Beugnot's *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 137.

three Italian priests, whom they would have hanged but for the intervention of a popular lawyer, M. de Brival. At Uzerche, at 4 a.m. on the morning of July 30, news came that 16,000 men, under the command of the Comte d'Artois, had marched from Bordeaux, burning and sacking every town on their way, and intended to dissolve the National Assembly. At this terrible news the citizens lost their heads; they buried their money, and the women fled into the woods. The men assembled and sent couriers to Brivè and Tulle, and the country people, armed with spades and pickaxes, to the number of 10,000, came in to help.¹

This universal scare had one very great result. It was to it, much more than to the establishment of a National Guard at Paris, that the creation of volunteer armed forces all over the country was due. Madame de Staël speaks of it as a marvel that in one week so many thousands of national guards were enrolled; but she, as well as many subsequent writers, has ignored the existence of the old city militia in all the principal cities. Paris had, indeed, been deprived of its old local militia many years before, but in nearly every other important town the institution still existed. At Guéret and Vernon, for instance, the old city militia was several hundred strong, and formed the nucleus round which the national guards were organized. To take the proceedings at Guéret² as typical, there the committee, which had been elected under the influence of the scare of July 29, issued orders that every man between the ages of sixteen and sixty should be enrolled in the new National Guard to assist the city militia. Four companies were at once formed; officers were elected, and the streets were patrolled night and day. They elected as colonel and lieutenant-colonel of the battalion two officers in the regular army, and it is noticeable that in nearly every town regular officers were thus elected. These national guards were everywhere enrolled to fight the brigands, and generally developed from the irregular forces which had been assembled under the influence

¹ Seilhac's *Révolution en Bas-Limousin*, p. 96.

² Duval's *Archives Révolutionnaires de la Creuse*, pp. 48-51.

of the "great fear." Their first operation was generally to take possession of the nearest barrack or fortress, and it was at this time that the famous Château Trompette, near Bordeaux, surrendered to the ninety electors of that city.¹ At Lyons the attack of the people on the old château of Pierre Scize, which was now used as a prison, was foiled by the troops and the "muscadins,"² and at Marseilles the inhabitants were unable, from its impregnable situation, to take the Château d'If. With these exceptions, nearly every fortified place in France fell into the hands of the national guards. If the provincial national guards had not been formed in imitation of that of Paris, they nevertheless consisted of much the same elements. There had generally existed a bourgeois militia, and it had been strengthened by bourgeois recruits into a Garde Bourgeoise. They were originally raised to fight the brigands and to maintain order, and the maintenance of order was made very difficult by the high price of bread. In nearly every city the first work of the National Guard was to put down bread-riots, in which they had always been quite successful, and then, having provided for the maintenance of order, the inhabitants of the cities and towns turned their attention to the condition of things in the rural districts.

The clear line of demarcation both in education and material prosperity between the bourgeois of the cities and the peasants has been noticed, and while the bourgeois despised the peasant, the peasant hated the bourgeois. In the cause of order the national guards in many districts marched from their cities to put down the insurgent peasantry in their neighbourhood. In French Flanders the National Guard of Douai arrested many peasants, who were tried before the Parlement of Douai, and twelve of them were at once condemned to be hanged.³ In the districts of the Maçonnais and the Beaujolais, the newly elected committee of Maçon accompanied the National Guard, and hung

¹ *Histoire de la Terreur à Bordeaux*, by Aurélien Vivie, p. 25. Bordeaux : 1877.

² Balleydier's *Le Peuple de Lyon pendant la Révolution*, vol. i. p. 7

³ *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. ii. p. 251.

on the spot where they caught them some twenty peasants without any legal condemnation.¹ Still more like civil war was the expedition of the National Guard of Lyons against the insurgent peasants of Dauphiné. They marched out in military array, and in an engagement which followed, eighty peasants were killed and sixty taken prisoners. After this gallant feat of arms a column was erected by the citizens of Grenoble to their brave comrades of Lyons.² This war between the peasantry and the national guards emphasized the difference between them, and had important results. The whole city of Lyons bitterly paid in after years, when it was sacked after its memorable siege, for the cruelty of some of its inhabitants, when the peasants, armed with their pitchforks and their spades, marched up at the bidding of Couthon and Collot d'Herbois to wreak their vengeance.

A great distinction also must be made between the riots in different provinces. In the Maçonnais and the Beaujolais, where most châteaux were burnt, the métayer tenancy existed, and the poverty of the peasants made them most desperate and ferocious. So they were also in Franche Comté, where on one occasion the peasants defeated a body of national guards in a pitched battle.³ But in French Flanders, which Arthur Young describes as the best farmed and most prosperous province in France, the rioters did not bend their energies against the châteaux, but rather against the douanes or custom-houses, and the dépôts of the gabelle or salt tax.⁴ In Normandy, where the peasants had been ruined by the commercial treaty with England, the tendency was rather to destroy the new-fangled machinery.⁵ In Alsace, and especially in the Sundgau, the wrath of the peasants was expended on the Jews, whose houses were burnt and pillaged.⁶ In the district

¹ *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. ii. p. 250.

² Balleydier's *Histoire du Peuple de Lyon*, vol. i. p. 9; and *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. ii. p. 252.

³ *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. ii. p. 246.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

⁵ Boivin-Champeaux' *La Révolution dans l'Eure*, chapter iii.

⁶ *Histoire de la Révolution française dans le Département du Haut-Rhin*, by M. Véron-Réville, p. 9. Paris and Colmar : 1865.

of Machecoul there were no riots at all; but in the neighbouring districts, which were afterwards to form the chief centres of the Vendéan war, the peasants sacked the châteaux of the lords whom they afterwards served with such fidelity.¹ This fact, that the very peasants who burnt their lords' châteaux in July and August, 1789, fought under those lords in 1793 and 1794, forms a curious commentary on the statements of those writers who have dwelt on the love and devotion with which the Vendéan lords were regarded by their peasantry. Many theories have been proposed as to the causes of the universality of the peasant war, and amongst others the influence of the freemasons has been suggested; but an examination of the number of lodges in France in 1789 shows that freemasonry only existed in the greater cities and towns. It was quite unknown to the peasants, though its due importance will be seen at a later period, and more especially the assistance given by the German lodges on the Rhine to the advance of the revolution; but it is absurd to suppose that it had anything to do with the "war against the châteaux." That the leaders of the various local insurrections came from the towns, and were paid by the Duke of Orleans, has been frequently asserted; but until it is possible to examine the registers, if they exist, which contain the names of the men tried and hung as ringleaders in different parts of France, it is impossible to come to any certain conclusion. In one instance, namely, at Troyes, where the name is known of an unfortunate ringleader who was hanged on July 23, he is described as a carpenter, not in the town of Troyes, but in a neighbouring village.² Until further evidence may be forthcoming, it is only possible to say at present that the insurrection of the peasants seems to have been a spontaneous outbreak, and not the work of any organized band of emissaries.

The popular commotions which took place at Troyes³ between the months of July and September have been care-

¹ *Le District de Machecoul*, by A. Lallié, 1869, p. 73.

² Babeau's *Troyes pendant la Révolution*, vol. i. p. 195.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. i. pp. 185-243.

fully analyzed and ably described by a local historian, and what happened there is typical of what happened in many other cities and towns. The news of Necker's dismissal had been received with dismay by men of all classes in the city of Troyes, and the municipal officers had at once reported the excitement to the new ministers. When, therefore, the news of the capture of the Bastille reached the city on July 16, it was accompanied by printed copies of the king's speech of the 15th which were distributed in the streets. The municipality, following the example of the electors of Paris on July 13, ordered the houses to be illuminated from 8 p.m. to 4 a.m. the next morning, in order to prevent any crowd collecting unobserved in the streets. July 18 was market day, and when the peasants arrived at the city gates they refused to pay the usual dues on entering the city, because, they declared, the octroi had been abolished at Paris. As they could not be admitted without paying, and they would not pay, they all went away, and their absence caused a great dearth of grain in the market. At this, signs of a riot appeared, and it was ordered that all the grain left in the city should be taken to the Hôtel de Ville. A turbulent crowd then assembled in the great square, and the city militia was speedily recruited by volunteers from the bourgeois class, who wished to assist in keeping the peace. On the 19th, in spite of the volunteers, the populace attacked the Hôtel de Ville, and a serious riot was only prevented by the distribution of bread at a very low price. On the 20th the workmen forced the manufacturers and masters to close their workshops, and paraded the streets; while the municipal officers at this juncture were assisted in their deliberations by the chief notables of the town. On the 21st the country people, under the guidance of a village carpenter, named Jobert, forced their way into the city; but Jobert was soon seized by the city militia, and hung on the 23rd. His widow, dressed in deep mourning, then wandered up and down the neighbouring villages, demanding vengeance and exciting the minds of the peasants. Further riots were imminent, when Necker arrived, on July 27, on his way back

to Paris, and was received with great popular rejoicings. Nevertheless, the municipal government felt so little confidence in itself that it applied to the government for the assistance of another regiment. The Royal Dragoons accordingly arrived on August 8, and finding that the soldiers of the Regiment of Artois had mounted the tricoloured cockade, the troopers, who were all royalists, immediately began rioting with them. The populace sided with the Regiment of Artois, and on August 9 the colonel of the cavalry regiment thought it wise to withdraw from the city. On August 15 the old municipal officers resigned, and a new committee was formed at the Hôtel de Ville; but as this committee contained none of the popular leaders, the populace were no more satisfied than they had been before. The popular leaders saw that they must overthrow this new committee, and especially the National Guard, as the bourgeois who had joined the old city militia called themselves. On August 26 a leader appeared for the working men of Troyes, in the person of one of themselves, Benoît Chaperon, under whose guidance the blacksmiths' and the gunsmiths' shops were searched for arms; and then the armed populace paraded the streets without interruption from the soldiers, who refused to fire on them. Dissensions gradually rose to a great height between the bourgeois and the working classes, which culminated on September 9 in the greatest riot ever known in Troyes. Owing to the dearth of bread, the bakers of Troyes had sent an agent, named François Besançon, to England to buy rice; but when the rice arrived, the bakers did not like their bargain, and told the people that the rice was poisoned. A mob soon collected, and, after pulling several sacks of rice off the waggons, took its rather musty smell as signifying the presence of poison, and loudly declared that somebody must be punished. When the new municipal committee at the Hôtel de Ville saw the howling mob around them, the members were terrified and were ready to do whatever they were ordered; but the popular leaders remembered the fate of Jobert, and determined to permanently subdue the bourgeois notables by making a fearful example. Forcing

their way into the council chamber, they seized upon Claude Huez, a man of blameless life, and of some literary as well as administrative ability, who had been for many years mayor of the city, and dragged him out upon the steps of the Hôtel de Ville, where he was beaten to death by the mob. Satisfied with this exhibition of their power, the mob left the Hôtel de Ville, and all men in Troyes knew that Benoît Chaperon was for the time the ruler of the city.

At Caen, in Normandy,¹ another riot, ending in murder, took place on August 12, which caused as much excitement in Paris as the murder of Huez. In the streets of the city there had appeared certain soldiers of the Regiment of Artois, wearing on their breasts medals given them in honour of their sympathy with the popular cause. The soldiers of the Regiment of Bourbon, encouraged, the people asserted, by their junior major, the Comte Henri de Belzunce, attacked the soldiers of the Regiment of Artois and tore their medals from them. The National Guard, which had been formed by the bourgeois on the news of the capture of the Bastille, turned out, and the soldiers were ordered back to barracks. The tocsin was then rung from the church towers, and the barracks were besieged by the populace and defended by the National Guard. The success of the populace seemed so certain, that the officers of the National Guard persuaded M. de Belzunce, who was the object of the especial hatred of the people, to surrender, and go under their escort to the Hôtel de Ville. He accompanied them as a prisoner, and the officers believed his life was saved, when the mob suddenly burst into the Hôtel de Ville, seized De Belzunce, and after a mock trial shot him in the great square, and afterwards tore his body to pieces.

At Rouen, the capital of Lower Normandy, the result was very different; a great riot took place, but the cause of order was triumphantly maintained. Bordier, the famous harlequin of the Paris Variétés,² for whom innumerable pantomimes had

¹ *L'Assassinat du Major de Belzunce*, by Eugène de Beaurepaire, in the *Revue de la Révolution* for June and July, 1884.

² De Goncourt, *La Société Française pendant la Révolution*, pp. 36-40.

been written, and who was the pet of a certain section of the Parisian playgoers, had been ruined by his love of gambling, and had, after the taking of the Bastille, borrowed sufficient money to go to the popular watering-place of Forges to repair his health. But politics had turned the actor's brain, and he became a leader of the carabots of Normandy, who, like the English Luddites, waged war against the introduction of machinery. At their head Bordier had besieged the house of the intendant of Gisors. He was arrested and taken to Rouen, but was released on his representation that he had been forced to lead the carabots to save his own life. After this escape Bordier again mingled in politics, and became a close ally of Jourdain, an avocat of Rouen, who was the acknowledged leader of the most revolutionary party in Rouen. With Jourdain he posted a proclamation on the walls of the city, demanding the heads of the first president of the Parlement of Rouen, of the procureur-général or attorney-general, and of the intendant. During the night of August 3 the two headed a mob, which burst into the Intendancy; but there was no evidence of such vigour at Benoît Chaperon's at Troyes, and the intendant made his escape. The mob broke into the wine-cellars, and in the morning the National Guard had no difficulty in clearing out the drunken rioters, and in arresting Bordier and Jourdain. Bordier was rescued by some of his admirers, but was soon after again arrested on his road to Paris, and imprisoned with Jourdain. At the news of the imprisonment of their harlequin, rumours were heard in Paris that thirty thousand Parisians, with Saint-Huruge at their head, would march to the rescue; but the authorities at Rouen, nothing daunted by the threat, put the two ringleaders on their trial. Both were condemned to death, and in spite of the intercession of Bailly and Lafayette on behalf of Bordier, both were hanged at Rouen on August 21.¹ In this instance the vigour of the

¹ *Journal des principaux épisodes de l'époque révolutionnaire à Rouen et dans les environs de 1789 à 1795*, by E. Gosselin, pp. 23-29. Rouen : 1867. *Histoire civile, politique et militaire de Rouen*, by H. Fouquet, pp. 690-691. Rouen : 1876.

bourgeois of the city is plainly proved, and the weakness of the authorities at Troyes and Caen as plainly manifested; for while the bourgeois of Rouen put down their rioters, and hanged the leaders for an example, those of Troyes and Caen were unable to prevent foul murder from being committed in their streets.

The chief riots at Strasbourg had taken place at an earlier date than those at Rouen, Caen, and Troyes, and were not stained by bloodshed. The constitution of Strasbourg was that of a free imperial city of the empire. It was governed by two senates, a prætor royal, and twenty tribes. The German, or rather the native Alsatian element, constituted the bulk of the bourgeois class, and the deputies for the free city to the States-General were by their names, John de Turekheim and Étienne Joseph de Schwendt, evidently of German origin.¹ But the majority of the working population in the city were of French descent, and they had chosen for their leader a great friend and correspondent of Turgot, Mirabeau, and Condorcet, who was also an Alsatian by birth—the Baron de Dietrich. He had noticed the excitement with which the dissensions between the three orders at Versailles had been followed at Strasbourg, and had reported it to Mirabeau, and he had also foreseen that serious riots must take place against the antiquated governing body of the city. On the news of the taking of the Bastille, which had been received on July 18, the populace ordered that every house should be illuminated, and enforced the fulfilment of their orders. The magistrates, indeed, were not overjoyed at the news, but Dietrich persuaded them to acquiesce in the general illumination, and thus probably saved their lives. Of the riots which followed there is an excellent account in the travels of Arthur Young, who was at that time stopping at Strasbourg.² The populace regarded the town-hall, a beautiful building erected in 1585, as their Bastille, and finding that the garrison, which

¹ *Strasbourg pendant la Révolution*, by E. Seinguerlet, chap. i. p. 33. Paris: 1881.

² *Travels during the Years 1787, 1788, and 1799*, by Arthur Young, F.R.S., 2nd edit., vol. i. p. 156. 1794.

was under the command of Rochambeau, an old fellow-soldier of Washington and Lafayette in America, would not interfere, a large mob attacked it, and entirely pillaged it on July 21. Arthur Young says that the attackers contained persons decently dressed, that the archives were destroyed, and a shower of books, papers, pictures, and articles of furniture rained incessantly from the windows and were smashed. It was an act of "wanton mischief" rather than of pillage, and had the intended result of sealing the fate of the old close government of Strasbourg. On August 11 the old city officials resigned, and on the 13th a new municipality was elected, which at once organized a National Guard of seven battalions of infantry and a squadron of cavalry to prevent riots in the future. The new municipality was, of course, not legal, but when municipalities were established all over France, the same individuals were re-elected at Strasbourg, as in nearly every other town; and Dietrich, whose popularity had become very great, was the first popularly elected mayor of Strasbourg.

The history of the events of the last months of 1789 at Vernon, in Normandy, present two distinct points of interest, because, though not in themselves so characteristic or typical of the revolutionary movements as the riots of Rouen, Caen, Troyes, and Strasbourg, they yet illustrate the rapid growth of the feeling of universal suspicion, and also Lafayette's attempt to obtain an influence in the provinces from his position at Paris. Vernon was one of the towns which had been most affected by the commercial treaty with England. The introduction of machinery had reduced the wages of a weaver from fifteen to two sous a day, and would have caused great distress even without the competition of the English manufacturers.¹ Ever since the year 1786 the distress of Vernon had been increasing, and the inhabitants of the town had only been kept from downright starvation by the liberality of the Duc de Penthièvre,² the hereditary seigneur, through the

¹ Boivin-Champeaux' *La Révolution dans l'Eure*, chap. iv. pp. 89-115.

² For the noble character of this prince, see *Le Duc de Penthièvre, sa Vie et sa Mort*, by Honoré Bonhomme, 1869.

winter of 1788. His kindness has left his name still remembered in the town, but no private fortune could permanently relieve the distress. One day towards the end of July, after the reception of the exciting news of the capture of the Bastille, a man covered with dust rushed into the town. Whether he reported the presence of brigands or not is unknown, but his very appearance made the women fly to the churches and the men to arms. On this occasion a riot was prevented by the good order and good conduct of the old town militia, which, as in other towns, was speedily augmented by bourgeois volunteers. The next stage was to appoint a permanent committee to assist, or rather to supersede, the old municipality. On August 20 the new committee, with ill-advised zeal, ordered that all the farmers round Vernon should report to it what their harvest might be expected to yield. This measure not only showed the people of Vernon how much the scarcity was likely to increase, but also showed the farmers how greatly they could raise their prices. Nevertheless, until the month of October all remained quiet, by which time a corn-dealer, named Planter, had concentrated the wrath of the people on himself. He had hired from the committee the old town fort, which was almost in ruins, for a granary, and the wrath of the people arose when it was reported that he did not intend to sell his grain to the starving people until prices rose yet higher. On October 27 the tocsin rang out, and the populace, in spite of the efforts of the National Guard, attacked the unfortunate Planter. His life was only saved by the gallantry of a young Englishman, named Nesham, who happened to be in the town at the time, and the National Guard then managed to restore order. The committee were then so afraid that order could not be maintained much longer without assistance that they appealed to Bailly and Lafayette for help. Lafayette, who, in giving the bourgeois volunteers of Paris the name of the National Guard, had aimed at becoming himself commandant of the volunteer army, not only of Paris but of all France, gladly seized the opportunity of interfering, and at once sent a trusted officer

of his, named Diérès, with a strong force of Parisian national guards to Vernon. Five of the chief rioters were arrested, but it was rather to Bailly's present of grain than to the Parisian national guards that the quiet which followed this outbreak was due. Diérès soon returned to Paris, bringing with him Nesham, who was crowned with a civic crown for saving the life of a citizen by Bailly at the Hôtel de Ville of Paris, and who was soon after made a citizen of Vernon.

This expedition of Lafayette's shows the course of action which that general wished to adopt. Not satisfied with being the most powerful man in Paris, he wished to be the most powerful man in France, and wished to command all the national guards of the whole kingdom. The bourgeois of the provincial towns did not care about Lafayette, but the fear of an attempt at reaction, and still more of a rising of the peasantry, made them feel the need of combination. In November, 1789, the national guards of the fourteen cities of Franche Comté bound themselves into a federation to assist one another,¹ and similar federations were formed in other groups of cities. That of the cities of Franche Comté had a local cause. M. de Mesmay, a wealthy citizen, gave a dance and fête at his château of Quincey, near Besançon, and while everything was going on gaily a barrel of gunpowder, which had been got for making fireworks, suddenly exploded, and many people were killed and injured. In the suspicious state of men's minds this explosion was believed to be intentional, and M. de Mesmay was everywhere searched for by the populace and the National Guard of Besançon. Not finding him anywhere, the National Guard of Besançon communicated with the National Guard of Lons-le-Saulnier, which accordingly proceeded to the Château de Visargent and searched it, but only succeeded in finding the lady of the château hidden in a box amongst some dirty linen, and the almoner concealed in a loft.² This free communication between the national guards and permanent committees in different towns is in itself very significant of the new departure of the French people.

¹ Sommier's *La Révolution dans le Jura*, p. 30.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 23-26.

There was as yet no law authorizing or regulating these new permanent municipal committees. They had sprung up of themselves; generally, as in Paris, from the committees of electors, who had, in disobedience to the règlement, continued to meet after the meeting of the States-General. Though possessing no legal or clearly defined powers, these municipal committees were able to enforce obedience to their orders through the national guards, and were in every instance composed of the leading notables and bourgeois of the town. That such national guards and such municipal committees should have sprung up so quickly is a proof of itself that the provinces of France were ripe for revolution. There is no greater mistake than to assert that the revolution was the work of Paris alone. Both national guards and municipalities in the provinces arose spontaneously, and had the party of reaction been able to dissolve the National Assembly and conquer Paris, it would then have had to face armed and organized France. Paris, to be sure, led the way, but it is a mistake to believe that the provinces were only at a later date forced by misery or the contagion of example to follow the lead of Paris. It is equally certain also that the bourgeois of the provincial towns saw as clearly as those of Paris that for the preservation of their property they must organize themselves, and must prepare to defend themselves, if they were not to be overwhelmed by the numbers of the working classes in the town and country alike. Self-interest to as great an extent as patriotism had led to this universal revolution in the provincial towns, but neither could have been successful had it not happened that the spirit of patriotism infected the soldiers of the French army. There is not a single instance of the troops firing upon or charging the National Guard or the populace, while on the other hand there are many instances of their failing to protect their own officers. This decay of military spirit will receive a longer examination elsewhere, but it must be noticed now as an important factor in the development of the revolution in the provinces; and it may be further noticed that the sympathies of the soldiery were with the populace and not with the bourgeois. They

themselves had sprung from the populace; and when, at a later date, the populace came into collision with the bourgeois, the soldiery to a man were found to be on the side of their own kith and kin. That the new organization should have come into existence, with its municipalities, national guards, and federations, so rapidly and so effectually, is a proof of the weakness of the old régime. Nowhere were the officials in direct opposition to the new movement. Very often the mayor, who had been appointed before 1789, was re-elected to his office, and acted with the new municipality as successfully as he had done with the old municipal officers; and the king must have felt how very small his power was when he heard the daily reports from the provinces. The officials regarded themselves as bourgeois rather than as royal servants, and had no hesitation to cry "Vive la nation!" instead of "Vive le roi!" to preserve their places. Also the very rapidity and success of the new organization, which proves the weakness of the old régime, proves likewise the incompetence of the National Assembly. The Assembly had not taken the lead in the new organization, and the new municipalities were in full working order before the Assembly had begun to discuss the question at all. For, while it was discussing the rights of man, the cities of France were inventing the new order of things.

The same incapacity marked the policy of the Assembly towards the insurrection of the peasants; if it was nowhere suppressed by the royal forces, still less was it affected by the proclamations of the Assembly. The measures of August 4, had, in the eyes of the nobles, only legalized the misconduct of the peasants and had robbed themselves, while the abolition of the tithes had freed the landholders from an impost without relieving the poorer peasantry. With regard to the taxes, the hated *taille* and the old obnoxious customs duties were all abolished, but were still to be levied until new arrangements were made. The rural mind naturally failed to understand the position. If these taxes were abolished, the peasants were certainly not going to pay them for a time for the purpose of relieving the king's necessities. The peasants,

like the bourgeois, wanted to get all they could for themselves, and could not be made to understand that the revenue for the future was to be raised for national purposes, and not merely to pay for the expenses of the king and his courtiers. The Assembly also did nothing, except issue proclamations to put down the insurrections. Stern repression by the national guards of neighbouring cities was not the way to prepare France for general harmony ; it merely served to set the towns against the peasants, and for allowing this the Assembly deserves to bear the blame.

The condition of the working classes in the towns was even more threatening to the cause of order than that of the peasants. The causes of the poverty of the ouvriers of Paris, and the reasons why many able-bodied men could get no work and had to beg, have been noticed in discussing the state of the working classes in Paris, which resembled that of the working classes all over France. In purely manufacturing cities new considerations, both social and economical, appear ; and as Lyons was pre-eminently the great manufacturing city, it will be worth while to glance at the condition of the working classes there.¹ The city contained 150,000 inhabitants, and its proportion to the other cities of France may be estimated from the fact that it had one hundred and fifty electors allotted to it in the electoral assembly of its bailliage in 1789, while Bordeaux and Marseilles had only ninety each. The line between the bourgeois and the ouvrier class was very clearly drawn at Lyons. The bourgeois class were extremely wealthy ; the municipal office of échevin or sheriff conferred nobility, and thus nobility was within the reach of every manufacturer. The system of manufacturing was not that of large manufactures which now prevails. The wealthy manufacturer who undertook a large contract let

¹ Balleydier's *Peuple de Lyon pendant la Révolution*, vol. i. chap. i. ; Morin's *Lyon depuis la Révolution de 1789*, vol. i. chap. iii., and particularly the first numbers of a series of articles, *L'insurrection et le siège de Lyon*, by A. Duvand, in the *Révolution Française* for April, May, and June, 1885.

it out at once to numerous master-workmen, each of whom had his own little workshop. The minute regulations which ruled these workshops resembled those in force in the great Flemish cities in the fourteenth century. No master-workmen was allowed to employ more than two hired labourers and two apprentices. The monopoly for each species of work, whether dressing, weaving, or dyeing, was possessed by a guild, and though the guilds were often collectively wealthy, the individuals belonging to them were often very poor. When work had been plentiful, the position of a master-workman was not bad; but even then those who could not get work had often no resource but to starve. The punishment was often very severe on any master who employed more than two hired workmen, and thus the number of unemployed workmen was, owing to the guild regulations, always large in Lyons; and when scarcity of work forced the master-workmen to dismiss their journeymen, the number of the unemployed was still further increased. Lyons had recently experienced many bad years, owing to the Anglo-mania in Paris, which had caused English cloth to be worn instead of Lyons silk; and though the wealthy bourgeois still lived very comfortably in their luxurious villas round the city, and could afford to wait for better times, scarcity of work meant to the ouvriers of Lyons simply starvation. Even before the revolution a distinct opposition existed between the bourgeois and the proletariat, though their interest in obtaining work might seem to be identical, and it only remained for further starvation to bring about a collision. The working men had also been profoundly influenced by the freemasons and Martinists. Freemasonry, as it has always been, was rather a mode of organizing charity than anything else, and it was natural that the men who had been helped by the freemasons and Martinists should be ready to die for the opinions of their benefactors. The fêtes of July 2 and 3, the attack on the castle of Pierre Scize, the Bastille of Lyons, and the formation of a bourgeois guard of "muscadins," have all been noticed, and mention must now be made of the sympathy felt by the working classes of Lyons for

the peasants outside the walls. While the bourgeois guards of Lyons were helping the bourgeois of Grenoble and other towns to put down the peasants of Dauphiné, many of the unemployed workmen of Lyons escaped from the city and joined the rioters. High prices always affected the ouvriers, and especially the journeymen labourers first. The bourgeois and even the master-workmen had always some savings on which they could live till better times, but scarcity of work and an increase in the price of bread meant immediate starvation to the workmen. Yet the whole question of the subsistence of the ouvriers was almost entirely ignored by the National Assembly. The deputies were nearly all of bourgeois families themselves, and since the working men, although they had made themselves disagreeable in murdering Claude Huez at Troyes, and in other bread riots, had been kept from actual rebellion by the vigorous action of the national guards, the deputies did not trouble about them. Therefore, while the Assembly, under the influence of Salomon's report, was legislating for the peasant, it neglected the working man in the great cities. Rousseau and his sympathizers had written much about the poverty of the tillers of the soil; but there was no romance about the poor journeymen workmen, and while the sympathy of the philanthropists and the Assembly was moved for the peasant, it was not much exercised on behalf of the workman. Bitterly was France to expiate the neglect of the Constituent Assembly, for only four years later the condition of the working men became the great critical question. This neglect of the working classes proved once more the selfishness of the bourgeois as a class, which appeared in the great mistakes they made when they drew up a constitution appropriate only to a France consisting of comfortable bourgeois. The really democratic leaders were not slow to take advantage of this mistake, and Danton declared in later days that from the wealth and selfishness of her bourgeois France must turn to the patriotism and the numbers of her ouvriers.

The chief lesson taught by the history of the troubles in the provinces in the latter months of 1789 was that the

Assembly was utterly incompetent to deal with the grave practical questions which were before it. It was all very well to draw up a theoretically perfect constitution, while the great economical causes which had produced the revolution in the provinces were neglected with an entire neglect, which sealed the fate of the new constitution. To the gradual formation of that new constitution it is now necessary to turn; but while following the progress of the revolution in Paris and the history of the Assembly, it must never be forgotten that every stage of this progress was followed with the keenest interest in the provinces, that the provincial cities were marching forward as quickly as Paris itself, and that any neglect of their particular grievances was sure to be followed by risings of the peasants and ouvriers. All news was eagerly devoured by the provincial populace. Journals were started, like the *Feville Villageoise*, to inform even the most remote villages how matters were progressing at Paris; and when Mirabeau's great plan of an appeal to the provinces is discussed, it will be found that public opinion in the provinces had advanced as quickly and as far as in the capital.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FIFTH AND SIXTH OF OCTOBER.

Disorderly character of the debates in the Assembly—Debate on the number of chambers—The question of the veto—Appearance of parties—Duval d'Esprémesnil—Mirabeau-Tonneau—The bishops—The Archbishop of Aix—The right—Mounier and Malouet—The left—The extreme left—The centre—Garat—Excitement in Paris—New journals—Marat—The king and the army—The mob of women—Their arrival at Versailles—Royal carriages stopped—Arrival of Lafayette—Attack on the palace—Who was to blame?—Importance of events—Retirement of Mounier.

WHILE the provinces were thus organizing national guards and municipalities, and while the spirit of revolution was spreading through France and declaring itself in every district, the Assembly, which should have been the centre of all revolutionary impulse, was continuing to waste precious time. The causes of this singular lack of practical power, and of the many failures to make use of great opportunities, are not only to be found in the theoretical character of the political ideas of individual members of the Assembly. It is true that the majority of the deputies were theorists, whose desire was to put into practice the various maxims of their favourite philosophical authors; but it was rather to the inexperience of the Assembly, as an Assembly, than to the character of the deputies, that the waste of time must be attributed. A striking proof of this is afforded by the excellent work done by many of the committees or bureaux of the Assembly. These committees consisted of but very few members, who appointed a reporter, and many of their reports are models of careful and

yet unpretentious work. Business was conducted in them with despatch and thoroughness, while in the Assembly itself business remained almost at a standstill. The want of method in the proceedings of the Assembly was soon perceived by Mirabeau to be the source of all the waste of time, and he at once sought a practical remedy. Throughout the month of August, Paris had been crowded with Englishmen, who had come over to see the city which had just been the scene of such stirring events, and to hear a debate in the National Assembly. Among them were most of the leading members of the Whig party in the House of Commons, who sympathized with the Revolution, but who were surprised at the unbusinesslike and disorderly character of the sittings of the great Assembly. There was no real order of procedure, and very little attempt to preserve silence; every sort of obstruction and every description of personal abuse was freely indulged in. The Baron de Gauville mentions in his memoirs,¹ that when a vote was taken "par assis et levé," that is, by the voters for or against a motion rising or retaining their seats, it was the custom of those who retained their seats, either to drag their neighbours down by their coat-tails, to the great detriment of their coats, or to make them rise by the application of a smart kick. To remedy these evils, Mr. Samuel Romilly,² the eminent Whig lawyer, who was afterwards solicitor-general, at the request of his friend Mirabeau compiled a careful digest of the rules of procedure observed in the English House of Commons, which Dumont translated into French, and Mirabeau himself presented to the Assembly. The National Assembly, however, was far too French to wish to copy English procedure, and preferred to go on in its own disorderly fashion. Extreme confusion was the result. Deputies, instead of speaking from their places, had to climb up into a lofty pulpit or tribune, and while one member was delivering his oration, others would be on the steps on either side trying to drag him down, or sometimes to throw him over. When an orator did get a firm footing in the tribune, he persisted in speaking at great length,

¹ *Mémoires*, p. 23.

² Romilly's *Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 104.

and with such tiresome verbosity, that, on August 5, Charles François Bouche, a deputy for Aix, proposed that no speech should be allowed to last more than five minutes, which would have certainly facilitated business, but also have checked the eloquence of Mirabeau and Cazalès. The individual deputies were so little known by sight that the strangers, who walked about the hall during a debate, often took the opportunity of voting. Further, the sittings were largely occupied with the reading of numerous letters and petitions on every imaginable subject, and with listening to long and tedious addresses from deputations of all sorts—sometimes from a mob-meeting in the Faubourg St. Antoine, or from the hairdressers of Paris, or at another time from the compatriots of the oldest man in France, the centenarian of Mount Jura, presenting him to the Assembly. These childish performances were of themselves enough to hinder work, and along with it there was carried on a course of systematic obstruction, chiefly by certain of the young nobles, who, much against their will, formed part of the Assembly. All this obstruction and confusion was intensified by the fact that the Assembly was not yet divided into parties, though similarity of opinions had already formed small knots of friends and partisans.

The debates on the form of the Declaration of the Rights of Man had been long and violent, but real party spirit did not begin to appear until two important practical questions arose—whether under the new constitution there should be one or two chambers in the new French legislature; and whether the king should have a veto on all measures passed by that new legislature. The discussion on the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which dragged its weary length through the month of August and part of September, had not indicated any marked difference of party; but it had shown the strong line of demarcation between the supporters of different philosophical writers. It had, above all, proved clearly that a very large number of deputies believed implicitly in the doctrines of Rousseau, and they wrangled over the particular words to be used in the declaration, as if each word contained some car-

dinal point of a new religion. But when, in the month of September, the two new questions of the number of chambers and of the king's veto were proposed, political instead of philosophical differences began to appear. A committee, under the title of the Comité de Constitution, or Constitutional Committee, had been elected on July 14, to draw up the bases of a new French constitution. It consisted of Mounier, Talleyrand, Siéyès, Clermont-Tonnerre, Lally-Tollendal, the Archbishop of Bordeaux, Le Chapelier, and Bergasse, and had at once elected Mounier its reporter, and prepared to follow his guidance. In September he brought up a report recommending that there should be two chambers in the new French legislature, as there were in England; but before any explanation was made of the nature of the proposed chambers, a very warm debate arose. That there were many admirers of English institutions in France has been noticed, but they were greatly outnumbered in the Assembly by those Frenchmen who thought it derogatory to copy England, and who wished to strike out something very original and very perfect all by themselves. The great majority of the earlier leaders of the Assembly were, like Mounier, in favour of the creation of two chambers; but new orators came to the front, who advocated the single chamber, and on September 11 the proposition of the committee that there should be two chambers in the new French legislature was rejected by 849 to 89. On the rejection of his scheme, Mounier at once resigned his seat on the constitutional committee, as did also Bergasse, the Archbishop of Bordeaux, Clermont-Tonnerre, and Lally-Tollendal, and their places were filled on September 14 by Target, Thouret, Desmeuniers, Tronchet, and Rabaut de Saint-Étienne. Mounier even contemplated resigning his seat in the Assembly, and was only partly propitiated by being elected president of the Assembly on September 28.

The question of the two chambers did not affect the deputies or the populace of Paris so much as the question of the king's veto. Those who wished to imitate the English constitution of course proposed that the king should have the

power of vetoing any measure passed by the new legislature, while the more radical deputies insisted that there was no resemblance between the position of a constitutional king of England and that of future kings of France. The new school of journalists in Paris were equally violent on this subject, and whether the veto should be granted or not became the question of the month of September in salon and tavern. It need hardly be said that Mirabeau supported the absolute veto, and made an admirable speech in its favour on September 1, of which the arguments were derived from a little pamphlet by the Marquis de Casaux, who was a Fellow of the Royal Society of London, and thoroughly understood English institutions.¹ He declared that, if the veto was rejected, supreme executive power must pass from the king to the Assembly, and that he would then rather live at Constantinople than at Paris, because France would have twelve hundred tyrants instead of one, and he preferred one. His strenuous support of the absolute veto won him no approval from the court, while it made the popular leaders in Paris suspect that he had betrayed their cause. Yet there was no treachery in his position and no approach to the court. Mirabeau, as has been said, was an intensely practical statesman, and he saw that practically the centre of power must be in the people, and that it mattered very little if the king had a veto or not, if the great majority of the people really desired the passing into law of any particular measure. He knew, from his study of English history and contemporary politics, that if the King of England persistently vetoed a bill on which the heart of the people was set, he would very soon be overthrown, and that the king would hardly dare, therefore, to veto a bill unless he felt himself supported by the people. The veto, therefore, really gave to the people, through the king, the means of checking their own representatives. The absolute veto was then advocated by Mirabeau with all his influence, and he might possibly have carried the day had not Necker, with his usual

¹ *Un plagiat oratoire de Mirabeau*, by F. A. Aulard, in the *Annales de la Faculté des Lettres à Bordeaux* for December, 1880.

stupidity, interfered. Lafayette, not being a practical statesman, was opposed to the absolute veto, and he imagined a curious hybrid mode of procedure, which he called the suspensive veto, in imitation of the limited veto given to the President in the United States over the proceedings of the Congress. According to this plan, the king might veto a bill passed by the legislature, but his veto only suspended the passing of the measure for six months, because at the end of that time the bill became law, if the legislature passed it again, even in spite of the king's renewed veto. Any more unstatesmanlike compromise could hardly have been imagined. It would have simply given the king power to irritate the legislature by suspending their measures, while it deprived him of any effectual authority, and made his weakness palpable. Necker acted vainly and foolishly on the plan which Lafayette had vainly and foolishly invented. As if on purpose to destroy any credit the king might still possibly retain, he made the king come down to the Assembly and declare with his own mouth that he was in favour of the suspensive veto. This settled the question, and the Assembly, after having wasted months in discussing the rights of man, now commenced its labours of constitution-making by a ridiculous compromise, which was agreed to on September 11 by 684 votes to 325. It was no wonder that Volney, who remained calm enough to see the mistakes which were being made, proposed amidst loud applause, on September 18, that the National Assembly should dissolve itself, and make way for a new one elected on different principles.

The discussion on the veto had given for the first time some means for analyzing the position of political parties in the Assembly, and naming their leaders. Hitherto the Assembly had only been divided into the tiers état and the two sections of the privileged orders, which had, willingly and unwillingly, united with the National Assembly. To use the modern French terms, it may be said that the extreme right consisted of devoted royalists, and the extreme left of advanced reformers; and that there was a centre of many sections

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between the two. The deputies on the extreme right were at this time occupied, as they were until the dissolution of the Assembly, in the pleasing labour of obstruction. It was headed by Duval d'Esprémesnil, a counsellor of the Parlement of Paris, and the Vicomte de Mirabeau, younger brother of the great statesman, who was commonly known as "Mirabeau-Tonneau," or "Barrel Mirabeau," from his rotundity and capacity for containing liquor.

Jean Jacques Duval d'Esprémesnil was the son of an administrator of the French East Indies, who had married the daughter of Duplex, and was born at Pondicherry, the capital of the French East Indies, in 1746. He inherited a handsome fortune, and, after gaining some reputation as an *avocat* at the court of the Châtelet, had purchased the office of a counsellor in the Parlement of Paris. He at once determined to make some noise there, and was most active in the affair of the diamond necklace, when he freely commented on the conduct of Marie Antoinette, and in opposing the reversal of the sentence on the Comte de Lally. He then took the lead in opposing the registration of Brienne's May edicts, and was in consequence imprisoned in the castle of Mount Saint Michel, near Saint Malo. On his return to Paris, after the dismissal of Brienne, he supported the theory of the majority of the Parlement of Paris, that the new States-General must be exactly like the old States-Generals of former centuries. Vote "*par tête*" seemed to him monstrous, but yet he was elected a deputy for the noblesse of Paris because of his bold opposition to the court in previous years. He had almost at once taken the lead of the conservative noblesse in the month of May, and only joined the tiers état with the majority of his estate, at the king's especial command, when he became the chief leader of those deputies who sat on the extreme right, and were opposed to all reform. He had very real historical learning and some eloquence, but had become factious from sitting long in a minority. He was seriously convinced that France could not continue to prosper if the old systems of law and government were abolished; but his words seldom had any effect, from the general conviction

that his policy was entirely instigated by selfish motives, and that he hoped to become keeper of the seals. His personal reputation was very low; and he was sincerely disliked by the courtiers, who submitted to his leadership with reluctance. He was, moreover, a profound believer in Mesmer and Cagliostro, and Mirabeau cleverly hit off his factious turbulence, with its want of sincere purpose, in the nickname of "Crispin-Catilina."

Louis Auguste Riqueti, Vicomte de Mirabeau, or Mirabeau-Tonneau, was a politician of a very different type. He was the second son of the Marquis de Mirabeau, and younger brother of the Comte de Mirabeau, and had been from his boyhood as much beloved by both his parents as his brother had been detested. He had, of course, entered the army like other young nobles, and been conspicuous for every sort of vice which can be learnt in the idle dissipation of a garrison town, but particularly for his drunkenness, which he affirmed was the only vice his brother had left for him. He had served in America with distinction, and was one of the officers selected by Washington for the American order of Cincinnatus. On his return to France he had been made colonel of the Regiment of Touraine, and made some noise in Paris with his drunken escapades. During the elections he had sat among the nobles of the Haut-Limousin as proxy for his mother, who had large estates in that province, and had been elected by them deputy to the States-General. General attention had been drawn upon him by his brother's fame, and he lost no time in proving the wide difference which existed between them. He was intensely jealous of his brother's reputation as an orator, and occasionally tried to rival him in lengthy speeches. These were failures; but he was more successful in interrupting the progress of business by practical jokes and drunken freaks. It was calculated a little later that the Vicomte de Mirabeau could generally waste one sitting a week; and that the rules of the Assembly provided no means for suppressing such a nuisance was one reason for its waste of time, the more especially as his friends tried to follow his example, and carried out a regular system of obstruction.

D'Esprémesnil and Mirabeau-Tonneau headed only a small body of nobles and courtiers, who were opposed to any sort of reform in the government of France, and who strove in every way to make the Assembly ridiculous, together with a very few deputies of the tiers état who were sincere believers in the advantages of irresponsible monarchy, such as Charrier, deputy for the sénéchaussée of Mende in Languedoc, who was afterwards to lose his life as the leader of a desperate royalist rising. Of far more importance was the compact body of bishops, who had formed the minority of clergy, who were nearly one hundred in number, and who sat on the extreme right, in the belief that the Church in France was in as great peril as its monarch. These bishops did not rank themselves among the followers of D'Esprémesnil, but preferred a leader of their own, the learned and accomplished Archbishop of Aix.

Jean de Dieu Raymond de Boisgelin de Cucé came of a very old Breton family, and was born in 1732. He had always from his youth a predilection for the priesthood, and, after surrendering his rights as eldest son to his next brother, had been ordained in 1755. His birth assured his rapid promotion in the Church, and he became successively Grand-Vicar of Rouen in 1760, Bishop of Lavaur in 1765, and Archbishop of Aix in 1770. He was in every respect superior to the ordinary French prelate, and was both a scholar and a politician. His learning, though not of the very greatest, was sufficiently notable in a French prelate to secure his election to the Académie Française in 1776; and in 1786 he published a graceful verse translation of the *Heroides* of Ovid, who seems to have been the favourite poet of the French bishops. He had some experience of politics in his diocese, for the Archbishop of Aix was the perpetual president of the *communautés* of Provence, who had continued to meet for local purposes after the suspension of the Estates of Provence in 1639. As the revolution approached he gained much reputation and popularity in Provence, and was elected to the States-General for the clergy of Aix. He had played a conspicuous part in the Estate of the clergy in May and June, 1789, but had attached

himself rather to the party of the Cardinal-Archbishop of Rouen than to the followers of the more violent Archbishop of Paris. When the three orders united at the king's command, he became still more prominent, for the more prudent bishops now distrusted the Archbishop of Paris; and he eventually became their leader in the place of the Cardinal de la Rochefoucauld, whose great age prevented his constant attendance at the stormy meetings of the National Assembly. The Archbishop of Aix was too experienced a politician to advocate the obstructive tactics of Mirabeau-Tonneau, and while intending to support the prerogatives of the king and the inviolability of the Church with all his might, he saw no advantage in exasperating the majority of the Assembly. He therefore boldly attacked feudal privileges on August 4, and hoped to delay the time when it might be necessary to defend the Church. But event followed event more quickly than he expected, and he was soon obliged to use his whole contingent of bishops in a persistent opposition to the measures proposed to the Assembly.

On the right, as opposed to the extreme right, of the Assembly sat the more thinking supporters of the monarchy. These men were not fanatical admirers of the old system of government; but they argued that it should serve as a basis for reform, that the reforms should not be excessive, and that the Assembly should try rather to simplify the present system than to develop a new one. The great orators of this party, Maury, Cazalès, and Montlosier, had not as yet become leaders, and Montlosier had indeed only just taken seat, and the right was at present led by Mounier and Malouet. It was this party which had the majority in the first constitutional committee, and which had drawn up the first plan of a constitution. Now that the two chief points of this constitution had been rejected, its authors felt their weakness in the Assembly, and were wrathfully preparing to resign their seats. But the right contained abler politicians than the disappointed constitution-makers; and while Mounier, Bergasse, and Lally-Tollendal had been drawing up constitutions, Malouet, Clermont-Tonnerre,

and the Bishop of Langres had been examining the political situation, and attempting to form a party. In the month of August a committee of fifteen had been formed out of the leading members of the right, and each answered for twenty supporters, making a compact party of three hundred moderate reformers firmly attached to the monarchy, who could sway the Assembly. Unfortunately, the vote on the question of the veto proved that this expectation was far too sanguine, and that even with the conservative nobles and the bishops only 325 votes could be mustered for assuring to the king a position at all superior to that of the President of the United States. The committee saw that the king's influence in the Assembly was bound to diminish while it sat within a few miles of the excitable Parisians, and three of its members, Malouet, Redon, and the Bishop of Langres, requested Necker and Montmorin on their behalf to see the king, and to beg him to remove the Assembly twenty leagues further from Paris. The poor king utterly failed to comprehend the wisdom of this advice; he either went to sleep, or pretended to go to sleep, and when he woke up abruptly said "No," and left the Council.¹ The constitution of Mounier and the policy of Malouet sufficiently characterizes the party of the right at this time. The leaders were monarchists, supporters of the absolute veto, and of the retention of some influence by the king. Their weakness lay in the fact that they had got no party together in spite of the efforts of Malouet, and so were unable to do anything but plan and scheme, while at the same time, from the very number of these leaders, they were unlikely to co-operate long, and a spirit of jealousy was sure to arise among them. The right was, in fact, disorganized by the vanity of Mounier, and was not to play a worthy part until its greatest orator and representative, Cazalès, gave evidence of his great capacity.

The great party of the left was no better organized than the right, and not much stronger numerically, but it contained a far greater number of influential politicians. It was not as yet split up into sections, and contained men of every possible

¹ Malouet's *Mémoires*, pp. 303, 304.

type, who differed on every conceivable point. Among them must be noted Siéyès, whose importance arose from the recollection of his past services; Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun; Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, the Protestant leader; Camus, the Jansenist; Le Chapelier and Lanjuinais the Bretons; Target, Thouret, Treilhard, D'André, and Tronchet, the great lawyers; and a group of liberal grand-seigneurs, such as the Duc de la Rochefoucauld, and the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt. Among them must not be forgotten the leader of the curés, Grégoire. All these politicians derived their influence from their oratory and power of carrying the votes of the centre; for though the party of the left was not much stronger numerically than the party of the right, it always succeeded, on taking a vote on an important question such as the veto, in gaining a majority. It could not be said that the left had such fixed political ideas as the right, but all the leaders were agreed in a policy of utterly overthrowing the present system of government, and establishing a new one on what they believed to be true political principles.

The extreme left consisted, like the extreme right, of a very small number of deputies, who were as convinced of the necessity of establishing a really democratic government, as D'Esprémesnil was of maintaining the absolute power of the king. They were as violent politicians as the deputies of the extreme right, and as utterly contemptuous of the centre, which declined to follow their extreme councils. This small knot of believers in democracy contained many men whose names were to be famous throughout the history of the Revolution; among them Maximilien de Robespierre, deputy for Artois, Jérôme Pétion, Merlin of Douai, Prieur of the Marne, Rewbell, Larevellière-Lepaux, Vadier, Salle, Lepeletier de Saint-Fargeau, and François Nicolas Buzot, deputy for Évreux. Between the left and the extreme left sat a group of young nobles, who held very extreme opinions, and who were later to obtain the command over the deputies of the centre, which was now held by more moderate men. This brilliant little group was now being formed under the leadership of what

was called the triumvirate, Adrien Duport, Antoine Pierre Joseph Marie Barnave, and Charles de Lameth. To them adhered all the brilliant young nobles who had served in America, notably Alexandre de Lameth, Alexandre de Beauharnais, the Duc d'Aiguillon, the Prince de Broglie, the Vicomte de Noailles, and the talkative but amusing Baron de Menou. The triumvirate had not yet, however, obtained the influence which it was to exercise at Paris, and its followers had not entirely separated themselves from the deputies of the left and extreme left. Finally, it must be noticed that in the month of September, 1789, the whole left was united in favour of the suspensive veto; no distinction between extreme and moderate parties could be drawn as on the right; it was not until they had won the victory, when the Assembly was at Paris and the king discredited, that the victors began to quarrel among themselves.

These were the chief party leaders and parties which had begun to show themselves in the September of 1789, but it would be a very great mistake to suppose that every deputy in the Assembly was ranked in some party or other. Party spirit and party government are to be found in England alone, and have an interesting history of their own. In an Assembly where the ministers have no seats in the legislature, party government is impossible; and even if they had had seats, it is very doubtful if party government could have been established in the National Assembly. In every French Assembly, in the Constituent, in the Legislative, in the Convention, in the Council of Ancients, and in the Council of Five Hundred, a very large proportion of the members, generally a good half, sat in what was called the "centre." These men bound themselves by no political obligations, and voted either according to their own convictions, or from a desire not to offend the possessors of power. Malouet recognized this when he wished the king to remove the Assembly to a distance; Lafayette knew it when he wished the Assembly to come to Paris; and Mirabeau again and again experienced it. Yet the men who sat in the centre were by no means the

least able of the deputies; among them were to be found philosophers like Destutt de Tracy, economists like Dupont de Nemours, wits like Brillat-Savarin, the author of the "Physiologie du Goût," and men of letters like Garat. It was the powerful voting influence of the centre which every orator strove to gain. It was ready to follow the advice of Mirabeau or Siéyès, Rabaut de Saint-Étienne or Lanjuinais, according to the arguments which pleased it best at the moment. It could not be said to have any leader, for it did not form a party, but its spirit is best shown in such men as Barère, the excitable but prudent young editor of the *Point du Jour*, and Garat, the popular professor of history at the Lycée of Paris.

Dominique Joseph Garat was born at Bayonne in 1749 and was the son of a doctor in the Pyrenees. He was educated for the legal profession, and became an *avocat* at Bordeaux. But he had no taste for the law, and one day set off for Paris with a tragedy in his pocket. He at once went to Panckoucke, the famous publisher, who did not publish his tragedy, but, recognizing his literary ability, took him on the staff of the *Journal de Paris*, and introduced him to his brother-in-law Suard, and the other men of letters who met at his house. He soon became acquainted with Diderot, D'Alembert, and Buffon, and obtained his first literary success in 1779, when he won the prize offered by the Académie Française for the best Éloge on Suger. He followed up this success by winning similar prizes, in 1781 and 1784, for Éloges on Montausier and Fontenelle. In 1786 he was appointed professor of history at the Lycée, and the eloquence of his lectures soon attracted all Paris to hear him. He became the fashionable ladies' lecturer of the day, and was welcome in every literary salon. When the States-General was summoned, he had not offered himself as a candidate anywhere, but his compatriots had not forgotten him, and, to his own surprise, the electoral assembly of the tiers état of Labour elected the brilliant professor, the fame of whose lectures and éloges had reached even to the Pyrenees, their deputy, together with his brother. In the

National Assembly he had taken his seat in the centre, and was a typical representative of its political conduct. Throughout the whole session of the Assembly he never made himself conspicuous as a partisan, though he was a ready speaker, but his vote was always given with the majority. This was not from any cowardice or motive of self-interest, but was due rather to a singular facility for being convinced. Like Barère, his temper was easily stirred by any enthusiastic demonstration; without any fixed political principles, they both regarded every motion proposed by itself, and not with reference to a general scheme of policy. Neither of them ought to be accused of inconsistency; they were both equally liable to be carried away by their feelings, and forgot the import of their yesterday's vote in the excitement of the debate of to-day. Very representative were they of the hot-headed and excitable but the brave and generous Frenchmen of the South; both had the power of inspiring personal affection; both played great parts throughout the history of the Revolution, and outlived it; and both died peacefully in their native villages, and were followed by mourning crowds of neighbours to an honoured grave. Barère and Garat were typical of the deputies who sat in the centre of the National Assembly in this very facility of conviction; they were excited by every burst of eloquence in the Assembly and every manifestation of popular feeling without its walls, and could not be expected to preserve the calm judgment of an average English member of Parliament sitting in a House which has learnt moderation from the lessons of its long history.

The debate on the veto had had the effect of bringing to light the great differences of opinions which existed among the deputies to the National Assembly, but the excitement in the Assembly was nothing to the excitement in Paris. Until the month of August the Parisians had been chiefly occupied in criticizing their new municipal government, and in laughing at Lafayette on his white horse, whom nevertheless, in spite of ridicule, the bourgeois were beginning to trust and to obey. All through August Paris had been crowded with foreigners

and country cousins, to the great profit of the Parisians, and the novelty of their having some voice in the government of the city had not yet worn off. But in the month of September winter seemed to be very near at hand, and the people of Paris of all classes began to consider whether anything had yet been done by the Assembly to mitigate the severity of the usual winter famine. The king's visit, on July 17, had had a good effect, but the influence of the queen was too well known for any confidence to exist. On the contrary, a rumour was again circulating that troops were being concentrated on Paris, which had its origin in the fact that the Régiment de Flandre was going into garrison at Versailles. In addition to their distrust of the court, the Parisians were very dissatisfied with the dilatory behaviour of the Assembly. It seemed to them to be merely wasting time in useless discussions, instead of carrying out practical reforms, or doing anything to restore the disorder of the finances. This distrust of the court and discontent with the Assembly was fostered by the numerous new journals which had been established in Paris since the taking of the Bastille. "Only bring the king and the Assembly from Versailles to Paris," the new journalists repeated, "and have them under your own eyes, and you will see that the Assembly will not be so slow, and that the price of bread will go down." The debate on the veto gave them a new subject for argument, and they really made the populace believe that if the absolute veto were granted to the king the price of bread would rise. The bourgeois did not believe this, but they were as persistent as the working classes in demanding the removal of the king and the Assembly to Paris. They knew that, if the king were at the Tuileries, he would be a sort of hostage against any royalist attack being made upon Paris from the provinces, and felt, with Lafayette, that they and he would never have the influence over the Assembly which they desired until it sat in Paris, and was bound to depend upon the National Guard for protection against the mob. They therefore joined in the demand for the removal to Paris, and abused the supporters of the absolute veto; while the people, with their keen sense of

ridicule, contrived to associate the obnoxious idea with the king and queen, by always terming them Monsieur and Madame Veto.

The new journals had had much to do with exciting this feeling against the veto in all classes, and though none of those which appeared for the first time between July 14 and October 5 equalled the *Révolutions de Paris* either in circulation or ability, many of them had special features which ought to be noticed. Passing over the *Observateur* of Feydel, a dry but useful summary of facts, and the *Journal Universel* edited by one Pierre Jean Audouin, who signed himself "the revolutionary sapper," and whose journal must have circulated only among his friends of the working class, a very notable journal is the *Journal d'État et du Citoyen*, of which the first number appeared on August 13. It was edited by a Breton lady, Louise Anne de Kéralio, who had accompanied her father to Paris on his election to the States-General. She had been inspired by the numerous journals which were being started around her to attempt one herself, and had such success, that in the month of December a journalist named Robert, who had an eye to business, married her, and merged her journal with his, under the title of the *Mercure National*. Far more remarkable than these journals were the *Chronique de Paris*, the *Journal des Débats et des Décrets*, and the *Ami du Peuple*. The *Chronique de Paris* was established to meet a real need. There was no journal existing which appealed exclusively to the bourgeois. The *Révolutions de Paris* often went too far for them, and the *Point du Jour*, the *Patriote Français*, and the *Courrier de Provence* were too exclusively devoted to explaining the sentiments of Barrère, Brissot, and Mirabeau to be influential among the whole bourgeois class. The editors of the new journal were not particularly distinguished men, and succeeded in obtaining a large circulation by not obtruding their own ideas. They wisely engaged a large body of contributors to write for them, instead of confining themselves to one or two, and thus contrived to give great variety to every number. Among the writers they engaged were such distinguished men as Condorcet and

Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, and throughout the sitting of the Constituent Assembly they managed to exactly suit the bourgeois taste, not only in Paris but in the provinces, so that their paper, though not a power in the land, like the *Révolutions de Paris*, was widely read, and had considerable influence in forming the opinions of the whole bourgeois class. The *Journal des Débats*, which still exists, arose in a very different fashion. Mention has been made of the corresponding committees established in every important town in France after the election of the deputies to the States-General, and of the eagerness with which they demanded information as to what was being done at Paris and Versailles from their deputies. Especially eager for information were the rival cities of Riom and Clermont-Ferrand in Lower Auvergne, and very competent was at least one deputy for the latter city, Gauthier de Biauzat, to give it well and succinctly. The popularity of Gauthier's reports, which were read aloud in the theatre of Clermont-Ferrand,¹ made him think of printing them, and from this idea arose the *Journal des Débats*. In the month of August, Gauthier de Biauzat and Huguet, deputies for Clermont-Ferrand, and Grenier, deputy for Riom, agreed to write a new weekly journal without pay, on condition that copies should be sent gratis to Auvergne, while Baudouin, the printer to the Assembly, and an elector for Paris, agreed to print and publish it on these conditions. The journal soon attained a wide provincial circulation, for it was very ably written, and its account of the debates in the Assembly and of events in Paris, without being so full as the *Moniteur*, was undoubtedly the best published in any weekly journal.

On September 12 appeared the first number of a journal, which was soon to change its name to the *Ami du Peuple*, and to be the most characteristic journal of the whole revolutionary period. Its founder was one of the most maligned men of his time, and as he typifies a large class of persons at this period, it is worth while analyzing his career somewhat

¹ See chap. vi. p. 170; and Mège's *Les Fondateurs du Journal des Débats*.

minutely. Jean Paul Marat was born at Boudry, near Neuchâtel, in Switzerland, on April 13, 1742.¹ His father, who spelt his name "Mara," was a physician of some ability, and, on being exiled from his native island of Sardinia for abandoning the Roman Catholic religion, had taken up his residence in Switzerland and married a Swiss Protestant. Jean Paul was the eldest of three sons; his next brother settled down as a watchmaker at Geneva, and his youngest brother entered the service of the Empress Catherine, and distinguished himself in the Russian army under the title of the Chevalier de Boudry. Jean Paul was from his childhood of an intensely sensitive and excitable disposition, and also so quick at his books that he became a good classical scholar, and acquainted with most modern languages. As his chief taste, however, seemed to be for natural science, he was intended to follow his father's profession, and was, at the age of eighteen, sent to study medicine at the University of Bordeaux. He there obtained a thorough knowledge of his profession, but devoted himself particularly to the sciences of optics and electricity. From Bordeaux he went to Paris, where he effected a remarkable cure of a disease of the eyes, which had been abandoned as hopeless both by physicians and quacks, by means of electricity. From Paris he went to Amsterdam, and finally to London, where he set up in practice in Church Street, Soho, then one of the most fashionable districts in London. He must soon have formed a good practice, for he stopped in London, with occasional visits to Dublin and Edinburgh, for ten years, and only left it to take up an appointment at the French court. While in London he wrote his first book, and in 1772 and 1773 he published the first two volumes of a philosophical and physiological "*Essay on Man*." The point he discussed was the old problem of the relation between body and mind, and he treated it in a very interesting manner from the physiological point of view. He held some extraordinary theory about the existence of some fluid in the veins which acted on the mind, which, however, does not impair the

¹ *Marat, Esprit politique*, by F. Chevrement. 2 vols. Paris : 1880.

interest of his inquiries into the cause of dreams, or diminish the respect felt for his wide reading and extensive knowledge both of ancient and modern philosophical and medical authors. He shows a wide knowledge of Latin and Greek literature, and while writing in good English freely quotes French, German, Italian, and Spanish writers. In one part of his book he declared that it was ridiculous for any one to make psychical researches without having some knowledge of anatomy and physiology, and openly attacked Helvétius for despising scientific knowledge in his famous "*De l'Esprit*." Voltaire naturally took the side of Helvétius, and did the young author the honour of noticing, and very severely criticizing, his book. Marat himself translated it into French, and published it at Amsterdam in 1775. His next work was of a political character. He had got mixed up with some of the popular societies in England, which were striving to obtain a thorough reform of the representation of the people in the House of Commons, and in 1774 published a work, which he entitled "*The Chains of Slavery*." In this book, which is partly historical and partly political, he begs the electors to take more care in the choice of their representatives. It is written in a very declamatory style, and strikes the note of the responsibility of representatives to their constituents, which is the key-note of all his political ideas. The book is published in quarto, and is printed on fine paper, so that it can hardly have been meant to appeal to the populace; but it nevertheless procured him the honorary membership of the popular societies of Newcastle and other great northern cities. Subsequently he again returned to his profession, and after publishing a medical tract in 1775, of which no copy is known to exist, he published "*An Inquiry into the Nature, Cause, and Cure of a Singular Disease of the Eyes*," in 1776.¹ In this little pamphlet there is no violent language; it describes the disease and the cases he had cured in perfectly simple language, and shows at least that he was no mere quack, but a scientific physician. On June 30, 1775, he had, while on a visit to Scotland, received the honorary degree of M.D. from

¹ See *Academy* of September 23, 1882.

the University of St. Andrews for his eminence as a doctor, and had probably received similar compliments from other universities, because, on June 24, 1777, Jean Paul Marat, "médecin de plusieurs facultés d'Angleterre," was appointed, for his good character and high reputation as a doctor, physician to the body-guard of the Comte d'Artois, with a salary of a thousand livres a year and allowances. To take up this court appointment he moved to Paris, and soon acquired a large practice there, and the name of "physician of the incurables," from the number of hopeless cases he was successful in treating. He also moved in the best society about the court, and won the affections of the Marquise de l'Aubespine for saving her life. For some reason or other, most probably because he had obtained a competent fortune and desired to satisfy his ambition, he resigned his court appointment in 1783, and devoted himself to science. He had long observed the phenomena of heat, light, and electricity, and in the course of the next five years published the result of his experiments, and presented them to the Academy of Sciences. His hard work won him the friendship of Benjamin Franklin, but the violence with which he attacked his adversaries, and his audacity in doubting the conclusions of Newton, prevented him from obtaining a seat in the Academy of Sciences. When he recognized that the hostility to himself prevented due recognition of his work, he determined to win the approbation of the Academy by concealing his name; and his translation of the "Optics" of Newton, which was covered by the name of M. de Beauzée, and published in 1788, was at once crowned by the very Academy which had rejected him. His political work during these years was confined to a treatise, in imitation of Beccaria, on the subject of punishments. The approach of the States-General, however, revived his political enthusiasm, and in the March of 1789, when he believed himself to be dying, he published his "Offrande à la patrie," which was followed in quick succession by a supplement and other pamphlets. Of these distinctly the most able is the "Tableau des Vices de la Constitution Anglaise," which he presented to the Assembly in

September, 1789. In it he points out what he had learnt in the popular societies of England, that the English people was by no means so well governed as it was supposed to be; that the influence of the king and the ministry was overwhelming through the extent of patronage, and that the rich there bought seats in the House of Commons as they bought estates. Marat then felt that he could not express himself frequently enough in pamphlets, and on September 12 appeared the first number of a journal written entirely by himself, called the *Journal du Peuple*, which title was changed to that of *Ami du Peuple*, or *The People's Friend*, with the fourth number. To understand the man, it is necessary to get rid of preconceived ideas. Suspicious and irritable, excitable and sensitive to an extreme, he attacked everybody, and attacked them all with unaccustomed violence; but with all this he was in private life a highly educated gentleman. The extent of his attainments appears from his numerous works, and it must be remembered that he could not for years have been a fashionable physician and held a court appointment without being perfectly polite and well bred. His faults arose from his irritable and suspicious nature, and years of persecution made him half-insane towards the end of his life; but in September, 1789, he was in perfect possession of his senses, and the very popularity of his journal showed how congenial his gospel of suspicion was to the Parisians.

Was there any ground for the distrust entertained by the people of Paris and fostered by the journalists towards the court? Undoubtedly there was. The king was being again and again pressed to leave Versailles for Compiègne or Fontainebleau, and was certain to yield at last to the solicitations of the queen. She had not been crushed by the failure of Broglie's scheme, and now rested her entire hopes upon the Marquis de Bouillé, who, as commander-in-chief on the eastern frontier, had his head-quarters at Metz. The Comte d'Estaing, the commandant of the National Guard of Versailles, was ready, not only to connive at the escape of the royal family, but even to cover it, and had for that purpose got leave from the

municipality to be free to act against any movement from Paris on Versailles. Any attempt to escape would be useless without the hearty co-operation of the king's body-guard and of the garrison of Versailles. To prove and inflame their loyalty, the king, queen, and royal family came to witness the great banquet which was given, on October 1, by the body-guard to the Régiment de Flandre in the theatre of the Château. Their reception was most enthusiastic; and the delighted soldiery sang with fervour Blondel's song out of Grètry's opera, "Richard Cœur de Lion," "O Richard, O mon Roi, l'univers t'abandonne." Then, in their royalism, they tore off their tri-coloured cockades and mounted white ones.¹ The war against tricoloured cockades continued all the next day, when the maids of honour pinned white ones on every courtier's breast, and Laurent Lecointre, the rich draper of Versailles and one of the captains of the local National Guard, was publicly insulted in the palace. This news fed the flame of suspicion among the Parisians; they now felt no doubt that the king would retire into some garrison town and collect forces to besiege and punish them. The journalists fanned this mood of suspicious anger, and all Parisians, from the wealthy bourgeois to the poorest starving ouvrier, were determined that the king should come to Paris, though they did not know exactly how he could be compelled to do so. Lafayette was equally desirous to achieve the same result for his own purposes, but also did not know how to manage it. The terrible starvation which was increasing in Paris settled the difficulty, and also gave Lafayette an opportunity to pose as the saviour of the monarchy.

On October 5, at about six o'clock in the morning, the tocsin began to ring in Paris.² National guards began to

¹ Miot de Melito's *Mémoires*, vol. i. pp. 15, 16.

² For the events of October 5 and 6, see the *Mémoires* of Miot de Melito, vol. i. pp. 18-29; the *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et La March*, vol. i. pp. 82-86; Lafayette's *Mémoires*, vol. ii. pp. 339, 340, and 347-349, Paris, 1837; and *Les journées des 5 et 6 Octobre, 1789*,—a letter written to his wife on October 6, by an eye-witness, the Marquis de Paroy—in the *Revue de la Révolution* for January, 1883.


appear in the streets, and a woman collected other women round her in the market by beating a big drum. Yet the rabble of Paris did not accumulate with the same vivacity of July 14; the national guards had done their work of maintaining order thoroughly, and had terrified them, while a month or two's imprisonment for trying to get up a riot on the subject of the veto had made Saint-Huruge more cautious, and other leaders afraid to suffer a similar punishment. The women of Paris knew no such fears. How they were collected together in the great square before the Hôtel de Ville no one has been able to explain. Whether it was by some secret machination of Orleans or Lafayette, or owing to the maternal instinct, which would not let them see their children starve before their eyes, that they had assembled, matters little; the fact remained that there were some five thousand women in the Place de Grève in a state of frenzied excitement, many of them starving, and all desirous that some one should be punished for their sufferings. Bailly and the municipality were at their wits' end, and occupied themselves in sending out messengers for Lafayette every few minutes. The starving women would not wait for the commandant of the National Guard, but seized an unfortunate abbé at the Hôtel de Ville, and were proceeding to hang him, when a man of energy appeared on the scene. It was Stanislas Maillard,¹ one of the conquerors of the Bastille, and now a captain in the volunteer corps which bore that name, who happened at about seven o'clock to be going to the municipality to make some requisition. He was a man of great energy and perfect presence of mind, as he had proved in the capture of the Bastille, and was to prove again in the massacres of September, and took in the state of affairs at a glance; he at once seized a drum, and, shouting "*À Versailles!*" said exactly what the women wanted, and reminded them then that there would be bread enough in Paris if the king were only there. They dropped their victim at once, and, crowding together under leaders of their own, among whom stood pre-eminent Théroigne de

¹ *Stanislas Maillard*, by Alexandre Sorel, p. 12. Paris: 1862.

Méricourt with a naked sabre, followed Maillard with loud cries on the road to Versailles. They were accompanied by a crowd of the lowest and poorest of the rabble of Paris, and followed at a little distance by the conquerors of the Bastille, marching in regular order, not to co-operate in their movement, but to protect them if necessary. The municipality ordered Lafayette to follow at once in order to prevent bloodshed. He ordered the paid battalion, the former Gardes Françaises, to get under arms, and concentrated various volunteer battalions in different quarters, but delayed ordering an advance till about four o'clock in the afternoon. He wished to be the saviour of the king, and it would not be sufficiently glorious to forestall the danger.

Meanwhile the news that the tocsin was ringing in Paris, and that a mob was marching on Versailles, was brought to the king, while he was hunting in the forest of Rambouillet, at about half-past one. He received the news with his usual indifference, but nevertheless returned at once to the palace, where he found all the four companies of the body-guard, six hundred in number, drawn up in order of battle in the Cour des Ministres, and the Régiment de Flandre along the Place d'Armes. On the left of the Place d'Armes also, in the former barracks of the Gardes Françaises, which were now their head-quarters, had collected some two hundred of the national guards of Versailles. Between three and four o'clock the women reached Versailles, covered with mud, for the weather was very bad, and it had been raining all day.¹ Some went at once to the palace and demanded food, which was readily given to them; but the greater part, still under the leadership of Maillard, went to the hall where the Assembly was sitting, under the presidency of Mounier. Maillard addressed Mounier on behalf of the women, demanding that the price of bread should be lowered by a decree, and the Assembly then decided that a deputation of their own members should accompany a deputation of the women to the king. The deputations were most graciously received by Louis with all the goodness of his

¹ The Marquis de Paroy's letter, p. 3.



CHURCH
OF
ST. LOUIS

REFERENCE.

- A. Cour des Ministres.
- B. Cour Royale.
- C. Cour de Marbre.
- D. Parterre d'Eau.
- E. Parterre des Fleurs.
- G. The Reservoirs.
- H. The Château of Versailles.
- K. The Great Stables.
- L. The Small Stables.
- M. The Kennel.
- N. The Hôtel des Menus Plaisirs (where the States General met).
- P. The Tennis Court.
- Q. Convent of the Recollets.
- 1. Post Office.
- 2. War Office.
- 3. Foreign Office and Ministry of the Marine.
- 4. Controller-General of the Finances.
- 5. Ministry of Public Works, or "Batiments du Roi."
- 6. Chancellerie.

VERSAILLES IN 1789.

heart; but, on getting outside the palace gate, the women were nearly torn in pieces by their sisters for submitting to that gracious reception. Many of the women had remained in the Assembly, filling the galleries and even the body of the hall, and they now cried out for the members to go on doing something, and above all to contrive to give them all plenty of food in Paris; but Mounier behaved courageously, and declared that the Assembly would not deliberate under pressure. Many of the women then made their preparations to spend the night in the Assembly, which passed a motion that, considering the gravity of the situation, it would sit *en permanence*.

During the evening the crowd round the palace gates had been swelled by new-comers from Paris, who wished to see what was going on, and two or three slight disturbances had taken place. At last, between six and seven o'clock, the royal travelling carriages were seen by the national guards of Versailles, who still remained under arms, to be coming across the Place d'Armes from the Great Stables to the private entrance of the Orangerie; and the cry at once arose that the king must not be allowed to leave the palace. Several of the national guards then dashed forward and insisted on the carriages being driven back again. Soon after, the additional troops, such as the Régiment de Flandre, were seen to march off to their quarters, for both king and queen had recognized that it was too late to escape, and that they must wait for Lafayette. An hour afterwards the body-guard, who had been intended to accompany the king's flight, trotted across the Place d'Armes towards their barracks in the Avenue de Sceaux, and on their way they were fired upon by the national guards of Versailles, and one of their horses was killed, which was immediately roasted and eaten by the Parisian mob.¹

At last, at about eleven o'clock, Lafayette arrived with the greater part of the National Guard of Paris, including the paid battalion, and several guns. He at once had an interview with the king, and, after assuring him of his power and his

¹ Miot de Melito's *Mémoires*, p. 23.

willingness to protect him, demanded his unconditional acceptance of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. The king complied, and requested Lafayette to look to the safety of the palace, but absolutely refused to admit his men into the palace, alleging that his guards would keep watch there as usual. Greatly chagrined, Lafayette told off his men to sleep in the various churches of Versailles, and left the Cour Royale at about a quarter past twelve, on the rumour of an attack on the barracks of the body-guard, in the Comte de la Marck's carriage. The carriage was checked on entering the Cour des Ministres by crowds of drunken men, ready for any daring enterprise, who had broken through the outer gate of the palace, and was finally stopped at the entrance of the Avenue des Sceaux. Lafayette then returned to the Cour des Ministres, and, on paying a visit to the Comte de Montmorin, had the assurance to say that all was well, and that as he was very sleepy, he must at once go to bed. He accordingly left the palace, and went off to sleep at the Hôtel de Noailles.¹

As might have been expected from a crowd of the lowest rabble of Paris, after a night spent in dancing, drinking, and eating horseflesh, an attack was made upon the palace with the dawn of the morning of October 6. About five o'clock some of the mob, who had got into the gardens, found a back door, opening on the Parterre d'Eau, unguarded, and soon forced their way into the Cour des Marbres, while Lafayette continued to sleep peacefully. They tried to make their way straight to the queen's room, and killed two of the body-guards who defended the antechamber and staircase. However, two body-guards, Miomandre and Victor Maubourg, managed to defend her bedchamber until she had time to escape by a private staircase to the king's own room. At the noise of this fighting the paid battalion of the Parisian National Guard, which was on duty under the command of Colonel Cardignan, and of which Lazare Hoche was sergeant-major, quickly arrived at the palace, and cleared it in a very few

¹ *Correspondance entre le Comte de Mirabeau et le Comte de la Marck*, ed. by A. de Bacourt, vol. i. p. 85. Brussels: 1851.

minutes. At about seven o'clock appeared Lafayette, wide awake to the advantages of his position; he first persuaded the king, queen, and royal family to appear on the balcony to the people. They were greeted with shouts of "Le Roi à Paris!" and Lafayette then urged the king to comply with the wish of the people. The king knew he must give way, and acquiesced; and Lafayette then announced to the people that the king unconditionally assented to the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and that he would come to Paris that afternoon. Maillard, with a body of followers, including men carrying the heads of the slaughtered body-guards, started off at once to take the good news to Paris, where he was warmly received by the municipality. At a little past one the royal carriages left Versailles, and late in the evening, escorted by Lafayette on his white horse, the Parisian National Guard, and the mob, reached the capital. The royal family first went to the Hôtel de Ville, where they had to listen to an harangue from Bailly, and then went to the Tuileries, which had been so long unoccupied that there were not even sufficient beds to sleep in.¹ Thus ended the memorable days of October 5 and 6, 1789, to the great glory of General Morpheus, as the royalists called him, and to the real destruction of monarchical power in France.

Who were the contrivers of the events of October 5 and 6? Mirabeau and Orleans were most strongly suspected at the time. But there is direct evidence that Mirabeau spent the evening of October 5, and dined with the Comte de la Marck;² and a quotation from the journal of Mrs. Elliott not only shows that Orleans was not present, but illustrates the attitude of the court towards him. "The Duke of Orleans," she writes, "was certainly not at Versailles on that dreadful morning, for he breakfasted with company at my house when he was accused of being in the queen's apartment disguised. . . . He expressed himself as not approving of the bringing of the king to Paris; 'that it

¹ *Mémoires de la Duchesse de Tourzel*, edited by the Duc des Cars, vol. i. p. 23. Paris: 1883.

² *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et La Marck*, vol. i. p. 82.

must be a scheme of Lafayette's,' but added, 'I dare say that they will accuse me of it, as they lay every tumult to my account. I think myself this is a mad project, and like all Lafayette does.'" ¹ On the other hand it is proved that Lafayette did not do his best to prevent the exodus of the starving women; that, instead of following them quickly with his forces, he allowed many hours to elapse before he began his march after them, and that at the critical time of the early morning, when the rabble were breaking into the gardens, he was enjoying his night's rest. The municipality of Versailles also must bear part of the blame. As soon as he heard the report of the march of the women to Paris, Laurent Lecointre, the wealthy linen-draper, begged the municipality to prepare lodging and food for them, and, had his advice been listened to, the mob would not have remained in the Place d'Armes all night, and Lafayette would never have had his opportunity of saving the royal family.

The events of October 5 and 6 close the second period of the Revolution. They form a complement to those of July 14. Had the Assembly or had the king taken advantage of the capture of the Bastille to establish a new and strong constitution, the events of October would never have taken place. But the Assembly wasted its time, and the king made no effort, so that a further step in the road of revolution was bound to follow. They were days of great importance, for in them the union between the history of the Revolution and the history of Paris was sealed. Paris had engulfed the king and the Assembly; and this was due in the first instance to the journalists and mob orators who had excited the populace into the belief that the presence of the king and the Assembly would ensure food for themselves, and in the second to the extreme vanity of Lafayette, who wanted them there merely to increase his own honour and glory.

The events of October 5 and 6 were followed by a second panic for emigration. Many of the noblesse who had made

¹ *Journal of my Life during the French Revolution*, by Grace Dalrymple Elliott, pp. 37, 38.

themselves obnoxious in any way retired to Turin or Brussels, London or Spa, which became the head-quarters of the émigrés. By most of them emigration was regarded as a pleasant foreign trip, which would soon be over; but when they felt impatience because it lasted so long, they occasionally used menacing words about foreign intervention, which only exasperated Frenchmen and patriots the more against them. More curious than the second emigration was the resignation of Mounier and friends. On October 8 Mounier resigned both the presidency and his seat in the Assembly, and his example was followed by Bergasse, Lally-Tollendal, and twenty-three other deputies of the right. Thus ended the political career of Jean Joseph Mounier. No man had done more for the cause of the Revolution; no man at the meeting of the States-General had received or deserved a warmer greeting; no man had possessed so high a political reputation; and no man could have failed more entirely than he had done. His failure was due to both intellectual and moral deficiencies. He was essentially a theorist, and when his theories were not approved of, he lost his temper and abused the deputies who did not agree with him. It is sad to think that a man whose career had promised to be so distinguished should have closed it at so early a period of the Revolution he had done so much to bring about, from a mere infirmity of temper.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ASSEMBLY AT PARIS.

The Assembly at Paris—The Manège—Parties become more defined—Talleyrand—The right : the Comte de Montlosier, the Abbé Maury, Cazalés—The left : the triumvirate, Adrien Duport, Barnave, Charles de Lameth—The followers of the triumvirate—Mirabeau enters into communication with the court—His plan—Proposes new ministers—Decree of November 7—Mirabeau's manner of work—Assistants—Collaborators—Policy—Detested and distrusted—Increased bitterness of political feeling—Political duels—Theatrical and artistic politics—The "Cercle Sociale"—The Jacobin, 1789, and Cordelier Clubs—Camille Desmoulins founds the *Révolutions de France et de Brabant*—Marat and *Ami du Peuple*—Royalist journals—The *Actes des Apôtres*—Attitude of Continental powers—Attitude of England and America—Why no one interfered—The four men in power—Position of Bailly, Lafayette, and Necker—Mirabeau's first appeal to Lafayette—He is summoned by the court.

THE result of the removal of the Assembly to Paris, which followed the events of October 5 and 6 as a matter of course, was exactly what Lafayette had anticipated. It now debated under the eyes of the Parisians, who were able to influence its deliberations in more ways than one. At Versailles it had sat in the enormous hall of the king's "lesser pleasures," and the inconveniences of so large a meeting-place had been keenly felt in the earlier sessions. On the very day of meeting, the words of the king and of the keeper of the seals could hardly be heard by the deputies of the tiers état, and complaints were made all through the debates on the Declaration of the Rights of Man of the impossibility of hearing many of the chief speeches. The vastness of the hall had another

serious inconvenience, which has already been noticed. It allowed strangers to force their way into the body of the place, join in the general hubbub, and occasionally to vote. In Paris no such place of meeting was obtainable, and these inconveniences disappeared. When the king took up his residence at the Tuileries he had at once ordered the National Assembly to follow him to Paris, and the committee of deputies appointed for the purpose reported in favour of the Manège, or riding-school, as the best place they could find for the home of the Assembly in Paris. The Manège was an oblong building, some 240 feet in length by 60 feet in width, and was situated on the north side of the Tuileries gardens, exactly where the Rue de Rivoli now joins the Rue Castiglione. As will be seen by the plan,¹ it stood in no main street, and could only be reached either by a long walled court stretching along the Tuileries gardens from the royal stables at the end of the Rue du Dauphin, or by a narrow passage leading from the Rue St. Honoré between the convents of the Feuillants and of the Capucins, exactly where the Rue Castiglione now runs. It was one of the four royal riding-schools established by Louis XIV. for the instruction of the young nobility, in which not only riding, but dancing, fencing, and mathematics were taught; but the expense of education there—for each pupil had to have his own governor, tutor, and servant—had caused it to be deserted for the more economical école militaire, and it had been shut up for many years. It consisted only of one long narrow hall without any rooms adjoining, so that the committee-rooms, library, and archives had to be established in the neighbouring convent of the Feuillants. In front of this convent, along the Rue St. Honoré, stretched a broad terrace, the Terrasse des Feuillants, which soon became the regular lounging-place of the deputies and seekers after news, who assembled there day after day to discuss the debates and report the last bon mot. Very different to the bustle on this terrace was the gloomy silence of the gardens of the Tuileries, which were now closed to

¹ See plan of the Tuileries, vol. ii. chap. iii.

the public and strictly guarded. While the Manége was being adapted for its new purpose by the architect Pâris, the Assembly sat in the great hall of the archbishop's palace, where the electors of the tiers état of Paris had sat in the month of May, when a terrible accident there hurried on the building operations. On October 26, one of the temporary galleries gave way, and a deputy of Lorraine was severely injured, and several others hurt. All despatch was now made, and on November 9 the National Assembly sat for the first time in its new abode.

When the alterations were completed, it was found that the new building was much better adapted for debating than the great hall of Versailles, but a difficulty at once arose as to the management of the three large galleries which had been erected. At first the Assembly declared in grand language that the whole nation might be present at the debates, but the inconveniences of such magnanimity were soon manifested. Throughout the day the populace of Paris, and especially the women of all classes, crowded these galleries, taking the keenest interest in the proceedings, and applauding or hissing as seemed best to them. Among them fruit-sellers and newspaper-girls wandered about with discordant cries, and the galleries much resembled the gallery of a theatre. People of higher rank, bourgeois or noblesse, had at first to share the seats with the first-comers; but after a time the admission to one, and at last to all the three galleries, was by ticket only. This regulation was often broken on days of exciting debates, when the mob forced its way in, ticket or no ticket. On these days the resemblance to the gallery of a theatre was completed by the sale of front seats by the poor men, who had seized them, to those more wealthy and with greater interest in politics than themselves. The Assembly sat openly before all Paris, and the Parisians must bear their share of the blame poured on the Assembly for its waste of time. But did the change of locality influence the Assembly in any other way than by crowding the building and overlooking its transactions? Undoubtedly it did, both by indirectly encouraging the popular orators to make more and more radical motions and more and

more revolutionary speeches, and at the same time by forcing many deputies, who at Versailles were inclined to measures of reform, into violent opposition from fear of mob rule.

It has been noticed that parties began to appear during the debates on the veto, and at Paris they became yet more clearly defined. The centre continued to hold the balance, but both the right and left became more fully organized under their different leaders. These leaders had even obtained sufficient authority to be able to communicate with each other in the name of their parties on matters of procedure; and, for instance, to avoid degrading the Assembly by frequent contested elections, it was agreed that deputies of the right and left should be alternately elected presidents of the Assembly at the fortnightly election. The disappearance of the moderate group, inclined to the establishment of a well-balanced constitutional monarchy, had simplified the position of parties considerably, and, in opposition to the triumvirate consisting of Duport, Barnave, and Charles de Lameth, which for the next year and a half led the left, there had been formed a sort of triumvirate on the right, consisting of the Comte de Montlosier, Cazalés, and the Abbé Maury, which, while it did not join in the obstructive tactics of D'Esprémesnil and Mirabeau-Tonneau, was yet resolutely opposed to further reform, and desirous only of consolidating the reforms already consented to by the king. But, besides these two groups, there was one little deformed man in a clerical dress, who belonged by birth and profession to the right, and who yet sat upon the left, though without leading it—a cripple who was to have a long and eventful life, and who was now gaining a great position in the Assembly; a man whom no one trusted, and yet worthy of some study—Charles de Talleyrand-Périgord, Bishop of Autun.

Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, who during the next few months played a part of supreme importance in the Assembly, was born at Paris on February 13, 1754. His family was one of the oldest in France, and had had its share of the rich preferments in the Church and State which were allotted to successful courtiers. He was the eldest son of the

Prince de Talleyrand-Périgord, and would naturally have inherited the title and wealth of his family; but his weak health and deformed body determined his father to leave the family to be represented by a younger brother, and to make his elder son a dignitary of the Church. He was educated at the Collège d'Harcourt and at the Sorbonne, but was so little loved at home, that he once said he never remembered sleeping at home until he had entered the world as the Abbé de Périgord. He took orders when very young, and was present as the Abbé de Périgord at the coronation of Louis XVI.; but in his youth he desired rather to enjoy the gay life of the salons of Paris than the intrigues of the court at Versailles. The "little Abbé," as he was called, soon made himself immensely popular. His wit, and still more his character for gallantry, caused his presence to be welcome to all the literary ladies of Paris, and he began to win the reputation for bons mots and epigrammatic sayings which he retained to the end of his life. Though he did not himself push his fortune at court, his great family influence procured him, in 1780, the lucrative appointment of agent-general of the clergy, which was always a step to a bishopric. In the American war he fitted out a privateer to serve against the English, which was a great financial success; and in 1788 he was consecrated Bishop of Autun. He had hardly time to show his qualities as a bishop, and it may be doubted whether he would have set a particularly good example to his flock; but he did succeed in making himself very popular with the bourgeoisie and smaller noblesse of his province. In 1789 he presided at the electoral assembly of the clergy of the sénéchaussée of Autun, and succeeded in the difficult task of pleasing both the clergy and the tiers état. His speeches were loudly applauded, and printed as pamphlets, and his election as deputy to the States-General was almost unanimous. In the separate assembly of the Estate of the clergy at Versailles he did not play a very prominent part, and was not one of the four bishops who joined the tiers état, with 145 other clergy, on June 22. He was contented to wait for his opportunity. He had, however, formed an intimacy

with Mirabeau, which was strengthened when he became more aware of Mirabeau's statesmanlike ability. He had gained sufficient popularity, after the reunion of the orders, to be elected, on July 17, a member of the committee appointed to draw up the bases of a new French constitution, and had acted on that committee in opposition to Mounier, and on the side of Siéyès. At Versailles he still kept rather in the background, but when the Assembly came to Paris, and he perceived which was the successful side, he made himself conspicuous by a motion that the property of the Church belonged to the nation. This motion opened the way for the sale of the Church property and the civil constitution of the clergy, and throughout the discussion on these questions Talleyrand remained one of the most influential members of the Assembly. He was not so much distinguished for his eloquence as an orator, as for the boldness of his conceptions and the logical arguments with which he supported them. That he had some really statesmanlike ideas is shown by his close intimacy with Mirabeau. With that great man he continued intimate till his death, when he read to the Assembly the speech Mirabeau had not lived to deliver. His career during the reign of Napoleon is more generally known, but at this period it must be remembered that he was the only distinguished Churchman who deliberately planned the overthrow of the Church in France. It cannot be said of him, as it can of Grégoire, that he believed a national Church would teach a higher and purer Christianity; he saw only that by leading the attack on the Church, in which he was himself a dignitary, he would win for himself the greatest consideration and popularity.

Of very varying careers and temperaments were the three orators who practically led the right of the Assembly after the retirement of Mounier and the manifestation of the wholesale and factious opposition which the extreme right had adopted. These three orators were the Comte de Montlosier, the Abbé Maury, and Cazalés. François Dominique de Reynaud, Comte de Montlosier, was the twelfth and youngest child of a poor nobleman of Auvergne, and was

born at Clermont-Ferrand in April, 1755. He was educated at the Jesuit College at Clermont-Ferrand, where his great ability and unaccountable mysticism were both perceived, and then went to Paris for a short time. There he made the acquaintance of D'Alembert and other men of letters, but was particularly interested in the phenomena of mesmerism. He found he did not love the city, and determined to retire once more to Auvergne, and there live and die. He accordingly married in 1781 a wealthy widow fifteen years older than himself, because she happened to own an old house of his ancestors, and lived a hermit life. Having some knowledge of geology, he set to work to study the geological features in his own neighbourhood. The result of his investigations appeared in his "*Théorie des Volcans d'Auvergne*," published in 1789, and won him more than a local reputation, which showed itself in his election as deputy "*suppléant*" for the noblesse of Lower Auvergne to the States-General. In September one of the deputies for his bailliage resigned, and he took his seat in the National Assembly. He naturally seated himself on the right, and entered into a close alliance with his compatriot, Malouet. With Malouet he opposed any further reforms, not because they were not wanted, but because he believed they were coming too quick and too soon, and feared for the maintenance of the Catholic religion; for, strange to say, his love for geology had not affected his religious belief, and he remained a very earnest Catholic. He was eventually to make his name famous by a magnificent apostrophe, but at present he was only beginning to be distinguished as an orator, and in ideas generally followed his friend Malouet.

Jean Siffrein Maury, who was the chief defender of the Church against the attacks of Talleyrand, was one of the ablest orators and readiest debaters in the Assembly. He was as loose a Churchman as Talleyrand himself, and if more distinguished as an orator, possessed none of Talleyrand's wonderful perspicacity in seeing how the wind blew. He was the son of a Protestant cobbler, who had been driven from

French soil after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and was born at Valréas, near Avignon, in 1746. His cleverness was perceived by the priest of the parish, who sent him to the Jesuit College of Avignon, where he took orders; but, finding that Church preferment could only be obtained at Paris, he started for the capital without a penny in his pocket, in 1766. He there gave lessons, and sent in, but without success, essays for the various prizes offered by the Académie Française. At last the Bishop of Lombez heard of his ability, and made him his secretary, and a canon of his cathedral. His growing reputation had secured him an introduction into some salons, and in 1772 he was selected to preach the panegyric on St. Louis before the Parlement of Paris. His success was so great, that a deputation from the Parlement at once went to the king and requested that their preacher might be given a good abbey. The king complied, and Maury became the Abbé de la Frenade. He was then for some years the most popular preacher in Paris, and in 1776 preached at court. After his sermon, the king said the only witty thing recorded of him—that the Abbé Maury had shown in his sermon a vast knowledge of classics, of metaphysics, and of every science and branch of literature except theology. He had made oratory his especial study, and particularly pulpit oratory, by which he hoped, in spite of his birth, to rise to high dignity; and in 1777 published the result of his reflections on the subject in his "*Essai sur l'Éloquence de la Chaire*," which still remains a French classic. The style is hardly pleasing, but the critical power displayed is of a high order. Maury was the first critic who noticed the immense superiority of the pulpit oratory of the reign of Louis XIV. to that of his own century, and he rightly ranks Bossuet above Fléchier and Bourdaloue. He then co-operated with the Abbé de Boismont in his "*Lettres secrètes sur l'État actuel de la Religion et du Clergé en France*," which won him the friendship of his collaborator, to whom he became coadjutor, and eventually successor in the headship of the rich monastery of Lihons, or Lions, in Artois. His literary merits were further

recognized in 1785 by his election to the Académie Française in the place of Lefranc de Pompignan, the adversary of Voltaire. The electoral period of 1789 gave him a further opportunity of distinguishing himself; he went down to his abbey, and though almost unknown in Artois, by his ability and reputation soon won a commanding position among the curés of the united bailliages of Péronne, Roye, and Montdidier. He showed the most liberal tendencies, and influenced the clergy to co-operate with the noblesse and tiers état of his bailliages to draw up their cahier in common. But the length of time taken over the joint cahier prevented the clergy from co-operating for long, for the curés had to be in their parish churches on Sunday to say mass; so the clergy drew up a short cahier under the influence of Maury, and separated after electing him and the Abbé de Dupont their deputies. This cahier¹ of the Abbé Maury's proves how liberal his ideas were, and how thoroughly he had assimilated the reforming ideas of the Parisian salons. In it he demanded, in the name of the clergy of the united bailliages of Péronne, Montdidier, and Roye, that the States-General should be summoned every five years, that there should be no more privileges in matters of taxation, that lettres de cachet should be abolished, that every one should be eligible for public employment, and that no loan should be raised without the previous consent of the States-General. When the States-General met at Versailles, the Abbé Maury was expected to be on the side of the reformers, and the disappointment was proportionately more keen when it was found that the orator strenuously opposed the reunion of the three orders. It is almost impossible not to believe that he took up this position from a hope of obtaining promotion from the court, for in the month of May he could not plead fear of mob-rule as his excuse. The general conviction that he was a renegade from the liberal party from motives of self-interest caused him to be especially detested in Paris, and in the meetings in the Palais-Royal he was held up to execration with Broglie and

¹ See *La Révolution à Péronne*, by G. Ramon, pt. ii. pp. 73-99.

the Polignacs. He felt his danger so keenly that, after the taking of the Bastille, he attempted to leave France; but he was recognized at Péronne, and arrested there on July 26. His ready wit saved him from any harm, but he was ordered to return to Paris to his duties as a deputy, and by his courage throughout the next two years amply disproved any charge of personal cowardice which might have been brought against him. His eloquence cannot be compared for power with that of Mirabeau and Barnave, still less with that of Vergniaud, but it was always ready and pointed, and his lively sallies made him popular even with his opponents. He was several times in danger of his life when walking the streets of Paris, but always managed to conciliate his assailants by some well-turned though often very obscene jest. He was certainly the readiest political speaker of the right, but the universal disbelief in his earnestness or honesty prevented his arguments from having much weight. He cannot be called a professed obstructionist, like Mirabeau-Tonneau, but it must be confessed, nevertheless, that he very often did obstruct the progress of business. His importance during the debates on the civil constitution of the clergy was only second to that of Talleyrand, and it is characteristic that the first attack upon it and its defence should have fallen into the hands of two Churchmen so little worthy by their lives either to attack or defend it.

Jacques Antoine Marie de Cazalés, who, if not so ready a debater as Maury, was a more eloquent orator, because his oratory came from his heart, was born at Grenade-sur-Garonne in 1758. His family had been of doubtful nobility until the seventeenth century, when its head held municipal office at Toulouse, and his father was only a counsellor at the provincial parlement of Toulouse. The young Cazalés had obtained a commission in the cavalry in 1773, and had early taken an interest in politics, if the report that he was for some months in prison at Lourdes for taking a conspicuous share in some demonstration against the Parlement Maupeou can be believed. He had been distinguished in his regiment as an extremely

indolent young officer, with a taste for drink and play, and also for studying history and abstract political philosophy, and was only a captain in the Dragoons of Deux Ponts in 1789. In that year he was infected with the universal political enthusiasm of the time, and determined to offer himself as a candidate for the States-General. He was rejected by the noblesse of Toulouse and Cahors, but was at last elected by the noblesse of the little new bailliage of Rivière-Verdun. The cahier in which he must have had a share is not extant, but it would be extremely interesting to see, for it must have embodied the amount of reform he deemed necessary. After the meeting of the States-General, he strenuously opposed the reunion of the orders, and, believing the monarchy lost on July 14, he tried to emigrate, like the Abbé Maury, but was stopped at Caussade, as Maury was stopped at Péronne. On his return he took his seat on the right of the Assembly, and though he did not speak often was soon recognized as an orator. His intense laziness and his fondness for play prevented him from ever becoming a great political leader; but, whenever he could be prevailed upon to speak, his eloquence made him listened to, and often warmly applauded by the very opponents who outvoted him. It is greatly to be regretted that he was too indolent either to leave any memoirs on the occurrences in which he played so prominent a part, or even to correct his own speeches, and it is only possible to come to any conclusion as to his political opinions from the reports of his speeches in the *Moniteur* and other journals. His view seems to have been that the best government for France would be a constitutional monarchy, with a freely elected chamber and responsible ministers; but he strongly objected to having any new form of government forced upon the king, and again and again declared that to have an unwilling king at the head of the new constitution would ensure the failure of that constitution. His peculiar detestation was mob-rule. "Let us attack," he said, "the tyranny of the people as well as the tyranny of kings." It is extraordinary, considering his great powers, that his ambition

did not overcome his laziness, and that he did not play a greater part; but any such ambition was effectually extinguished by the coldness with which the nobility on the right of the Assembly looked upon this poor scion of an insignificant family of Languedoc. At court he was regarded without favour, because he openly declared that he believed the old monarchy had lived its life, and must make way for a new one—a doctrine not at all acceptable to the haughty Marie Antoinette. “I do not think,” he once said, “that the king holds his crown from God and by his good sword, but by the free will of the French people.” With such champions as Maury and Cazalés, a dissolute abbé and a young officer unsupported by the court, it cannot be wondered at that the right made so poor a fight against the revolutionary party in the Assembly.

The triumvirate which directed the policy of the left for more than a year and a half, until the flight to Varennes, when it was horrified at the state of France, and tried to induce the deputies who had followed its advice to retrace some of their steps and strengthen the monarchy, consisted of Adrien Duport, Barnave, and Charles de Lameth; and of this triumvirate it was said that Duport was the brain, Barnave the tongue, and Lameth the hand.

Adrien Duport de Prélaville was, without exception, the ablest party leader, who appeared during the session of the Constituent Assembly, if not during the whole Revolution. While other men were satisfied to head small cliques, or, like Robespierre, to boast of their independence, and insist upon following no leader, and voting upon every question according to their consciences, Duport perceived that without party government representative assemblies must remain mere conglomerations of individuals, and not useful machines with definite rights and duties. To this knowledge of the advantages of party government he added extraordinary qualifications for a party leader—a real knowledge of men, a power of making others see things from his point of view, great patience and social qualities, which enabled him to make

and keep many friends. Born at Paris, in 1759, of a legal family, he was only thirty years of age at the commencement of the Revolution, and had inherited a good property, and the office of counsellor of the Parlement of Paris. He had thrown himself into the struggle of the Parlement against Brienne with great ardour, and had, in the summer of 1788, collected a party around him which included Lafayette, the Duc de la Rochefoucauld, the Vicomte de Ségur, Talleyrand, Fréteau de Saint-Just, and Hugues de Sémonville. His skill in forming a party and his ability in managing it greatly struck the Duke of Orleans, who resolved to attach him to himself. Duport was delighted with the opportunity thus afforded of being able to use the name, influence, and wealth of a prince of the blood in forming his party, and threw himself into the idea of making Orleans a constitutional king, with himself as prime minister.¹ With this idea he had secured his election to the States-General for the noblesse of Paris, and had gradually formed a compact party among the young noblesse who first joined the tiers état, and had also denounced the banquet in the Orangerie, and laboured for the removal of the National Assembly. But he soon discovered that the Duke of Orleans was not to be depended upon as a political patron, and determined to use the party which he had formed entirely for his own advancement. His policy was to outbid all other leaders of the left in lavish promises to the people, and to support all the most unpractical schemes which charmed the majority of the Assembly, and thus establish for himself such an influence that the king would at last be obliged to call him to office, when he would be a great constitutional minister, and undo any mischief which might have been done in these early days. Duport was born at a wrong time, and acted on a wrong principle. In the early days of the Revolution enthusiasm was everything, and a calm, calculating statesman had no chance. To be a real leader of the people in a time of revolution, a man must feel as the people do; it is only in times of peace and

¹ See chap. iii. p. 83.

tranquillity that credit will be given to a man of reason rather than a man of enthusiasm. Duport was soon to feel this. When at last he understood the extent of the harm he had done, and tried to turn back and strengthen the executive, he found on how slight a basis his popularity had been built up, and that, after the flight to Varennes, Robespierre and Pétion had become the idols of Paris in place of Barnave and himself. His later life was marked by no political success; Danton saved him from massacre by releasing him after he had been arrested in August, 1792, and he emigrated. He returned after Thermidor, and again attempted to form a party, but the coup d'état of Fructidor sent him once more into exile, and he died at Appenzell, in Switzerland, in 1798.

Antoine Pierre Joseph Barnave, the orator of the triumvirate, was two years younger even than Duport, and was born at Grenoble in 1761. His father was a wealthy avocat of Grenoble, and he himself joined the bar there in 1782. His excitable temperament and loving disposition showed itself in early youth, in the deep grief which he evinced at the death of his brother, and in his duel at the age of seventeen because he believed his mother had been insulted. He had established a reputation for eloquence at the bar, and in 1788 threw himself ardently into the movement in Dauphiné, and as a disciple of Mounier was elected to the States-General. At Versailles he soon gave up his admiration for his former leader, whose vanity and insufficiency were only too palpable, and when Duport offered him his friendship he at once accepted it. Of an ardent and poetical character, he soon cemented his political alliance with Duport, and the latter had no difficulty in instilling his own ideas into Barnave's head and getting him to develop them in the tribune. With all the southern excitability of his nature, he imbibed a violent admiration for the queen, after bringing the royal family back from Varennes, and his communications with her and his intrigues for her led to his death upon the guillotine on November 30, 1793. But in the latter months of 1789 he had no such admiration of Marie

Antoinette, and was ready to give utterance to all Duport's insinuations against the court, by which Duport hoped to win himself popularity both in the Assembly and among the people, and win his way to office.

The Comte Charles Malo François de Lameth, the hand of the triumvirate, was also a most frequent speaker in the Assembly, though not such an orator as Barnave. He was the third son of the Marquis de Lameth, who had been killed in Hanover in 1762 when chief of the staff, and was a nephew of Marshal de Broglie. The dauphine, Marie Antoinette, had adopted the sons of the general, and the Broglie influence rapidly advanced them all in the army. Comte Charles de Lameth had served as quartermaster-general to Rochambeau's army in the War of the American Independence, and had been wounded at Yorktown; and on his return he had been made colonel of the Cuirassiers du Roi, and had married a rich heiress. In America he had imbibed the current notions about politics, and was full of admiration for Washington and Lafayette, and in 1789 had been elected to the States-General by the noblesse of Artois. At Versailles he soon fell under Duport's influence, and, in spite of abuse for his ingratitude, violently attacked the court. Though gifted with eloquence, and a man of ability, he was really a tool in the hands of Duport, who used his popularity with the liberal noblesse to strengthen his party in that quarter.

The most distinguished followers of the triumvirate were all members of the young nobility, and nearly all belonged to the great families of the vieille noblesse and held commissions in the army, while the voting power of the party consisted of lesser known deputies of the tiers état, who were glad to follow these leaders instead of the less conciliatory speakers of the extreme left, to whose ideas the majority had not yet been educated. Foremost among these young noblemen were the Chevalier Alexandre de Lameth, brother of Comte Charles, and the Duc d'Aiguillon, son of the notorious Foreign Minister of Madame du Barry at the end of the reign of Louis XV.; and conspicuous among the rest were the Baron de Menou, the

Duc de Luynes, and the Marquis de Latour-Maubourg among older men, the enormously wealthy Marquis de Laborde de Méréville, the young Prince de Broglie, and the Vicomte de Noailles.

Above all these men in oratorical power and statesmanlike ability stood Mirabeau. As time went on, his conspicuous superiority to every other member of the National Assembly became more generally manifest. The court might hate him, the people might distrust him, but all parties had to acknowledge his marvellous powers; and it is now necessary to examine closely Mirabeau's attitude in the latter months of 1789, for in studying his policy, his plans, and his rebuffs, the incompetence of the Assembly and the short-sightedness of the court will most clearly appear. As early as the end of May, 1789, Mirabeau had been introduced to Malouet by Duroveray, and after saying that he wished for a free constitution, and not the destruction of the monarchy, had begged Malouet to contrive an interview for him with Necker. Necker consented, but after a few words the orator and the minister parted, mutually disgusted with each other,¹ and Mirabeau owed his first opportunity of being useful to the court to Louis Auguste, Comte de la Marck, a young prince of the ancient Flemish house of Aremberg, colonel of a proprietary regiment in the service of France, and a particular friend of Marie Antoinette, as a native of one of her dear brother Joseph's dominions. Her friendship with La Marck had never been associated with the scandals surrounding her intimacy with Esterhazy and other young foreigners, but his influence with her was well known. In 1788 he had at his own request been introduced to Mirabeau by Senac de Meilhan at the house of the Prince de Poix.² He was struck with the statesmanlike power and practical tendencies of the great orator, and feeling how serviceable he could be to the queen, determined to keep up the acquaintance. The acquaintance quickly ripened into friendship and intimacy, for no man had such power of win-

¹ Malouet's *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 282.

² *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et La Marck*, vol. i. p. 63.

ning devoted friends as the immoral Mirabeau, who was despised by the great men and women of the Paris salons. When La Marck became more intimate with Mirabeau, he urged the queen to make an effort to win the orator's assistance, and was at last authorized by Monsieur, the Comte de Provence, to request Mirabeau to draw up a memoir as to what course the king had better pursue in the present emergency. This was early in October, just after the transference of the king and the Assembly to Paris. Mirabeau was overjoyed at the opportunity afforded him, and in two days drew up a wonderful state paper, which must ever remain a monument of his perspicacity and sound judgment.

He commenced with the assertion that a new constitution was necessary for France, and that all which had been hitherto done by the Assembly must be ratified and regarded as an integral part of the new French constitution. No backward step must be taken, but the initiative, for the future, in framing the new constitution must come from the king and not from the irresponsible talkers in the Assembly. He then proceeds to show that the only way in which the king can manage the Assembly and thus direct the formation of the new constitution, is to select a responsible ministry from the leading members of the Assembly, who, being both servants of the king and representatives of the people, would, after the fashion of an English ministry, try to strike out a practical form of government, which would at once satisfy the people and preserve the efficiency of the executive. When once such a ministry was formed all would go smoothly. There would then be a legitimate bond of connection between the king and the Assembly, and a good and effectual system of government would be devised. But there was yet another feature in the case to be considered. The king was really a prisoner of the Parisian mob, which was also in a position to overawe the Assembly, and the executive had lost all power since the month of July. This must be remedied. The king ought to leave Paris and go to some provincial capital, best of all to

¹ *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et La Marck*, vol. i. pp. 254-264.

Rouen, summon the Assembly to him there, and, if it would not come, convoke a new Assembly with which to draw up the new constitution. Provided that the king would publicly and authoritatively declare his adherence to the principles at present sanctioned by the National Assembly, and that he would appoint men who had the nation's confidence as his ministers, Mirabeau declared that he felt certain that if in that case the mob of Paris attempted to resist, the people of France would support their king. But matters had not come to such a pass yet. It was possible that the king and the present Assembly might yet be able to act together. To do so the first thing necessary was to form a responsible ministry from among the leaders of the Assembly.

Mirabeau had all along foreseen this contingency, and with a just confidence in his own powers felt that he himself would make the best possible minister at this crisis. He had tried to ally himself both with Necker and Lafayette; but these two vain men, wrapped up in their virtue and their present popularity, had refused to negotiate with him. Nevertheless, he was far too great a man to show signs of petty spite at a time of national crisis, and the first ministry, which he recommended to the king directly after his state paper of October 15, contained the names of all the most prominent politicians of the time.¹ He proposed that Necker should be Prime Minister, "because he will then be as powerless as he is incapable, and yet preserve his popularity for the king;" and that Lafayette should be Marshal of France, with a seat in the council, and generalissimo to recognize the army. The Archbishop of Bordeaux, Champion de Cicé, was to be Chancellor; the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt Minister for War, "because he has honour, firmness, and personal affection for the king, which will give him security;" the Duc de la Rochefoucauld Minister for the Interior and the city of Paris, with Thouret under him; the Comte de la Marck Minister for the Navy, "because he cannot have the War Office;" the Comte Philippe de Ségur Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Talleyrand

¹ *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et La Marck*, vol. i. pp. 280, 281.

Minister of Finance, "a place which his motion on the estates of the clergy has fairly won for him, and which no one could fill better." The Comte de Mirabeau was, he further recommends, to have a seat in the council without a department, "because the government must show clearly that its first assistants shall be good principles, character, and talent," and he would undertake the general management of the Assembly. Montmorin was to be made a duke and have his debts paid, Target was to be Mayor of Paris, Mounier keeper of the king's library, and Le Chapelier Minister of Public Works. When the impossibility of including both Necker and Lafayette was proved to him, Mirabeau proposed a second scheme, by which the Duc de la Rochefoucauld was to be Minister of Justice, Talleyrand Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lambert Minister of Finance, La Marck Secretary for War, and Siéyès Minister of Public Instruction, which proved equally impracticable. But the whole scheme, the idea of his forming a responsible ministry and taking the initiative in drawing up the new constitution, was far too vast for the mind of the poor king, which, as Monsieur said upon this occasion, could no more grasp such a collection of ideas than oiled billiard balls could be held together.¹ As to the queen, she detested Mirabeau as the favourite of the people, and would not hear of any compromise between the absolute monarchy and an Assembly she despised. But even yet Mirabeau might have forced the hand of the court. He had at least one strong supporter there. La Marck might have persuaded the queen, Monsieur would do his best with the king, and the influential Austrian ambassador, the Comte de Mercy-Argenteau, thoroughly understood the greatness of his schemes, and was ready to support them, when the ill-advised jealousy of the other deputies in the Assembly spoilt the whole plan.

In the first days of November a rumour had spread abroad through Paris that Mirabeau was to be appointed minister, with other deputies for his colleagues. There was a general murmur. The court was trying to buy over the representa-

¹ *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et La Marck*, vol. i. p. 90.

tives of the people, was the cry; the new ministry would obtain a powerful sway over the Assembly, and there would be an end of the new constitution. The majority of the deputies could not understand that governments and constitutions exist not for the purpose of encouraging logical legislation, but for the maintenance of good order, in order that every man, of whatever grade or class, might be able to do his work in security as long as he did not injure his neighbour. This feeling of suspicion grew so strong that on November 7 Lanjuinais, deputy for Rennes, proposed that it should be declared illegal for any member of the Assembly to take office under the crown while he held his seat in the Assembly, or for six months after his resignation. It was useless for Mirabeau to protest. The theorists carried the motion, and this great opportunity for procuring reform without resorting to revolution failed. How heavy this blow was to the great man against whom it was directed need hardly be stated. His hope of securing without bloodshed a new and strong government for France vanished. But the buoyancy of his mind, and his knowledge that oftentimes mistakes bring about good results in the end, kept him ready to renew his schemes. The decree of November 7 was not only of paramount importance in itself, but gives another admirable instance of the incompetence of the Assembly. Indeed, the mistake they made was so obvious that it is hardly necessary to dwell upon it, and it strikes the key-note of the consistent policy of the Assembly to divorce the executive from the legislative power, and thus to make all harmony between them impossible. The secret of good government is to maintain the two powers in harmony, and centuries of compromise have fairly solved the question in England, where the executive being chosen from the legislative power is answerable to it, and if in opposition to it has to resign office. At the same time, in all matters of administration the executive can act on its own responsibility, and the legislative does not interfere in every small administrative detail. Well might Mirabeau have despaired. The communication with the court

was temporarily broken off. La Marck went away to his regiment, and Mirabeau was left with only the consciousness that he had made his warning voice heard, and had made one bold attempt to stave off the anarchy which was inevitably approaching. Before La Marck left Paris, he made every arrangement for renewing the communication between the court and Mirabeau when necessary. The great orator was terribly extravagant and terribly poor. He had, indeed, succeeded to his father's estates on the death of the Marquis de Mirabeau on July 13, but they were heavily mortgaged, and he would not leave his duties in the Assembly for a single day to regulate his own affairs. The profits of his journal went into the voracious pockets of Madame Lejay, and he often had not money enough to get a dinner. La Marck was very rich, and could not bear to see his friend in pecuniary embarrassments, and asked him to accept as a loan a sum of six louis a week, which Mirabeau accepted with thanks and promises to be useful to the lender whenever it should be in his power.

When La Marck left him, Mirabeau continued to work as he had done during the summer of 1789, but with better organized strength. He attached to himself a group of men who bear the proud title of the collaborators of Mirabeau, and in examining his labours it is necessary to notice this group of friends. First of all, before seeing how much help he received, a remark which Goethe made to Eckermann, after reading Étienne Dumont's "*Souvenirs de Mirabeau*," deserves to be quoted: "The French look upon Mirabeau as their Hercules, and they are perfectly right. But they forget that even the Colossus consists of individual parts, and that even the Hercules of antiquity is a collective being—a great supporter of his own deeds and those of others."¹ The amount of assistance which he received was very great; but everything which was written for him, whether it was a speech or an article in a journal, he managed to illuminate with the light of his own

¹ *Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann*, vol. ii. p. 419. London: 1850.

genius. This use of the collaboration of others had been a common practice with him long before the outbreak of the Revolution. He had, when working as a literary hack at Amsterdam, before he was imprisoned in Vincennes, spent his days in translating, and among other translations completed one of Watson's "History of the Reign of Philip III.," with the help of Decrest. This practice of translating may have led him on insensibly to his own peculiar method of work. His tract "*Sur l'Ordre de Cincinnatus*," which he wrote in England after his release from prison, and which Romilly translated into English for him, was merely a version of an American pamphlet published at Charlestown in the year before. Certain officers in the American army had conceived the idea of an order with a regular chapter, knights, badges, and other paraphernalia. Some anonymous individual wrote a pamphlet showing that such an institution would be contrary to the spirit of the American Republic, and would undermine republican ideas. Mirabeau saw this pamphlet. He did not literally translate it, but he gave its arguments in his own declamatory style, with additional thoughts suggested by himself. He then sent the pamphlet to Target, who illustrated it with legal and historical notes, and he then published it as an essay by the Comte de Mirabeau. Similarly his great work on the Prussian monarchy was based entirely on documents thrown into shape for him by the Prussian Major, Mauvillon, and the ideas as well as the facts which underlie his financial pamphlets against the stock-jobbers and the Banque de St. Charles were supplied to him by Panchaud and Clavière. When he came up to Paris as a deputy in April, 1789, the two speculators received him cordially, and Clavière introduced him to two other Genevese exiles, Étienne Dumont, who brought a letter of introduction from Romilly, and Duroveray, who were destined to be his chief collaborators.

Both these men were great admirers of Mirabeau's talents, and were proud to be able to render him any assistance in his labours. Dumont, for instance, happened to be in the gallery of the Assembly when the concentration of the troops round

Paris formed the chief topic of discussion, and he it was who drew up the famous address to the king which Mirabeau proposed with so much eloquence and so much success.¹ Duroveray's assistance was rather in journalism. Mirabeau had only time or patience enough to write the first two or three numbers of the *Lettres à mes Commettants*, which afterwards became the *Courrier de Provence*, and soon left the editorship entirely to Duroveray, who for his labours received a small salary from Lejay. From this slight beginning Mirabeau had, by the time the Assembly was established in Paris, collected round him a veritable workshop of authors and compilers; but before giving any notice of their various capacities, the advantages of the enthusiastic friendship of Nicholas Frochot must be mentioned. This young avocat was born in 1761, and had been elected to the States-General by the bailliage of La Montagne in Burgundy. He first entered into communication with Mirabeau after October 5 and 6, and soon became one of his nearest friends. He did for the orator in the Assembly much what La Marek did for him at court, and spent his time in trying to persuade individual deputies to support Mirabeau on this or that question, in explaining away any offence that might have been given, and in acting generally as his agent there.

Who wrote Mirabeau's speeches?² This important work was confided chiefly to five individuals. Étienne Dumont, the friend of Romilly and the future secretary and interpreter of Bentham, wrote the chief political speeches. He used to go to Mirabeau when some political motion was going to be moved, learn his view of things, and then write the speech, which Mirabeau would deliver from the tribune. Clavière, with the occasional help of Duroveray, wrote the financial speeches; and the Abbé Lamourette, whose name chiefly survives as the proposer of the "baiser Lamourette" in the Legislative Assembly, composed those on the civil constitution of the clergy. Pellenc,

¹ *Souvenirs sur Mirabeau*, by Étienne Dumont, p. 76. London: 1832.

² For an examination of this question, see Aulard, *Les orateurs de la Constituante*, pp. 130-170.

who was Mirabeau's private secretary and lived in the same house with him, made himself useful in compiling; and Reybaz, another Genevese exile, actually wrote the famous speeches on the assignats, on the right of making war and peace, and even the speech on the devolution of the property of intestates, which Talleyrand read as the dead orator's posthumous work to the Assembly. In his letters to Reybaz, Mirabeau makes more than one confession that he has such confidence in him that he reads off his compositions straight to the Assembly without a previous perusal. Notice especially, "I kiss the hand of your fair secretary, Mademoiselle Reybaz, but I must request her to write a little larger, as I could not read her manuscript very distinctly the other evening." He took no shame to himself for thus appropriating the labours of others. It was their pride to work for him; they took no pay, and each of them was rewarded by feeling that he was making his voice heard on some great French constitutional question through the mouth of the great orator. Certainly no other man ever lived who found so many men willing to efface themselves merely to contribute to his glory.

A typical instance of Mirabeau's treatment of political subjects at this period is to be found in his two speeches on Necker's financial proposals of August and November. In August, 1789, Necker proposed that a tax of one-fourth should be levied on all descriptions of property. There was a general murmur, but Mirabeau rose and said that he should support the proposal, not because it was a good one, but because something must be done, and nobody had any other plan to propose. But when, in November, Necker came down to the Assembly and proposed that the collection of all the taxes for five years should be granted to a bank in which he himself was interested—the Caisse d'Escompte—in consideration of its meeting the deficit, Mirabeau exclaimed against the proposal for political reasons. He asked "whether the Assembly wished to hand over the government of the country to a private bank for five years?" and this *reductio ad absurdum* secured the rejection of Necker's proposals. The same states-

manlike spirit with which he had discussed the veto he exhibited in the debate on the king's right to make peace and war in May, 1790. He argued that an executive which was intended to be of any use at all must have some power; that the Assembly could not always be sitting, and even if it was, that a large body of men could not adequately treat minute and delicate questions of foreign affairs, the state of which differed from day to day and almost from hour to hour. By a skilful parliamentary manœuvre he was successful in May, 1790, though he had failed on the question of the veto in the previous September.

Personally Mirabeau was detested by most of the leading deputies in the Assembly, and distrusted by the people of Paris. His practice of giving nicknames was particularly disagreeable to sensitive individuals. Lafayette he termed "M. Grandison-Cromwell"—a happy epithet which exactly hit off the general's hopes and his punctilious politeness; while Siéyès he called "Mahomet," D'Esprémesnil "Crispin Catilina," and Camus "Drapeau Rouge," or "Red Flag," from the bright colour of his nose. Suspicion of his communications with the court had further made him unpopular with the radical leaders of the type of Robespierre, who were advocates for the strictest severity and purity, not only in private, but also in political life. His personal unpopularity with men who, though not such purists as Robespierre, were yet observers of the decencies of life, such as Lafayette, Necker, and Bailly, can only be explained by the licence he gave himself in little matters, according to his maxim, "*La petite morale est ennemie de la grande morale.*"¹ He tried to coalesce in turn with Necker, Lafayette, the court, and the deputies of the left; for as long as he could obtain some prospect of quiet and order for the country, he cared not what influence he made use of. Well did he know that it was his former immoral life which really prevented the success of his great ideas in politics, and sadly did he say to Dumont, "The sins

¹ Romilly's *Memoirs*, p. 80.

which I committed in my youth are giving me their full punishment now."

Mirabeau's fame seemed to throw all others into the shade, but other reputations were made in Paris at this period, and a difference must be noted between those which were made in salons and in the popular clubs. The influence of the salons had increased after the transference of the court and the Assembly to Paris, for they were then in closer communication with the leading politicians, and that closer connection with the Revolution led to increased bitterness, social as well as political. As the revolutionary party became more successful, its opinions became more marked, and at the same time the courtiers became more violent. This increased bitterness in politics appeared not only in polite society, but in popular clubs and in the journals. The chief salons which were in vogue increased in power and in bitterness, and the excitement of the stirring scenes and startling changes of the time naturally increased the vivacity of life. Pleasure was pursued more ardently than ever when its monopoly by the wealthier classes seemed to be approaching its end. Gambling-houses sprang up all over Paris, and members of both sides of the Assembly—Mirabeau and Cazalés alike—might be seen losing every penny they possessed at the same table. All the other vices seemed to grow in magnitude. The theatres were more thronged than ever, and the more dissolute the plays the larger were the audiences.

One result of this increased sense of the shortness of life, and the need to obtain all the pleasure possible, was shown by the great increase of duelling in the upper class. Duelling had always been fashionable in France, but it now reached a greater height than ever. Most of these duels arose from gambling or other disreputable causes, but some had a political meaning and a real political influence. Notable among these was the famous duel of the Duc de Castries with Charles de Lameth, in which the latter was badly wounded. Cazalés similarly fought with Barnave, after which they became warm and attached friends; and the rivalry between the towns of

Riom and Clermont-Ferrand, as to which should be capital of the new department of the Puy de Dôme, ended in a duel between the Comte de Montlosier, deputy for Riom, and Huguet, deputy for Clermont-Ferrand, who had called Malouet, the friend of Montlosier, an ordinary intriguer.

The keenness with which men of letters followed the early days of the Revolution has been noticed, and the new bitterness which had been inspired into politics appeared in their rivalries. Particularly was this noticeable in theatrical quarrels. To the directors of the Comédie Française, a young littérateur, Marie Joseph Chénier, had offered a new play, bearing the title of "Charles IX." The play was full of innuendoes against royalty, and was calculated to throw great discredit on the king, and more particularly on the queen, by a vivid representation of the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and the interest taken in it by Catherine de' Medici and her son. Whether the play should be accepted or refused was violently debated among the sociétaires of the Comédie, and a schism appeared between the revolutionary and reactionary actors. At the head of the revolutionary party was Talma, the greatest tragedian of his day, who was supported by Dugazon and Mademoiselles Sainval and Desgarcins. The opposition were Naudet and Dazincourt, who had always played the kings, with most of the actresses, including Mademoiselle Contat and Mademoiselle Raucourt. The piece was accepted and first played on November 4, 1789, and every attack on royalty was enthusiastically taken up by the crowd which filled the pit, which often came to blows with the more aristocratic occupants of the boxes. Occasionally a turn of wit won the day, and Mademoiselle Contat received universal applause when she skilfully turned a line directed against Catherine de' Medici in favour of the queen.¹

But if theatrical feeling was divided, the painters of Paris nearly all showed their revolutionary sympathies in their pictures. In the Salon of 1789,² Moreau, the historical painter,

¹ *Le théâtre de la Révolution 1789-1799*, by Henri Welschinger, pp. 47-52. Paris : 1881.

² De Goncourt, *La société française pendant la Révolution*, pp. 43, 44.

exhibited two pictures of the States-General; while Louis Charles David, who was to revolutionize the art of painting in France, exhibited "*Les Amours de Paris et Hélène*," painted for the Comte d'Artois, and a picture of "*Brutus et ses fils*," of a different character, and well calculated to inflame republican feelings. Side by side were landscapes by Joseph and Carle Vernet, flower-paintings by the famous Van Spaendonck, with some feeble portraits by the fashionable lady-painter of the day, Madame Vigée-Lebrun. In ladies' dress also could be shown sympathies with the court or the Revolution; they carried on their fans, instead of scenes by Watteau, either pictures of the storming of the Bastille or portraits of the queen. The tricolour cockade was ingeniously worked into every portion of ladies' dress; and hair-dressers, not to be outdone, introduced the coiffure à la liberté.

If there was violence in theatrical, literary, political, and fashionable salons, there was still more in the various clubs and cercles. The cercle differed from the political club in that it was supposed to be purely social; and Claude Fauchet, the eloquent abbé, whose sermon on the martyrs of the Bastille had been listened to by the king on his first visit to Paris after that memorable day, had established a cercle, which he called the "*Cercle Sociale*." This was intended to be merely a place of meeting for men of all classes, and was to improve the manners of the lower classes by allowing them to mix with their superiors in education; but it proved a failure, for wealthy bourgeois of the better class attended it for the purpose of conversation, and the lower classes chiefly for the cheap food provided. The conversation in such cercles must have been tame compared with the excitement which existed in political clubs.

The transference of the Assembly to Paris had increased the importance of the Breton Club, which now began to hold its meetings in the hall of the Jacobin Convent. The chief orators who attended, and had the ear of the club, were, in addition to the founders, the Lameths, Barnave, and Laclos, the friend of Orleans. The great change which altered this

committee of a few deputies into an important political organization began by their admission to their sittings of any one who took an interest in politics. The hall of the Jacobins became then the meeting-place of all those bourgeois of Paris and of those journalists who sympathized with the radical party in the Assembly, and Barnave there explained to them what steps he was going to take in the Assembly, and how he could best be assisted by deputations and petitions. The influence of the Jacobin Club became so great upon popular opinion in Paris, that in the summer of 1790 the king contributed funds for the establishment of a rival club, to be called the "Club of 1789," of which the first presidents were Bailly and the Duc de la Rochefoucauld. It was intended to support the idea of constitutional monarchy, but it had so little of the spirit of life in it that Mirabeau, who was president in July, 1790, soon left it for the Jacobins, and it at once expired. As interesting as the foundation of the Jacobins was that of the Club of the Cordeliers, which was the chief meeting-place of the popular party in the Faubourg St. Marceau, and it was there that Danton at this time began to win his great reputation, and to be regarded, like his friend Camille Desmoulins, as an agent of Orleans; and there could be little doubt that he was in close communication with Laclos, Orleans' trusted friend. Nevertheless, Danton made no attempt at open insurrection in his favour, and when he came to the front, in July, 1791, it was not as an Orleanist but as an extreme radical, and the future supporter of a strong government under a new régime can be perceived. The bitterness which infected the salons appeared also in the political clubs, and many an inflammatory speech was made in them, demanding the lives of traitors and threatening popular outbreaks.

This increased bitterness was still more manifested in the popular journals. It was on November 28 that Camille Desmoulins published the first number of the *Révolutions de France et de Brabant*, which was distinctly an imitation of Loustallot's weekly *Révolutions de Paris*. Its interest does not consist in the news it contains, but in the lively sallies

of Camille Desmoulins, his keen insight into humbug, and his tendency to laugh at everything, good or bad, whether steps backward or forward on the path of liberty.

Far more serious was the journal of Marat, the *Ami du Peuple*, which had been established in September, 1789.¹ It was before anything else a journal of suspicion; it continually warned the people of Paris to beware of treachery, and declared that there were traitors in the Assembly, traitors in the court, traitors in the municipality of Paris, and traitors in the popular clubs. Marat suspected every one, but the particular objects of his enmity were Bailly and Lafayette. It was enough that they were in power for Marat to suspect them, and his suspicions appear in every number of his journal. But not satisfied with inculcating a general suspicion of every one in power, his journal became the receptacle of suspicions against individuals, and was made to play somewhat the same part as the famous "Lion's Mouth" at Venice. Any one who suspected any one else of doing any evil, either in public or in private life, was encouraged to send his suspicions to Marat, who at once published them. He declared that if the suspicion was unfounded, and it could be proved untenable, he would apologize, and the suspected person would not suffer, but would be considered all the more a good citizen. On the other hand, if the accused person made no attempt to prove his innocence to Marat, the journalist never ceased to attack him, and cried out for punishment. Nothing was too great and nothing too trifling for his suspicious pen—from a plot to blow up the Assembly, to the robbery of a small sum of money from a till. Everything was denounced to the people, who were told they were to be upon their guard, and that they were to trust nobody. This tendency to suspicion had become a sort of mania in Marat's mind, but side by side with it he had many great qualities for a popular journalist. Every one knew he was never afraid to attack the powerful, and even the people itself. "O foolish Parisians!" he exclaims; "ye dreaming Parisians! ye Parisians, who pride yourselves on your know-

¹ See chap. vi. pp. 217-219.

ledge, yet are ignorant as asses!" is his perpetual cry to them; and yet the populace of Paris never took his abuse in bad part, and Camille Desmoulins contented himself with laughing at "poor M. Marat." His attacks on Lafayette brought him into more serious trouble. Like all vain men, Lafayette was intensely and peculiarly sensitive to ridicule. The attacks of Marat and the sallies of Camille made him take many unconstitutional steps. On one occasion he called out a whole battalion of the National Guard to arrest Marat and smash his press; but the libeller escaped quite easily. Yet the perpetual persecution of Lafayette caused Marat to spend his life in hiding; he had to live in the sewers, and publish his paper where and how he could, and it is pathetic to see the dirty scraps which he was so often obliged to use for conveying his suspicions. The mind of the man became embittered by persecution; his attacks became more cruel than ever. Lafayette had overshot his purpose, and the persecution of Marat only made the journalist appear a martyr and a hero to the populace of Paris.

The influence of the journals was now too obvious to be neglected by the court, and the three most important royalist journals, all of which were largely subsidized by the court, were the *Ami du Roi*, edited by Royou, the *Petit Gauthier* edited by Brune, the future republican general and marshal of Napoleon, and, chief of all, the *Actes des Apôtres*. These journals had in common a large vocabulary of abuse and a great deal of wit. The abuse which they poured on the leaders of the Assembly was of the very grossest type, and most of it is absolutely unreadable. The wit was of the most obscene character, and the *Père Duchesne*, which has been held up to execration as the filthiest journal ever published, is moral by the side of some of the numbers of the *Actes des Apôtres*. Of the *Petit Gauthier* little need be said, though it is rather more decent than the others. The *Ami du Roi* was suggested by Marat's *Ami du Peuple*. Not satisfied with issuing forged numbers of the *Ami du Peuple*, the court was delighted with the idea of an *Ami du Roi*; but incomparably

the most witty and decidedly the most obscene of the three is the *Actes des Apôtres*, of which the first number was published on November 2, 1789. Some notice of its editors and characteristics will give a fair idea of royalist journalism.

The chief writers were five in number.¹ Jean Peltier, the son of a shopkeeper of Nantes, who acted as editor; Antoine de Rivarol, the son of an innkeeper at Bagnols, who pretended to be a count and became a friend of D'Alembert's before 1781; the Chevalier de Champcenetz, a lieutenant in the Régiment de Flandre; the Vicomte de Mirabeau, brother of the great Mirabeau; and Souleau, an old school-friend of Camille Desmoulins, who had been in the hussars and had then become an avocat. All these were men of the most abandoned character, but all had a great reputation for wit. Peltier alone simply sold his pen to the best buyer, but the others were more or less in earnest. Rivarol, Champcenetz, and Mirabeau-Tonneau were generally drunk, and composed most of their witty sallies in the cafés of the Palais-Royal. Nearly all their numbers are unreadable, and too indecent to afford quotation, but it may be said that Théroigne de Méricourt was their special subject for abuse and obscene wit. The description of her marriage with Populus, a deputy, whose name made him a good object for royalist ridicule, is described in a most amusing fashion, and the characteristics of Siéyès are well hit off; but the full description cannot be quoted. The *Actes des Apôtres* was not only written by professed wits and confined to ribald personalities, but it contained various long articles on subjects of foreign policy and finance. It may be said that these articles are as unreadable from their dullness as the others from their obscenity. The principal collaborateurs of Peltier in this line can be named. They were Bergasse, the Martinist deputy for Lyons, and old opponent of Beaumarchais, the Comte de Lauraguais, and Montlosier, one of the leading deputies of the right. Though these journals have little historical value in themselves and seldom give any assistance in the comprehension

¹ *Un journal royaliste en 1789. Les Actes des Apôtres*, by Marcellin Pellet. Paris: 1873.

of the course of events, yet they exhibited the nature of the opposition the royalists offered to the progress of the Revolution. It was an opposition not based on argument or reasoning, but one which consisted for its force on witty abuse, and attempts to make its opponents ridiculous. Peltier, like so many others, was deserted by the Bourbons, whom he had served so bravely in their hour of need. He died of starvation in the Rue Montmartre in 1825, nine years after the Cardinal Maury had died in the dungeons of the Castle of St. Angelo at Rome. Most of the other writers on the *Actes des Apôtres* paid with their lives for their wit. Champcenetz was guillotined in 1794, and Souleau was assassinated by Théroigne de Méricourt for his insults to her, on August 10, 1793.

The contents of the royalist journals showed the real weakness of the cause of absolute monarchy in France. While the revolutionary journals were distinguished by their earnestness and entire belief in the success of their cause, the royalists contented themselves with laughing both in and out of season. A more important danger threatened the Revolution from the émigrés, who were now filling with their murmurs many of the chief capitals of Europe. Foreign princes had, strange to say, generally looked with favour on the French desire for reform. The age which preceded the Revolution was the age of benevolent despots, when everything was to be done for the people by the king, and not by the people themselves. This had been the main point of the internal policy of Frederick the Great in Prussia; the finances were to be improved, justice to be well administered, and order maintained, all by the absolute will of the king. Whether from his example or from the general diffusion of the new philosophy, most of the monarchs of Europe at this time were distinctly reformers. Joseph II., the emperor, projected the most widely reaching reforms of any man of his day. He conceived the idea of a national German Church; he desired to unite his dominions by one common bond of similarity of language and administration; and to improve his finances he did not hesitate to alter the hereditary policy of the house of Austria, and to dissolve many

monasteries and convents of begging friars. His example was followed by his brother Leopold, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who, with the help of Scipio de Ricci, Bishop of Pistoia, had reorganized the entire government of Tuscany, and had attempted to put the maxims of the French school of economists into practice. In every state there was either a reforming king or a reforming minister. Besides Joseph and Leopold, must be mentioned Charles III. of Spain and the Count d'Aranda, the great reformer Tannucci of Naples, and De Mauprat at Parma; and the great administrative reforms of Catherine of Russia should not be forgotten. This universal feeling of the need of some reform in the old system of absolute monarchy, and these numerous attempts to meet that need, had caused foreign princes and ministers to receive with great joy the news of the various schemes of Turgot and Necker for the reform of France. They began to feel a little more doubt when they heard of the summons of the States-General, for none of the potentates who have been mentioned ever dared to meet an elected assembly of their own people; but they expected that all would go well, and that the force of the king, backed by his nobles, his Church, and his army, would be sufficient to prevent the reformers from going too far. The news of the capture of the Bastille rudely shook their equanimity. The most truly liberal in mind, such as Charles III. and Leopold of Tuscany, were not disturbed; but Catherine of Russia, and still more the small Italian and German princes, and the dukes of the Rhine, were greatly disgusted at the bold action of the people of Paris. Their disgust increased as the émigrés began to arrive at all their little courts with terrible reports of the indignities to which they had been subjected—that their carriages had been broken and sometimes mud thrown at themselves, that the soldiers refused to obey their officers, that the peasants were burning their châteaux, and generally that the old world was rapidly coming to an end, since noblemen and their property were no longer sufficiently respected.

In England and in America the very news of the conster-

nation in Russia, Italy, and Germany was received with transports of wild enthusiasm. A model of the Bastille and a representation of its capture was sent to Washington by his friends at Paris, and the Americans prided themselves at having set an example which their former allies were about to follow. In England the same feeling was perceptible, and the English people, and more particularly the English statesmen, did not doubt that the French people were going to imitate their example and their constitution. The close connection of most of the leaders of the Revolution with America and England has been noticed, and their numerous friends in both countries watched the progress of the Revolution with delight. Mention, too, has been made of the crowd of Englishmen who filled Paris in the months of August and September, and the interest of the English people was sufficiently shown in the length of the reports of the proceedings in France which filled the English newspapers. The events of October somewhat dashed the enthusiasm in England, and increased the dismay on the Continent. The rejection by the Assembly of the system of two chambers and of the absolute veto showed the English that the French were not going to imitate their own institutions, and the presence of Lally-Tollendal in London further testified to the extreme measures the Assembly was taking. Already English statesmen began to be afraid that France was going too far, and would establish a constitution with such freedom of election that the English system of rotten boroughs would seem more objectionable than ever. But this feeling was not shared by the prime minister, Pitt, who was too great a man not to perceive that each country must develop in its own way; and perhaps he would not have been sorry if the French reforms had brought about that change in the system of representation which he had vainly advocated. The news of the forced entry of the king and the queen into Paris, and the manifest power of the Parisian mob, had already affected all those who, like Burke, were inclined to look on the dramatic aspect of the struggle of a court with a nation, and who themselves were possessed with a holy horror

of mob rule. But if even in free England the events of October had worked such a transformation, they had still greater effect on the Continent. These events were utterly inconsistent with the idea of any harmonious action between the king and the people, and every monarch felt that perhaps his turn might come next. Every month brought more refugees belonging to the second emigration to the smaller capitals, and rumours were already afloat that the French people must be taught to respect their own monarch by the soldiers of other nations. Such rumours were circulated in the courts of princes like the King of Sweden, who were too far from the scene of action for successful interference, or in petty courts where too few troops were maintained to do anything. More powerful monarchs had serious business on their own hands.

The Emperor Joseph was in the midst of a struggle with the Belgians which his reforms and his disregard of their nationality had provoked, and which bore a sufficient resemblance to events in France for Camille Desmoulins to term his journal *Les Révolutions de France et de Brabant*; the King of Prussia was too busy with his own court intrigues to wish to spend his money in foreign interference; and the King of Spain, though himself a Bourbon, and bound to the King of France by the "Pacte de famille," was still too liberal a monarch to wish to interfere unless matters made a further progress. The feeling of anxious discontent noticeable at foreign courts exasperated the French people, and made them even at this early date fear that the murmurs of the émigrés might induce foreign kings to interfere in their affairs.

During the early months of 1790 there were four men in Paris more conspicuous than the rest, and their relation to each other and the causes of their respective positions must be analyzed to understand not only the growth of public opinion in Paris but in the provinces. The Parisians well understood that they had assumed the lead of the Revolution as a result not so much of the capture of the Bastille as of the events of October 5 and 6, and this knowledge made Paris concentrate within itself the chief interest of the period. The provinces

were eagerly listening for news from Paris, and were ready to act as before in harmony with the Parisian leaders. The four men whose influence was now paramount were Bailly and Lafayette, Necker and Mirabeau.

Bailly, as Mayor of Paris, represented the bourgeois of Paris and the municipality rather than the people. The legal municipality, which had replaced the assembly of the electors, had been elected at the end of July; but the definite scheme of a Paris municipality was not assented to till February, 1790. On April 1 the municipal council under the new act was elected. Paris was divided for municipal purposes into forty-eight sections, on the motion of Gossin, instead of sixty districts, and it was hoped that this arrangement would destroy those district assemblies whose existence so much harassed the unfortunate mayor. It has been remarked that the appointment of Lafayette had deprived the mayor of the great duty of the maintenance of order, and he found that his principal function—and a most vexatious one it was—was to provide cheap bread for the Parisians. This could only be done by means of large loans from the State. Bailly sent messengers all over Europe, and especially to England, to buy corn, which he sold to the bakers much below cost price, on the condition that they sold cheap bread; but all his efforts could not prevent bread from being very scarce occasionally, and then the ferocious temper of the mob appeared. On October 21 there was an especially violent riot, when an unfortunate baker, named François, was hung in the Place de Grève. In spite of his great efforts, Bailly found himself, by the illogical and vivacious temperament of the mob, charged with being the author of the scarcity of food. His own vanity, and still more that of his wife, laid the mayor open to ridicule both in the royalist and revolutionary journals; and it is quite certain that, mocked at by all parties alike, universally despised, and without any real power, he found his mayoralty anything but a pleasant time. And as if the attacks in the journals were not enough, his own municipal council would not leave him alone, and he had every day to hear petitions from the more radical

sections demanding his own dismissal. The weakness of position mainly arose from his not possessing the command of those forces which maintained order, and he had to bear the responsibility of office without its compensating power.

That power was entirely in the hands of Lafayette, whose popularity increased from day to day among the members of his own force and among the bourgeois, who looked upon him as the impersonation of the bourgeois revolution, and of the cause of order. Lafayette was as much abused in the journals of all sides as Bailly. The queen detested him, the more witty courtiers and royalists laughed at his airs and graces, and the advanced revolutionists declared that he was sold to the court. Yet he had to compensate him the consciousness of real power, for he was without doubt the most powerful man, not only in Paris, but in France. To be sure, his idea of the confederation of all the National Guards under his command did not seem to progress; but occasionally, as in his interference at Vernon,¹ he managed to exhibit his power in the provinces. But his intense vanity and sensitiveness to ridicule made him lose sight of the great aims he might have attained, and he cared more to arrest an obscure journalist, and to influence the Assembly by a fine parade, than to labour to attain a really good administrative system in the capital. Sometimes, as in the case of the riot which ended in the murder of François, the baker, he found that, even with his National Guard, he could not entirely control the mob. The best instance of his weakness is shown at the time of the murder of the Marquis de Favras, in the month of February, 1790. The marquis was an old political intriguer, and was now a friend of Monsieur, the Comte de Provence, and was arrested for trying to raise a loan from the Paris bankers for Monsieur in order to arrange his own affairs. Monsieur declared, on his honour, that the money was not raised in order to enable him to emigrate; and Favras was acquitted by the Court of the Châtelet, which had been appointed *ad interim* to try cases of high treason. The people believed him to be guilty, and, some said inspired by the friends of Orleans, the mob seized upon him and hung

¹ See chap. vi. p. 190.

him on a lamp-iron in the Place de Grève. The absence of Orleans, who had been sent to London after the events of October 5 and 6, at the demand of Lafayette, had removed a serious obstacle to the general's ambition; but the friends of Orleans were still in Paris, and yet hoped to show that their patron's money had not been wasted. Nevertheless Lafayette's position was certainly extremely difficult, and he made it more so by voluntarily magnifying trifles, and thinking more of securing the establishment of his own importance than of procuring such arrangements as would ensure the defeat of the mob. It is to be feared that his vanity and love of popular admiration was at the bottom of this neglect, and by shilly-shallying between his desire to obtain universal applause and the confidence of his own followers, he failed to be entirely trusted by either side.

Necker, though still director-general of the finances, found his popularity fast waning. Not only the Assembly but the people found that his financial abilities had been greatly over-rated, and that his presence at the finances did not bring about the prosperity which had been promised. On the contrary, he showed himself but a poor deviser of schemes for real improvement, and was satisfied with any trifling expedient. The defeat of his motion to hand over the collection of the taxes to the "Caisse d'Escompte," and still more the proposal itself, had discredited him with all thinking politicians; and the man whose dismissal in July, 1789, had set the whole country in a ferment had now but very little weight in anybody's estimation.

Mirabeau was the real ruler of the situation, and the one man who could have established some system of order which might have lasted, but the unfortunate motion of November 7, 1789, prevented him from using his great abilities in the way which would have been most useful to the country. As has been said, he had tried to unite himself in turn to Necker and Lafayette, but every attempt had been spurned by those vain and conceited men. In October, 1789, after having experienced the insults of Necker, he made his first appeal to Lafayette. "Whatever may happen," he wrote, "I shall be yours to the end, because your great qualities have much attracted me, and because it is impossible for me not to take the keenest

interest in a destiny so fair in itself, and so closely bound to the Revolution which is leading the nation to liberty, as yours. If you have at all reflected on the treacherous collusion of the ministers with the brutal, or rather the insane pride of the contemptible charlatan¹ who has brought the throne and France itself to the very verge of ruin, and who is determined to complete that ruin rather than recognize his own incapacity, you will no longer believe that I, of all men, could be their assistant.”² Mirabeau thought that it was the general's political allies who prevented him from cordially co-operating with himself, but, alas! it was not Lafayette's friends who traduced Mirabeau to him, but Lafayette's own vanity, which feared that the assistance of so great a man might eclipse himself; and when he returned no answer to Mirabeau's appeal, the great man determined no longer to try to treat with those who would not give up their petty prejudices for the service of the state, and who thought only of their own aggrandizement.

Such were the principal men in Paris and in France during the latter months of 1789 and the earlier months of 1790, while the Assembly was developing the constitution and drawing up the civil constitution of the clergy, and the people of Paris were becoming more and more revolutionary in their tendencies; and as abstract measures took precedence in the Assembly of practical reforms, the need of these practical reforms became more and more manifest. When the Assembly had completed some six months' discussion, the court again renewed, at the desire of the Comte de Mercy-Argenteau, its communications with Mirabeau, and yet another attempt was made by the great statesman to stop the country on the road to anarchy along which it was proceeding, and once more to set before the eyes of king, Assembly, and people the paramount necessity of maintaining order, peace, and good government, instead of wasting time in dissensions among themselves, which would only prolong the terrible crisis through which France was now passing.

¹ Necker.

² *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et La Marck*, vol. i. pp. 268, 269.

CHAPTER IX.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Constitution-making—The colonies of France—Colonial policy of the Assembly—The constitutional committee—Target—Thouret—The new constitution—The old provinces—The new departments—The new local government—The procureurs-syndics—Mania for election—Active citizens—"Loi des trois jours de travail"—"Loi du marc d'argent"—Universal condemnation of the parlements—Confusion of old French law—New system of judicature—High Court for cases of high treason at Orleans—Weakening of the executive—Distrust of the royal power—Good intentions of the Assembly.

WHILE making many mistakes in administration, mostly caused by its inexperience, and many from a real spirit of philanthropy, the Constituent Assembly, as its title indicates, regarded its real duty as the formation of a constitution, and many of its administrative mistakes arose from its belief that a good constitution could cure all the ills of France, and that, if the new constitution were only thoroughly just and logical, local troubles would at once cease, and France would soon settle down to enjoy the benefits of a new and representative system of government. But the Assembly did not understand that, if such a constitution could have been successful, serviceable, and warmly welcomed in the month of June, 1789, it would be quite inadequate to meet the aspirations of the people in September, 1791. The delay in drawing up the new constitution, and the piecemeal manner in which it came into force, were obstacles to its success, which could hardly have been avoided. A single lawgiver, or a junto of three or four, might be able to issue an elaborate system of government in a few

hours, but an assembly of twelve hundred members, most of whom had their word to say, and many of whom wished only to obstruct, was not fitted for the speedy promulgation of an entirely new system of government, while its progress in its work was still further impeded by the necessity for entering into details of administration. Its unpractical character in these matters has been so much insisted upon that weight must now be laid on the great advantages which it obtained for France, and on some of the really admirable results of its deliberations. Before examining the division of France into departments, the elaborate system of local self-government, the abolition of the old courts of justice, the establishment of a representative constitution, and the lengthy discussion of these great reforms, it will be advantageous here to examine its colonial policy, and to notice the terrible mistakes which its philanthropy and want of practical experience caused in that department of affairs.

It has often been asserted that France is not in its nature a colonizing country. To be sure, England, Spain, and Portugal have all formed greater colonies than France, but this is rather the result of accident than of any inherent deficiency in the French character. On the contrary, the importance of colonies was earlier recognized in France than in England, and French statesmen of even the most debased ages of the French monarchy took more trouble and spent more money on their colonies than the English ministers had ever dreamed of doing. No colonies in the middle of the eighteenth century were so prosperous or so well-governed as the royal colonies of Canada and Louisiana, which were really created by the French government, and supported by the royal treasury; while the English colonies along the eastern sea coast of America had either sprung from the individual enterprise of great men, who had desired to find a secure home for their co-religionists in the New World, such as Lord Baltimore and William Penn, or if at first founded by royal assistance, had soon been left to their own resources. The origin of the French influence in the Canadas has been attributed to the French Jesuits, but

the enterprise of the French seamen, such as Jacques Cartier, encouraged by the ministers at home, must not be underrated. Great concessions were made to the colonists; large sums of money were spent in conciliating the Red Indians, and establishing forts and factories, and the keenest interest was shown by Louis XIV. in his establishments beyond the sea. Louis XV. had been equally interested, and when Montcalm arrived in Canada, it seemed possible that his great plan of uniting Louisiana and the Canadas, and thus hemming in English progress towards the West, might be successful; but the elder Pitt also knew the advantages of colonial enterprise. He it was who sent Amherst and Wolfe to subdue Montcalm; he it was who insisted that French influence in North America should be extinguished by the cession of their American possessions at the peace of Paris, in 1763. In this quarter, then, French influence had been checked; but it was still very great in the East and West Indies, and in the East Indies Dupleix, Labourdonnaie, and Lally had fought on more than equal terms with the servants the Honourable East India Company, and had it not been for the greatness of Clive and the policy of Warren Hastings, the French East India Company might have obtained that influence which was reserved for the English Company in Leadenhall Street. Want of money and the absence of support from home had prevented the French from getting a secure hold upon India; and when the Revolution broke out, the chief outlets of colonial enterprise in the East were the islands of Mauritius and of Bourbon. In them many wealthy French planters had settled, and made the colonies both rich and prosperous. They were well governed and well administered, because a large amount of local authority was left to the colonists themselves; and the beauty of the islands was proverbial throughout France, even before Bernardin St. Pierre had immortalized it in "Paul and Virginia." But the colonial wealth of the Mauritius was nothing compared to that of the island of San Domingo. The West Indies had, during the seventeenth century, been pretty well occupied by the various European powers; England, under Cromwell, had

seized Jamaica, and had long held Barbadoes and some of the smaller islands; Spain pretended to own them all, but only really kept up establishments in Cuba, Porto Rico, and Trinidad; France not only possessed the greater part of San Domingo, next to Cuba the largest and most fertile of all the islands, but also many of the smaller ones, such as St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Martinique; and even smaller nations, such as Denmark, Sweden, and Holland, had established themselves at St. Kitt's, St. Croix, St. John, and St. Thomas. Of all these nations, France had spent the most money on her West Indian possessions, and had brought them to the highest pitch of prosperity. The eagerness with which, at every war with France, the English ministry seized the smaller islands, was a manifest proof of their value, but they had never been able to successfully subdue San Domingo. In 1789 San Domingo reached the climax of its prosperity; its wealth and capabilities can be studied in the "Memoirs" of Malouet, who was for many years in the colonial service there, and the progress of Martinique is traced in the "Memoirs" of Bouillé, who was for many years governor of that island. The wealth of the San Domingo planters was as proverbial in France as that of the "nabobs" in England, and many wealthy creoles, like Josephine de la Pagerie, made matches with the highest nobility in France. Nantes and Bordeaux, the two chief centres of the West Indian trade, derived their wealth almost entirely from their communications with San Domingo, and the prosperity of the island was jealously observed by both English and Spanish statesmen. As in every other island, the work of the sugar-plantations in San Domingo was entirely done by slaves, but the slaves there were not treated so badly as in the English and Spanish West India islands, as the very large number of mulattoes, descendants of Frenchmen by negro women, conclusively proves. But the mere fact of the existence of slavery was sufficient to excite the French as well as the English philanthropists. Mention has been made of the "Société des Amis des Noirs," established by Brissot, in imitation of the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, which was

flourishing in England under Wilberforce and Clarkson. The objects of both societies were the same. Declamations on the subject of the cruelties of slavery, and the right of every man to be free and to the produce of his own labour, were equally common in both of them, and the French enthusiasts had the first opportunity of putting their views into execution.

During the very first sitting of the States-General, certain individuals, calling themselves deputies of San Domingo, asked to be permitted to have seats in the great Assembly, but were met by a question whether they had been elected by the free vote of both black and white inhabitants. Such an idea seemed preposterous to all who had ever been in the West Indies, and the deputies were permitted to take their seats. The events of June and July had been followed with interest in San Domingo by all the French colonists there, and they had proceeded to elect committees and establish National Guards similar to those in the principal cities of France. But the "Société des Amis des Noirs" thought far more about the slaves than of the French colonists, and noisily demanded from the Assembly that all slaves should be instantly freed; nay, more, should be permitted to have all the rights of citizenship. Ridiculous as this idea was, it was received with applause by the philanthropic and unstatesmanlike Assembly, and measures were at once ordered to be taken to secure the emancipation of the slaves. The idea was universally scouted by all statesmen, including, of course, Mirabeau; but the motion was passed. At first there were none to tell the slaves of the great advantages which an Assembly in a distant country had been pleased to grant them. But the news was eagerly received by the mean whites and the poorer creoles of the cities. These at once claimed a share of the government, and made themselves so obnoxious that many of the respectable inhabitants began to leave the island. The seeds of mischief were thus sown; for these classes, as well as the mutinous soldiers, soon spread the news of their coming emancipation among the slaves. During the existence of the Constituent Assembly, the destruction of all trade, which was threatened by their measures,

did not come to pass, but four distinct parties had already appeared in San Domingo—the committees of planters and wealthy inhabitants, those of the mean whites, the mulattoes, and the slaves. The slaves had not done anything of political importance, but when the time comes to speak of the terrible slave war in San Domingo, it will be necessary to refer back to these measures of the Constituent Assembly. Their policy in this regard is distinctly typical of their policy with regard to the Church, and still more with regard to the army, for in both instances the desire for logical completeness entirely destroyed both institutions. Enough insistence has now been laid on the mistakes of the Assembly, and it is time to consider their more lasting work.

The constitutional committee, which had been appointed in the month of July, had proposed certain bases and a certain mode of procedure for the drawing up of the new French constitution. It has been seen¹ that on the rejection of the two chambers and of the absolute veto the majority had resigned, and had been succeeded by Target, Thouret, Desmeuniers, Rabaut de Saint Étienne, and Tronchet; and the new members, as well as Le Chapelier and Talleyrand, were greatly under the influence of Siéyès, and inclined rather to a constitution based on his own peculiar theories than an imitation of English institutions. The two most important constitution-makers now became Target and Thouret.

Gui Jean Baptiste Target was born in Paris in 1733, and had early become an avocat in the capital. There he made himself a great name at a very early date, and had spread his reputation not so much by his pleadings as by his publication of historical and political works. The beauty of his literary style ensured his election to the Académie Française in 1785, and he had by that time won not only a reputation in the salons but among the real literary leaders. He supplied the legal and historical notes to Mirabeau's "*Considérations sur l'Ordre de Cincinnatus*," and his friendship with Mirabeau was of old standing. His reputation was more than French, it was European, and

¹ See chap. vii. p. 201.

his opinions were quoted by the greatest English lawyers, and especially by Sir Samuel Romilly. After becoming the leader of the Paris bar, his opinion was considered of supreme weight on every question concerning the general principles of equity. His knowledge of these general principles was very great, and he stood at the head of the law-reformers, who from the middle of the eighteenth century were striving to deduce from the philosophies of Montesquieu, Beccaria, and Rousseau something which would effectually remedy the injustice of a stern and rigid system of law. This knowledge of equity made him a valuable member of the National Assembly, to which he was elected a deputy by the tiers état of Paris extra muros, or without the walls. He had preferred to sit for this constituency instead of for Paris itself in order to be present at the first meeting of the States-General, but continued to preside at the Hôtel de Ville over the elections of the city. He was elected a member of the constitutional committee on its first formation in June, 1789, but had at first been outvoted by the constitutionalists, who under Mounier commanded the majority of the committee. When the supporters of the imitation of the English constitution resigned, Target came to the front, and was generally regarded as the real maker of the new constitution. To be sure, in most instances, Target only carried out the suggestions of Siéyès, who was the inventor of the various electoral expedients and of the elaborate system of counter-checks; but the credit for the establishment of the jury and of the new tribunals belongs to Target himself, and, had it been possible, he wished to draw up a new code of law. Target was not at all an effective speaker in the Assembly, but left the office of reporter rather to his colleague Thouret; but he was well known to be the most industrious member of the constitutional committee, and, if by nothing else, his importance is proved by the perpetual sallies against him made by the royalist journals, and especially by the *Actes des Apôtres*, in which it was always declared that the new constitution was the unwieldy and ill-formed child of M. Target of Paris. He refused to defend the king in later life, and during the Terror

acted as secretary to the revolutionary committee of his section, and used his position to save many lives. His experience of political life had not made him desirous to become a member of the Legislative, the Convention, or any other political assembly, by which he probably saved his own life, and in 1798 he was appointed a judge of the Tribunal of Appeal. Napoleon recognized his great merits as a lawyer, and made him one of the three commissioners who drew up the Code Napoléon. As he was never an extreme radical or advanced revolutionist, he led the quiet life of a jurist and thinker throughout the days of the empire, and died peacefully in Paris, in the full enjoyment of his great powers and reputation, on September 7, 1807.

Jacques Guillaume Thouret, who was the reporter of the constitutional committee, and therefore the mouthpiece of Siéyès and Target, was the greatest provincial lawyer elected to the States-General, and was early recognized as one of the ablest speakers in the Assembly. He was born at Port l'Evêque, in Normandy, in 1746, was educated at Caen, and became an avocat at Rouen, and in time the leader of the bar there. He was in 1789 elected first deputy for the tiers état of Rouen. He was doubtful at first as to which side he should take in the Assembly, and had shown such reactionary tendencies that he was forced, by his general unpopularity, to resign the presidency of the Assembly, to which he had been elected on August 3, 1789. On September 15 he had been appointed a member of the constitutional committee, and in October became its spokesman. He was the chief contriver of the suspensive veto, and also proposed the abolition of the parlements. In January, 1790, he was president of the Assembly, and declared that the king was only the first public functionary of the realm. After the flight to Varennes, his opinions again became less revolutionary, and he assisted in the final revision of the constitution. His share in drawing it up was so universally recognized that he was elected the last president of the Assembly in September, 1791, and in that capacity presented the Act of

Constitution to the king for his assent. In 1791 he was elected president of the Court of Appeal, and was re-elected under both the Legislative Assembly and the Convention in August, 1792, and in November, 1793, during the Terror. But his reactionary tendencies during the latter months of the Constituent Assembly were not forgotten, and on April 22, 1794, he was guillotined with Le Chapelier, his former colleague in the constitutional committee, d'Esprémesnil, the old supporter of the parlements, and Malesherbes, the defender of the king. His importance in the Assembly arose rather from his being reporter of the constitutional committee than from any great capacity he had exhibited. He was certainly inferior as a jurist to Target, but seems, as president of the Court of Appeal, to have shown himself an upright judge.

The logical mind of Siéyès made him peculiarly fitted to superintend any complete system of reorganization, but he represented the general mind of the Assembly in its most unpractical shape. Instead of studying the work of constitution-making in the chronological order, in which the new constitution was actually drawn up, it will be better to discuss, as a whole, the progress which was made in the latter months of 1789 and the earlier months of 1790. This is the more necessary, as every part of the constitution formed in the minds of the constitution-makers part of one consistent whole, though circumstances caused certain portions to be promulgated before others. For instance, the regulations for the creation of the new municipalities and of local self-government was the first part of the constitution to be minutely prescribed, because France was at the time under the rule of provisional committees, which had no legal status and no definite powers. The question of municipalities, which was the most pressing, was the first to be treated, and as early as April, 1790, the new local governments were in full legal operation, while the final regulations as to the connection between the king and future assemblies was not settled till the year 1791, and even the question of municipalities was unavoidably mixed up with that of the formation of the larger units of local government.

It was agreed on all sides that the old system of provinces and provincial governments must cease. By their very existence they perpetuated the recollection of past differences of nationality, and tended to encourage provincial patriotism in preference to national feeling. Instances of the strength of provincial feeling and the dissensions between province and province, town and town, during the electoral period, have been given.¹ Moreover, every individual province had its own peculiar local customs and its local history. In Brittany the old Breton constitution, which had been guaranteed at the marriage of Anne of Brittany, was still in full force, though the excitement of the electoral period had shown the existence of a strong popular feeling against it. Franche Comté, which had only been united to France for little more than a century, had preserved its local independence under both Burgundian and Spanish rule, and had thus been severed in opinion and feeling from the rest of France. Alsace, again, had retained many imperial customs, which had been guaranteed to Strasbourg and the ten imperial cities when Alsace had been annexed by Louis XIV. Lorraine, under King Stanislas, had preserved its independence until the year 1766, and was as distinctly German in its government as Alsace. The customs and government of French Flanders again resembled those of the imperial cities, and in the south the province of Roussillon was Spanish both in language and nationality. The provincial spirit had been encouraged by the existence of the old governor-generalships, and independence of thought by the difficulty of communications with Paris, and the establishment of provincial parlements and provincial academies in the chief provincial capitals. The old system of taxation also had preserved the traditions of the various origins of the provinces of France. There were three distinct divisions of the country for purposes of customs duties. There was France proper, including the centre of the country; the provinces "*reputés étrangères*," comprising Burgundy and other provinces united to France in the sixteenth and seven-

¹ Chap. i. p. 24.

teenth centuries; and the provinces "*étrangères*," such as Alsace, which had only been conquered by Louis XIV. In local government there was again to be perceived a distinct difference between the "*pays d'élection*" and the "*pays d'états*." In the "*pays d'élection*" the supreme authority had been given to the intendants, while each "*pays d'état*" had continued to possess its local assembly, which had the regulation of provincial affairs and the apportionment of certain taxes for provincial purposes. But the system in each "*pays d'état*" was different. The Estates of Brittany consisted of three chambers of the three orders; in Languedoc there were two chambers, the one consisting of clergy and noblesse, the other of petite noblesse and deputies of the towns; in Béarn there were also two houses of assembly, which exactly corresponded to the two houses of the English Parliament. These anomalies, though interesting in themselves to the historical student, were utterly repugnant to the logical ideas of Siéyès and his chief coadjutors, who did not fail to perceive that the weakening of provincial spirit would contribute to the strengthening of the national feeling of patriotism. As early as September 29, therefore, Thouret, the deputy for Rouen, moved that a new division of France should be made for administrative purposes, and on November 12 a division into eighty equal departments, governed only by considerations of natural boundaries, was voted.

It was some months before the various committees appointed to decide on the new divisions sent in their reports, but by the month of February the new lines of demarcation had been marked out. The system had naturally been strongly opposed by the deputies of the right, who hoped they would thus gain an increase of popularity in their provinces, and the details were discussed and even fought over for a long time. The new arrangements were always made on the recommendation of committees, consisting of all the deputies of each province, and most bitter were the disputes which took place about the limits to be chosen and the towns to be selected for provincial capitals. Occasionally the dissensions ran high,

and the duel between Huguet, deputy for the tiers état of Clermont-Ferrand, with the Comte de Montlosier, deputy for Riom, which grew out of the animosity between these two cities as to which should be the capital of the new department of the Puy de Dôme, has been noticed. The departments were to be named from rivers and mountains, in order not to perpetuate either the influence of any particular town or any historical recollection. Thus Auvergne was divided into the departments of the Puy de Dôme and the Cantal, and the department in which Paris was situated was termed the department of the Seine. This system met with the entire acquiescence of the deputies of the left, who hoped it would effectually extinguish all old remembrances, and make all Frenchmen feel themselves to be Frenchmen, and not Picards or Provençals, Gascons or Bretons. It was found, however, that France could not be divided into eighty perfectly symmetrical departments, and the Assembly had to assent to the formation of eighty-two, with an eighty-third for the island of Corsica. According to the original scheme, France was to be divided peremptorily into eighty departments, each of which was to be divided into nine districts with separate government districts, each district into ten cantons, and each canton into ten municipalities, thus splitting up France into seventy-two thousand municipalities. But, as in the case of the departments, the country would not easily lend itself to this methodical idea of equal subdivisions, and various local exigencies caused the deputies to modify the rigorous lines of division, which Siéyès and his friends would have liked. The various units of government decided upon, the next question was as to the different functions with which the local authorities should be entrusted.

There was to be a departmental government in every department, a district government in every district, a cantonal government in every canton, and independent municipalities in every municipality. This perpetual subdivision, and this creation of innumerable communities of government, was a further proof of the inexperience and utterly unpractical

character of the Assembly. Nevertheless, the constitutional committee showed the greatest ingenuity in complicating the mode of formation of every little government, and meting out to each certain small functions. The members of the municipalities were to be directly elected by the citizens of the municipality, and the citizens of the canton were further directly to elect the cantonal government, but appointments to the district and departmental offices were far more complicated. A body of electors was to be elected by all the citizens of each department, and to them were to be proposed, in every district and in every department, a list of candidates for district and departmental offices. The electors were to elect the various officers and then depart, and Siéyès imagined that he had thus carefully provided a mixed system of election and selection which would meet every necessary requirement. There was also similar elaborate machinery provided for watching the departmental and other officers at their duties. There were to be councils-general in every department, which were to appoint directories, and councils in every canton and district, and so on with the most minute elaboration. That such a system could not possibly work, and would allow only intriguers to take the trouble to secure appointments, which needed so much canvassing and so many candidatures, did not seem to enter the minds of the members of the constitutional committee; nevertheless the elaborate system proposed delighted the logical members of the Assembly, and it was voted by acclamation. At first, delighted with the idea of exercising local power, there were plenty of candidates for office, and no difficulty in obtaining eligible officers. The elections in the department of the Seine were, of course, the most interesting. Talleyrand, Siéyès, La Rochefoucauld, and Mirabeau were all elected to the council-general of the department of the Seine, and afterwards to the directory; but Mirabeau was defeated in his attempt to become procureur-general-syndic by Pastoret, and for the presidency of the directory by the Duc de la Rochefoucauld.

The system of procureurs and procureurs-syndic deserves

an additional notice of itself. Every department was to elect a procureur-general-syndic with two substitutes; every district a procureur-syndic; every canton and every municipality a procureur. The functions of these procureurs and procureurs-syndics were very badly defined, but circumstances threw into their hands, in the critical year of 1792, the complete powers of the various local governments. Indeed, from the elaboration of the system, it would be inevitable that in every unit there should arise one man who would absorb most power. The procureurs were originally intended to have a general superintendence of the maintenance of order in their governments, and were supposed to act also as public prosecutors, and in general as assistants to the various mayors and presidents. When the various councils-general and directories were not sitting, their powers were exercised by the procureur, so that at critical times, when it was impossible to collect even comparatively small consultative bodies, the procureur had to act on his own authority. What an important part Roederer, as procureur-general-syndic for the Seine, played on August 10, 1792, is well known, and his conduct on that occasion had its counterpart in nearly every department of France.

The idea of establishing these innumerable officers and small councils was that they might all act as checks upon each other, and the result was a terrible confusion of powers everywhere. Thus, for instance, the municipality of Paris and the department of the Seine each claimed the same powers, and the result of a struggle between them was the entire victory of the municipality or commune of Paris, though not until its personality had been considerably changed by the introduction of more advanced revolutionists. The very advantages which might have been expected from local self-government entirely disappeared before this over-elaboration, and the care taken to restrain officers, if they attempted to exercise functions which did not belong to them, effectually prevented those officers from doing anything at all, or else enabled them, if strong men, to entirely overrule the advice of their supervisors. This system was made even more un-

workable by the mania for election which possessed the leading members of the constitutional committee; every officer, and every council in every district, canton, and department, was to be elected, after a long and elaborate series of electoral contests, by an absolute majority. It seemed as if the deputies were so delighted at having once been elected themselves that they were enamoured of the very idea, and a large portion of the time of any one taking an interest in politics must have been consumed every year in electing various people to various offices and various councils. But there was a further fault in this system, one far more important than the mania of election, which by itself would probably only have resulted, as it has done in America, in the abstinence of all respectable people from public affairs, and the promotion of political intriguers, for it deliberately opposed the bourgeois to the working classes, and that was the introduction of the two laws of the "trois jours de travail" and of the "marc d'argent."

It was decreed that no one should be allowed to vote even for the appointment of the most insignificant official if he was not an "active citizen," that is, if he did not pay taxes equal to the amount of three days' wages in the locality in which he resided. This effectually prevented any working man who might happen to be out of work from any share in the government whatever, though it permitted peasants who resided in their own hovels, and were thus householders, to have a voice in public affairs. By the other law no individual might be elected to any council or any office who did not pay taxes equivalent to a mark of silver. This regulation disfranchised even comparatively wealthy workmen in regular employment, and carefully restricted all office to the bourgeois. That these regulations created a perfect outburst of indignation among the journalists of Paris cannot be wondered at, for it disfranchised the whole of them at a blow, and they truly declared that the Assembly was merely looking to the interest of that bourgeois class from which the majority of them had sprung. The unworkable nature of the new constitution, and the passing of these two laws, were enough of themselves to

show that the great constitution which the Constituent Assembly was drawing up with so much care could not last, and that it would have very soon to give way to some more practical form of government.

Having effectually treated the question of local government and administration to their satisfaction, the constitutional committee proceeded to draw up a reformed judicial system, based upon the new administrative arrangements devised by Siéyès. The old parlements, which had, just before the elections of 1789, obtained such an immense popularity that the mere suggestion of their abolition nearly led to serious consequences, had sealed their fate by their opposition to the new Assembly; but had they been ever so compliant, the anomalies implied in their existence, the hereditary character of their offices, and their close connection with the old provincial organization, would have ensured their destruction. Even before the capture of the Bastille their opposition had been declared. Nearly every parlement had formally protested against the union of the three orders, for it must never be forgotten that the individual presidents and counsellors of the parlements were all noble by tenure or by office, and that the large legal element in the tiers état was supplied by the *avocats* and *procureurs*, and not by the counsellors of the parlements. All their threats of ceasing to administer justice were now laughed at and disregarded. In former days the threat had been a serious one, for the sympathies of the people had gone with the parlements and not against them. Headed, for legal reasons, by Target and Thouret, and followed by Lanjuinais, Le Chapelier, and all the most distinguished lawyers of the Assembly, the *avocats* and *procureurs*, who roughly corresponded to the English barristers and solicitors, had many a grievance against the parlements. They complained that justice was not administered strictly according to law, and still less according to the wide principles of equity which had been derived from the works of modern philosophers, but rather according to the influence which could be brought to bear upon individual counsellors. As their income depended upon fees, it was to the interest of the judges of the parlements to drag on cases as long as possible,

and many a case before the Parlement of Paris had as lengthy a history as an English suit in Chancery.

The objections of the leading *avocats*, many of whom were great jurists like Lanjuinais and Target, to the procedure of the parlements were augmented when the law itself, which they administered, was considered. The provinces of France were roughly divided into provinces, where the "*loi du droit écrit*" and the "*loi du droit coutumier*" were respectively followed. The written law was supposed, as in Italy and Germany, to be the Roman law; but, as a fact, it was more necessary to master certain of the most respected commentaries on the Roman law rather than the law itself. Great and enduring as the Roman law must ever be as a monument of legal knowledge, yet the world had expanded in its needs and requirements since the days of Justinian, and in many departments, as in those of criminal and commercial law, were quite out of consonance with modern ideas. The "*droit coutumier*" partook rather of the character of English common law, and rested on precedents derived from the Middle Ages, and the justice which regulated it was, therefore, as mysterious, unintelligible, and often as grossly unjust as decisions under the old common law of England during the last century. The complexity of the various glosses on the Roman law, and of the whole of the "*droit coutumier*," naturally left room for injustice in allowing innumerable appeals in which wealth was certain to carry the day. The great lawyers of the constitutional committee, who were supported by the legislative committee including Charles François Lebrun, the future consul, who had been secretary to Maupeou, and who now sat in the Assembly for the tiers état of Dourdan, Durand de Maillane, and Merlin of Douai, wished, therefore, not only to reform the system of administering the law, but also to draw up one consistent and intelligible code for the whole of France. The great ideas of the Code Napoléon were in the minds of the great lawyers of the Constituent Assembly; and of the authors of the code, Target, Tronchet, and Merlin of Douai were all members of the Constituent Assembly. But alas! the inexperienced

Assembly, with practical difficulties before it, was not fitted to discuss and pass such a great reform in law as the Code Napoléon afterwards effected.

Nevertheless, it established a very effective new system of judicature. Every department was to have its own criminal and civil tribunal; every canton and every district was to have its own cantonal and district courts, with appeals lying to the departmental tribunals; while in Paris there was to be a High Court of Appeal, which should receive in the last instance appeals from the whole of France. All this was truly admirable. Instead of its being necessary for every trifling case to be tried by the parlement many miles from the scene of the dispute, there would be all over France tribunals at easy distances which should do justice. The old system of payment by fees, which always induced judges to spin out cases, was abolished, and the judges were to be paid out of the revenues of the department or district. The jury system was introduced from England, and juries were established for criminal cases alone. Lastly, small criminal cases, which had hitherto been judged by the old feudal courts of the bishop or the lord, were now to be brought before the juge de paix of the municipality or commune, who was appointed in imitation of the English justice of the peace. He was to do summary justice in all small cases brought before him, and had to report all more serious cases to the procureur or his substitute, when prosecution was to be insisted at the public expense if the facts demanded it. Nothing could be more admirable than these reforms, and had the excitement of the time permitted the drawing up of such a code as the Code Napoléon, there is little doubt but that the Constituent Assembly, whatever faults it may have committed, would have left an enduring monument. But these reforms were vitiated by the mania of the majority of the deputies for election. Not only were the juges de paix and the judges of the departmental and other tribunals to be elected, but the very juries were to hold office for a stated time, and were to be elected likewise. This was simply ridiculous, for the

men most fitted to be judges are not generally likely to succeed at the hustings. Yet at first the system worked well. Merlin of Douai, the great lawyer, was elected president of the Criminal Tribunal of the department of the Nord; Target, president of one of the civil tribunals, and Treilhard of the Criminal Tribunal of Paris; Bigot de Préameneau, judge of the fourth arrondissement of Paris; and Thouret was elected president, and Maleville a judge, of the High Court of Appeal. But the subordinate offices of juge de paix and district judge were not always so well filled. To give but a single instance, although it was necessary that a juge de paix should be a lawyer, there was no regulation about his assessors, and at Provins, as if in mockery, six cobblers were elected assessors, who, it may be added, did their work very satisfactorily.¹ Bad as the idea of election is when applied to the administration of justice, it is still worse when the appointments are made for six years only, for then there must always be a feeling in the judge's mind that he must administer justice so as not to prejudice his re-election. This mistake vitiated the whole scheme of Target and Thouret. But, faults though there were, it must be confessed that the attempt of the Assembly to reorganize the law courts contained more elements of success than that of their reorganization of the administrative system. The numerous lawyers in the Assembly also tried their best to spread a knowledge of the law, by proposing law universities in the chief towns and law professorships all over the country.

Efficient, however, as the new system might be for general purposes, the important question as to what court was to try cases of high treason, or treason against the state, caused a violent discussion in the early days of the Assembly. Soon after the capture of the Bastille the question had arisen, and the Assembly had decreed that Besenval and others of the royalist leaders should be tried by the Court of the Châtelet. This court was one of the old feudal courts, with special jurisdiction in certain districts of Paris, and so was by no means

¹ *Histoire de Provins*, by Félix Bourquelot, p. 321. Provins : 1839.

fit in itself to examine such important cases. Its acquittal of Besenval disgusted the people, and its practical acquittal of Orleans and of all who were accused of participating in the events of October 5 and 6 made it distrusted by the court, and it was necessary to devise some new tribunal. The Parisians declared that there was no need for a special tribunal, that the people would do justice on traitors, and that the ordinary Parisian judges would be quite competent to treat such affairs. But the Assembly thought otherwise, and, fearing the influence of the Parisians, ordered that a High Court should be established at Orleans with jurisdiction in cases of high treason, of which the jurors should be elected by the departments, and the judges nominated by the king, and the sentences revised by the Assembly itself.

Many merits can be perceived so far in the work of the Assembly, but their attempts to provide for the government of the whole country, as distinguished from that of a department, were miserable failures. From the examples of past centuries most of the deputies were impressed with something like terror of the executive power, and every means was taken to weaken and check the executive in every possible way. The king was only to have a suspensive veto, and was not allowed in any way to interfere with the administration of justice or the local government of the country. The ministers were to be responsible under tremendous penalties to the legislative power, and were to have hardly any initiative of their own. In fact, had the system devised by the Constituent Assembly been drawn up for the express purpose of reducing the efficiency of the government of the country as much as possible, it could not have been better planned. How the deputies could ever have expected any one to become a minister under their projected régime is most extraordinary; but if the executive was to be so weakened and so hampered and on the other hand the legislative power was to be supreme, no minister with any self-respect or common sense would hold office more than a month. The deputies to the future legislative assemblies were to be elected by the body

of electors, who were chosen in the various local subdivisions to elect councils-general and procureurs-syndic; and the Constituent Assembly seemed to think that much the same class of men was wanted in the legislature of the kingdom as in the councils-general of a department. That there was a great and wide difference between local and national business they failed to understand. When the Assembly was elected, it was to have supreme power of legislation and interference. Thus the deputies could order ministers to be tried before the High Court of Orleans, and could not become ministers themselves until they had resigned their seats for at least six months. It was thus carefully contrived that men who had gained the confidence of the country in their legislative capacity should not attempt to undertake office at all, with the natural result of a rapid succession of ridiculously weak ministries; and most of the troubles which ensued may be attributed to the fact that it was impossible for any ministry to cope with the anarchy which was showing itself. Though they were not to have seats in the Assembly, the ministers were to be permitted to come down and address the deputies when they wished; but they were not allowed to act without due authorization, or if they did, their lives were held responsible. This ridiculous weakening of the executive and the carefully devised separation between the executive and the legislative powers stamped the Constituent Assembly, in spite of its industry and the many great qualities its members displayed, as utterly unfitted for the task of constitution-making which it had set itself.

Any real power which a constitutional king might and ought to possess had been taken from the King of France by the passing of the suspensive veto, and the discussion as to who should have the right of making peace and war will show the same distrust of royalty pervading the Assembly, though its weakness was shown more clearly in May, 1790, than in September, 1789. The distrust of the Assembly can be well explained by the repugnance of the queen and court to the new ideas; but, as Mirabeau himself remarked, the government

of France had been declared to be monarchical, and yet the monarchy was to be a figure-head and nothing more.

In the course of the next chapters the policy of the Assembly with regard to the Church, the finances, and the army will appear, and the same faults and merits which it showed in the drawing up of the constitution will then be seen. There was the same longing for logical completeness rather than for that effectiveness which should be the aim of good government. There is the same desire to attribute great insight into men, and great experience of affairs to every individual citizen, which the knowledge of human nature possessed by the deputies of the Assembly should have taught them not to have expected. All men are not born statesmen or politicians, and the best form of government is that which brings the men best fitted to be statesmen to the head of affairs, just as the best system of judicature is that which produces the best judges and the best advocates. Yet the merits of the majority of the deputies to the Constituent Assembly will appear in the ensuing chapters; their real longing to try to contrive such a mode of government as would give every Frenchman some interest both in legal and imperial affairs; their desire that equal justice should be meted out to every man, whether rich or poor; their wish that birth and wealth should not be the only passports to education and political power; their earnest hope that the new state of France should be something better than the old; their belief that men were not made to be governed, but to govern themselves, and that, if France was to be made happy, great, and prosperous, it could only be so because every Frenchman was himself fairly governed and justly taxed, and could feel himself no unimportant unit in his fatherland. Yet the Constituent Assembly forgot that the poor working man was just as much a Frenchman as the wealthy shopkeeper, and that, if its noble aims were to be realized, every working man should feel himself of as much political and social importance, and that he had as much right to a share of the government and a vote, as the most comfortable bourgeois of them all.

CHAPTER X.

THE CIVIL CONSTITUTION OF THE CLERGY.

Policy of the Assembly towards the Church—The Church in France—The idea of a Gallican Church—Christianity attacked by Voltaire, the Encyclopædists, and Rousseau—Weakness of the Church in France—The king would not reform it—First debates on the Church ; its property declared to be national—Suppression of religious houses—Dom Gerle's motion—The civil constitution of the clergy—Its weak points—The oath imposed on the clergy—Tolerance of the Assembly in matters of conscience—Clergy who took the oath—Leaders of clerical opposition—The Cardinal Archbishop of Rouen—The Archbishop of Aix—Dom Gerle—The Abbé Gouttes—The Abbé de Montesquiou—The Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt.

THE formation of the new constitution was the great work of the Constituent Assembly, and it encountered many difficulties by having at once to destroy and to construct, and further by having every day to take part in dealing with actual administrative details. Many mistakes were unavoidable with an inexperienced assembly of lawyers and theoretical politicians ; and the essentially unpractical character of the new constitution has been already pointed out. But there is one point of still greater importance, about which the Assembly made a succession of blunders, hardly paralleled by their conduct with regard to San Domingo, and this was their attempt to reconstitute the French clergy as a national body paid by the State, and elected by the citizens, who were to be as much servants of the State as the judges and administrators.

The idea of a national Church has existed at different

periods in every country which has adopted Christianity. In the Middle Ages the supremacy of the pope, as the spiritual ruler of the world, governing in harmony with the emperor, had sometimes worked well, but the degradation of the Papacy during its exile at Avignon finally destroyed this theoretical completeness of design, and by the fourteenth century all Christian nations had, side by side with their acknowledgment of the papal superiority, a desire to maintain their national Churches and their national institutions.

In England, from its distance from Rome, the idea of a national Church had taken deepest root and had been most successful; but it also appears not only in France and Germany but still more markedly in Hungary and Spain. During the residence of the Papacy at Avignon, the popes had become merely nominees and servants of the kings of France, which had of itself indisposed other nations to recognize its authority; and the old pretensions of governing the world did not again appear until the popes had safely re-established themselves at Rome. A new vitality was given to the Papacy by the Reformation. The success of the movement in England, France, and Germany made it obvious to the Papacy that it must set its house in order, and the rise of the order of the Jesuits marks the reorganization. There were no more glaring scandals at Rome, and the popes of the seventeenth century met the progress of the Reformation by inculcating purity of life to their priests, and entirely re-organizing the system of education. How, under this new movement of reaction, the Reformation was stamped out in Spain and Italy and driven back from Southern Germany is well known, but in France the overthrow of the Reformation was due not so much to the revived strength of the Papacy as to the junction which was formed between the kings of France and the popes. The policy of Richelieu really cemented the Roman Catholic Church in France far more than the massacre of St. Bartholomew. Richelieu only followed in the steps of Henri IV. in combining the power of the Papacy with that of the throne in destroying the political power of the Huguenots. He paved

the way for the entire sway of the Church of Rome. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes was the unavoidable consequence of the capture of La Rochelle, and Louis XIV. was only completing the work of Richelieu. Yet Louis XIV. desired to unite the character of a national Church in France with the power he could obtain from a union with the Papacy, and this union was consummated in the famous concordat of Louis XIV.

The despotic government of the Catholic Church of Rome was highly pleasing to the despotic temper of Louis XIV.; yet he did not fail to see the strength which could be derived from encouraging the old Gallican Church. By the concordat he obtained the power of nominating the bishops and abbés of France, whom the pope was bound to appoint canonically in return for being officially recognized as head of the Church. Thus the royal power of appointment and the supremacy of Rome in matters of doctrine were both preserved. It must be said at once that the leaders of the Gallican Church in no way dissented from any articles of doctrine laid down by Rome; and the Gallican Church would only have resembled the English Church in its government, not its doctrine. The practical destruction of the Huguenots by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the dragonnades, was the reward which the king gave the pope for acquiescing in his government of the national Church. In the eighteenth century the idea of independent national Church government was allied with Jansenism, and a distinct epoch is marked in the history of the growth of the Gallican idea. This is not the place to discuss at length the tenets of Jansenism, which had a curious affinity to Calvinism, but it must be remembered that the Jansenists not only wished for a greater stringency of doctrine, but also for independent Church government. The struggle between the Jesuits and the Jansenists formed a great part of the history of the reign of Louis XV., but as time went on a new factor appeared which threatened more injury to the Roman Catholic Church than internal dissensions. The struggle had ended, and the Jansenists seemed to have

won a great victory, when the order of the Jesuits was suppressed; but at that time the nation was no longer divided between two religious sects, but into the two great divisions of the Christians and the unbelievers. Rousseau had preached a new religion, which for the time had superseded both Catholicism and Jansenism.

Christianity was attacked on three distinct lines by the thinkers of the eighteenth century, and the varying methods of these different attacks are best shown by noticing the attitude of the three great leaders of French thought—Diderot, Voltaire, and Rousseau. The influence of Diderot and the Encyclopædists was rather negative than positive; they supplied not only to France but to Europe new interests, which superseded in men's minds the old absorbing interest of religious theories. They preached the gospel of science; they tried to show in lucid style what great things science had done, what great aims it had achieved, and what fair promises it made for the future; and a scientific impulse was given to the French people. Like all men of science, they were apt to think only of absolutely proving their points, and since the truths of Christianity could not be scientifically proved, they held them to be untrue. Voltaire's attack was at once more direct and more violent, but it was not as purely negative as that of the Encyclopædists. Voltaire mocked at the Christianity and the pretended infallibility of Catholic dogma; but he recognized what the Encyclopædists did not, that there are many subjects which absorb men's minds which cannot be proved. He did not propose any actual substitute for Christianity, but ever laid weight in his writings on the feeling of humanity. The poverty and wickedness of mankind were ever his favourite themes, and he attacked rather the illiberal persecution by which the Roman Catholic Church tried to maintain its waning supremacy, than the existence of the idea of religion. It is this breadth of human sympathy which makes Voltaire's works so deeply interesting, and gave them such great effect. How he erected a church with the super-scription, "*Deo erexit Voltaire*," is well known, and shows that

he felt how great an influence the idea of a divinity had upon men's minds, and though he preached no religion of humanity, he yet showed that charity for mankind could exist apart from Christianity. Rousseau, the third great thinker of the eighteenth century, admitted a direct substitute for Christianity. He did not spend his powers in reviling the want of logic or want of charity in the Christian Church so much as in preaching a new religion of humanity. The "Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar" included at once the idea of a true minister of the people and of the human faith which had inspired him. By laying weight on the idea of a supreme Being, and ever harping on the necessity that men should love each other, he was able to strike the imagination of those whose imagination was stronger than their reasoning powers. Of all the blows dealt at Christianity in the eighteenth century, Rousseau's was the hardest; for he was able to rouse enthusiasm, while the other thinkers only won admiration for themselves and mild approval of their doctrines.

The immense influence of these philosophical attacks did more than internal dissensions to weaken the Church. The very priests and still more the dignitaries of the Church were not ashamed to draw its revenues and deny its doctrines. The wealthy bishops enjoyed Voltaire's sallies in Paris while drawing their immense incomes from the Church, and the poor curé who could not live upon his stipend taught his flock the "Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar." The clergy being themselves thus affected, how could it be expected that the laity would still remain sincere Christians? One other factor in creating dissatisfaction with the Church was implied by the very existence of Protestants in France. The persecution which they long underwent, their being refused the common rights of citizens and even of men, remained as a glaring proof of the intolerance of the Roman Catholic Church. Their numbers were not great, except in certain districts, but their influence was very great in proportion to their numbers. The persecuted pastors of the Huguenots had by their very persecution bound their flocks closer to them in

an exceptionally loving bond. The Catholic Church in France was, therefore, weakened both from without and from within, and its doctrines attacked both as heretical and as belonging to an altogether false religion.

Its existence in France depended mainly on the assistance it could give to the king's government. Louis XIV. had used the Church as the means of government, and Louis XVI. continued the same tradition, although in his time the Church had lost whatever governing influence it had once possessed. In describing the elections of the Estate of the clergy, some notice has been taken of the excessive inequality between the incomes of the bishops and abbots, who had little work to do, and the curés, who really laboured among their people. This inequality was so glaring that, although reform of the organization of the Church in France was strongly advocated by many who had the true interests of religion at heart, in opposition to such a reform there could only be found those who were or hoped to be wealthy dignitaries. But the court and the ministry had a distinct motive for supporting the older constitution of the Church; without the rich Church benefices how could the younger children of the nobility be provided for? Just as had happened in the administration and the army, abuses were supported by the court in order that it might be able to supply the extravagances of its noblesse. In the reign of Louis XIV. it was, indeed, necessary to provide rich offices for noblemen, in order to deprive them of political ambition, and keep them from disturbing the royal despotism; and Louis XVI. failed to recognize that things had changed, and that the noblesse would no longer have been able to have any effect on politics, no matter how loudly they murmured. But Louis XVI. had no wise adviser at hand to tell him this truth, and assure him that, if he attempted of his own power to reorganize the Church, he would meet with the enthusiastic support of every Catholic in the kingdom, and would only have to put up with the sullen discontent of a powerless nobility. The need of reform was so obvious, that in every *cahier* drawn up by the electoral assemblies of the tiers état

it had been proposed that some radical change should be made in the government of the Church. None were found bold enough to advocate the non-recognition of the Christian religion, but all wished that it should be more adequately preached. For, as always happens, men who in their wisdom believed themselves to be without any need of religion, yet wished that religion should be taught to the poorer classes.

The king, then, would not and could not interfere to reorganize the Church. Could the Church reorganize itself? It is enough to refer to the unanimous protest of the convocation of the clergy in Paris, in 1787, against the recognition of the unfortunate Protestants as citizens, to show how the dignitaries of the Church failed to perceive the necessity for reform. The need for reorganization was fully acknowledged by the humbler class of the curés who were not represented among the dignitaries at Paris, and to the preponderating influence of the curés in the elections to the Estate of the clergy must be attributed the cordiality with which a large proportion of that Estate welcomed the idea of a thorough reform being made by the Constituent Assembly. Yet it was not a desire to reform the Church, but rather to appropriate the Church revenues for the relief of the financial necessities of the State, which brought about the first interference of the Constituent Assembly. Many of the cahiers had suggested that the Church property should be resumed by the State, and the desire that the Assembly should deal with it appeared on the night of August 4. In the delirium of generosity which then possessed the deputies, a decree was passed that tithes should no longer be paid to the Church. In vain was it for Siéyès to point out that by this decree the Assembly was merely making a present of 120,000 livres a year to the landed proprietors, and to urge that the tithes should be redeemed and not recklessly given away. The economic knowledge of the Assembly was too slight to understand this fact, and by one single blow the Church was deprived of a portion of its income, and the landed proprietors only relieved in proportion. It was in the debate on the abolition of the tithes that the theory that the estates of the Church had

been given to the Church by the State was first distinctly declared, and the question was then shelved by the Assembly, while the more important question of the words of the Declaration of the Rights of Man was being discussed at length. But the needs of the treasury were so great that in September the idea was again mooted, and on September 24 the Abbé Maury, who had a large revenue from his benefices, and hoped for a larger, distinguished himself by his opposition to the idea of resuming the Church estates. Maury declared that the treasury ought to protect the dues of the clergy, and even to pay back to the Church the tithes which had been due to it up to August 4. Such impertinence could not stave off the event, and after the Assembly had gone to Paris, Mirabeau, on October 14, moved a decree containing two distinct propositions; firstly, that the goods of the Church were the property of the nation at large, as long as a sufficient income was afforded to maintain the decency of public worship; and secondly, that no curé should have less than twelve thousand francs a year and a house. A long and heated debate took place. Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun, repeated the motion; Montlosier, a fervent and sincere Catholic, supported it on the one condition that all vested rights should be respected. The excitement which followed the murder of the unfortunate baker, François, put off the subject until October 23, when Talleyrand introduced the subject in the same terms as Mirabeau. He was supported by Camus, Barnave, and Thouret—a Jansenist, a philosophical orator, and a lawyer; and still more powerfully by many of the clergy who sat on the left of the Assembly. Not only did Grégoire and the Abbés Rastignac and Dillon speak warmly in favour of the proposition, but the Abbé Gouttes made an appeal on behalf of the Church which well embodies the ideas of the reforming clergy. "The wealth of the clergy," said he, "has done much harm to religion, for it has introduced into the clergy men who have no other call than the love of a living. It is on account of such people that the Church deserves the persecution which it is now undergoing; it is on their account that the contempt deserved only by a few ecclesiastics is poured

upon all pastors, and it is the pastors who are the most useful class of the clergy. But," he added, "the curés ought not to be paid out of the treasury for fear of the risks that religion might thus run." The motion was violently opposed by Maury, Malouet, and the Bishops of Clermont and Uzès; and Maury quoted, amid great applause, a line from Crébillon—

"Ah ! peut-on hériter de ceux qu'on assassine."

The debate continued until November 2, when Mirabeau's motion was carried by 568 votes to 346. The principle once decided, it was not long before the wealth of the Church was required for the necessities of the treasury, and in December, 1789, assignats to the value of four million francs were issued on the security of the royal and Church property.

By the terms of the decree of November 2, a new constitution of the clergy had been implied, but the Assembly was for some time too busy in developing other parts of the constitution to undertake this most difficult task. Nevertheless, it showed a wide liberality of opinion by decreeing, on December 24, that Jews, Protestants, and actors should no longer be under any disability, and in spite of Maury they were all declared capable of holding any civil or military position. On February 13, 1790, the actual reconstitution of the Church was begun by the suppression of all monastic vows and religious houses. The property of the monasteries was naturally the first to be appropriated. Their existence had long been a subject of discontent in France, and the reforms of the earlier part of the reign of Louis XVI. had augmented this discontent. He had attempted, as Joseph II. afterwards attempted in Austria, to diminish the number of monks and friars, but he had not dared to touch their property. The result of the royal reform of the religious houses was that a very few abbots and monks shared their enormous wealth instead of a large number. The motion was most warmly supported by Paul Louis Roederer, who won for himself a prominent position in this debate, and he was followed by Barnave, the Duc de la Rochefoucauld, and Pétion, who at the beginning of 1789 had proposed in his "*Avis aux Fran-*

çais"¹ the abolition of the celibacy of the clergy. By the same decree it was determined that for the present the monks and nuns should remain in their monasteries and convents on a pension until further arrangements were made, and that the orders specially devoted to nursing the sick and to public education should be maintained. On April 9 Chasset brought up a report of the ecclesiastical committee that it was time for the Assembly to hand over to the departments the management of Church property, and also to decree fixed salaries to all the clergy. The budget demanded for their maintenance was no less than 134,000,000 francs. This proposition was violently opposed by all the clerical party, headed by Mgr. Boisgélín de Cucé, Archbishop of Aix. In the midst of a violent debate, a Carthusian monk, named Dom Gerle, who united strong republican principles with religion, proposed that the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion should always be that of the nation. His proposition was readily applauded by the right, and at the instance of his Jacobin friends he withdrew it the next day; but the subject once proposed was warmly taken up, and the motion was only rejected at last after an eloquent speech by Mirabeau, who reminded the Assembly of the intolerance of Louis XIV., and pointed with a grand gesture to the window whence King Charles IX. had given the signal for the massacre of St. Bartholomew. The debate created much excitement in Paris, and Mirabeau-Tonneau and the Abbé Maury with difficulty escaped from the hands of the populace. The motion was rejected, and the right showed their weakness by getting up a protest which was only signed by 297 members, of whom more than 250 belonged to the order of the clergy.

Again the question of the new constitution of the clergy was adjourned by the important debate on the subject of the right of declaring peace and war; but on June 17 Camus, on behalf of the ecclesiastical committee, brought up the project of the new constitution of the clergy. According to this the number of bishoprics was to be reduced, and there was to be but one bishop for every department, and one *curé*

¹ See chap. i. p. 40.

for every commune. The bishops were to receive from 12,000 to 50,000 francs a year, and the curés from 6000 to 12,000 francs. So far the new arrangement was admirable. The ridiculous disproportion between the bishops' salaries and those of the curés was abolished. The new constitution of the Church was to correspond with the new administrative division of the kingdom, and incomes sufficiently liberal were allotted to all the clergy. But the plan of the committee contained two ridiculous propositions which completely destroyed any chance of vitality in the new organization. Both bishops and curés were to be elected, and before consecration or institution were to take, in the presence of the people, an oath to support in every way the new constitution of the country, which was not yet completed.

These two ridiculous propositions were, of course, passed by the Assembly, and the civil constitution of the clergy was finally decreed on July 12. On both these points the Assembly gave way to its mania for election and taking oaths, and had failed to recognize that their new constitutional Church must, if it was to exist at all, be in regular succession to the old Catholic Church of France. The Jansenists, and still more the philosophers, said that there was no reason why the pope should not confirm duly elected bishops and curés, as he had for so many years confirmed prelates appointed by the king; but they did not perceive that the Church of Rome could not be expected in any way to assist an Assembly which had not agreed to the terms of the concordat. By announcing its willingness to annex Avignon, which would be flat robbery of an old possession of the pope's, and by abolishing the religious orders, the authority of the pope had been deliberately defied, and yet the pope was to be expected to confirm the new constitution. Still more was the clause of the oath a proof of legislative incapacity, for the constitution was not yet completed, and the new curés and bishops were to swear to uphold in every way what was not yet in existence. The strength of the Roman Catholic Church lies in its carefully graduated hier-

archy, and the very idea of election was a distinct attack on that hierarchy. To be sure, Grégoire and the other ecclesiastics, who were full of the idea of a national Church, believed that, when once the new Church was constituted, it would eventually be recognized by the pope if it proposed no new doctrine; but the nationalists did not sufficiently recognize that many of the clergy would refuse to take the oath, and that there would arise in France two distinct bodies of clergy, fundamentally opposed to each other, not in doctrine but in theory of government. Further, by the second title and nineteenth article of the new civil constitution, newly elected bishops were distinctly forbidden to apply to the pope for the confirmation of their appointment, and all priests were submitted in every respect to the civil authorities. Thus in two more points the necessity of applying to Rome for confirmation was formally denied. The power of the pope was formally attacked, and it can hardly be wondered at that the debate was very violent. The new constitution once decreed by the Assembly, it was hoped that the king would use his veto; but, though his feelings were much worked upon by the ecclesiastics in whom he trusted, he yet confirmed the new constitution on August 24, though it is to be feared that, at the same time, he made a mental reservation which caused considerable trouble and even violent riots during the Holy Week of 1791.

That the new civil constitution would produce dissension was so obvious, that on July 24 it was declared that no bishop or curé could remain in office without taking the oath; and since they still continued to act, it was decreed on November 27, 1790, that all bishops and curés who did not take the oath in one week should be at once dismissed, and if they still continued to officiate, should be prosecuted before the district tribunals as disturbers of the public peace of the Church of France. Only four beneficed bishops took the oath out of 135; the Cardinal Archbishop of Sens, the worthless Loménie de Brienne, who had done so much to bring ruin on France, and was now eager to break the laws of his Church; Mgr. de

Jarente, Bishop of Orleans; Mgr. Lafont de Savines, Bishop of Viviers; and Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun; and also three bishops in *partibus infidelium* who were acting as coadjutors—Mgr. Gobel, Bishop of Lydda, who was to apostatize when first constitutional bishop of Paris; Mgr. Miron-dot, Bishop of Babylon; and Mgr. de Loménie de Brienne, nephew of the cardinal-bishop, and Bishop of Trajanopolis. This decree was sanctioned by the king on December 26, 1790, and finally established once for all a great schism between the different parties in the Church, which added to the obvious probability of a civil war. Finally, in August, 1790, on the motion of the Abbé Montesquiou, as reporter of the ecclesiastical committee, the Assembly at once took over the management of the Church property.

In discussing the animated debates and following the regular order of them, which ended in the civil constitution of the clergy, two important motions with regard to religion have been omitted. On February 19, 1790, Foucauld proposed that the Jesuits should receive the same pension as the monks. Considering that the order of the Jesuits had been formally suppressed in France twenty years before, this was a significant sign of the impression they had made on the country, and it also shows a real spirit of liberality and tolerance in the Assembly, which knew well enough that the Jesuits would be most violently opposed to all their new ecclesiastical decrees. It knew that the strength of the Papacy in France had always depended upon the Jesuits; yet, in memory of the great services the order had rendered to education, it granted them liberal pensions. The second motion to be noticed is that proposed by the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt on April 13: "That the Assembly had not and never could have any power over men's consciences and their religious opinions; that the majesty of religion and the respect due to it prevented it from becoming a subject of deliberation." This motion was agreed to, although the Assembly showed its preference for the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman mode of worship, and prepared to spend an enormous amount of money upon its

maintenance. The broad spirit of tolerance thus displayed by the Assembly on this motion does it the very greatest credit, and it is to be regretted that it spoilt its noble plan of a new and well-organized religious establishment by insisting on the process of election.

The interest of these debates lies not so much in the inherent importance of the subject as in the illustration it affords of the Assembly's mode of work. The same keen sense of the necessity for radical reform, and the same courage in proposing wide and comprehensive schemes, which appear in the general development of the constitution, are clearly visible, and also the same adherence to theories, which ruined any chance of the existence of the general constitution, appears in the civil constitution of the clergy. Yet it was in itself a grand attempt to form a genuine national Church for France. The Assembly had to deal with many great abuses. It carefully avoided interference with dogma, and deserves credit for wide and comprehensive tolerance. During these debates many deputies for the first time made their mark, and many others maintained the high distinction they had won. As the foremost framers of the civil constitution of the clergy, may be mentioned Camus, Talleyrand, and Grégoire—a strange trio; the first a violent Jansenist, whose opportunity had at last come, and possessing all the earnestness of a fanatic; the second the most dissolute of dissolute prelates, who hoped only for personal advancement, and saw in the new constitution a means to rid himself of the hated clerical garb; while the third, from his modesty and learning, as well as from his oratorical powers and noble uprightness and purity of life, was one of the shining lights of the whole history of the Revolution. If Henri Grégoire could only be taken as a type of the men who made the civil constitution of the clergy, no greater benefit could ever have been bestowed in France than its promulgation, and no greater damage could ever have been done to the cause of pure religion than its overthrow by Napoleon. Unfortunately, Grégoire had but few equals. Most of the new bishops and curés were ambitious men, who obtained

their election by flattering the electors, and who used their office to overthrow the religion of which they were the ministers, and many of whom, like Gobel, not only denied their religion, but professed atheism, and indulged in the worst excesses of the worship of the goddess of reason. In contradistinction to these unworthy bishops could be distinguished many of a higher character, such as the learned theologian Claude le Coz, Bishop of Rennes, and Jean Louis Jacob, the ignorant Bishop of St. Briec, who was beloved by his flock, and died of a fever caught in visiting the sick in the hospital.

Besides the regular leaders of the Assembly, certain deputies made themselves very conspicuous during the debates on the Church. The two archbishops who led the clergy in their opposition to the establishment of the civil constitution, and who afterwards refused to take the oath, were the aged Cardinal de la Rochefoucauld, celebrated throughout France and loved throughout Normandy for his charity and munificence, and the Archbishop of Aix,¹ who was an unwearied speaker on clerical subjects, though by no means possessing the character of the Archbishop of Rouen. He had on August 4 boldly attacked the feudal privileges, but when the idea of seizing the Church property was mooted, he came to the front and led the clerical opposition. He was the unwearied opponent of every reform, and he it was who drew up the "Exposition des Principes de la Constitution civile du Clergé," which most clearly expressed the reasons of the orthodox clergy for their repugnance to the new scheme. The two archbishops were able to command a considerable number of votes on Church questions, for although the majority of the curés had refused to obey them in June, 1789, when the subject of vote "par tête" was debated, they sympathized in the opposition to the new civil constitution. More than two hundred and fifty out of the three hundred deputies of the clergy had protested against the rejection of Dom Gerle's motion, and quite the same proportion refused to take the

¹ See chap. vii. p. 206.

oath, among whom were men no less pure in life and upright in character than Grégoire.

It fell to the lot of a monk to propose that the Catholic religion was to be for ever the religion of France. Antoine Gerle was born at Riom, in Auvergne, in 1736, and was thus a compatriot of Lafayette and Malouet. In early life he entered the convent of the Chartreuse of Porte St. Marie, and became in 1775 the prior of the monastery. He was sent by his order to the electoral assembly of the clergy of Auvergne at Riom, and elected, on March 27, deputy suppléant to the States-General. He was, therefore, not present at the Oath of the Tennis Court, though David inserts his portrait in his great picture. He did not join the Assembly till December 11, on the resignation of a curé, the Abbé de la Bastide. He spoke the very next day on the uncertainty in which the monks were left because of the decree of November 2, and he spoke with such success that he was at once elected a member of the ecclesiastical committee. The poor monk who had been mewed up in a monastery for nearly forty years quite lost his head in the turmoil of Paris, and, half-mad with excitement, became one of the leading orators of the Jacobin Club. On April 12 he moved his famous motion on the Catholic religion; but, on being upbraided by the Jacobins, withdrew it on the following day. The excitement his motion caused drove him yet more mad, and he became acquainted with Suzanne Labrousse, a half-mad countrywoman, who declared that she could foresee the future. He occupied the latter months of 1790 in supporting her extraordinary visions, and even quoted her in the Assembly. Dom Gerle took the oath to the civil constitution of the clergy, and was at once declared an apostate by the general of the Carthusian order. He was appointed Grand-Vicar of Meaux, but refused the office and remained in Paris. In the course of 1791 he quietly gave away to the poor all the property of his monastery, and when the Constituent Assembly was dissolved he was afraid to return to Auvergne for fear of being prosecuted, and lived in Paris on a pension of nine hundred francs. He was an elector of Paris in 1792, and then became acquainted

with Catherine Théot. This mad woman declared herself the mother of God, and said that Dom Gerle was her prophet. He used to initiate the votaries of Catherine Théot with extraordinary ceremonies, and was arrested in 1794 as a conspirator. After the 9th Thermidor he remained in prison, and was not released until 1795, when Catherine Théot had died in prison. Dom Gerle then lived very obscurely in Paris, occupied with some secret business, probably as a spy, under the Minister of the Interior, and died there about the year 1805. Though a half-mad enthusiast, he had occasional bursts of eloquence, which made him popular at the Jacobin Club.

Two other clerical members of the ecclesiastical committee deserve some notice. The Abbé Gouttes was a priest after the manner of Grégoire, and had but one sincere desire, which was to reorganize the Church to its primitive character. Jean Louis Gouttes was born at Tulle, in 1740, and had served for many years in the dragoons before he took orders, and was then appointed curé of Argilliers, in Languedoc. He was elected to the States-General by the clergy of Beziers, and at once joined the left and followed the lead of Grégoire. From his career he could not be called a learned priest, but his earnestness and frankness gave him great weight as a speaker, and in 1791 he was elected Bishop of Autun, in the place of Talleyrand. He did not long maintain his place, for he violently opposed the Republic, and was guillotined in Paris on March 26, 1794.

The Abbé de Montesquiou was a priest after the manner of Talleyrand. He was born at Auch, in 1757, of the noble family of the Ducs de Montesquiou-Fézensac, and became the agent-general of the clergy in succession to Talleyrand, in 1785. He was elected deputy for the clergy of Paris in 1789, and was one of the most energetic members of the ecclesiastical committee. He was president of the Assembly in January, 1790, and discharged his duties well. He defended the religious orders in February, but moved the final alienation of the goods of the Church in August, 1790. In November, 1790 he was made to speak against the oath, but would most

willingly have taken it. In the ecclesiastical committee he tried to manage matters so that while the Church seemed to be disunited it might really attain great power; and Mirabeau, seeing his intention, remarked of him with truth, "Distrust that little serpent, or he will certainly seduce you."

The Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt was the type of a grand seigneur; but while personally a sincere Catholic, he desired entire toleration of all religions throughout France, and for that purpose had moved his famous motion in April. He was born in 1749, and served in the Carbineers. In 1768 he first visited England, and shortly afterwards became assistant to his father as Master of the Wardrobe. In 1770 he was disgraced by Louis XV. for adhering to the Duc de Choiseul, and ordered to retire to his estate at Liancourt. This estate he tried to manage after the fashion of the English noblemen whom he had known in England. He improved agriculture in every way; he established schools of design, and finding that the invention of the spinning-jenny had thrown many people out of work, he set up a large manufactory at Liancourt. He was decidedly a liberal in opinion of the English type, and was a particularly intimate friend of Turgot. Louis XVI. liked him and trusted him, and when, in 1789, he was elected deputy for the noblesse of Clermont, he took a leading position in the Estate of the noblesse. He was elected the third president of the National Assembly after Bailly and the Archbishop of Vienna, as a testimony of the great respect in which he was held. In 1791 he was Governor-General of Normandy, and earnestly supported Mirabeau's plan that the king should leave Paris and establish himself at Rouen. In 1792 he was marked out for arrest with his cousin, the Duc de la Rochefoucauld, but escaped to England, and spent some years at Bury St. Edmund's, near his old friend, Arthur Young. It was now that he met the reward of his great charity and munificence; for two friends of his, Lazouski and Charles Lacretelle, who had joined the republicans, saved what of his property they could and sent it to him in England. Further than that, the department claimed from the Convention the estate of

Liancourt and the school which the duke had established as public property, urging that they would be most useful to the State. He had become Duc de la Rochefoucauld, in August, 1792, and on receiving the money from Lazouski travelled in America. In 1799 he returned to France, and his old department with joy returned to him his great estate of Liancourt untouched and indeed improved. He refused to recognize Napoleon, or to mix any more in politics; but the emperor insisted on giving him the Legion of Honour for his great services as a manufacturer, and for introducing vaccination into France. On the return of the Bourbons, Louis XVIII. did all he could to induce him to take office, but the duke lived happily on his country estate, and, unlike most of the nobility, cared more for the love of his neighbours than the favour of the king. He died in 1827, and although his body was insulted by the police, under the direction of the government of Charles X., thousands of his poor retainers followed their benefactor to the grave.¹ He was a fine type of the liberal grand seigneur, and had immense weight in the early days of the Revolution from his well-known personal intimacy with the king, and his high principles. He did not interfere much in political questions, but confined himself rather to doing what good he could to assuage the poverty and famine among the people. Had more of the nobility of France been like the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, not only would the noblesse have kept their estates untouched and their property unhurt, but the Church of France might have been widened by the introduction of liberal ideas; and a civil constitution of the clergy, supported by such bishops as Grégoire and Le Coz, and by such laymen as the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, might have survived the terrible crisis into which it was to be plunged by the ill-considered measures of the National Assembly.

¹ *Vie du Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt*, by the Marquis de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt. Paris: 1827.

CHAPTER XI.

MIRABEAU AND THE COURT.

Weakness of the court—The Comte de Mercy-Argenteau—The Comte de la Marck—Negotiations between Mirabeau and the court—Mirabeau's letters to the king and to Lafayette—His opinion of Lafayette—Debts paid by the king—The affair of Nootka Sound—The debate on the right of declaring peace and war—Interview at St. Cloud—Mirabeau's knowledge of foreign politics—The foreign policy of the Assembly—Mirabeau and Montmorin—Mirabeau reporter of the diplomatic committee—Danger of anarchy—The four enemies approaching—Mirabeau's thirtieth note for the court—Extravagance—New assistants—Health gives way—Return of Orleans—The riot at the Hôtel de Castries—The new ministry—Mirabeau's new partisans—The fête of the Federation—Mirabeau's great plan—Could it have succeeded?

THE first months of the year 1790 had been passed by the Assembly in developing its new constitution and in preparing the great measure of the civil constitution of the clergy. It had also interfered in many points with the administration, and had made clearly manifest the intention of the majority of the deputies to reduce the king to be merely the first servant of the nation. It might have been perfectly possible to have proved to the people of France how impractical and utterly devoid of vitality was the work of the National Assembly; but, instead of doing this, the court and the ministry alike occupied their time in personal squabbles. The queen spent her money in hiring libellous hack-writers to attack the leading members of the left; and the ministers, with Necker at their head, tried to temporize in order to stand well with

all parties. Such policy, or rather such want of policy, was steadily leading the court to a position of utter impotence, which encouraged those radicals in the Assembly and in Paris who were now beginning to dream of a French republic. Marie Antoinette had at least one able adviser by her side—the Comte de Mercy-Argenteau, who had been ambassador at Paris since the year 1766, and had arranged the marriage of the queen, and who had been practically her guardian throughout her residence in France. He had seen her, both when dauphine and queen, every day for many a long year, and had reported her daily conduct and mode of life to her imperial mother. Naturally it was to the Comte de Mercy-Argenteau that the queen appealed, when she found her own influence inadequate to check the progress of the Revolution.

Florimond Claude, Comte de Mercy-Argenteau¹ was born in 1722 at Liège, and had succeeded to the great Mercy estates in Hungary and Lorraine on the death of his father, who had been chosen heir to the last Field-Marshal de Mercy, the descendant of the great general of the Thirty Years' War in 1723. He had been appointed ambassador at Turin in 1757, and had been naturalized a Frenchman for his Lorraine property. He had been appointed Austrian ambassador at Paris in 1766. He there formed an important link in the policy of Maria Theresa and her minister, the Prince von Kaunitz, whose lifelong wish was to humble Frederick of Prussia by forming a close alliance with France. The Duc de Choiseul, who was chief minister of France, entered thoroughly into the policy of the empress-queen, and to the Pacte de Famille, which united the courts of France and Spain, he desired to add a close union with the house of Austria. Mercy-Argenteau and Choiseul arranged the marriage of the Archduchess Marie Antoinette with the dauphin, and when the princess left Vienna, Maria Theresa requested him to direct her daughter's conduct, and ordered her to obey him in every respect as her most confidential friend. The daily reports of the ambassador

¹ *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et La Marck*, vol. i. pp. 198–205.

to the empress¹ show how minutely he supervised everything connected with the household of Marie Antoinette; and when she became queen of France his influence proportionately increased with hers. But he was a very wise counsellor, and while pointing out to the queen how she could best assist the policy of Austria, he gave her the best advice as to how to win the hearts of the people of France. Her frivolity and extravagance astounded him, and he did all in his power by frank remonstrance to check it. His advice was not always followed by the headstrong queen, but in every situation of difficulty she applied to him. He had earnestly advised her, whatever else she did, to be sincere in her politics, for he declared that plots would only bring discredit on her fame; and he tried as much as possible to identify himself with France by selling his large Hungarian estates, and purchasing property in San Domingo. Such was the character and such had been the career of the statesman to whom Marie Antoinette applied in her great distress. His long residence at Paris had made him thoroughly acquainted with all French statesmen, and had given him an insight into French character. He perceived, as clearly as Mirabeau himself, that the only way for the French monarchy to continue to exist was for it to obtain authority over the Assembly by making a close alliance with the leaders of the Assembly, and he also perceived that Mirabeau was the one man best fitted for this post. He therefore earnestly begged the queen to open a communication with Mirabeau, to trust him wholly, to attach him to herself by uniting his interests to hers, and to give him *carte blanche* to direct the Assembly towards limited monarchy. He knew, what Marie Antoinette never could understand, that absolute monarchy in France was over, and that nothing could ever bring back the old feudal ideas. His desire was to establish a strong ministry with Mirabeau at its head. He therefore begged the queen to open communications with Mirabeau, and

¹ *Correspondance de Marie Antoinette avec Marie Thérèse, accompagnée des rapports secrets du Comte de Mercy, publiée par M. d'Arneth et M. Geffroy. 3 vols. 1874.*

that La Marck should be asked to act as intermediary. The queen consented, and Mercy wrote to La Marck in the middle of March, inviting him to come at once to Paris.

Auguste Marie Raymond, Prince d'Arenberg and Comte de la Marck,¹ came of an old Flemish family which had long been distinguished in the service of Austria. His father, though a prince of the empire, had served as field-marshal in the Austrian army during the Seven Years' War, and had won great distinction under Marshal Daun. His mother was the daughter of the last Comte de la Marck, the direct lineal descendant of the "Wild Boar of the Ardennes." Prince Auguste was the second son, and had at an early age served in the Austrian army in Belgium, and had a good opportunity of studying Marshal Lacy's new organization, which was modelled on that of Frederick the Great. In 1768 he was adopted by his maternal grandfather, the last Comte de la Marck, and in 1770 went to France to commence his service in the proprietary regiment which his grandfather owned in the French service. He had been particularly recommended to the young dauphine by Maria Theresa, and was cordially received by her as a son of one of her mother's favourite generals. He did not remain long with his regiment, and succeeded his grandfather in 1775. He then went to court, where he became the intimate friend of the Vicomte de Noailles and other brilliant young courtiers. He commanded his regiment in India under the Comte de Bussy, and on his return became inspector-general of infantry, and assisted in the reorganization of the French army, which had been initiated by the Comte de Saint-Germain and carried out under his immediate superintendence. He married Mademoiselle de Cernay, a great heiress in French Flanders, and had been elected in 1789 by the noblesse of Quesnoy to the States-General. He had been introduced to Mirabeau in the year 1788, by Sénac de Meilhan, at the house of the Prince de Poix, and had become very intimate with him. He had determined to use this intimacy to serve the queen, and had, in September, 1789, promised to allow

¹ *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et La Marck*, vol. i. pp. 11-24.

Mirabeau fifty louis a month to assist him in his great pecuniary need. It was through him that Mirabeau had been asked to draw up a memoir for the court in October, 1789, which he presented to Monsieur, the Comte de Provence. He had then taken a great part in the conferences which took place at the end of October, when the idea of a ministry containing Necker, Lafayette, and Mirabeau was talked of; but after the fatal decree of November 7 had been passed, Mirabeau became greatly discouraged, and La Marck left Paris for Belgium. There he remained until he received the important letter of the Comte de Mercy-Argenteau demanding his presence at Paris.

La Marck arrived on March 16, and at once had a long interview with the ambassador; but he refused to make any overtures to Mirabeau, or in any way interfere in the matter, unless Mercy himself agreed to give Mirabeau an interview, and asserted that the orator had been greatly disgusted by the manner in which he had been treated in the previous October. The ambassador showed great reluctance to meeting Mirabeau, and thus surrendering his duty as ambassador to interfere in French politics; but after a fortnight's delay he agreed to meet Mirabeau, and had a secret interview with him, in the beginning of April, in La Marck's house.¹ La Marck next had an interview² with the king and queen, in the apartment of the first bedchamber-woman, Madame Thibaut, when their majesties declared that they would be very glad to receive advice from Mirabeau, but declared also that they would only communicate with him secretly. La Marck felt that this restriction would almost destroy any chance of Mirabeau's doing any good, for it clearly showed the distrust the queen felt of the tribune, and that she felt towards him the same antipathy which she had expressed in the previous year. She refused even to listen to his advice until La Marck assured her that Mirabeau had dined with him on October 5, and that he would swear himself that Mirabeau had nothing to do with the events of October 5 and 6. After this assertion the queen

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. i. p. 102.

² *Ibid.*, p. 103.

begged La Marck to ask Mirabeau to advise the court as to their future conduct. Mirabeau expressed to La Marck his joy at being at last of some service to the cause of order, for he perceived that in the present state of affairs matters were going from bad to worse, and, in his oft-repeated expression, "if something was not done at once, the people would trample on the corpses of the king and queen."¹

Mirabeau thereupon wrote to the king, on May 10, 1790, a letter,² in which he declares that the re-establishment of the legitimate authority of the king was the first need of France, and the only means of saving her. He saw clearly that anarchy was approaching with rapid steps, and that the only means to check it was to give the king real power to execute the law. He continued, "I must have two months to collect, or rather to make, means of action, to prepare men's spirits, and bring back to reason all prudent citizens. I will maintain in every department an influential system of correspondence, and will report the results to the king. My movements will be unperceived, but I shall every day make one step forward. A quack promises an immediate cure and kills; but a real physician observes, and acts systematically, doses, measures, and sometimes cures." He had before this made one more attempt to form a coalition with Lafayette, who was still incomparably the most powerful man in France. He felt that Lafayette had treated him very badly in the negotiations of the previous October, but hoped that he might now think differently, and be willing to join him. He wrote to him on April 28,³ that he had only been separated from him because Lafayette's political friends were worthy of neither of them; but he continued, "These motives of separation exist no longer; the Barnaves, Duports, and Lameths fatigue you no longer by their active inaction. Monkey-like, it is possible to simulate cunning, but not strength. Great things can be done with machines, and even the noise of thunder can be imitated, but thunder cannot be made. . . . The real perils which menace the State are the long struggle with anarchy, the want of

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. i. p. 81.

² *Ibid.*, p. 318.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 312.

respect for the law, all the blows which might dismember the empire, all the differences of public opinion, the quarrels of the new administrative bodies, and, above all, the judgment which this kingdom and Europe will pass upon the edifice of that constitution, from which the scaffolding, that does not yet permit us to see the whole, will soon disappear. . . . Nobody knows better than I do the elements of fear and hope which attract to you the most moderate people of France."

The communication with the court once opened, La Marck felt it necessary that the union should be made firm, and, at the suggestion of the Comte de Mercy, agreed to ask Mirabeau what terms he would desire. Mirabeau declared that he would be quite happy if his debts could be paid, and if he could himself receive an income of one hundred louis a month. The queen agreed, and a schedule of Mirabeau's debts was sent to her. They amounted in all only to 208,000 livres—a sum by no means excessive, when it is considered that his father's property afforded an income of 50,000 livres a year. The schedule included many curious items, especially a debt for Mirabeau's wedding suit, which had never been paid for. The orator threw himself with his wonted enthusiasm into the cause, believing that he had at last a chance to do something. He continued to appeal to Lafayette to treat him openly as his ally. "Oh! M. de Lafayette," he exclaimed, in his letter of June 1,¹ "Richelieu was Richelieu against the nation and for the court, and though Richelieu did much harm to the public liberty, he did great good to the monarchy. Be Richelieu for the nation on behalf of the court. You will restore the monarchy by consolidating public liberty. But Richelieu had his Capucin friar, Joseph. Do you, too, have your gray cardinal, or you will lose yourself and not save us. Your great qualities need my directing energy, and my directing energy needs your great qualities. You believe in little men who, for little considerations, by little manœuvres, and with little views, wish to make us useless to each other." On

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. i. p. 324.

the same day, June 1, he sent to the court a long memoir,¹ in which he declared that he had "always been the defender of the monarchical power, regulated by the law, and the apostle of liberty guaranteed by the monarchical power. It has been said of the divinity," he remarks, "that to work is to pray to it; it should be said of kings that to serve them is to recognize their benefits." He continued to discuss the power and character of Lafayette,² "whose policy," he said, "will always be to fear and flatter the people, to partake its errors from hypocrisy and self-interest; to support, whether right or wrong, the most numerous party; to terrify the court by popular riots which he himself had planned, or had inspired the fear of, in order to render himself necessary; to prefer the public opinion of Paris to that of the rest of the kingdom, because his strength does not come from the provinces. The man," he continued, "though no demagogue, will always be dangerous to the royal power so long as the public opinion of Paris, of which he can be but the instrument, continues to be a law to him."

Mirabeau had given such proofs of his desire to assist the court by his attempt to ally himself with Lafayette, though he well understood the vain and weak character of the man, and shown so much political wisdom in his notes, that the queen, although she did not for one moment intend to trust him, readily agreed to the Comte de Mercy's proposition, that Mirabeau's debts should be paid, and a monthly income allowed him. She pressed La Marek to undertake this task; but he said that the necessary visits to the court would be so frequent that suspicion would fall upon Mirabeau; and Mgr. de Fontanges, Archbishop of Toulouse and Almoner to the queen, was let into the secret, and given the important commission. Mgr. de Fontanges was a good specimen of the French ecclesiastic; though not so witty as Talleyrand, so dissolute as Dillon, so able as De Cicé, or so intriguing as De Boisgélin, he was the one archbishop whose character stood fairly high both with the queen and with the people. He had obtained his rapid

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. i. pp. 326-330.

² *Ibid.*, p. 328.

promotion by being the great-nephew of the famous Cardina de Bernis, minister of Madame de Pompadour, and somewhat resembled him in character. He not only accomplished the payment of Mirabeau's debts skilfully, but handed him four promissory notes for 250,000 livres each, signed by the king, which were to be cashed on the termination of the Constituent Assembly, if Mirabeau had fulfilled his promises.

In these very months of May and June Mirabeau distinguished himself in the Assembly in the great debate upon the right of declaring peace and war. He would certainly have taken the view he did whether he had been in communication with the court or not, for it was in strict consonance with his character, and especially with his conduct with regard to the veto. The question arose out of a dispute between England and Spain on the subject of Nootka Sound. Throughout the eighteenth century, Spain had perpetually been attempting to prove that she was a great power by interfering with England in America; but it always ended in her backing out of the matter, to the great credit of English statesmen. On this occasion the Spaniards had claimed the English settlement of Nootka Sound in Vancouver Island, off the west coast of North America, on the ground of precolonization, and had roughly treated some of the English colonists, and the captain of an English ship of war. Pitt, who was a great believer in threats, made a great noise as to what he should do, and ordered a large fleet to be prepared, which is known in English naval history as the Spanish Armament. The court of Spain blustered loudly, and appealed to the court of France for assistance under the terms of the *Pacte de Famille* which had been concluded by Choiseul. By the *Pacte de Famille*, France and Spain were bound to assist each other in every foreign complication whatever, and the king of France felt himself morally bound to comply with the demand of Spain. Naturally the *Pacte de Famille* was violently attacked in the Assembly, and Mirabeau pointed out to the king¹ how he could escape from the difficult position in which he

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. i. pp. 338-345.

was placed. He declared that on all grounds the *Pacte de Famille* should be dissolved, since it must necessarily often involve France in unjust wars brought about by Spain alone for Spanish interests, and he recommended that an ordinary treaty of alliance should be concluded instead. By this expedient he believed the Spanish difficulty could be got over, for Spain in her present position must consent to whatever the king of France requested, and he himself knew enough of Spanish policy to know that the probability of war with England was very slight. On this understanding, after an extremely diplomatic speech by Mirabeau, in which he managed to offend neither Spain nor England, the vote for the completion of sixteen new ships was carried.

The debates on the question of the Nootka Sound dispute brought on a yet more important debate on the subject of the right of declaring peace and war. This right, Mirabeau declared, must necessarily belong to the king, as head of the executive. It was impossible for an Assembly, or even for a committee of an Assembly, to carry on secret negotiations, and follow from hour to hour the rapid changes of diplomacy, and he pointed out that the favourable moment for making peace or war must often be lost when a large number of individuals had to be consulted, and very often long debates to be listened to. The wisdom of his remarks was obvious, but the radical majority of the Assembly entirely failed to perceive their importance. The Lameths, and still more Robespierre, thought that if the king had the right of declaring peace and war, France would often be plunged into wars for merely dynastic purposes, and that the wealth of the kingdom would be squandered in projects which did not concern the nation. Mirabeau was too thorough a statesman to insist rigidly on every detail of his plan, but he managed to carry the essential part of his proposition, namely, that the king should have the power of initiative, both in peace and war, while the Assembly should have the right of ratifying or not the royal initiative. He knew that public opinion would seldom allow a war, when once entered upon, to be suddenly

stopped, or that a peace should not be ratified unless it were obviously and flagrantly imprudent. On this question, therefore, the French Assembly received very much the same power as the English Parliament, which, while it can censure ministers for their conduct of foreign affairs, cannot of itself direct the course of diplomacy or of war. Mirabeau, by his conduct in this important debate, had well proved again his title to the rank of a great statesman. He had shown the value of his assistance to the court, and had earned the hatred of the extreme radicals and of the populace of Paris, who even planned attempts upon his life and his popularity. Even while he was speaking upon the subject, the cry of the newsboys was heard without, "For sale, a new pamphlet, entitled 'The Great Treason of the Comte de Mirabeau.'"

His conduct earned him on this occasion the thanks of the queen, who consented to have an interview with him, on July 3, at Saint Cloud.¹ To Saint Cloud the court had retired for a short period, and Mirabeau had also left Paris to stay with his niece, Madame d'Aragon, at Auteuil. After a long secret interview, of which the radicals got some hint, but which they could not prove, had taken place, Mirabeau was greatly impressed by the manly attitude of the queen. "Nothing shall stop me," he said afterwards to La Marck; "I will die sooner than not fulfil my promises." But the queen unfortunately was not equally impressed by Mirabeau; she declared that the very sight of him had filled her with horror, though she now believed him devoted to the cause of the monarchy, and that she had even suffered a slight indisposition as the result of the interview with the man whom she persisted in associating with the events of October 5 and 6.

Mirabeau's complete mastery of foreign politics had appeared during the discussions of the difficult Nootka Sound question, and he soon proceeded to take the entire management of the foreign policy of France, which he regulated until his death in the following year. He had studied foreign politics more thoroughly than any living Frenchman. From his sojourn

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. i. p. 134.

at the court of Berlin, and keen observation in his early days, he had completely mastered German politics, and knew exactly what was necessary to prevent Germany from interfering in the internal affairs of France. His stay in England and his many English friends made him equally a master of English politics. At the same time, he was the only man who understood how peculiarly dangerous was the extraordinary disregard of the ordinary processes of diplomacy which was sanctioned by the Assembly, and how it had damaged France in the eyes of foreign countries. He knew that the one thing necessary for the Revolution to come to a quiet and peaceful termination was that it should develop without interference from foreign nations. He knew also that the German princes were watching affairs in France with the keenest interest, for they feared that the example of the French people would be infectious, and that they would have trouble at home. In fact, all that the German states required at this early period was a pretext for interfering, and that they should not have that pretext was the great desire of Mirabeau and all thinking men in France.

The high-handed disregard of foreign treaties and foreign nationalities, shown by the Constituent Assembly with reference to Avignon and the German princes whose estates lay in Alsace and Lorraine, made it probable that a sufficient pretext would be given for German interference. Avignon had nearly been declared united to France without the consent of its ruler, the pope, though innumerable treaties had recognized his sovereignty. Robespierre and other deputies of the extreme left said that the people of Avignon spoke French, and therefore ought to become French citizens, whether the pope objected or not. The rights of the princes of the empire in Lorraine and Alsace had been recognized also by numerous treaties, and even the most extreme members of the Assembly acknowledged that these rights could not be taken away without due compensation. It was very doubtful whether the princes of the empire would accept any compensation at all, and it was a curious and difficult question of international

law whether they could be made to surrender their rights, even on receiving a good compensation. But the Assembly, with its ideas about the rights of man, ignored the difficulty and settled the matter its own way. A fortunate combination of circumstances at this time gave Mirabeau the opportunity to take the whole management of foreign affairs into his own hands, and thus kept France from suffering at once for the headstrong policy of the majority of the Constituent Assembly.

The Comte de Montmorin Saint H rem,¹ the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was quite incapable of managing his department efficiently in a time of crisis, and was not sorry to have such an adviser as Mirabeau to help him. He had had a good deal to do with the great statesman before the meeting of the States-General, and had not been favourably impressed with his character. It was to him as Foreign Minister that Mirabeau had sold one manuscript of his "Secret History of the Court of Berlin," on condition, according to Malouet,² that he should not become a candidate for the States-General, and the minister was naturally chagrined that Mirabeau had not only secured his election, but also allowed Lejay to publish the book from another manuscript. He had been exceedingly wrath at this breach of faith, and had, in 1789, proposed to ship Mirabeau off to India to get him out of the way. His position as Necker's chief supporter in May and June, 1789, has already been noticed; he was dismissed from office, with Necker, on July 12, and returned with him after the taking of the Bastille. But even Montmorin, though no great politician, had perceived the weakness of Necker, and had, by the end of 1789, ceased to believe in him as thoroughly as before. It was not so much vacillation of principle as a desire to be ever on the side of the strongest which made Montmorin incline to the society of the chief members of the left. He hated to oppose anything, and conferred with Barnave and his friends rather in order that he should not be perpetually reprimanded and

¹ See chap. iii. pp. 79, 80.

² Malouet's *M moires and Correspondance*, vol. i. pp. 238-242.

harassed in the Assembly, than from any adherence to their principles. He was, in the summer of 1790, allowed to perceive that there was some bond of union between Mirabeau and the court, though he was not completely initiated into the secret alliance until the following September; but as early as July he perceived that he was expected in every way to listen to Mirabeau's advice.

In July, 1790, after the affair of Nootka Sound, a diplomatic committee was elected by the Assembly, primarily to examine all existing treaties between France and foreign powers, and also to communicate and report to the Assembly upon all questions of foreign affairs.¹ Mirabeau was elected reporter of this committee, and soon obtained such ascendancy over the other members, that he often wrote his reports without submitting them to the sanction of the committee at all. Montmorin's character made him quite willing to transfer the burden of foreign politics to Mirabeau, who thus became in effect a constitutional foreign minister. He directed Montmorin what to write in his despatches, and what to say to the Assembly when summoned before it, and was able to defend despatches which he had himself inspired, and measures which he had recommended to the Assembly itself. Had every department of the State been similarly managed, the difficulty of carrying on the executive government might have been greatly relieved, and every department would thus have had its spokesman in the Assembly. But there was only one Mirabeau, and he had as much as he could do in directing the foreign policy of France in addition to his other labours.

But notwithstanding the immense amount of time taken up by the management of foreign affairs, Mirabeau never lost sight of the great evil which was threatening France, namely, the increase of anarchy. This was the point he had so strongly insisted upon, in his first communications with Lafayette, and at the conferences of Poissy in October, 1789, and

¹ *Le Département des Affaires étrangères pendant la Révolution (1787-1804)*, by F. Masson, 1877, chap. iii.

again in his letter of April 18 to Lafayette. He saw very clearly that Lafayette was not doing his best to put down the anarchy which reigned in France, because it was for his own advantage that it should last until he became a veritable mayor of the palace. In a note, dated June 20, 1790,¹ Mirabeau explained the position of affairs in one short sentence. He wrote, "The army gives means for brigandage to whoever cares to take up the trade of robbery on a large scale. Mandrin could to-day become king of one and even of many provinces." Mandrin was the greatest robber and brigand France had ever seen in the eighteenth century, and the words of Mirabeau were as true as they were strong. But if Lafayette would not act, neither would the ministry. The ministers were afraid to take any strong measure for fear of being condemned and dismissed by the Assembly, and their sole desire was to remain in office. In the same note Mirabeau speaks of² "the utter impotence of the ministry which is more cowardly than feeble, more and more swallowed up in its own vanity every day instead of being occupied with urgent business, more and more directed to this one object, of maintaining itself in power a few weeks longer, and of attempting to oppose, not the Revolution, but the revolutionists, instead of trying to render one real service to the king."

In his sixteenth note for the court, dated August 13,³ Mirabeau begins, "Four enemies are advancing with redoubled speed—taxation, bankruptcy, the army, and the winter. It is necessary to take some decided step. I mean by that, that we must either prepare for events while we wait for them, or else provoke events while we direct them. In two words, civil war is certain and perhaps necessary. Does the court wish to attack or to be attacked? Can it or will it wish to prevent its breaking out?" In this memoir Mirabeau shows his appreciation of the difficulties, which were rapidly producing a state of anarchy. As to the great financial question, he had long known the utter incompetency of Necker, and how he was wasting all the great opportunities which the

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. i. p. 334.

² *Ibid.*, p. 335.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 384

Assembly threw into his hands. Mirabeau himself had neither leisure nor inclination to undertake the management of the finances of the kingdom in addition to that of its foreign affairs; yet he did his best to hurry on the fall of Necker, and to secure the retirement of at least one incompetent minister, who had entirely lost all the popularity which he had enjoyed in the previous July. The whole question of the economic condition of France must be treated separately to understand the difficulties with which Necker had to contend, and the manner in which financial distress was forcing on a political crisis. With regard to the army, Mirabeau was equally at issue with the whole policy pursued by the Assembly, but perceived that, to strengthen the executive, it was necessary to in some way secure at least a portion of the army for the personal safeguard of the king. The only troops which could be depended upon were the Swiss; and in August, 1790, Mirabeau earnestly begged the court to appoint an inspector-general of the Swiss, a post which was authorized by the National Assembly, and to form them into a distinct corps which could be depended upon to protect the king, and he proposed for the office his friend La Marek.¹ This subject he insists upon more and more towards the end of the year, for it formed an integral part of the great plan which was slowly forming in his mind, and which he felt it necessary that the court should at once adopt. The last great danger which was approaching was the winter, and the winter meant starvation to many of the poorer classes. These great dangers, Mirabeau insisted again and again, could only be avoided by following his advice and complying with his great plan; but the queen would not and could not trust him, and in spite of all efforts she was steadily hurrying her husband and herself to their doom. She would only follow Mirabeau's advice just so far as it suited her, but would not wholly trust him.

On discovering that, in spite of his great services, his advice was treated in this way, Mirabeau sent to the court, on October 14, 1790, the famous note which is numbered 30

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. i. p. 386.

in his correspondence with La Marck.¹ This contained a regular profession of political faith. In it he discusses four questions. Firstly, What ought to be understood by the bases of the constitution? To this he answers, Monarchy, hereditary in the dynasty of the Bourbons; a legislative assembly, periodically elected and confined to legislative functions; the unity of the executive power, which is to be supreme in all matters of administration, execution of the law, and in the direction of the army; the maintenance of the new divisions of the kingdom; the power of the legislative assembly to arrange taxation; liberty of the press; gratuitous justice; responsibility of ministers; sale of royal and Church lands; establishment of a civil list; and the utter abolition of all privileges and of the feudal system. Such he declares to be what he understands by the bases of the constitution. The second question he asks is, What is meant by the popular party? The really popular party is that which wishes to maintain the constitution. If the court would only abandon entirely the old magistracy, the noblesse, and the clergy, it will be able to influence the majority of the Assembly, and to acquire the right means to direct it; and to direct is to govern. He thirdly discusses the question of a ministry. If the new ministry was chosen from among the Jacobins, they would prepare the whole country for a republic; if from other than the Jacobins, the Jacobins would make government impossible, and the present state of anarchy would be continued. Therefore it would be best if the decree of November 7 could be repealed, and some ministers chosen from the Jacobins and some from another section of the popular party; for, says Mirabeau, identity of powers is a great means of reconciliation and union. The fourth question is, Who shall be sent amongst the departments to instruct the provinces as to what is going on in Paris? To this he answers that literary men should be sent, with a salary of one thousand livres a month, to consult all the better class of citizens and to explain to them what mistakes the Assembly had made, and that a great change was necessary if a durable constitution was to be

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. ii. pp. 14-17.

established. Mirabeau had not long sent in this important note, when he discovered that Marie Antoinette was taking the advice of Bergasse as well as his own, and even preferring Bergasse to himself. His contempt for this "mesmeric idiot," as he called him, was expressed in a violent letter to La Marck,¹ in which he says, "What can be expected from a court which seeks for the remedy of its evils on the tripod of the illuminati." No wonder that Mirabeau was often discouraged in the formation of his great plan, and no wonder that, in spite of all his greatness, the Revolution was bound to make steady progress, and that the queen, with the stubborn obstinacy of a wilful woman, was driving the king directly towards destruction.

All through the latter months of 1790 Mirabeau's influence with the people and the Assembly somewhat diminished. His communications with the court were suspected though they could not be proved, and he gave the best grounds for their being suspected by breaking out suddenly into luxury with the money he had received. The sudden payment of the debts of such an utterly ruined man would alone have raised suspicions, and they were increased by his taking a splendid mansion and setting up a large establishment. In vain did La Marck beg him to live in his old style, and merely to move to larger apartments. Throughout his life Mirabeau had been so poor and so unable to indulge his taste for spending money, that when he had the opportunity it was too sweet for him to surrender. Yet, after all, the money granted to him by the court was not so very great in extent. It consisted of one hundred louis a month, and three hundred livres for M. de Comps, his copyist, who had to copy all his notes for the court, and who was necessarily greatly in his confidence. Pellenc had also to be paid a considerable salary, but not by the court; and Mirabeau's expenses, without keeping up a luxurious household, would have been enough to consume a much larger income. Notwithstanding the perpetual rumours about his communications with the court, he remained a great favourite

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. ii. p. 21.

with that section of the Parisian populace who loved him rather for his oratory and turns of witty expression than for his political opinions, and who recognized the great man without troubling themselves about the details of his conduct. From his newly acquired income he was able to entertain on a great scale, and the company entertained was not always of the highest quality, though it often included such men as La Marck, the Vicomte de Noailles, the Prince de Poix, and the Archbishop of Toulouse.

The assistance which he now received from Dumont and Duroveray and Clavière was much less than it had been formerly. Dumont had returned to England to superintend the education of the eldest son of the Marquis of Lansdowne; Duroveray had more than once quarrelled with Mirabeau, and was now conducting the *Courrier de Provence* pretty much as if it were his own and he was its original founder; while Clavière was forming a bond of union with men of more extreme and republican opinions than Mirabeau altogether approved. Their places were taken by other valuable coadjutors, foremost among whom were Pellenc, De Comps, Lamourette, and Reybaz.¹ Joachim Pellenc, who had been secretary to Mirabeau throughout his career in the Assembly, now became more than ever necessary to his political existence; he understood his master's style so thoroughly that Mirabeau had only to express a few ideas for Pellenc to work them out exactly after his own fashion. He was also a somewhat learned publicist, and had a wide knowledge of history with which to assist Mirabeau in cases of difficulty. De Comps was a very young man, who came of an ancient but ruined family of Provence. In 1788 he had attached himself to Mirabeau, and became his copyist, but he does not seem to have been trusted with any independent work. He was theatrically fond of his master, and either went mad or pretended to go mad for a short time after Mirabeau's death. The Abbé Lamourette had come to Mirabeau's assistance during the discussions on the civil constitution of the clergy, and had written his speeches

¹ See chap. viii. pp. 251, 252.

on that subject for him. He quite understood Mirabeau's opinion, that a national Church was desirable rather for the distribution of charity than for religion and education, and that the constitutional clergy should receive a fixed salary from the State in order to prevent them from again becoming an order, or anything but the paid subjects of the State. But Mirabeau and Lamourette both had too much knowledge of the history of the Roman Catholic religion, not to see that the compulsory imposition of the oath would necessarily cause an important schism. Reybaz¹ was the most useful coadjutor of Mirabeau at this period. He was a Genevese like Dumont and Clavière, but was far more modest than either of them. Exiled from his own city for his advanced republican principles, he lived in great obscurity in Paris with his daughter, until one day he was fortunately introduced to Mirabeau. The orator found the sentiments of the modest Genevese were greatly in consonance with his own, and requested him to assist him in his work. Reybaz had long desired to have his say on the subjects which interested him, and gladly accepted Mirabeau's proposal. Some of the greatest speeches which Mirabeau delivered, particularly those on the assignats, were written word for word by Reybaz, and yet there is never any sign of the author's claiming any credit for his work. It is amusing to read how Mirabeau apologizes to Reybaz for occasionally omitting a word or two of his written speeches; how delicately he compliments the writer on the praise which he himself is winning, and how he begs that the fair secretary of Reybaz will write a little larger.

Mirabeau's health suffered seriously this summer, and he had the first attack of the internal disease which was at last to terminate fatally. It is quite unfair to attribute Mirabeau's illness to excesses, for he was no notorious drunkard, and, as Mirabeau-Tonneau remarked, "drunkenness is the only vice Honoré has left to me." His immensely strong constitution had suffered severely from his long imprisonment at Vincennes. His labours ever since the meeting

¹ *Un Collaborateur de Mirabeau*, by Ph. Plan, 1879.

of the States-General had been immense, and in spite of the well-known help of so many distinguished men, the communications with the court and his management of foreign affairs had rendered them quite colossal. It is not to be wondered at that his health began to give way. In July, 1790, he had had a very severe attack, from which he feared he would not recover, and hurriedly sent for La Marck, to whom he gave all his correspondence,¹ and asked him to preserve it and publish it after his death, in order to show what his political principles really were. During this attack his eyes had become affected, and he became nearly blind, which made it impossible for him to write. This it was which rendered it necessary that De Comps should be paid by the court. Such was the life of Mirabeau during the latter half of 1790, keenly enjoying every pleasure, the friend of Talma the actor, admired and painted by David the artist, and adored by the circle of his intimate friends. It did not matter with whom he came in contact, every one, except the queen, was charmed by the frankness, openness, and the wonderful sweetness of his nature. There was a breadth in his character which prevented him from remembering, or seeming to remember, any small or petty injury, or taking any account of malicious sayings. He was always ready to forgive, not from any great charity in himself, but because forgiveness came easy to him. Often, indeed, he bitterly declared to La Marck what harm the immorality of his youth was doing to France, but he never said a bitter word against those who were ever ready to hold him up to reprobation, and to attack him with a libellous fury, which would have enraged beyond endurance any other man of the period. It was this breadth in his mind, in his character, and in his political opinions which made him the great man he was.

It is necessary to notice his conduct in certain small matters in order that stress should not alone be laid upon his political plans, for he was a great man in little things as well as in great. Particularly admirable is his advice to the

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. i. p. 374.

queen, when the news arrived that the Duke of Orleans had left England and was to present himself in the Assembly. He had no reason to love Orleans, but despised him heartily. He had suffered much from having his name associated with that of the duke in connection with the events of October 5 and 6. Yet his advice is tendered without any trace of personal animosity or contempt. He advised the court and the queen¹ to receive the duke open-handed, and to allow him to take his seat in the Assembly, and then to say that they hoped that the first prince of the blood-royal would not forget what a duty he owed to his sovereign. By this means, said Mirabeau, Orleans might be converted into a very useful friend. There was no need to ask his advice, but if the queen received the duke and his friends graciously, they would certainly not spend money in discrediting the court, but rather in attacking Lafayette. The queen agreed, and received Orleans with kindly words; but the officious stupidity of the courtiers made them insult him beyond all endurance, and made him a very dangerous enemy. Yet, as Mirabeau had foreseen, he did spend part of his great wealth in attacking Lafayette, and it is a strange thing that before the duke had been two months in Paris the populace actually hissed the great man on the white horse, though his bourgeois national guards were still ready to follow him. On the question of the abolition of titles and liveries Mirabeau showed himself equally broad-minded. He did not care for the baubles themselves, but, as he pointed out, the inborn vanity of man prevents absolute equality from ever existing; and if old historical titles were abolished, new ways of distinguishing one class from another would soon grow up. He saw clearly through the foolish idea of social equality which was having such weight, and remarked that "the notion of equality is only a violent fit of the revolutionary fever."² It is in these short remarks that La Marck, who in this year acted towards the great man the part of Boswell towards Johnson, has preserved for us Mirabeau's very spirit as well as the actual

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. i. p. 351.

² *Ibid.*, p. 141.

letters which he wrote. In many other instances Mirabeau proved his freedom from prejudice. His speeches on army reorganization and on the behaviour of Bouillé at Nancy will be described in their places, but his practical good sense appears in his motion of October 19, that the tricolour flag should be adopted in the royal navy. A mutiny had just broken out at Brest among the sailors, more for want of pay than political grievances,¹ and Menou, a great friend of Lafayette and an excitable man, who was to run through every phase of opinion, serve every kind of government, profess every kind of religion, to become a Mahometan pacha in Egypt and die a general under Napoleon, produced a somewhat ridiculous report on the subject. Mirabeau showed that one flag for the army and another for the navy was simply absurd, and that, instead of going in for minute changes in ranks and pay, the navy must be reorganized, and recognized to be a national service as well as the army.

Still more characteristic was Mirabeau's conduct on the affair of the sacking of the Hôtel de Castries. The excitement of public life in Paris, added to the usual code of honour in polite society throughout Europe, had caused a great number of duels between deputies who sat on the right and the left of the assembly. Many of them were caused simply by personal disputes, but some arose out of political bitterness. The most notable political duels were those between Montlosier and Huguot in January, 1790, between the Vicomte de Mirabeau and Latour-Maubourg, between Barnave and Cazalés, between Charles de Lameth and Labourdonnaye, and now in October, 1790, between Charles de Lameth and the Duc de Castries. In this duel Lameth was wounded, and a rumour spread among the people that there was a regular plot on foot among the deputies of the right to murder those of the left. A riot broke out, which might have arisen from the natural indignation of the people, but which La Marck asserts² was got up by Feydel, the editor of the

¹ Chap. xiii. p. 403. *Correspondance*, vol. ii. pp. 27-29.

² *Ibid.*, vol. i. p. 151.

Observateur français, Paré Danton's clerk, and Gilles Clermont, who was afterwards a royalist spy. Anyhow, the fact is certain that the Hôtel de Castries was attacked and completely wrecked, and that Lafayette, with a battalion of national guards, stood by and looked on without making any attempt to interfere. La Marek also asserts, on the authority of an eye-witness, that the wrecking was done by bourgeois and well-dressed wrong-doers, and that the populace had been so cowed by Lafayette's vigorous military dispositions that it merely looked on and took lessons for the future. This hardly appears probable; but it is very likely that Lafayette was prevented from interfering by the respectable character of the wreckers and by a fear of losing his influence with the bourgeois class. On this subject Mirabeau, almost for the last time in his life, supported Lafayette, and opposed a motion for an inquiry into his conduct before the Assembly. Why he did so cannot be explained; but it is very notable that he had the broad-mindedness to defend a man who had refused to accept his services or in any way to co-operate with him, instead of doing his best, as he might have done, to ruin his power for ever.

As early as June, 1790, the king had told La Marek that he wished to change his ministry, but this wish was to be kept strictly secret, and the ministers were to know nothing of the communications between Mirabeau and the court. Mirabeau expatiated in note after note on the feebleness of the ministry, and when at last Necker resigned, in August, 1790, it was obvious that a great change was at hand. Mirabeau's advice was, as has been seen, that a ministry should be chosen from the different sections of the popular party in the Assembly, Jacobins as well as members of the moderate centre, because the fact of sitting in one ministerial council would insensibly modify their opinions. First of all, however, an attempt should be made to repeal the disastrous decree of November 7. To this effect he managed to put into currency an idea that it would be a good thing to revise the constitution even as far as it had already gone; and he found that the idea was warmly

taken up by many members of the centre, who felt that perhaps they were going too far in destroying the power of the executive. To make this revision effective it must be carried by a majority of the Assembly; but Lafayette perceived the drift of the idea, and thinking that it might tend to make Mirabeau a minister, threw in the weight of his opinion against it. So nothing was to be hoped from the project of revision. Mirabeau again begged the king to appoint as ministers men who had no affection for or dependence on Lafayette. He also recommended that the king should persuade the present ministers to give in their resignations, and that they should not be forced to resign by a vote of the Assembly. For, if that took place, he pointed out that the king would exhibit more markedly than ever his own weakness. His advice, as usual, was only partially followed. All the ministers except Montmorin, who was indeed in the secret as regarded Mirabeau, and who had made himself agreeable to the Assembly, resigned between October and December, 1790, and a new ministry was at once appointed. But, in spite of the remonstrances of Mirabeau, the composition of the new ministry was greatly influenced by Lafayette, and in particular the new minister of justice, Duport-Dutertre, the procureur-substitute of the commune of Paris, who succeeded the Archbishop of Bordeaux as keeper of the seals, was a mere satellite of Lafayette, and expressed his willingness to try the queen herself even, for great offences, on the smallest provocation.¹ The other new ministers were Duportail² at the War Office, at the special request of the king; Valdec de Lessart, at the Finances, and afterwards Minister of the Interior; and Claret de Fleurieu, Minister of the Navy.

¹ *Relation de ce qui s'est passé à l'Hôtel de Ville ce mardi soir, 23 Novembre, 1790, relativement à M. le Nouveau Garde-de-Sceaux.* B.M.—F. 835. (3.)

² See the mention of a letter from Louis XVI. to Duportail, November 12, 1790, ending "J'espère, monsieur, que vous passerez par-dessus vos répugnances, et vous me feriez une véritable peine de ne pas vous rendre à mes instances," in a *Catalogue d'une précieuse collection des Lettres Autographes*, issued by M. Étienne Charavay for a sale on April 15 and 16, 1885.

None of these men had great weight in themselves, or any great ability ; for who would accept office in a ministry which was deprived of all power, and afforded every probability that its possessor would be held up to the execration of the people ? This was not at all what Mirabeau wanted, and, as he remarked in one of his notes, it was no use his going on giving advice which was not followed.

Under the pressure of circumstances, he then made an attempt to form a new party among the left who would support the king and back up his own measures. The new party was to be headed by certain friends of Lafayette, who were discontented with him, and who now wanted to show their power against him. The leaders of this section were Talon, Sémonville, and Duquesnoy. None of them had great ability, but all were clever intriguers. Talon had been advocate-general at the court of the Châtelet, and had long acted as intermediary between the court and Lafayette. He had taken great interest in the negotiations of October, 1789, and now, in October, 1790, definitely deserted the party of Lafayette. Sémonville, though an able intriguer, was little better than a spy, and it is very doubtful whether his negotiations with Mirabeau were not solely instigated by a desire to discover what was the nature of Mirabeau's connection with the court. Duquesnoy, the deputy for Nancy, was a more able man. He had distinguished himself as president of the Assembly, and had long been one of the chief speakers of Lafayette's party in the Assembly ; but he was now disgusted with his behaviour, and entered into communications with Mirabeau. Without trusting any of the three entirely, Mirabeau made use of them to form a party, and even had some interviews with Barnave himself. He found the young deputy of Dauphiné was almost frightened at the extent to which he had gone, and showed every disposition to place his eloquence at the service of the new party. But Mirabeau did not dare to trust him entirely, for he feared that the young man might be led away by his old connections. Had a new party been formed and a revision of the constitution carried, it is possible that the Assembly might have

remedied some of its terrible mistakes; but there was a general feeling of distrust between all the associates which prevented the results of their union being as great as they expected them to be. Mirabeau, however, though annoyed by the failure, was not wholly disconcerted by it, for it only strengthened in his own mind the necessity that the court should adopt the great plan which he had at first formulated in his note of October, 1789, and which he had developed during 1790.

Considering their love of dramatic display, the French people, and the Parisians in particular, were not likely to allow the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille to pass without some great fête, and this anniversary Lafayette determined to use as a means for consolidating his power over the whole of France. It was agreed that every department of France should send certain representatives, and still more, that every National Guard should send certain of its members to be present at the great fête in Paris. All Paris, including duchesses and grisettes, soldiers and bourgeois, laboured in the Champ de Mars to dig up the soil and prepare the ground for the ceremony. In the presence of a vast assembly, on a great altar erected there, the king heard mass sung by Talleyrand, and swore to be faithful to the constitution which was not yet completed; and the fédérés from the provinces shouted, "Vive Lafayette!" Never had his power appeared more manifest. The cries of "Vive Lafayette!" drowned the cries of "Vive le Roi!" and Mirabeau used this fact as yet another proof of the necessity of adopting his great plan.

It will be remembered that, in October, 1789, Mirabeau had recommended that the king should leave Paris and should call upon the provinces to assist him. He still recommended that course, but now elaborated his plan to a greater extent, and completed it in many details. This was the more necessary as the state of the provinces had considerably altered since October, 1789, and since Lafayette's power had considerably increased by the more complete organization of his forces. Directly after the fête of the Federation of July 14, Mirabeau begged¹ the king to go at once to Fontainebleau. Go in the

¹ Note of July 17, 1790, *Correspondance*, vol. i. pp. 371-374.

light of day, he wrote; no one can restrain you. Go, as you have just gone to Saint Cloud, to Fontainebleau, another of your palaces, and there issue a proclamation that the Assembly is too much under the control of one city, and that it is not legislating for the good of the people. Confirm most of the decrees which have hitherto been passed, and announce that you will consent to many which your own judgment disapproves of, if a new legislature insists on it. There is no need of force. The country is enthusiastic for Louis, the restorer of the liberty of France; and you will find it no hard task to summon around you men who will be willing and able to re-establish the royal authority. The provinces groan under the anarchy which exists, and will gladly come at your summons to help you against Paris. But when the king did not comply, and matters went from bad to worse, and he became more and more a prisoner in his capital, Mirabeau's language became stronger. "Why should we fear civil war?"¹ he said to La Marck. "Civil war! it will be the means of saving the king, who will be lost without hope if he continues to stop in Paris." Foreign war, indeed, was to be feared, but civil war would only prove how greatly the country loved order. Civil war tempers the spirit of union, and revives political enthusiasm, which might otherwise be lost, when a country has had its fill of political reforms. As the year passed on, civil war became more and more present to his mind as the only expedient, and he saw that the provinces were not so much to be depended upon as he had thought, and that the king must have troops about him to restore order. That was the reason why he recommended that the Swiss regiments should be formed into one corps, under the command of La Marck, who should also make out a plan by which the most trustworthy troops could be posted along the frontier in such a way that they could readily concentrate on Rouen, where the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, the commander-in-chief, was devoted to the king, and at the same time to the cause of the constitution. Once at Rouen, he thought, and with troops around him on whom he could rely, the king should

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. i. p. 141.

appeal to the good sense of the country, and order the Assembly to join him there in a few days. If the Assembly refused to join him, let the king summon a new one, and the Assembly in Paris would lose its power. At Rouen he would be near the faithful provinces of Brittany and Anjou, and he would also be able to command the food supply of Paris, which came up the river Seine from England and America to the capital. With a little pressure from foreign powers, and a bold face backed up by ten thousand good troops, Paris would give way without a blow; and if Lafayette determined to fight, the populace, pressed by famine, would soon put a stop to his efforts. Indeed, it might be possible by that movement for the king to make himself exceedingly popular in Paris. If he himself was at Rouen, he could hurry provisions up to the capital, and could take the credit of feeding the people, and say that he had left the capital only to provide the better for its sustenance. Mirabeau's plan was not adopted, because the queen distrusted him, because she refused to recognize that the character of the French monarchy was for ever changed, and because she deemed it more courageous still to stand in the breach of the attack in Paris. It would have shown greater courage at this time for her to have used her influence with the king to induce him to take Mirabeau's advice. The one doubtful point was how far the provinces would do what Mirabeau expected; and as each month went by, it became more and more doubtful whether they were imbued with the conviction that the power of the king must be maintained, and that order must be restored. This was the weak point of Mirabeau's plan. Certain it is that in the month of October, 1789, and possibly in January, 1790, the provinces would have looked upon the king as the maintainer of order. But in July, 1790, it was generally perceptible that the provinces would trust rather to the Assembly than to the king, and regard the monarch, as the affiliated Jacobin clubs were taught by the Jacobin club of Paris to regard him, rather as the destroyer than the restorer of order. A more thorough discussion of the condition of the provinces in 1790 will show to what extent they might have been

depended upon ; but nevertheless the greatness of Mirabeau's conception cannot be denied. He had struck the key-note of a policy which might have united France against Paris, and it must have at least improved the king's position and reputation. Well might Mirabeau exclaim about the harm that the immorality of his youth was doing his country ; for though his devoted friends believed he could do anything, he knew well that the bourgeois class still remembered the immorality of his early life, and that the queen withheld her confidence from him. These considerations do not tend to make Mirabeau's reputation as a statesman stand less high, but only show of what importance good personal character is to a politician. Statesmen of the style of Alcibiades, though they may occasionally have great successes, and though they may often see more clearly than other men, can never obtain the power of inspiring that general confidence by which alone a ruler of men can govern public opinion.

It is useless to speculate on what might have been—whether the provinces would have acted as Mirabeau hoped, whether there would have been civil war, whether Lafayette would have fought against the king, or whether the Assembly would have followed him. The course of the revolution was to go on like a perpetual torrent. New obstacles were to arise only to be surmounted. Europe in arms was to be fought ; France was to pass through her long agony, out of which she was indeed to arise triumphant at last over all foreign enemies, but subject to the sway of a military despot. But not for five and twenty years did a fresh opportunity arise for the Bourbons to reconstruct their monarchy on modern principles ; for by Mirabeau alone, and acting on his advice alone, could the most ancient royal family in Europe have continued to maintain the place it had so long held, as absolute monarchs of a great country and the adored tyrants of twenty-one millions of men.

CHAPTER XII.

THE FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY.

Importance of the financial question—Taxation and internal douanes—Colbert's protective system—Effect of Law's schemes, and rise of the study of political economy—Establishment of agricultural societies—The physiocrats—Turgot, Necker, and Calonne—Necker's financial proposals, and the financial policy of the Assembly in 1789—Economic state of the country, and scarcity of specie—Necessity of feeding Paris—Where was the State to find money?—Errors with regard to the value of Church property—Manner in which Church lands were sold—Mirabeau proposes a new issue of assignats in August, 1790—Resignation of Necker—Minor points of the Assembly's financial policy—Economic state of France in 1790—The Marquis de Montesquiou—Dupont de Nemours—Mirabeau as a financier.

IN September, 1789, while the Assembly was still at Versailles, Goupil de Préfeln, deputy for the tiers état of Alençon, who in point of age was the oldest deputy in the Assembly, and who sat on the extreme left, ended a speech by declaring in impassioned tones that "Catiline was at the gates, and yet ye deliberate." Mirabeau replied, with a fine oratorical turn, "Catiline is not at the gates, and never will be; but bankruptcy, horrible, hideous bankruptcy, is staring us in the face." This phantom of bankruptcy had had very great influence on the summons of the States-General, and without the prospect of bankruptcy it is very doubtful whether the States-General would have been summoned in 1789 at all. The States-General, as Necker told the deputies in his opening speech on May 5, met to relieve the king's financial necessities, and to

make some arrangements for the liquidation of the increasing national debt. Again and again political events and stirring incidents threw the great financial question into the shade; but it was perpetually cropping up, and presented an element of danger which the real statesmen in the Assembly could not fail to perceive. How the National Assembly acted in matters of finance, and how the deputies treated the great question which had caused their convocation, is of much interest, because the numerous financial mistakes which marked the progress of the French Revolution derived their origin from the errors committed by the Constituent Assembly; and to understand what was the financial policy of the Assembly, it is necessary to examine the economic state and financial history of France, in order to comprehend how the difficulties arose which it had to meet.

The economic evils existing in France in 1789 had grown up from two distinct sources, the feudal system and the despotic royal power. All the old oppressive feudal dues and rights, most of which had been abolished or commuted in England at a very early period, and which had been finally bought up by the House of Commons in 1661, existed in France right up to the very time of the Revolution. They consisted of tolls and rights of market, duties on mills, and innumerable small fees to be paid to the lord at various stages of the tenant's life. The immense extension of the tenure, called copyhold, in France has been noticed, and it was chiefly maintained in order that the lord might get occasional dues on slight mistakes or instances of neglect on the part of the tenant. All these feudal dues, which were exceedingly tiresome and unjust in their nature, though perhaps not yielding a very large revenue to the lords of the land, did much to check agricultural prosperity, and remained in full force side by side with royal taxation. The various modes of collecting the royal taxes and administering them plainly manifested the despotic power of Louis XIV. and Louis XV., and showed the utter absence of any moderating influence such as was supplied in England by the existence of Parliament, and they

also can be explained only by reference to the internal policy of those monarchs. Direct taxation did not count for much in the royal revenue, and it was chiefly confined to one poll-tax, known as the *taille*. In itself such direct taxation is not unjust; but Louis XIV., whose policy it was to maintain the wealth of the nobility, while attracting it to Versailles, and destroying its power in the provinces, had always upheld its freedom from the weight of personal or direct taxation. The obvious injustice of four-fifths of the *taille* being paid by the poor had struck all inquirers into the financial condition of France from the time of Marshal Vauban¹ to that of Necker, and in the electoral assemblies, which elected the deputies to the States-General, the privileged orders in nearly every instance agreed to surrender their privileges in matters of taxation, which they knew must at once fall when the States-General met. After all, direct taxation formed but a small portion of the revenue of the country. Its bulk was derived from indirect taxation. Of the indirect taxes, the most important were the *gabelle* and the customs duties. The *gabelle* was a salt tax, varying in amount in different provinces, extremely difficult to collect, and very harsh in its incidence on the lower classes. Turgot declared that an army of 60,000 collectors had to be paid for its collection, and that every year more than 20,000 men were condemned to the galleys for smuggling or refusing to pay. What made it seem most harsh was, that if every peasant or *ouvrier* did not buy a certain amount of salt for himself and his family every month, he was at once assumed to buy from the smugglers and his house was searched accordingly. The expense of collecting this tax was so great that not more than one-fifth of the money paid by the taxpayer reached the royal treasury. Still more disastrous in their effect upon the country were the internal customs duties. France was divided for customs purposes into three distinct divisions,² which crossed and re-crossed each other—the provinces proper, the provinces “reputed

¹ Vauban, *La Dîme Royale*, 1705.

² *Revue Historique*, January, 1882.

foreign," and the provinces "foreign." The "foreign" provinces, by which title were designated Alsace, Lorraine, Franche Comté, French Flanders, and all the conquests of Louis XIV., paid no duties on importations from foreign countries, but had to pay heavily when they sent their produce or manufactures into France itself. The provinces "reputed foreign," such as Brittany, were those which had been united to France by marriage or otherwise during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and were for customs purposes entirely separated from the rest of the country. The maintenance of these internal douanes was very prejudicial to trade, and caused an immense amount of smuggling, as it was impossible to guard sufficiently the long lines of provincial frontiers. The necessity of enforcing such customs regulations filled France with bands of brigands, who were so severely punished by the law when they were caught, that their resistance caused more loss of life to the army and *maréchaussée* than many a foreign war. In addition to the internal douanes, every city had its own *octroi* and its own system of duties, merely for purposes of raising a municipal revenue. There were also heavy duties on wines, spirits, and tobacco, and a restrictive tariff on importations from foreign countries, in order to protect the manufacturing interests, which seriously increased the price of cloth and other necessaries. These taxes were chiefly let out to farmers-general, who had obtained complete command over the finances of the country by advancing money to the government when any need arose. The farmers-general naturally contrived to get considerable profit on their contracts, and insisted on being supported by the full power of the law. The result of this complicated system of taxation was that the people, and especially the lower classes, were very severely taxed both directly and indirectly, while the royal treasury only received a very small proportion of the money paid.

Owing to this system of taxation, the treasury received but a small revenue, while the economical condition of the country was so much affected that France, though naturally one of the

richest countries in Europe, was at this period one of the very poorest. The condition of modern France has shown how possible it is for the country to yield an enormous revenue and yet remain extremely prosperous. The French people are essentially thrifty, and under proper financial arrangements can afford to meet very heavy demands. The utter absence of any knowledge of political economy had, however, prevented the successive French kings and ministers from regulating the collection of the taxes so as to improve the economical condition of the country. Mention has been already made of the treatment under which agriculture had fallen to its lowest possible degradation in the France of the eighteenth century, and this degradation was due to the mismanagement of the taxation. Colbert, possessed by the one idea of making France capable of supplying itself by its own manufactures, had greatly neglected the agricultural portion of the community, and had not seen that France is essentially an agricultural and not a manufacturing country. The mischievous system of internal douanes, with the extreme badness of communication throughout France, often caused famine in certain districts, while others not many miles off were rejoicing in abundant harvests. This degradation of the agricultural interests had naturally brought the attention of thinking men in France to the subject, and there had arisen a very important school of political economists, whose influence will have to be analyzed, for it extended beyond merely the system of agriculture. This great school not only treated the subject of agriculture, but almost by accident found out the important doctrine of free trade.

Vauban, the great marshal of Louis XIV., and the man who built and fortified all the great fortresses of France, was the first to call attention to the false principles shown in the collection of the taxes,¹ and in his "*Dîme Royale*" showed how small a proportion of what was paid by the people reached the treasury. The royal power was too great to allow his opinions to be acted upon, and the old marshal was at once disgraced.

¹ *La Dîme Royale*, 1705.

The regency of Orleans was marked by the speculative mania which was started by Law, and which is in many points a counterpart of the South Sea Bubble in England. But it had a far worse effect upon the economical condition of France generally than the South Sea Bubble had on that of England. For in England the mania for speculation affected rather the wealthy mercantile class in the towns and the shopkeepers of London, whereas in France many, if not most, of the landowners not only sold their property, but sunk in this visionary speculation money which they had managed to save, and which would otherwise have been invested in improving their land. What profits were made, were made by the bourgeois in the towns, the farmers-general of the revenue, and the speculators on the Paris stock exchange, while the landowners were permanently the poorer for their speculations. It was after the breaking of the Mississippi Bubble that the agricultural condition of France went from bad to worse, until the state of the provinces imperatively called the attention of philosophers to it. From the spectacle of this great wretchedness arose the first physiocrats.¹ This name they gave themselves because one of their main tenets was that taxation should be levied as much as possible on the increase of nature. They had perceived the immense waste caused by the collection of the innumerable taxes, and proposed that, instead of numerous taxes, the revenue should be raised by one single great tax paid by the owners of land. They argued that it was only from agriculture that a positive increase in wealth was attained. If one pound's worth of seed were planted in a field, ten pounds' worth of wheat might grow from it, and therefore taxes ought only to be imposed on those who had the advantage of producing this wealth. This theory of the physiocrats led to unexpected results. If the agriculturist alone actually produced wealth, while the manufacturer only changed wool into cloth and produced nothing, all taxes were

¹ *Les Économistes français du dix-huitième siècle*, by Léonce de Lavergne, 1870 ; *Collection des œuvres des principaux Économistes du 18ième siècle*, by Eugène Daire, 1847.

in reality paid either directly or indirectly by the agriculturist. All taxes, except the land tax, should therefore be abolished as being merely taxes exacted from the agriculturist in a circuitous manner, which would indeed have simplified the collection of the taxes; but the fallacy was obvious, and was shown by Voltaire in his clever pamphlet, "*L'Homme aux quarante Écus.*"¹ The propositions of the physiocrats did great good, not only in concentrating the attention of French thinkers upon the condition of the soil and of the agricultural interest, but in inducing them to consider what national wealth really was, and the first result was an immediate improvement in agriculture.

Agricultural societies were started all over France in every little provincial capital,² but unfortunately, as Arthur Young, who was an honorary member of most of them, pointed out,³ most of the members of these societies were bourgeois and residents in towns, who did not own a single acre of land, and who occupied themselves in discussing theories as to what farmers ought to do. Only a very few of the great seigneurs acted upon the impulse given to the scientific knowledge of farming by the physiocrats, notably, the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt and the Duc de Charost-Béthune, the descendant of Sully. These great nobles did try to manage their estates like English noblemen. They encouraged the introduction of agricultural machinery, presented improved ploughs to their neighbours and tenants, and tried to convince them that it was not necessary for their fields to lie fallow every third year in order to produce an adequate crop. The members of these agricultural societies did much to spread a better knowledge of the true principles of farming through France, and to their influence may be particularly attributed the increased popularity of sheep and the improvement of the breed by the

¹ *L'homme aux quarante écus—une apologue*, by Voltaire. Paris: 1776.

² See, for the Agricultural Society of Paris, Lavergne's *Les Économistes français*, pp. 439-475.

³ Arthur Young's *Travels during the Years 1787, 1788, and 1789*, vol. i. pp. 15, 16.

introduction of the Spanish merinoes. They also took a great interest in the first planting of potatoes, and Arthur Young describes a curious visit which he paid, with certain other members of the Agricultural Society of Paris, to some large gardens, where Parmentier was making experiments in potato-growing, only the day before the Oath of the Tennis Court.¹ But, though the attempts to improve agriculture were the most important actual results of the influence of the physiocrats, their primary aim was to simplify taxation by the imposition of one great land tax.

The founder of the school of the physiocrats was François Quesnay, a man of exactly the same age as Voltaire, who was physician to Madame de Pompadour, and had apartments at Versailles beneath those of the royal mistress, where he received the enthusiastic supporters of his ideas. He did not commence his literary career until he was more than sixty, and then contributed the articles on "farming" and "grains" to the *Encyclopédie*. These articles attracted great attention, and he followed them up by two small books, the "*Tableau économique*," printed in the palace of Versailles in 1758, under the personal supervision of Louis XV., and the "*Maximes générales du Gouvernement économique d'un Royaume agricole*," in 1760, in which he insisted again that all labour not connected with agriculture was *sterile*. Quesnay's chief disciple was the Marquis de Mirabeau, father of the great Mirabeau, who had always paid great attention to agriculture on his paternal estates, and threw himself with all the ardour of his family into the task of spreading the doctrines of Quesnay, of whom he termed himself the prophet. His chief works were the "*Ami des Hommes ou Traité de la Population*," the "*Théorie de l'Impôt*," which brought about

¹ "Dined with Parmentier at the Hôtel des Invalides. After dinner to Sablon, to see the society's potatoes and preparations for turnips, of which I shall only say that I wish my brethren would stick to their *scientific* farming, and leave the practice to those who understand it. What a sad thing it is for philosophical husbandmen that God Almighty created such a thing as couch (*triticum repens*)."—Arthur Young's *Travels*, vol. i. p. 115.

his imprisonment at Vincennes for attacking the farmers-general, and his "*Philosophie rurale*," and by his energetic character and the eloquence of his writings he made Quesnay's speculations famous throughout Europe. Unfortunately the early physiocrats united a political with their financial creed. Quesnay went out of his way to praise the government of China in his "*Despotisme de la Chine*," and argued that such a great scheme as he proposed could only be carried out by an absolute monarch, and that, therefore, it was expedient to increase and not to diminish the royal power in France. From the teaching of Quesnay arose a group of thinkers of far greater economical importance. Quesnay had asserted that all taxes must be levied on agricultural property, and that in consequence all other taxation must be abolished. The abolition of other taxation, which implied the doctrine of free trade, was the point of the new school taken up by Vincent de Gournay, who had been for many years commercial resident at Cadiz, and who had there seen the financial ruin caused both to Spain and her American possessions by the rigour of the protective system.

Gournay was, after his return to France, brought into official connection with Turgot, and imbued him with many of his economical ideas. Turgot was the one great practical physiocrat and the greatest thinker of the whole school. Without rushing to theoretical extremes, he had in his administration of the Limousin done all in his power to improve agriculture and to make carriage easier between district and district by maintaining good roads, and when he entered the ministry at the commencement of the reign of Louis XVI., he endeavoured to carry into practice some of the chief ideas of Gournay, notably his scheme for the abolition of internal douanes. By this time political economy had become the popular topic of the salons and the lecture halls, and just as the great ladies raved at different times about Rousseau and electricity, they now made the study of political economy the fashion, and every one liked to talk upon the subject with great glibness, if without much knowledge. The physiocrats

then became very influential. They had their regular organs, of which the chief, the *Éphémérides du Citoyen*, was edited first by the Marquis de Mirabeau and then by Dupont de Nemours, and they had disciples in every land. One of the sect, Rambaud, was summoned to St. Petersburg by the Empress Catherine to take charge of Russian trade; Gustavus III. of Sweden sent the Marquis de Mirabeau the cross of the Order of Vasa, and Leopold, Grand Duke of Tuscany, corresponded with him, and accepted the dedication of his "Philosophie rurale." But the most important development of the ideas of the physiocrats is to be found in Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations," which the Glasgow professor had intended to dedicate to Quesnay if the old French physician had lived long enough. Of what enormous importance Adam Smith's work has been to the science of political economy need not here be remarked; but it was from it that the younger Pitt derived his economical ideas, and on it he based the great economical improvements which he effected in the condition of England. To the influence of the economists may also be attributed the commercial treaty between England and France concluded in 1786, the result of which was to ruin the Norman weavers, and to make claret supersede port in England. The general results of the speculations of the physiocrats and the propagation of their ideas was an improvement in the condition of French agriculture, and truer ideas regarding foreign trade; but they had no effect whatsoever on the collection of the taxes or the regulation of finance, and the influence of the physiocrats, though very great in the salons, had not much effect on the French financial administration previous to 1789.

Had Turgot remained in office, it is possible that some great reforms might have been effected; but the first condition that great statesman demanded was that there should be a reduction in useless court expenses, and real harmony between the king and himself. The poor king, indeed, remarked to his minister, "You and I, M. Turgot, are the only two Frenchmen who really love France;" but the queen

did not at all approve of the stern minister who wished to curtail her extravagance, and insisted on his dismissal. After Turgot's fall, financial ministers took charge of the treasury, who had no sympathy with the economical ideas in vogue, and who carried on the financial management of France very much on the old bases. The greatest of them was Jacques Necker, and his career as well as his character made him look upon the finances of the country from a banker's point of view, and not an economist's. In his business capacity he had shown every quality necessary for a successful banker—courage in speculation, a cool head, and a real knowledge that money was not to be looked upon as so much actual gold and silver, but that it had a fluctuating value according to circumstances. He tried to carry on the affairs of France like a banker, and his great aim was to issue a good balance-sheet. To do this he had to meet the same difficulties as Turgot; but he was far too prudent to openly attack the queen's extravagance, and contented himself with trying to arrange the system on which loans were raised. This he did admirably. His personal acquaintance with the chief French and English bankers enabled him to raise money at a lower rate of interest than had been possible before, and he made more than one attempt to fund the floating debt. But however he might try to steer clear of unpalatable truths which might hurt the royal ears, he had to insist on some retrenchments, and, like Turgot, was dismissed by the influence of Marie Antoinette. When out of office he employed himself in drawing up and publishing his famous "Compte Rendu." This was simply the balance-sheet of France, and however much he may have falsified many items, there can be no doubt that he gave a very correct description on the whole of the amount of the revenue of France, and of how utterly it must necessarily fail to meet the expenses. Calonne, who succeeded Necker after an interval, was a very pleasant financial minister for the court. His idea was above all things to keep up appearances, and thus get plenty of credit. He did keep up appearances, much to the delight

of the queen and courtiers, and when he had exceeded his credit he left France with a much larger yearly deficit than Necker had bequeathed to him. Brienne continued, with less ability and smaller knowledge, to imitate Calonne; but eventually, like Necker and Turgot, he had to insist on retrenchment. When Necker returned to office in 1788, the States-General had been universally demanded, and he hoped he would be able to secure from the States-General means for setting the balance-sheet of France right. What political ideas he might have entertained have been noticed, but his desire for the States-General was directed rather by a wish to prove himself a miraculous financier than a great political reformer. He convinced the king that it was necessary to make an appearance of retrenchment in order to give an appearance of economy, and the king agreed, on March 24,¹ 1789, in the midst of the elections, to abolish the post of grand-falconer of France, and to discharge forty-two valets.

At the meeting of the States-General on May 5, Necker had declared that the purpose for which the States-General had been called was to relieve the existing financial distress, and he horrified the members of the Assembly by informing them to what an extent the deficit had grown. In 1786 the income of the State had been computed at 357 millions of livres, and its expenditure at 442 millions, to which must be added twenty-seven millions of pensions and seventy-two millions of arrears from the year before, making a total discrepancy of 184 millions, or, in other words, showing that the income for that year only met two-thirds of the expenses. The administration of Brienne had not improved matters, and Necker had to announce a yearly deficit of 125 millions of livres without calculating arrears, in spite of Brienne's proclamation of partial bankruptcy on August 16, 1788, by which all debts of the State, pensions and pay, were to be paid only three-fifths in money, and two-fifths in notes of the Caisse d'Escompte. The most striking point in Necker's speech is the complacent manner, in which he looks upon the deficit.

¹ B.M.—Tracts, 28 d. 2, No. 1.

He seems to have thought that it could be easily met without any particular effort on any one's part. The privileged orders were to pay the *taille* for the future, the king was to discharge a few more valets, and all would be well. Because the States-General acted in harmony with the king, the national credit would be restored, and new loans could be easily raised and the old ones liquidated. The events of May and June, and the absolute refusal of the States-General to pass any decree with regard to the finances, or pay any attention to poor Necker, instead of improving, quite destroyed the State's credit and Necker's hopes. The Assembly and the people of France were far too busily engaged in watching the great political struggle between the three orders to pay any attention to the financial complications until the capture of the Bastille had definitely established the status of the Assembly. The decrees of August 4 had effectually destroyed most of the old means of revenue. The abolition of tithes, as has been said, only benefited the landed proprietors, but did not help the State, though the Abbé Siéyès had advocated that the tithes should be redeemed by the landowners. On August 4 not only were tithes abolished, but pretty nearly all the customs duties on which the State had depended were also abolished. The *gabelle* and the system of the internal custom-houses were bound to go, and something had to be done immediately if any money was to be raised for the current expenses of government. On August 7 Necker informed the Assembly that hardly any taxes had been paid for the last three months. In the month of June, in the heat of the struggle between the orders, the Assembly had declared that all taxes should be paid provisionally until the Assembly had time to legislate upon them. But the people simply refused to pay taxes which had no longer the weight of law in their favour and which were no longer collected by main force, and the state of the treasury was worse than ever. Necker, therefore, proposed that the Assembly should allow him to raise a loan of thirty millions of livres at five per cent. The Assembly changed the rate to

four and a half per cent., and the loan was taken up. Three weeks afterwards, on August 29, Necker asked for a loan of eighty millions at five per cent, but only thirty-three millions were subscribed. It was obvious that the credit of the State had entirely disappeared, and that the system of loans had failed. Necker then, knowing it was impossible to raise taxes, practically gave up taking any trouble, and as the enthusiasm which greeted his return had entirely evaporated, he did nothing for some time. During the month of September the State subsisted chiefly on patriotic gifts, which included not only the magnificent present of 100,000 livres from the Duc de Charost-Béthune and of the royal plate, but also the jewellery of many great ladies of Paris, down to the very smallest gifts of little silver ornaments. The members of the Assembly gave up their silver shoe-buckles, and determined for the future they would only wear paste. But the government of the State could not be carried on by such means, and on September 29 Necker came down to the Assembly and demanded a grant of twenty-five per cent. or one quarter of all incomes, which, if it could have been collected at once on a proper valuation, would, though an extreme measure, have given a sufficient sum to the State to have carried on the government. But Necker added to his proposition that the tax should be payable any time within three years on the taxpayer's own valuation, clauses which effectually destroyed the chances of any considerable sum being collected at once. Ridiculous as the scheme was with these additions, Mirabeau supported it, and when other deputies were loud in their opposition, he rose and said, "The case is desperate, and something must be done. Nobody has proposed any other measure. I do not believe that this is a good one, but since there is no better in the field I will support it." After this speech the motion was carried, but such a tax naturally produced next to nothing; and in October, 1789, the expedient of taking possession of the estates of the clergy was proposed by Talleyrand. The excited debates which preceded the carrying of the motion on November 2

have been described, and it was then decided that the property of the Church belonged to the nation. These abstract motions would not produce money, and Necker continued to borrow from the Caisse d'Escompte, which he had himself established, and which had lent money to the State during the last year; and as his sole idea of finance was to raise loans, the minister proposed in November that the whole collection of the taxes should be handed over to the Caisse d'Escompte in consideration of an annual sum. Mirabeau opposed this proposition, which he said would simply hand over the government of the country to the Caisse d'Escompte, and proposed instead that paper money should be issued on the security of the Church lands, and that Necker's motion should be rejected. In this speech appears the first idea of *assignats*, and the idea of paper money had been first suggested to Mirabeau by Clavière,¹ one of his Genevese friends, who had a thorough knowledge of banking, and more original financial genius than Necker. Mirabeau warmly supported the idea of paper money, and believed it to be a far more efficacious means of relieving the distress of the State than perpetual loans. In the beginning of December the Marquis de Montesquiou, who was throughout the session of the Assembly the reporter of the financial committee, of which the reports were chiefly drawn up by Dupont de Nemours, the last of the physiocrats, brought up a report from that committee, that four hundred millions of livres should be raised on the lands of the clergy, and on December 19 the sale of Church lands to that amount was decreed.

Such was the history of the financial measures of the Assembly in 1789, and naturally the economic state of France in the month of December was far worse than it had been in the previous May. The farmers, indeed, had received great and substantial benefits; the internal douanes had been abolished, and under a decree proposed by a physiocrat, Heurtault de Lamerville, in 1791, absolute liberty had been given to them to grow whatever crops they pleased, instead

¹ See vol. i. chap. ii. p. 66.

of being dictated to on the subject by the intendants;¹ but very great damage on the other hand had been done by the anarchy which had existed ever since the month of July. It was all very well for the armed peasants to burn châteaux, but they further did serious harm to the agricultural interest by destroying the lords' cattle wherever they found them. The cattle were houghed and horses destroyed because they were the lords', and it would have been far better for the wealth of the nation if they had been simply appropriated. The political excitement, further, had affected men's liking for work, and the peasant found it more agreeable to burn châteaux or attend political meetings than to work in the fields. A similar state of things existed in the towns. There the workmen had received great theoretical advantages, but there was no work for them to do. In the present state of insecurity, no manufacturer or employer of labour would spend his capital in starting fresh works, but was ready to terminate all his contracts as quickly as possible. The difficulty was partially met in Paris and the larger towns by the establishment of State workshops, where a fixed amount of wages was paid; but the workmen, naturally, only appeared at the workshops on pay-day. The state of insecurity was paralyzing capital, as Mirabeau perceived, and it made him wish to establish as soon as possible some order in the French finances. Another difficulty was, even at this early date, beginning to appear; the émigrés took with them out of the country all the money they could get hold of in specie, and even the bourgeois and bankers, who did not emigrate, felt it safer to have their valuables in foreign banks, and especially in London. The smaller bourgeois, too, began to show a tendency to bury their money instead of lending it to the State, or extending their operations with it, and a serious difficulty was foreshadowed at this early date. It was this scarcity of specie which Mirabeau, on the advice of Clavière, proposed to meet by the issue of paper money.

Some idea may be formed of the great additional expense

¹ Lavergne, *Les Économistes français*, pp. 87, 88.

incurred by the government, when it is mentioned that Paris spent 360,000 livres a month upon her public workshops, and there had to be lent, in the months of January and February, 1790, no less than 17,000,000 livres with which to buy corn. From a financial point of view, lending money for the purchase of corn was simply and absolutely unjust, for it practically made the honest taxpayer support the working classes; but, for political reasons, the ministry and the Assembly did not dare to refuse to give Paris as much corn as she asked for. This necessity for the State to feed Paris had been recognized ever since July, 1789. Bailly, the new mayor, declared it impossible to prevent the Parisians from rising in insurrection unless he was able to provide them with cheap bread, and a committee was appointed at the Hôtel de Ville, the sole duties of which were to purchase corn and sell it to the bakers at a low rate. When it is remembered that this committee consisted, not of experienced men, but principally of politicians like Bailly, who six months before never dreamed of public duties, there can be no wonder that the money which they obtained, with great difficulty, from Necker was wasted. They purchased wheat by means of corn-brokers in England and Germany, and in the rest of France, and the natural result of their doing so was to send up the price of wheat considerably. Sometimes the provincial towns, which were capitals of large agricultural districts, objected to part with their corn, and thus reduce themselves to famine, and the populace of Provins, for instance,¹ with the help of a detachment of soldiers, arrested two electors of Paris, who had come to buy their corn, in August, 1789, and only released them on the approach of eight hundred national guards from Paris. The result of this policy was that the provincial cities were not likely to try to provide for themselves when they saw how easily Paris could get assistance by the threat of riots, and it became rather an advantage for a town to have a large number of rioters and starving work-people. The State had to pay for all this; the State had to compensate the nobility for the feudal rights which had

¹ *Histoire de Provins*, by Félix Bourquelot, vol. ii. p. 320. Provins: 1839.

been abolished; the State had to pay the expenses of the court, and also enormous interest on all its loans; and the State was applied to for money in every difficulty. How, then, was the State to get money? ✓

The sale of the Church lands was the solution proposed by the majority of the Assembly. Elaborate calculations were made that the whole debt of France could be paid if this proposition was at once adopted. But errors abounded in these calculations. The property of the Church was computed to yield 70 millions of livres a year, and this, at thirty-three years' purchase, was calculated to produce a lump sum of 2310 millions of livres. The deputies then went on to discuss what should be done with the 2310 millions, and particularly with the surplus, after paying off the national debt. The most important errors in this calculation were, that of the 70 millions of annual income, 20 millions belonged to schools and hospitals, which it had been unanimously agreed must be maintained, and that even the other 50 millions were not worth anything like thirty-three years' purchase. The Church property was not all land; much of it was in State paper, debts, mortgages, and similar kinds of property, which were now of very little value, and even the value of what lands there were could not be kept to such a price when a very large amount was at once thrown into the market. But the ordinary laws of political economy were quite unknown to the majority of the Assembly, which was quite prepared to vote a yearly budget of 134 millions of livres for maintaining the Church, in addition to 16 millions as compensation to monks, nuns, Jesuits, and members of other religious corporations, and yet believed it was making a good bargain. On March 6 Necker came down to the Assembly, and stated that he would need 250 millions for the coming year's expenses, in addition to the regular revenue, and also told the Assembly that the Church lands were not selling at all well. In fact, every one who wanted to purchase land hoped that by waiting he would get it much cheaper, if not have it granted to him for nothing at all. ✓ Meanwhile the peasants and small farmers were squat-

ting on the lands of the Church and of the noblesse, and taking possession of them without any title, or paying any rent.

On March 10 Bailly came down to the Assembly, and said that the city of Paris was willing to purchase the Church property within its walls, estimated at 140 millions of livres, for 100 millions, and for the remaining 40 millions would build a beautiful palace for the National Assembly. This was rather too much even for the majority of the Assembly; but it was decreed that the municipality of Paris should be allowed to undertake the sale of this Church property, and should receive one-sixteenth of the proceeds of the sale for its own use. This seemed a convenient way of getting rid of the Church property, and on March 17 it was resolved that the 400 millions' worth which had been ordered to be sold in the previous December should be disposed of in the same manner, and that at the same time 400 millions' worth of paper money, to be redeemed by this sale, should be issued under the title of assignats. They were intended by Mirabeau and Clavière to act as banknotes, and none were to be of less value than fifty livres. In April the Assembly further agreed to take over the debts of the Church, amounting to 149 millions of livres, and it became obvious that, as the Church was also to have a budget of 134 millions, it would make a good profit by getting rid of its property. In April the assignats were accordingly issued, and the stipulated portion of Church property handed over to the municipalities, and it was soon perceived that they did not intend to sell the Church lands at the best value for the State, but in the most profitable manner for themselves. They sold the lands which they had taken over, and it is to be noticed that the first 400 millions' worth of Church property disposed of consisted entirely of land, at a very low price, and gave possession as soon as one small instalment had been paid. Payment was also allowed to be made to the municipalities in assignats, which were received at their nominal value, and every reason was therefore given for speculators to try to depreciate them, and to such effect did they work, that by the month of May, 1790, assignats were already depreciated ten

per cent. By the month of August, 1790, there was again no more money in the treasury, but plenty of municipal obligations; for the municipalities did not pay the treasury in cash for the Church lands they received, but in bonds issued by themselves, which they did not intend to pay. The Church property which had been sold was itself speedily depreciated in value; for it was the custom of the purchaser, as soon as he had paid his first instalment, either in assignats or some old depreciated State paper, to cut down the timber on his new estate and get as much immediate profit out of it as possible before the second instalment became due, at which time he disappeared and went to buy more Church property in a distant province. To such an extent had this spirit extended, that it was a common thing for the purchasers of houses belonging to the Church, in towns, to pull them down immediately and sell the material for building purposes, by which they made a good profit before the second instalment became due. During the summer of 1790 many large fortunes were made by skilful speculations in Church property, and the French became a nation of gamblers.

When Necker informed the Assembly of the condition of the treasury in August, he announced the fact in his usual calm manner, and stated that the sale of the Church lands had produced next to nothing, but that he hoped it would finally produce a great deal, and made no suggestion as to the future. Mirabeau, instigated as usual by Clavière, came to the rescue. He said that in such an extremity recourse must be had to Herculean expedients. There was no advantage in getting small sums of money and spending them, and allowing the national debt to increase unchecked. Something must be done at once, and he proposed that eight hundred millions-worth more of assignats should be immediately issued under certain regulations. A decree must first be passed that there shall never be more than twelve hundred millions of livres in assignats in circulation at once, and that it was intended to reduce that amount as quickly as possible. Such a decree of the Assembly was necessary, according to Mirabeau, in order to

reassure the owners of assignats and prevent further machinations on the stock exchange, and to secure the gradual reduction of the amount, it should be further decreed that whenever an assignat was paid into the treasury, whether by a municipality or an individual, whether in payment of taxes, of debts to the State, or for the purchase of Church lands, that assignat should be at once burnt and no new one issued in its place. Had that been done, the value of assignats would have been effectually kept up, and if not always at par, they would not have fallen below ten per cent. discount. The treasury would not probably be very greatly relieved, but French credit would rise. He next pointed out that the rate of exchange was terribly against France, and that the amount of specie in the country was rapidly diminishing, and declared emphatically that uncertainty as to the future was destroying credit, and that specie would continue to disappear until a system of good government was firmly established. Mirabeau's motion for the creation of new assignats was opposed by Talleyrand, who was afraid of the effect of such a sweeping measure, by the Abbé Maury as a matter of course, and by Dupont de Nemours, who implored the Assembly to reject his proposition and to try to make up the deficit in the revenue by increased taxation on land. Mirabeau elaborately explains and defends his project, and suggests how it might be carried out in his twenty-first note for the court,¹ dated September 1, 1790. "We cannot be too terrified," he writes, "at the prospect of bankruptcy. The most powerful despotism cannot sustain its shock. . . . Specie will not reappear until the horizon clears. To prevent bankruptcy, order must be restored to the finances, and perfect harmony established between the Assembly and the finance ministry." By this he meant that such an understanding should be established between the minister of finance and the financial committee of the National Assembly as had been established between the minister for foreign affairs and himself as reporter of the diplomatic committee. "Necker," he continued, "will never direct the great operation of issuing

¹ *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et La Marek*, vol. i. pp. 397-401.

assignats as it ought to be directed. He did not conceive the idea of them; he is determined to oppose them, and he is no longer acting in harmony with the Assembly. He no longer governs public opinion. He was expected to do miracles, but he could not break away from routine; his pride and his prejudices have led him astray. His foresight never extends beyond a single month." Necker, therefore, he tells the king, must resign, and a new arrangement must be entered into at the finance ministry. Then he passes to the general question, and asks, "Is it possible to answer for the success of assignats? One can answer for nothing in a country like France, a prey to many conflicting passions and prejudices. . . . An administrator must be found who will devote himself to the expedient of assignats so entirely as to be ready to expose himself to the danger of failure. I only know one man who would do this, the author of assignats—Clavière." Clavière, he suggested, should become director of assignats; for he believed in them, and would certainly do his best to make them a financial success. Mirabeau's motion, in spite of much open opposition and the secret opposition of Necker, was eventually carried, mainly through the hearty support of the Marquis de Montesquiou, the reporter of the financial committee.

The natural result was that Necker resigned on September 10, and left France unregretted. He is a strange instance of the sort of man who gains popularity in quiet times and loses it in times of revolution. In the July of 1789 there was no more popular man in France than Jacques Necker; the news of his dismissal caused the capture of the Bastille. He was venerated throughout the country, and believed to be the only man who could make good the deficit which he had been the first to reveal to the people of France. Now, in September, 1790, he left France without a word of regret from a single person. He had shown himself unable to rise to the situation, unable to devise expedients in an emergency, and quite devoid of any original genius as a financier. Again and again Mirabeau had shown what ought to be done, and that it was perfectly possible to arrange the finances; but Necker was too puffed up with

conceit and too utterly devoid of any capacity to perceive the greatness of Mirabeau. He was succeeded, not, as Mirabeau had suggested, by Clavière, but by Lambert, who did nothing in particular, and resigned after a month in office.

Besides discussing the great financial crises of September and December, 1789, and March and August, 1790, it is necessary to examine some other decrees of the Assembly which affected the finances. Most important of all, the hated gabelle and the wine and spirit duties were abolished on the motion of Dupont de Nemours, speaking on behalf of the financial committee, and excise duties in general were attacked. Strange to say, the system of lotteries was maintained, and in September, 1790, one for ten millions of livres was drawn. It can hardly be wondered at, however, when it is remembered that a spirit of universal gambling had seized upon France. The drain which the city of Paris made upon the treasury still continued, and it has been estimated that no less than seventy-five millions of livres were lent to Paris by the State and spent on the purchase of corn; but the people of Paris were never satisfied, and the provinces were extremely jealous of the assistance given to the capital. Another mistake of the Assembly, or perhaps of the treasury, was in issuing five-franc assignats, in spite of the decree that they should never be under fifty livres in value. This measure was quite effective in depriving France of small silver and even copper coins, just as the issue of the larger assignats had driven away gold, but had given very little assistance to the treasury. The result was that even the workmen were now paid for their daily labour in paper money, and that specie was more than ever hidden away or buried until assignats should be still further depreciated. On the whole, the year 1790 closed very gloomily from a financial point of view, and there was every probability that 1791 would be signalized by a further issue of assignats, in spite of all the arguments of Mirabeau in the previous August.

The economical condition of France after these violent measures was not much worse at the end of 1790 than it had been in 1789, for however much the State had suffered, indi-

viduals in the country had distinctly profited. A large amount of land had changed hands, and there was the inevitable appearance of an increase in trade, which is always perceptible after a large issue of paper money. But the appearance was only factitious, for when it is felt that the value of paper varies from day to day and from hour to hour, business must take a more or less speculative character. Paper money only maintains its value when there is a general belief that it can be exchanged readily at a moment's notice for specie. The moment it ceases to be so exchangeable it ceases in value. The example in England of the forced currency of Bank of England notes at the beginning of the nineteenth century proves that it is possible for paper money to maintain ninety per cent. of its nominal value even when specie cannot be obtained on demand. But then there must be, as there was in England, a firm conviction that even if the specie cannot be obtained on demand, there is good security in the policy of the government that full value will ultimately be obtained; and such security was not felt by the people of France. The abolition of feudal dues and of the internal custom-houses had had a great economical effect on the northern part of France, and especially on Paris. Much land had hitherto been kept in pasture to escape the heavy duties on wheat; but now that the price of wheat was high, and the douanes abolished, every peasant and small farmer had his plot of arable land. Such arable land could not be expected to yield a good crop, even after a large amount of labour, in the first year, and the result was that numbers of the peasants sincerely regretted that they had exchanged their good cattle for weak wheat. In the south of France it was rather the abolition of the wine tax which had affected the peasant. Every peasant had a mania for growing vines, as he has to the present day, because they are not difficult to keep in order, and extremely profitable in a good year. The south of France therefore came nearly entirely under vines towards the end of 1790, and such vines grown on bad soil, planted at the wrong season, and ignorantly managed, naturally produced but little profit to the

peasant for the first year. These are but instances of the great economic changes produced in the country by the abolition of internal customs duties, and though, of course, they went too far, yet they were in the right direction, and the peasant thought it was better to grow poor wheat or cultivate poor vines on his own plot of land than to slave his life out on a little farm, which might be taken from him if he forgot some trifling due, or neglected some regulation of his lord. The two chief financiers, who worked out the details of the policy which has been described in the financial committee, were the Marquis de Montesquiou and Dupont de Nemours.

Anne Pierre Marquis de Montesquiou-Fézensac, though he sat upon the left of the Assembly, must not be confounded with the young and enthusiastic noblemen who made themselves conspicuous on August 4, and had then followed the triumvirate. He was a man of fifty in 1789; a *maréchal de camp* in the army, though he had not served in America; an *academicien*, though no great philosopher; a playwright and a favourite in the salons of Paris; and, above all, he filled the office of first equerry to Monsieur, the Comte de Provence, and was one of that prince's most trusted friends, and supposed to advocate his views in the Assembly. He came of a family of old noblesse in the Périgord, which must not be confounded with that of the great philosopher Montesquieu, who belonged to a parliamentary family of Bordeaux, and he was born in Paris in 1739. He was brought up at court with the royal children, and, after a few years' service in the household troops, was appointed colonel of the Régiment du Vaisseau at the age of twenty-two, and in 1771 first equerry to Monsieur. This situation at court gave him position, and he soon made himself a reputation in the salons of Paris as a society poet, and produced a comedy, "*Le Minutieux*," at the Comédie Française, in 1777. In 1780 he was promoted *maréchal de camp*, and in 1784 he was made a knight of the Order of the Holy Ghost, and elected a member of the Académie Française. In 1789 he began to take a part in politics, made himself conspicuous in the electoral assembly of the noblesse of the bailliage of Meaux,

where he proposed that the noblesse should surrender its privileges in matters of taxation.¹ He was, however, beaten there by D'Aguesseau, but was eventually elected a deputy by the noblesse of Paris, when his brother, the Abbé de Montesquiou-Fézensac, was elected by the clergy of the capital. From the time of the opening of the States-General he showed the liberal principles he had learnt at the court of Monsieur, and as a fluent speaker he soon won the ear of the Assembly after the union of the three orders. He did not know anything at all about political economy, but was so ready to speak on financial subjects that he was at once elected on the financial committee of the Assembly, when it was instituted in July, 1789, and by it he was for the same reason soon appointed its reporter. Without any fixed opinions of his own, he was ready to expound the ideas of the committee in well-chosen words, and soon acquired a great reputation as a financier. That a grand-seigneur of liberal ideas, indeed, and a cultivated mind, should be chosen as the spokesman of the Assembly on the great question of finance is yet another proof of the straits to which the Constituent Assembly was reduced by the fact that the special qualifications of the deputies were not known by previous experience. The Marquis de Montesquiou's success made him ambitious, and, after the flight to Varennes, he resigned his equerryship and threw in his lot with the popular party. He received his reward, and, after the dissolution of the Assembly, was appointed general commanding at Lyons, and in that capacity he invaded and conquered Savoy in September, 1792.

Pierre Samuel Dupont, generally known as Dupont de Nemours, was a man of the same age as the Marquis de Montesquiou, but he made his reputation as a political economist and a physiocrat long before the commencement of the Revolution. He had written his first economical articles in 1765, and had edited the *Éphémérides du Citoyen*, the organ of the physiocrats, from 1768 to 1772. He had been in office with

¹ *Histoire de Meaux et du pays Mellois*, by A. Carro, pp. 394, 395. Meaux: 1865.

his friend Turgot in 1774, and had been disgraced with him, and had then lived by his pen until Vergennes, who knew his value and his great reputation as a political economist abroad, selected him to draw up the bases of the commercial treaty with England with Dr. Hutton, the English representative, and afterwards appointed him commissary-general of commerce. In 1787 he had acted as secretary to the Assembly of Notables, and in 1789 had been elected deputy to the States-General by the tiers état of Nemours. He took his seat in the centre of the Assembly when parties began to be defined, and voted for the two chambers and the suspensive veto; but he soon gave up speaking on political questions, and devoted himself to finance, on which he was recognized as an authority. He was delighted with the opportunity of putting the physiocratic theories into practice, and eloquently advocated free trade and the abolition of the gabelle; but, though a learned economist, Dupont was no statesman, and he violently opposed Mirabeau's schemes in August, 1790, which he looked upon with the eyes of a physiocrat and not of a politician. His subsequent career was long and eventful. After becoming a royalist journalist, he was hidden during the Terror in the Observatory of Paris by the great astronomer Lalande; he then sat in the Council of Ancients, and narrowly escaped deportation; after a sojourn in America, where he became the friend of Jefferson, he acted as president of the Chamber of Commerce under Napoleon; and on the Restoration he again retired to America, and died at Delaware in 1817.

Such were the men who, with Necker, shared the reputation of being the three chief financiers of France. Both Dupont and Montesquiou were decidedly abler men than Necker; but there was one abler than any of them—Mirabeau himself. Not only was he the greatest statesman of the Revolution, but he was also its greatest financier, and many of the measures by which in after years Clavière and Cambon gained credit are suggested in Mirabeau's notes to the court. Great he was, because he saw that finance, to be successful, must be based on the right understanding of the course of politics in times of

Revolution. Finance cannot be separated from politics, and for Necker to attempt to carry on his little plans without regard to broad considerations of political expediency was utterly ridiculous. Mirabeau was unfortunately too occupied in the management of the department of foreign affairs to be able to interfere much with the finances ; for, great man as he was, it was impossible for him to manage every department of the State. Yet his financial speeches, and his notes to the court on the subject of the finances, will remain a testimony that if he had not been the greatest statesman of his age he would have been its greatest financier.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE FRENCH ARMY AND NAVY.

Disaffection in the army before 1789—Disproportionate number of generals—The household troops—The proprietary regiments—The foreign regiments—The infantry—The artillery—The cavalry—The militia and the colonial regiments—Large proportion of the great generals of the republic and of Napoleon either officers or soldiers in the old royal army—The military committee of the Assembly—Dubois-Crancé proposes conscription—Dubois-Crancé—The new military constitution, its mistakes and its results—The Marquis de Bouillé—The affair of Nancy—Opinions in the Assembly and in the clubs about it—Disorganization and want of discipline continue in the army—The French royal navy in 1789—Riots at Toulon and Brest—The naval committee of the Assembly and the new naval constitution—Disaffection continues—The old royal army and navy destroyed, and the new schemes abortive.

MIRABEAU, as has been seen, knew the importance for the success of his great plan of the co-operation of the army, but he had to recognize at last, in September, 1790, that the French soldiers could not be depended upon, and that, if the king was to have any protection whatever, the Swiss troops must be formed into a corps d'armée, and collected round the royal person under the command of La Marck. This was practically a confession on Mirabeau's part that the whole of the French soldiery had ceased to be loyal, and had become attached to the new principles of the Revolution instead of to the person of the king. The disaffection of both the officers and the men of the French army towards Louis XVI. dated back to the administration of the Comte de Saint-Germain,

who was Minister for War at the commencement of the reign, from 1775 to 1777. Saint-Germain was a man of great ability, and understood that if the French army was to hold its own against the armies of Prussia or Austria, the rigid discipline which Frederick the Great had introduced into Europe must be imitated in France. For this reason he had issued an elaborate system of field-manceuvres, and instituted a new drill, which was extremely oppressive to the men and utterly hateful to the officers, who had hitherto had plenty of leisure in time of peace; and had attempted to reform the Hôtel des Invalides and the military schools. He had further discontented the soldiers by giving their officers the power of beating them with the flats of their swords, and offended the court noblesse by abolishing the Mousquetaires and other bodies of the ceremonial household troops; and one of his successors, the Maréchal de Ségur, had also disgusted the new noblesse by an edict published in 1781, that no one who did not count sixteen quarters of nobility, or was not son of a knight of St. Louis, could hold a commission in the army. The most distinguished and accomplished young officers, who might under other circumstances have warmly welcomed the reforms of the Comte de Saint-Germain, soon had their loyalty affected by their service in America during the War of Independence. After serving side by side with the American colonists, who were fighting to overthrow the authority of a king, they lost respect for their own monarch, and brought home to France very advanced ideas as to the obedience they owed him. This feeling may be seen, not only in the behaviour and attitude of Lafayette, but in that of Rochambeau, the Vicomte de Noailles, the Lameths, the Prince de Broglie, Custines, and all the officers who had served in America, except the Vicomte de Mirabeau. In 1787 another vigorous attempt was made to introduce the new drill into the French army by the Comte de Brienne as War Minister, acting under the influence of the Duc de Guines, the Comte de Guibert, and the Comte de la Marck, who was then inspector-general of infantry, and had carefully studied the reforms introduced into the Austrian army by Marshal

Lacy. These reforms proved again to be most distasteful to the officers, and still more so to the men. In 1788 two great camps of exercise were formed at Saint-Omer and at Metz,¹ under the command respectively of the Prince de Condé and the Maréchal de Broglie, in which an attempt was made to develop the new system on a large scale. In these camps the most mutinous language was held by both officers and men. The young officers, headed by the Comte Charles de Lameth, colonel of the Cuirassiers du Roi, declared that Brienne, who was then in office, intended to overthrow French liberty by Prussian discipline, and the Comte de Guibert was held up to universal execration as the chief author of the reforms. The men were equally mutinous, for Frenchmen cannot stand the same amount of weary drill and minute regulations as the more stolid Germans, and they were much disgusted by the perpetual praise bestowed on the Swiss regiments of Salis Samade and Diesbach, which were the first to master the new drill. The Comte de Guibert felt the effect of his unpopularity in the electoral assembly of the noblesse at Bourges,² while the officers, who had distinguished themselves by their opposition to the new military organization, were everywhere elected to the States-General.

The excitement caused by the last new regulations only emphasized the general discontent of the army with Louis XVI., which foreshadowed the probability that it would never heartily obey him; but there were far more deep-seated reasons for its disaffection towards him. As in the Church, the higher ranks in the army were overpaid and filled entirely by the court noblesse, who regarded the army as a second convenient institution for providing incomes for their younger sons. The regulation of the Maréchal de Ségur had greatly increased the general discontent of the new nobility; but it must be remembered that even before its promulgation members of the poorer noblesse, unless they could somehow obtain court influence, never did rise above the rank of captain, and had to

¹ Miot de Melito, *Mémoires*, vol. i. pp. 2-5.

² See vol. i. chap. i. p. 31.

retire, after twenty-five years' service, with the cross of Saint-Louis and a very small pension. Such a practice effectually prevented the promotion of the officers best fitted to command both regiments and armies, and if it had been pursued under Louis XIV., Catinat, to mention no others of his great generals, would never have been a marshal of France. The greedy desire of the court noblesse to draw high pay had brought about a ridiculous disproportion between the number of the superior officers and of the men. When the Comte de Saint-Germain came into office, there were no less than 1295 general officers in the army, and though by 1789 this number had been reduced to 976, there was even then no less than one general for every 157 men, and very few of these generals had ever seen service. They were extremely well paid, while the men were only supposed to receive ten sous a day, of which the greater part never reached them. The French army in 1789 was divided into three broad categories, each managed after a different fashion—the household troops, the proprietary regiments, and the ordinary regiments of the line.

The *Maison du Roi*, or household troops, a magnificent body of men, well paid and splendidly attired, which had in former days done good service in the field, especially at Dettingen and Fontenoy, had become long before 1789 the most costly support of the royal dignity. Louis XVI. had none of the love of display which had characterized his two immediate predecessors, and had allowed the reforming war ministers, the Comte de Saint-Germain and the Comte de Brienne, to suppress four of the corps, which had formed part of what were called the household troops of the palace, as opposed to the *Gardes Françaises* and the *Gardes Suisses*. The four suppressed corps were the *Mousquetaires*, divided into two companies, the grey and the black, each consisting of seventeen officers and 198 privates of noble birth;¹ the *Cheveau-légers*, commanded by the Duc d'Aiguillon, with their gorgeous uniforms of red, white, and gold, who used to accompany the king's carriage on ceremonial occasions; the *Gendarmes de la*

Dubois-Crancé, by Th. Jung, vol. i. p. 66 note. Paris: 1884.

Garde, commanded by the Prince de Soubise; and the Gardes de la Porte, who had had to do duty at the palace gates during the day, commanded by the Comte de Vergennes. There remained only of the household troops of the palace, after these sweeping reforms, the Gardes du Corps, the Cent Suisses, and the police of the palace. The police of the palace were an unpretentious body of men, few in number, commanded by the Marquis de Sourches, as grand provost of the palace; and the Cent Suisses were a purely ceremonial corps, commanded by the Duc de Cossé Brissac, corresponding to the beef-eaters or yeomen of the guard in England, which derived its origin from the selection made by Louis XI. of a hundred trusty Swiss from his Swiss Guards for the special protection of his person, and whose uniform was an ancient blue, red, and gold costume of that period, and their arms the old-fashioned halberts and partisans. Far more important were the Gardes du Corps, or body-guards of the king, who had to do duty in the palace and defend the person of the king, and who showed how well they understood that duty in the terrible night of October 5. They were thirteen hundred in number, and every private had to prove sixteen quarters of nobility, that is, four generations without a *mésalliance*, while the officers were chosen from the most famous families of France. The privates ranked as sub-lieutenants and lieutenants in the army, and the corporals as captains, while the officers were all generals. They were divided into four companies, the Scotch,¹ the Ville-roy, the Luxembourg, and the Noailles, and were commanded in 1789 by the Duc d'Ayen, the Duc de Guiche, the Duc de Luxembourg, and the Prince de Poix. However devoted they might be, the Gardes du Corps were very insubordinate to their officers, and, on the very eve of the Revolution, demanded the restoration to rank of a corporal who had been degraded for presenting a seditious memoir.² The household troops of the palace also included the two companies of the Gardes du Corps of

¹ *The Scots Men-at-Arms and Life-Guards in France, from their formation to their final dissolution*, by W. Forbes-Leith. Edinburgh: 1882

² D'Hezecques, *Souvenirs d'un Page de la Cour de Louis XVI.*

Monsieur, consisting of a hundred gentlemen each, in a blue and red uniform, commanded by the Duc de Lévis and the Comte de Chabillant; and the two companies of the Gardes du Corps of the Comte d'Artois in green, commanded by the Prince d'Hennin and the Chevalier de Crussol, to which Jean Paul Marat had been physician from 1782 to 1786, who did duty in the apartments of their princes, but were not allowed to accompany them out of doors. Quite distinct from these corps of gentlemen, though included among the household troops, were the two regiments of the Gardes Françaises and the Gardes Suisses. The Gardes Françaises had their barracks in Paris, and only sent a detachment to mount guard outside the palace walls at Versailles. Their chief duty was to maintain order in Paris; but discipline had been almost entirely neglected during the colonelcy of the Maréchal de Biron, who had commanded the regiment ever since the battle of Fontenoy in 1745. The officers hardly ever saw their men, and had no sympathy with them, while the men lived as they liked; and Hoche, for instance, was enabled to eke out his slender pay by drawing water for the market gardeners, which he found so profitable that he used to pay a comrade to mount guard in his place.¹ An attempt had been made to remedy this state of things by the Duc du Châtelet, who had succeeded the Maréchal de Biron as colonel of the regiment in 1788; but his stern and capricious measures only drove the men to mutiny, and prepared their minds to play the great and important part they did in the early days of the Revolution.² The Gardes Suisses had been carefully preserved from the contamination of life in Paris by having their barracks placed at Courbevoie and Rueil, and they too only deserved the title of household troops because they sent a detachment to do external duty at the palace of Versailles. The privates were all of Swiss birth, and were recruited in Switzerland by the Swiss officers, who were descended from families which had been for generations in the service of France, and who were

¹ Rousselin de Saint-Albin, *Vie de Hoche*, p. 13

² See chap. iv. p. 126, and chap. v. p. 132.

not permitted to marry a French subject without the royal permission. They were not, however, so efficient in 1789 as they used to be; for their colonel, the General Louis d'Affry, was an old man in his seventy-sixth year, who had indeed distinguished himself in the Italian campaign of 1735, in the War of the Austrian Succession, and in the Seven Years' War, but who during his long command of the regiment, lasting over twenty-two years, had allowed many abuses, especially with regard to the pay of the men, to grow up, and left the active duties of his post to his lieutenant-colonel, the Baron de Besenval.

Next to the household troops in trustworthiness, and generally in efficiency, were the twenty-seven proprietary regiments sixteen of infantry, two of heavy cavalry, five of hussars, and four of dragoons. These regiments were some of those which had been raised by foreign princes or great French noblemen during the reign of Louis XIV., and had been bequeathed by them as personal property; but the tendency in the eighteenth century had been to reduce their number. The colonels were, in the case of the foreign regiments, appointed by the foreign monarchs who owned the regiments, or else were the proprietors themselves, and these colonels presented a list of officers to the War Office for the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and appointed to the other ranks whoever they pleased. The colonels were paid a fixed sum per annum with which to clothe and arm their men and obtain recruits, and the ownership of a regiment was a very valuable source of income, when the commissions were sold and every possible profit made. Occasionally, however, the proprietors, as in the case of the Comte de la Marek, took great pride in their regiments, and spent much money on them in obtaining the best recruits and best possible equipment, and these regiments were the very best in France. The chief proprietary regiments belonging to foreign princes were the Royal Suédois (of which the Comte de Fersen was colonel), Royal Bavière, Royal Deux-Ponts, Darmstadt, and Nassau, and the most important of those belonging to French or foreign noblemen were the

Esterhazy, Lauzun, and Berchiny hussars, the Montmorency and La Rochefoucauld dragoons, and the infantry regiments of La Marek, Bouillon, Rohan, Dillon, and Noailles.

The household troops and the proprietary regiments only formed a small portion of the French army; the bulk of the infantry and cavalry and the whole of the artillery were under the entire control of the War Office, and it is by examining them and their administration that the willingness of the soldiery to assist and not to oppose the progress of the Revolution can be best understood. First of all, it must be noticed that there were many foreign regiments in French pay which were not proprietary regiments, and which must be excepted from the general rule that the army was disaffected to the king. There were among them several German regiments, such as the Royal Allemand cavalry, and the Alsace and Salm-Salm infantry, which were recruited entirely from Germans, though their officers were French and appointed by the War Office, and the difference of the language they spoke to that of the people among whom they were quartered kept them from joining in any insurrection against the royal authority. The same argument hardly applies to the Swiss regiments of Château-Vieux, Diesbach, Salis Samade, Reinach, Castella, and the rest; but even amongst them the difference of nationality inclined them to obey their officers, and to take no part in politics as long as they were well treated.

The whole infantry consisted in 1789,¹ including both proprietary regiments and regiments of the line, but excluding the Gardes Françaises and Gardes Suisses as forming part of the Maison du Roi, of seventy-nine French and twenty-three foreign regiments, together with twelve battalions of light infantry, under the name of Chasseurs à Pied, instituted by the Comte de Saint-Germain. Each regiment consisted of two battalions, except the Régiment du Roi, which contained four; and the infantry, on a peace footing, was estimated at

¹ *Histoire de l'Infanterie française*, by C. A. V. Susane. 5 vols. 1876, 1877.

about 133,000 men. The foreign regiments were eleven Swiss (in which, however, Germans, Poles, Swedes, and Danes were allowed to enlist), eight German, three Irish, and one Italian, and their attitude towards the people among whom they dwelt has been noticed. The seventy-nine French regiments formed the real bulk of the infantry of the French army. The titles of all, except the proprietary regiments and those which had such special names as the Régiments du Roi, de la Reine, de la Couronne, Royal Marine, and Royal de Vaisseau, showed their local origin, such as the Régiments de Touraine, de Saintonge, de Guyenne, or Royal Auvergne, although they were no longer specially recruited from the provinces from which they had originally been raised. These French regiments were entirely kept up by voluntary enlistment; but irregular pay and bad administration caused the recruiting sergeants to pick up the very dregs of the people from the crimps who thrived in every large town and especially in Paris,¹ and the soldiers were, in the emphatic words of such different men as Saint-Germain, Mirabeau, and Dubois de Crancé, little better than brigands. Yet among these brigands were many men of a higher grade in society, whom the fascination of a military life drew into the ranks, such as Moncey and Bernadotte, the future marshals of France, who were the sons of lawyers at Besançon and Pau, and who ran away from their law studies to enlist in the ranks. The internal arrangements of each regiment were entirely in the hands of the colonel and officers, who embezzled the men's pay and made money out of them if they were avaricious, who tyrannized over them if they were cruel, and who neglected them if they did nothing worse. The commissariat arrangements were in the hands of the "administration of the army," a department as badly managed as the rest; the men had to sleep three in a bed, they were allowed a few sous occasionally instead of food, and the barracks were left utterly uncared for. The wonder is, not that the soldiers

¹ For a curious account of the crimps of Paris, their various stratagems for ensnaring recruits, and their haunts near the Pont Neuf, see Mercier's *Tableau de Paris*, part i. pp. 51-53 in the London edition of 1781.

were brigands, but that so many of them were capable of learning in such an army the elements of true military education, and that, instead of being utterly degraded, they were able to retain the elements of the military efficiency which made them the nucleus of the splendid armies of the Republic and Napoleon. It has been noticed how that, in June, 1789, the soldiers of the French regiments had everywhere fraternized with the people, and that in July the Maréchal de Broglie had had to recognize that not even the foreign regiments could be relied upon. This feeling of disaffection steadily increased during 1790, and even Mirabeau had to acknowledge that, for the accomplishment of his purposes, the army could not be counted an element of strength, but of weakness, to the royal cause.

Maladministration was not so rife in the artillery¹ and engineers, but the greater degree of knowledge required by both officers and men in these scientific corps, while it made their pay higher, yet made them think more about the degraded state into which the army had sunk, and made them support with the ardour of thinking men, not with the sentimental enthusiasm of the infantry, the cause of the Revolution. At a very early date it was observed that the gunners of the National Guard, not only in Paris, but in the provincial cities, who were nearly always old artillerymen, were the most advanced republicans in the country, and their comrades of the artillery of the line shared their sentiments. The artillery of the line consisted of seven regiments of two battalions each, and the sappers and miners of fifteen companies, forming a force of eleven thousand men, with nine hundred officers, under the command or rather the inspector-generalship, of the Comte de Gribeauval, in which the men and officers were in complete sympathy with each other. The officers had received a more thorough education than in the cavalry and infantry, and were generally drawn from the ranks of the poorer noblesse, for the cadets of the wealthier families did not care for the hard work and simple uniform; and therefore these officers in a body had to look to their profession alone

¹ *Histoire de l'Artillerie française*, by C. A. V. Susane. Paris: 1874.

for advancement, and enthusiastically supported schemes and ideas of reform which would give them a fair chance of promotion, and not confine the higher ranks of the army to the court noblesse. To mention but a few of the artillerymen and engineers who afterwards gained fame, not only Napoleon Bonaparte, but Law of Lauriston, Senarmont, and Montrichard, were all lieutenants in the artillery in 1789; Pichegru was adjutant-sous-officier, and Claude Perrin, afterwards Marshal Victor, Joubert, and Verdier, had served in its ranks; while Meusnier de la Place was a lieutenant-colonel, and Marescot, Caffarelli du Falga, Carnot, and C. A. Prieur-Duvernois all lieutenants in the royal engineers.

The cavalry regiments¹ showed exactly the opposite spirit; for it is a peculiar fact, which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for, that cavalry soldiers have at all times and in all countries been attached to monarchy and even tyranny. The French cavalry consisted, in 1789, of twenty-six regiments of cavalry proper (who were all cuirassiers, or heavy cavalry, except the two battalions of carbineers), eighteen of dragoons, twelve of chasseurs à cheval, and six of hussars, and amounted in all to two hundred and six squadrons, or about twenty-six thousand men. Eleven of these regiments were proprietary, and a source of great pride to their owners; but, even in those which were under the direct control of the War Office, the spirit of disaffection had made but slight progress, and it will be seen that, when the spirit of emigration spread, whole cavalry regiments deserted and showed their willingness to fight against France.

This French regular army was recruited by voluntary enlistment, that is, by means of crimps; but it was otherwise with the militia, consisting of thirteen regiments of royal grenadiers, sixteen provincial regiments, and seventy-eight garrison battalions, 55,000 men in all, which was recruited by conscription in the country districts. This conscription, from which Paris was free by old prescription, was a terrible burden

¹ *Histoire de la Cavalerie française*, by C. A. V. Susane. 3 vols. Paris: 1874.

upon the poorest class of agriculturists, for not only were the noble free from it, but any one with a little money could bribe the municipal or the village officers, or come under one of the thirty-nine classes of exemption,¹ and then the lot would not fall upon their sons. They had only to serve for seven years, but during those years they were treated far worse even than the ordinary infantry regiments. Worst of all, however, was the condition of the colonial regiments. To fill their ranks men were kidnapped and carried off by force, and suspected criminals were generally sent off to San Domingo, the Mauritius, or Pondicherry, as recruits. The Marquis de Sillery used very strong language on this subject in the Constituent Assembly. "The recruiting for the colonial regiments is managed," he said, "with the concurrence of the lieutenant of police of Paris. The citizens themselves assist in this vicious arrangement, for they request him to enrol for the colonies any children of whose conduct they may have to complain. These young exiles, after serving their time, dare not return to the country which has rejected them, and form that parasite class called the mean whites, which has become one of the most dangerous plagues of the colonies."² The words of Sillery were but too true, as the whole history of the French Revolution in the colonies too plainly showed.

It is curious, after this examination of the state of the French army in 1789, to see how many of the future great generals of the Republic and of Napoleon were serving, or had served, in the army of the ancien régime. Napoleon himself was a second lieutenant in the artillery regiment of La Fère, and was hard at work on his history of Corsica, with his eyes turned rather upon the destinies of that little island than of the great kingdom he was so soon to rule; and of the four greatest generals of the Republic, Dumouriez was *maréchal de camp*, a grade corresponding to that of an English major-general, commanding at Cherbourg; Pichegru was *adjudant-sous-*

¹ See these classes in *La France en 1789*, by Alfred Pizard, pp. 238-240. Paris : 1882.

² *Bonaparte et son temps*, by Th. Iung, vol. i. p. 132. Paris : 1880.

officier, the highest rank a non-commissioned officer could reach, in the 1st Artillery; Hoche was a sergeant in the Gardes Françaises; and Moreau alone was not in the army. The same proportion of old soldiers appears in an examination of the careers of the twenty-four French marshals of France appointed by Napoleon. Eighteen of them had served in the royal army, eight as officers and ten in the ranks. The eight ex-officers were Kellerman, who was *maréchal de camp*; Alexandre Berthier, a lieutenant-colonel attached to the headquarters staff; Serrurier, major in the Régiment de Beauce; Perignon, sub-lieutenant in the garrison battalion of the Lyonnais; Macdonald, sub-lieutenant in the Régiment de Dillon; Davout, sub-lieutenant in the Champagne cavalry; Marmont, who received a commission in the garrison battalion of Chartres in 1790, from which he exchanged into the artillery; and Moncey, who, after serving in the ranks of the Régiment de Conti, the Champagne infantry, and the Gendarmes of the Household, had received a commission as lieutenant, not in the regular army, but in the legion of volunteers of Nassau-Siegen, which, after the failure of the attempt on Jersey in 1782, became the Chasseurs Cantabres. The ten marshals of Napoleon who rose from the ranks of the ancient army included the very greatest of his generals and two kings. Five of them had retired before 1789, and owed their subsequent promotion in the armies of the Republic to their election to the command of volunteer battalions, and five were still in the ranks. Augereau, after serving, according to some authorities, in the Bourgoigne cavalry, and, according to others, in the Carbineers or in the dragoons of Artois, had entered the Neapolitan army as sergeant-instructor, and afterwards established himself as a fencing-master at Naples; Jourdan, after serving in the ranks through the American War of Independence in the Régiment d'Auxerrois, had become a draper at Limoges; Masséna had retired from the Régiment Royal Italien as adjutant-sous-officier in 1788; Oudinot had retired as a corporal after serving in the Régiment de Medoc; and Claude Perrin, afterwards Marshal Victor, also quitted the service

after attaining the same rank in the 4th or Grenoble regiment of artillery in 1788.¹ The five future marshals still in the ranks in 1789 were Murat, private in the Chasseurs des Ardennes; Bernadotte, sergeant-major in the Régiment Royal Marine; Lefebvre, senior sergeant in the Gardes Françaises; Soult, corporal in the Royal Infanterie; and Ney, private in the Colonel-General hussars. The proportion of former officers and soldiers appears still more markedly among the great generals of the Republic. Besides Dumouriez and Bonaparte, Montesquiou, Custines, Menou, Houchard, Dugommier, Dampierre, Anselme, Barbentane, Canclaux, Schérer, Dumerbion, Kilmaine, Aubert-Dubayet, Latour-Maubourg, Desaix, Grouchy, Baraguay d'Hilliers, Montbrun, and Dupont had all held commissions before 1789; while Marceau, Moreaux, Joubert, Souham, Lecourbe, Vandamme, Bonet, Friant, Rapp, Doppet, Rey, Richepanse, Verdier, Grenier, and Lapisse had all served, or were still serving, in the ranks. The only important generals, always with the great exception of Moreau, who did not learn their military education in the army of the monarchy, were Kléber and Laharpe, who had held commissions in the Austrian and Swiss armies respectively; and such young men as Bessières, Suchet, and Lannes, who were not twenty years of age in 1789, but whose military tastes would certainly have made them volunteer whenever a war broke out. Further exception might have been with regard both to Brune and Gouvion Saint Cyr, who became marshals of Napoleon, but even in their case the same argument of youth holds good, and admirers of the ancien régime may fairly boast that the old French army could not have been of such bad quality as has been commonly believed, and that if republican France produced the soldiers, which defended her against the combined armies of Europe, it was monarchical France which had trained and disciplined the great generals, without whose skill all the valour of the soldiers would have been useless. And it was

¹ According to the *États de service*, published in Gavard's *Galerie des maréchaux de France*, 1839, however, Masséna did not quit the army until September 30, 1789, and Victor not till March 1, 1791.

not only generals but administrators also that the old army supplied to republican France and to Napoleon. Not only were Carnot and Prieur-Duvernois, the two military members of the Great Committee of Public Safety, officers in the royal army; but the members of the topographical committee which assisted them, d'Arçon, Montalembert, and Laffitte-Clavé, and the great war ministers who preceded and succeeded them, Louis de Narbonne, Servan, Bouchotte, Milet de Mureau, Clarke, and Lacuée de Cessac, were all officers, while Pétiet had been a commissary, and the real organizer of the republican army Dubois de Crancé had served in the Mousquetaires.

Such was the condition of the French army in 1789, containing many great men and great soldiers, whose value was to become evident to all the world, but for the time utterly worthless both for foreign war and the maintenance of peace at home from its vicious organization. The disinclination of the soldiers to obey their officers, and their disposition to fraternize with the people, had shown itself in the summer of 1789. The Gardes Françaises could not be trusted, even in May, to put down the Réveillon riot,¹ and had, after the taking of the Bastille, been suppressed as a corps of the household troops, and had become the paid battalion of the National Guard of Paris;² the Régiment d'Artois had in July refused to fire on the people of Rennes,³ and had mounted the tricolour cockade; the Régiment de Bretagne⁴ refused to interfere with the rioters who attacked the Hôtel de Ville at Strasbourg; and in August the Royal Dragoons had been obliged to leave Troyes for fear that they would come to blows with the infantry regiment there, which had fraternized with the people.⁵ It was necessary that the Assembly should at once take some step to put down this state of anarchy in the army, and on September 30, 1789, it was decided to elect a military committee of twelve, which should draw up, with the Minister of War, the Marquis de la Tour-du-Pin Gouvernet, a new military constitution. On October 3 the committee

¹ Chap. iv. p. 124.

² Chap. v. p. 156.

³ Chap. vi. p. 170.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

was elected, and consisted of eleven officers or ex-officers in the army, and one avocat, Emmery, deputy for Metz. The eleven officers were the Comte d'Egmont, lieutenant-general; the Vicomte de Panat; the Marquis de Rostaing; the Baron de Wimpfen; the Baron de Flachslanden; the Comte de Gomer and the Marquis de Bouthillier, *maréchaux de camp*, or major-generals, who had all served in the Seven Years' War; the Vicomte de Noailles and the Baron de Menou, colonels and comrades of Lafayette in America; Mirabeau, who had served with the Régiment Royal Comtois in the subjugation of Corsica, and been made an unattached captain of dragoons; and Dubois de Crancé, who had belonged to the Mousquetaires before their suppression. To them were afterwards added the Marquis d'Ambly and the Marquis de Crillon, *maréchaux de camp*; Colonel the Chevalier Alexandre de Lameth; and Bureaux de Pusy, captain in the engineers. From a committee in which the majority were general officers of rank great schemes of reform could not be expected, and on November 19 the Marquis de Bouthillier, as reporter of the newly formed military committee, read a report confirming the system of voluntary enlistment for the army, and the Minister of War agreed with the conclusions of the report on December 12.

It was then that Dubois de Crancé rose, and protested against this conclusion in a vigorous speech, in which he laid down the principle of conscription as the only possible means to maintain a truly national army. "I tell you," he said, "that in a nation which desires to be free, which is surrounded by powerful neighbours and harassed by factions, every citizen ought to be a soldier, and every soldier a citizen, if France is not to be utterly annihilated. . . . How is it possible to make a man march forth to battle whose indolence has driven him into the ranks, who has in many cases become a soldier to avoid the penalties of the law, who in fact has sold his liberty for a price, side by side with the man who has taken up arms to defend his liberty? . . . It is necessary to establish a truly national conscription, which should include every one from the second man in the empire in rank down to

the last active citizen. . . . If you once allow the system of substitutes . . . the profession of arms will again be despised ; despotism will profit by it, and you will once more become slaves. . . . I now declare it to be an axiom that in France every citizen ought to be a soldier, and every soldier a citizen, or else we shall never have a constitution.”¹ The ex-mousquetaire was supported in his conclusions by the Baron de Menou, but was violently opposed, on December 15, by the Duc de Liancourt, the Duc de Biron, and Mirabeau ; and when Bureaux de Pusy declared that conscription would be an infringement of the rights of man, his case was lost, and on December 17 the Assembly decreed that the French soldiers of every arm should be enlisted as before, by voluntary enrolment, for a fixed sum of money. But the speech of Dubois de Crancé remained in men’s memories, and the time was to come when his idea of a national conscription was obliged to be adopted in order to save France from her enemies.

Edmond Louis Alexis Dubois de Crancé,² the man who first conceived the idea, which has changed the face of Europe, of making every able-bodied citizen serve a certain period in the army, and then form part of a national militia to be available in time of serious peril, came of a good bourgeois family in Champagne, and was born at Charleville, on October 17, 1747. He was the youngest of the fourteen children of Germain Dubois de Crancé, who had been first a commissary and then an intendant of police and finance in the administration of the army, and had served twelve campaigns in those capacities, and he was therefore accustomed to hear of military matters from his childhood. His eldest brother had served as a captain in the Dauphin cavalry, and had had his leg broken at the battle of Crefeld and had eventually died from his wound, a lieutenant-colonel and a knight of St. Louis ; the second had become a priest and a canon in the cathedral of Châlons ;

¹ Iung’s *Dubois-Crancé*, vol. i. pp. 16–28.

² *Dubois-Crancé, mousquetaire, constituant, conventionnel, général de division, ministre de la guerre*, by Th. Iung, Colonel d’Artillerie. 2 vols. Paris : 1884.

the third entered the administration of the army and became a commissary, and spent two years in England as a prisoner of war; while the fourth entered the engineers. Edmond Louis Alexis was naturally also destined for the army, and in 1765, before completing his fifteenth year, he entered the Grey Mousquetaires, one of the noble corps in the Maison du Roi, through the influence of his uncle Dubois de Loisy, who held the important court position of esquire to the Dauphine. He remained in the Mousquetaires until their suppression in 1775, and had among his companions in the company Alexandre de Beauharnais; the Marquis de Rostaing, who was to be his colleague on the military committee of the Constituent Assembly; Jacques Coustard, the future member of the Convention; and De Grave, who was to hold office for a few months as war minister. His early years at court were made uncomfortable by a process, instituted by some of the inhabitants of Châlons, to prove that the Dubois de Crancés had no right to the letters of noblesse which had been taken out in 1739. The case was tried, and in 1765 the sieurs Dubois de Crancé were forbidden to assume the title of noble, esquire, or chevalier. This decree, however, did no harm to the young mousquetaire, for from the services of his father and grandfather he was noble for military service, while it enabled him in after years to take his seat in the States-General as a deputy of the tiers état. The troubles of this lawsuit had caused the death of the old intendant of the army, and in 1764 Edmond Louis Dubois de Crancé inherited the fine estate of Balham-sur-Aisne from his father, with 80,000 livres. This fortune enabled him to cut a good figure among his comrades at court; but he avoided excesses, and spent his leisure in reading and dreaming. In 1772 he married an heiress, Mademoiselle Marie Catherine de Montmeau, and on the suppression of the Mousquetaires he retired to Balham and began to lead the life of a country gentleman. His wealth made him able to do good and his manners made him popular, and he was at once elected a deputy to the States-General by the tiers état of the bailliage of Vitry-le-Français. At Versailles he soon made his

mark ; he warmly supported the vote "par tête ;" he was elected a member of the financial and military committees, and on November 24 secretary of the Assembly ; so that it was no unknown man who, on December 12, demanded a national conscription for the army. But Dubois de Crancé was before his time ; the Constituent Assembly were afraid to adopt his grand schemes, and it was not until the days of the Convention, when France had become a republic, that he could carry out his great ideas.

The military committee of the Assembly did a great work in laying down the basis of a new French army, but the Assembly itself, by dwelling upon its favourite theories of social equality and the rights of man, effectually destroyed whatever respect for discipline was left, and entirely overthrew the efficiency of the old army while laying the basis of the new one. It was decreed that the *Maison du Roi* should be abolished and replaced by a "Garde Constitutionnelle," consisting of twelve hundred foot and six hundred horse, chosen in the departments from among the sons of the active citizens, to guard the king's person ; that the Gardes Suisses should remain a separate corps, under the command of an inspector-general ; and that the former Gardes Françaises should be split up into three regiments of infantry of the line, two battalions of chasseurs, and two of gendarmerie. Further, on the motion of the Marquis de Bouthillier, it was decreed that the French army should consist of 150,000 men with the colours recruited by voluntary enlistment and receiving a fixed rate of pay ; that one-fourth of the sub-lieutenancies should be filled by promotion from the ranks, and the other three-fourths by examination after a course in a military college ; that promotion to the rank of lieutenant and captain should go by seniority in the regiment and to the higher ranks by seniority in the army and selection, and that there should be only ninety-four general officers in the army instead of nearly a thousand. The militia was abolished and replaced by a new gendarmerie to maintain order, and the regiments of the regular army were to lose their old titles and be known by numbers alone. So far all was good, but all

power of maintaining discipline in this new army was extinguished by the Assembly's mistaken determination to look upon a soldier as a citizen, possessing all the privileges of citizenship. It was with difficulty that the deputies were prevented from allowing the soldiers votes, and it was universally agreed that they should be amenable to the civil courts, except in regard to strictly military offences. The majority in the Assembly was also greatly afraid of the necessary power which must be possessed by the officers over their men; the regimental treasury was to be under the direct control of a board consisting of two officers and three men elected by their comrades, and soldiers were always to be allowed to appeal to the nearest magistrate against their commanding officer. Finally, the regiments were to be always at the beck and call of the municipal authorities of the district or city in which they were stationed, and the men were to be allowed to form associations and clubs, and send petitions up to the Assembly. In vain did Mirabeau protest that a soldier ceased for the time being to be a citizen. In vain did he argue that for an army to be efficient it must be disciplined, and that power must be given to the officers to enforce discipline; for the Assembly, under the influence of their sentimental feelings, insisted on the annihilation of all military subordination. The result of this policy, added to the former feelings of discontent in the ranks which had appeared in the summer of 1789, was to weaken the army tremendously and make it utterly mutinous, as numerous military riots and mutinies proved up to the time of the affair at Nancy, which at last opened the eyes of the radical deputies to the complete disorganization of the army. Desertion increased to an incredible extent, for not only were deserters not punished, but they were warmly received either as sergeant-instructors or as simple sergeants by the National Guards of different cities, and protected by the municipal authorities. To such an extent had desertion increased, that it was estimated that thirty thousand soldiers left their regiments between July and October, 1789. The municipality of Paris took three hundred artillerymen of the Régiment de Toul into its pay

as paid gunners of the National Guard. Even officers took advantage of the general laxity, and Lieutenant Napoleon Bonaparte extended his three months' sick leave to a year, while he planned attacks upon the citadel of Ajaccio. At Lille, the regiments Royal de Vaisseau and de la Couronne came to blows with the chasseurs de Normandie and the hussars Colonel-General;¹ at Nîmes, the soldiers of the Régiment de Guyenne tore off many white cockades; the Régiment de Poitou arrested its colonel; the Régiment de Languedoc refused to leave Montauban; the Régiment de Salm-Salm demanded its chest at Metz; and the soldiers of the Royal Champagne cavalry mutinied at Hesdin because the officers did not ask them to dinner! All these occurrences showed how things were going; but far more important in itself and in its results was the affair of Nancy, after which all eyes were turned to the Marquis de Bouillé, the court with enthusiastic hope, the Jacobins with distrust and even terror, and the lovers of order with satisfaction tempered with doubt.

François Claude Amour, Marquis de Bouillé,² was certainly one of the most distinguished generals in the service of France, and had won great fame in the West Indies during the American War of Independence, and his strong royalist principles were so well known that it was universally expected that if the army declared for the king, he would be the general chosen to command it. He was born at Cluzel, in Auvergne, in 1739, and fought his way up from a captaincy to a colonelcy in the Seven Years' War. In 1768 he had been appointed governor of the island of Guadeloupe, and in 1777 governor-general of the Windward Islands, with his head-quarters at Martinique. As soon as France decided to take an active part in the American War of Independence, Bouillé began to distinguish himself. He took the island of Dominica, and was promoted *maréchal de camp* in 1778. He captured from the

¹ *Histoire de Lille et de la Flandre wallonne*, by Victor Derode, vol. iii. pp. 28-31. Lille: 1848.

² *Essai sur la vie du Marquis de Bouillé*, by his grandson, René de Bouillé. Paris: 1853.

English during the following years Tobago, St. Eustache, St. Kitt's, Nevis, and Montserrat, and was rewarded for his services in 1784 by the rank of lieutenant-general and the Order of the Holy Ghost. He had then been appointed governor of Metz and commander-in-chief of the troops in the Messin, one of the most important commands in France, from its proximity to the eastern frontier. He had shown his attachment to the ancien régime in the Assembly of Notables, and was warmly attached to the king personally, and had been known to express a very strong opinion in condemnation of the events of October 5 and 6. Lafayette knew his power and importance, and had done all he could to make friends with him both in Paris and by a special journey to Metz; but Bouillé's firm loyalty kept him from having any confidence in the commander-in-chief of the Paris National Guard. Mirabeau strongly believed in Bouillé, and that he would be ready to help the king if called upon, and the Jacobins distrusted him because they held the same opinion; but whatever his political ideas were, he was too thorough a soldier and too good a general to allow any relaxation of discipline. His firmness was severely tried by the conduct of certain of the regiments of his garrison; he had to punish the Régiment de Picardie, and to meet a yet more formidable mutiny in the Régiment de Salm-Salm, which demanded its military chest, on which occasion the dragoons of Condé had refused to charge, and he had crushed both mutinies by firmness alone. Bouillé had, in the early days of the Revolution, been hated by all classes in Metz; but he had ended by becoming very popular after taking the oath to the Constitution and saving the life of a citizen from a burning house, and had been elected commander-in-chief of the National Guard of Metz, a post which he refused. It was necessary that some attempt should be made to restore discipline to the army. The War Minister, the Marquis de la Tour-du-Pin Gouvernet, read a report to this effect on August 6. "In the last few weeks want of discipline has made threatening progress. Every day deputations of soldiers bring petitions to the ministry without the permission of their superior officers, containing the results

of the deliberations of their comrades, whom they call their constituents. Everywhere the soldiers wish to carry off the regimental treasure in order to divide it, and I have no doubt that the evil will not stop there; if they unite with the populace the soldiers will soon make every city tremble, and perhaps a portion of the kingdom. The danger is close at hand, for seven regiments have already united and formed a military congress."¹ The Constituent Assembly, frightened at this picture, revoked the decree allowing soldiers to form clubs and deliberate, and the news of a serious mutiny at Nancy caused every one to look towards Bouillé to see what he would do, and towards the Assembly to wonder if it would sanction vigorous measures on the general's part.

The city of Nancy, the ancient capital of Lorraine, was garrisoned by the Régiment du Roi, the only regiment in the service with four battalions, the Swiss regiment of Château-Vieux, so called from the name of its commanding officer, and the cavalry regiment of Mestre de Camp.² The soldiers of all the regiments had been on very friendly terms with the people of Nancy, and had cordially co-operated in two great federative ceremonies on April 19 and July 14; but great discontent existed among the soldiers of the Régiment du Roi, which had been commanded up to 1788 by the Duc du Châtelet, whose occasional fits of ill-timed severity produced the same feeling of disaffection among his men at Nancy as they afterwards did among the Gardes Françaises. By July, after the ceremony of the federation, this disaffection had reached its height, and thirty soldiers were expelled the regiment, and on August 2 the grenadier company mutinied on behalf of a comrade, but were soon persuaded to return to their duty by the Maréchal de Camp de Noue, governor and

¹ *L'Armée et la Garde Nationale*, by Baron Charles Poisson, vol. i. p. 247. Paris: 1858.

² For the affair of Nancy, see *Histoire de l'affaire de Nancy*, by X. Maire, Nancy and Paris, 1861; Poisson's *L'Armée et la Garde Nationale*, vol. i. chap. viii. pp. 241-270; René Bouillé's *Essai sur la Vie du Marquis de Bouillé*; *Histoire de Nancy*, by Jean Cayon, pp. 318-326. Nancy: 1846.

commandant at Nancy. On August 9, when the regiment was on parade, two men from each company stepped out of the ranks and demanded the accounts of the regiment from 1767, when the Duc du Châtelet had assumed the command. The officers agreed to hand over 170,000 francs, and the regiment accepted it, and sent a deputation to Paris to explain the circumstances. The Swiss of Château-Vieux at once followed the example set to them; but the officers were not so lenient, and had two men severely flogged. Then the other regiments, the populace of Nancy, and even the municipality, raised an outcry; all the officers were imprisoned, and eventually the two punished soldiers were rewarded with one hundred louis each, and the officers paid over 47,000 francs to their men, and the officers of Mestre de Camp also paid over 24,000 francs. This money was at once squandered in drink and debauchery, and all the dregs of the neighbouring towns came in to help to spend it; and it is noteworthy, as showing the character of the ringleaders, that Pomier, the chief of them, who became a commissary, was years afterwards tried and shot in twenty-four hours by General Serrurier for pillaging.¹ The Assembly had heard with equanimity of many similar disturbances, but even the theorists there felt that this affair could not be passed over. The eight delegates of the mutinous regiments were imprisoned; the Maréchal de Camp de Malseigne, lieutenant-colonel of the Carbineers, stationed at Lunéville, an officer of stern and unbending disposition, was sent with full powers to examine into the state of things at Nancy; Bouillé received the command of Champagne, Alsace, Lorraine, and Franche Comté, as well as of the Messin and the bishoprics, with orders to use force to repress the mutineers; and Lafayette sent a circular to the National Guards of the Meurthe, the Moselle, and the Meuse, begging them to assist Bouillé. On August 25 M. de Malseigne reached Nancy, and on the following day had to cut his way through the mutinous soldiery, and galloped to Lunéville, where his own regiment,

¹ Cayon's *Histoire de Nancy*, p. 319.

the Carbineers, was quartered. Outside Lunéville a free fight took place between his men and some troopers of the regiment of Mestre de Camp which had followed him, and sixty of the latter were taken prisoners. The news of this skirmish greatly excited the riotous soldiery at Nancy, and on the morning of August 29 three thousand of them encamped in front of Lunéville and demanded the surrender of Malseigne. The mayor of the city, in terror at their threats, begged Malseigne to sacrifice himself, and he accordingly gave himself up to the mutineers. On the way to Nancy he escaped, however, and returned to Lunéville; but the Carbineers had been infected with the same mutinous spirit, and during the night of August 29 his own soldiers carried him to Nancy, where he was imprisoned with the commandant, De Noue. Meanwhile Bouillé had not been idle. He collected a force of four foreign battalions of the regiments of Castella, Vigier, Diesbach, and Royal-Deux-Ponts, with the hussars of Berchiny and Lauzun and eight guns, on August 28, and, after adding six hundred grenadiers and six hundred national guards at Toul, appeared before Nancy with three thousand infantry and fourteen hundred cavalry on the 31st. The mutineers sent out delegates, who were informed that the three regiments must release the generals at once, march out within one hour, and surrender four ringleaders from each corps to be dealt with by the Assembly. The hour passed, and at four o'clock in the afternoon Bouillé advanced to within fifty paces of the Stainville gate.¹ There he was joined by the released generals, De Noue and Malseigne, with the news that the mutineers were leaving the city by another gate. Officers were then appointed to enter the city and arrange for the billeting of the troops, and all was believed to be over. But unfortunately the company on guard at the Stainville gate had not understood the surrender, and loaded their artillery.

¹ For a plan of Nancy in 1789, with its gates and streets, see *Promenades historiques à travers les rues de Nancy*, by C. Courbe. Nancy : 1883.

In vain did the young Chevalier de Desilles, a lieutenant in the Régiment du Roi, rush in front of the guns and try to dissuade the men from firing; he fell mortally wounded, and sixty of Bouillé's soldiers as well, at the first discharge. With a cry of "Treachery!" Bouillé's soldiers stormed the gate, and engaged for three hours in a murderous street fight with the Régiment de Château-Vieux, six hundred of the Régiment du Roi and the rabble, who had flocked to Nancy to help the mutineers to spend their money, and had pillaged the arsenal, and who now fired down upon the soldiers from the windows. By half-past seven Bouillé reached the Place Royale, where the barracks were situated; he had lost forty officers and four hundred men killed and wounded,¹ and had taken five hundred prisoners. His loss would have been greater still, if the bulk of the Régiment du Roi, which had returned to Nancy at the sound of the firing, had not been kept drawn up on parade and prevented from engaging by its officers. The Régiment du Roi was at once escorted out of the city by Bouillé's son with thirty hussars, and encamped until the Assembly should decide upon its fate; but a court martial, composed, according to the ancient custom of the Swiss regiments in the French service, of Swiss officers alone, tried the mutineers of the regiment of Château-Vieux by their own military code, and condemned the chief ringleader, Soret, to be broken on the wheel, twenty-two others to be hanged, and forty-one to be sent to the galleys for thirty years.

The vigorous action of Bouillé was received with delight by all the partisans of order in Paris, and his refusal of the bâton of a marshal for a victory over his fellow-citizens was loudly applauded. The National Assembly decreed, after an eloquent speech from Mirabeau, that the national guards had done their duty nobly as well as the troops, voted thanks to Bouillé, and sent two commissioners, Cahier de Gerville and Duveyrier, to Nancy, on whose report the regiments of Mestre

¹ Among the wounded was the Marquis de MacMahon, uncle of Marshal MacMahon, who was in command of the Lauzun Hussars. Maire's *Histoire de l'affaire de Nancy*, p. 159.

de Camp and Du Roi were cashiered. Special interest was excited by the conduct of the national guards of Metz and Toul, who had shared in the street battle of Nancy, and many of whom had fallen, and still more by the heroic deed of young Desilles. A grand funeral fête in honour of the slain national guards was held on the Champ de Mars by the National Guard of Paris on September 20; and after the death of Desilles from his wounds on October 17, his gallant act was perpetuated in poetry, painting, and sculpture, and, most characteristically, in two pieces for the stage, *Le Nouveau d'Assas*, presented at the Théâtre Italien in October, and *Le Tombeau de Desilles*, at the Théâtre de la Nation, in November, 1790.¹ But the enthusiasm with which the news of Bouillé's vigorous action was received by the court, the greater part of the Assembly, and the bourgeois, was not shared by the Jacobin Club and their leaders, who had long perceived the advantage afforded to their cause by the mutinous condition of the soldiery, and who now began to fear that the troops would be coerced into acting against the people. Marat in particular was very violent, and declared in the *Ami du Peuple* that the soldiers of the regiment of Château-Vieux were martyrs, and that the eight hundred deputies, who had supported the vote of thanks to Bouillé, ought to be hanged on eight hundred gallows-trees, and Mirabeau upon one higher than the rest. Loustallot, the young editor of the *Révolutions de Paris*, believed that the violent suppression of the Revolution was at hand, and that the king would be able to restore the ancient despotism by means of the army. The shock was so great to his enthusiastic nature that he died almost of a broken heart on September 20, the very day on which the grand funeral fête in honour of the national guards killed at Nancy took place on the Champ de Mars.

Loustallot need not have feared. The soldiers were far too much imbued with the principles of the Revolution to be reduced to obedience, and were exasperated rather than terrified by Bouillé's vigorous conduct; and the chief result of the

¹ Poisson's *L'Armée et la Garde Nationale*, vol. i. p. 262.

action at Nancy was to impress upon the minds of the troops the great fact that the national guards would never object to fight them, and accordingly they fraternized more and more with the populace, who hated the bourgeois and feared their military organization. The actual results of Bouillé's victory were very slight; the Assembly forbade the formation of clubs in the regiments, but refused to allow Bouillé's French prisoners to be prosecuted; the Jacobins commenced a steady and eventually successful agitation for the release of the forty-one Swiss soldiers who had been sent to the galleys; Danton presented a petition from the forty-eight sections of Paris, and himself thundered at the bar of the Assembly against the War Minister, De la Tour-du-Pin, who at once resigned; the populace began to associate the name of Bouillé, as they formerly had that of Broglie, with the idea of cruelty and tyranny, and the court, especially the queen, began to look to him as her sole hope of safety. It was only in Nancy itself and its neighbourhood that Bouillé's action was followed by any symptoms of a reaction in favour of royalty. At Nancy the local National Guard was temporarily suppressed, and the tricolour superseded by the white cockade; and at Belfort the soldiers and officers of the latest raised foreign regiment, the Royal Liégeois, and of the Lauzun hussars paraded the streets with cries of "Vive le Roi! au diable la nation." Disorganization increased instead of diminishing in the army itself after the affair of Nancy, and all military discipline, except within the actual region commanded by Bouillé, was at an end. Not only had more than 30,000 men, but more than that proportion of officers, left their duty. Many officers had already emigrated, and were either assembling round the Comte d'Artois or the Prince de Condé, or amusing themselves in London or at Spa. Even if they did not emigrate, ambitious officers selected this opportunity as a favourable one to get furlough, in order to promote their political aims, like Lieutenant Napoleon Bonaparte, who, after getting leave of absence for three months, spent more than a year in Corsica, intriguing and plotting for the independence of his native island; and plea-

sure-loving officers calmly left their regiments without leave, in order to enjoy the gaities of Paris. The officers who remained with their regiments had, however, a most ungrateful task. If as a body they were attached to the monarchy, they generally managed, as at Lille, Lyons, and Perpignan, to insult and offend their men, and grew more and more out of sympathy with them, and if one or two among them approved of the new principles, they were persecuted by their brother-officers. This was the case with young Louis Davout, sub-lieutenant in the Royal Champagne cavalry, who was imprisoned with great severity by his colonel, the Marquis de Fournès, at Hesdin, for being a day late, owing to his conveyance breaking down on his return from Paris, after taking a petition to the military committee there from the soldiers of his regiment.¹ But with all this absence of discipline and existence of disorder and insubordination in the regular army, great advantages were being obtained by the military efficiency of the national guards. Not only in Paris, but in every provincial town, retired officers and officers on leave were chosen to command and organize the new battalions, and retired soldiers gladly took up their arms again and served as privates or sergeant-instructors. It was from them that the national guards learnt the rudiments of discipline, and the rapidity with which whole battalions of volunteers, in the terrible struggle for existence, became real soldiers is easily accounted for when the number of old soldiers, and the still greater number of national guards, trained between 1789 and 1792 by old soldiers, is kept in mind.

The French royal navy² had distinguished itself far more than the French army during the eighteenth century, and had a greater reputation at the commencement of the revolution in 1789. It had, during the American War of Independence, proved itself more than a match for the English navy. The Comte d'Orvilliers had fought at least a drawn battle with

¹ Jung's *Dubois-Crancé*, vol. i. p. 176.

² *Histoire maritime de la France*, by Léon Guérin, new edit., vol. v. Paris: 1863.

Admiral Keppel; the Comte de Grasse had safely covered the passage and disembarkation of Rochambeau's corps d'armée in America, and co-operated with the Comte de Guichen in Bouillé's conquests in the West Indies; the Bailli de Suffren had fought a series of drawn but desperate battles with Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes off the coast of India; Laperouse¹ had ravaged the English settlements in Hudson's Bay; and these glories were enough to make the French people proud of their navy, despite of the utter defeat inflicted on it by Admiral Rodney on April 12, 1782, off the island of St. Eustatia. Louis XVI. had always been particularly fond of the naval service, and had shown the most marked favour to naval officers. He was also passionately fond of geography, and took the keenest interest in exploration—so much so that he issued orders, during the War of American Independence, that if any of his captains came across Captain Cook they were not to treat his vessels as belligerent. This encouragement and hearty interest produced not only great admirals such as the Comte d'Orvilliers, the Comte de Guichen, the Comte d'Estaing, and the Bailli de Suffren; and brave captains like Lamothe Picquet and Latouche-Tréville, Kersaint, Kergariou-Loëmaria, and De Couëdic, but learned hydrographers in Borda and Fleurieu, and famous navigators and surveyors in Bougainville and Laperouse, D'Entrecasteaux, Rosily, and Bruix. This taste of the king's led him to spend large sums upon his ports, including nearly twenty million livres on Le Havre, and far more upon the new harbour of Cherbourg, which had been commenced by his orders, and which he visited in great state in June, 1786. He was well supported by his Ministers of the Marine, De Sartine, the Maréchal de Castries, and the Comte de la Luzerne, who were all men of ability, and in 1789 he might well have boasted of his fleet, consisting of 81 ships of the line, carrying from 64 to 118 guns, 69 frigates of from 28 to 44 guns, and 141 smaller ships of war, making a total of 291 ships;

¹ So spelt by M. Guérin, who states it as the navigator's own spelling though he is generally called "Lapeyrouse."

while England herself, the great naval power, only possessed 135 ships of the line, 102 frigates, and 133 smaller ships, making a total of 370. With regard to the naval service, however, matters were no better than in the army, and even a succession of able ministers could not reverse the fatal practice, which had been followed in the reign of Louis XV., of making merit give way to birth. The number of officers was out of all proportion to the number of sailors, there being no less than 14,142 officers to 90,878 sailors; and these officers were selected from boys who had served a certain period on board ship as novices, and in time of war from officers in the merchant navy, who seldom if ever attained to the rank of captain, while the captaincies and all higher ranks were filled up from the royal corps of the Gardes de la Marine, which consisted entirely of members of noble and wealthy families, who were quickly promoted. The sailors were recruited, either by lot or the press-gang, out of the inhabitants of the sea coast, under an old regulation of the Marquis de Colbert-Seignelay issued in 1679. Indeed, the whole navy was governed by the regulations of this son of the great Colbert for more than one hundred years, until in 1784 the Maréchal de Castries determined to issue a new naval code and a scheme of reorganization. By this scheme it was decreed that the officers of the French navy should be divided into nine squadrons, and should consist of some 60 generals, of 100 captains, 100 majors de vaisseau (a rank corresponding to the English commanders, R.N.), 680 lieutenants, and 840 sub-lieutenants. Under the same scheme the ranks of enseignes de vaisseau and of lieutenants de frégate were abolished, as well as the Gardes de la Marine, and all young noblemen who wished to enter the navy had to pass through one of two royal naval colleges, which were established at Alais and Vannes. At the same time, it must be admitted that, as in the case of the army, all the chief naval captains, and all the admirals, who distinguished themselves under the Republic and Napoleon, had been officers in the navy of the ancien régime, before the ministry of Castries,

but it is also noteworthy that many of these officers, though by no means the majority, had only entered the royal navy after serving in the merchant service, and had received their commissions in spite of their birth. Thus, in 1789, Trogoff, St. Félix, Rosily, Pléville le Peley, and Bouvet were all captains in the royal navy, though the two latter had been originally captains of merchantmen; Truguet was a major de vaisseau; Bruix, Decrés, Brueys, Villeneuve, Villaret-Joyeuse, Allemand, Lacrosse, Latouche-Tréville, Missiessy, Nielly Linois, Emeriau, and Dupetit-Thouars, were all lieutenants, Bompard and Renaudin were sub-lieutenants; Ganteaume had returned to the East India Company's service after serving in the American war; and Willaumez alone of all the chief captains had never held a commission, and was in 1789 on board a merchantman. This long list of names bears witness to the excellence of the sailors of the old French monarchy, their great deeds in the American war prove their efficiency, and it must now be shown how the slumbering discontent which was felt by the men against their officers for not feeding and paying them well and regularly, by the officers against the civil service of the navy, and by the workmen in the dockyards, gradually rose to its height, and how the Assembly failed to do any good, and pulled the old navy to pieces without creating a new one, in order to see by what steps that French navy which had made so good a stand against Keppel and Rodney became so weak as to be thoroughly beaten by Howe and Nelson.

The riots at Toulon and Brest, though a year elapsed between them, and though one was essentially a riot of dockyard men and the other of sailors, may be noticed together, because they exactly show the different attitude of the rioters towards the executive government, and also that, if words had become more violent, men had not yet become accustomed to murder, and were more inclined to spare human life, when they had the power of a universally recognized Assembly to appeal to, than before. Toulon was one of the two most important naval cities in France; it was the head-

quarters of the Mediterranean fleet, as Brest was of the Atlantic fleet, but contained a much larger dockyard and arsenal, for ever since the destruction of the old arsenal of the galleys at Marseilles, on the recommendation of Malouet, in 1786, Toulon arsenal was the only one on the south-east coast of France. It was, besides, purely the town of the dockyard and arsenal, for it possessed but little facility for commerce and shipping, which all went to the free port of Marseilles. The Toulonese were noted even in Provence for their riotous disposition, and as early as March, 1789, during the elections to the States-General, they had pillaged their town-hall and the bishop's palace, and nearly murdered the bishop, Mgr. de Castellane-Léon. With their whole souls the Toulonese had followed the progress of events in Paris, and after the news of July 14 they all wore the tricolour cockade, elected a municipality, and formed a National Guard. Both Comte d'Albert de Rions, a most distinguished naval officer, who had commanded the *Pluton* in the battle of April 12, 1782, and the squadron at Cherbourg on the occasion of the royal visit there, and who was in 1789 the director of the port of Toulon and commandant of the arsenal there, and the Comte de Béthisy, commanding the Régiment de Dauphiné, which formed the garrison, incurred the greatest suspicion and dislike among the people for refusing to wear the tricolour cockade, though they at first permitted the workmen and soldiers to do as they pleased. However, on November 27, 1789, Comte d'Albert de Rions thought proper to forbid any workmen¹ to wear the tricolour cockade or enter the local National Guard under pain of instant dismissal, and on November 30 he summarily dismissed two foremen, Causse and Gavinet, for disobeying him. The result was a riot, and on the next day he closed the arsenal, and when he himself left it he found himself in the midst of a raging mob, from which he was with difficulty

¹ Guérin, *Histoire maritime de la France*, vol. v. pp. 221-232; and *Guerres maritimes de la France: Port de Toulon depuis ses origines jusqu'à nos jours*, by V. Brun, vol. ii. pp. 141-154. Paris: 1861.

extricated by some naval officers. The mob then collected round his house, and at last, to save his life, he consented, at the request of the municipality, to go to prison for a time, where at least he would be safe. The news of this riot created much excitement among the deputies of the right in the Assembly, and Malouet spoke so energetically and persistently on the subject that D'André was sent as special commissioner to Toulon. On his recommendation the Assembly decided, on January 16, 1790, that there was no necessity to prosecute anybody, and M. de Glandèves was appointed director of the port.

This riot at Toulon was, it will have been perceived, purely political, and only important from the naval point of view as illustrating the uncompromising firmness of the commandant, the devotion of his officers to him, and the disposition of the workmen of the chief dockyard and arsenal on the Mediterranean. The riots at Brest in September and October, 1790, were purely professional, and therefore far more important.¹ Great discontent had been caused in that port by the issue of a new penal code for the navy, sanctioned by the Assembly, on August 22, 1790, which, while it abolished flogging, confirmed various other punishments, which the sailors disliked much more. This discontent was brought to a head by the arrival of the *Léopard* from San Domingo on September 14, with certain factious individuals on board. The sailors of the *Léopard* had played an important political part in the colony, and had become, from the attention they had received there and the welcome they met with from the popular society of Brest, extremely arrogant and insubordinate. The mutiny on board the fleet commenced with an insult given to Major Huon de Kermadec on his ship the *Patriote*, commanded by the great navigator D'Entrecasteaux, by a drunken sailor of the *Léopard*. The Comte d'Albert de Rions, who had been most injudiciously transferred to the command of the squadron at Brest, ordered

¹ Guérin's *Histoire maritime de la France*, vol. v. pp. 269-274; *Histoire de la ville et du port de Brest*, by Prosper Jean Levot, vol. iii. chap. iv. pp. 229-249. Brest: 1866.

the sailor to leave the ship ; on which the crew of the *Patriote* mutinied, and forced both D'Albert de Rions and their captain, D'Entrecasteaux, to go on shore. The mutiny quickly spread to the crews of the *Entreprenant*, *Tourville*, *Apollon*, *Majestueux*, and *La Ferme*, and drunken sailors ashore, workmen at the arsenal, and the rabble insulted not only D'Albert de Rions, but Comte d'Hector, lieutenant-general of the arsenal, and Bernard de Marigny, major-general of the port. The members of the popular club affiliated to the Jacobins gladly fomented these disorders, and threw the complaints of the sailors against the new code and against their officers into the form of petitions to the Assembly ; while the municipality of Brest also interfered, and forbade De Marigny to send the brig *La Ferme* out of port until the complaints of the sailors had been inquired into. The Assembly then, on the report of M. de Curt, member of the colonial committee, decreed that the mutineers should be punished, that the crew of the *Léopard* should be discharged, and that two commissioners should be sent to Brest to restore order. The efforts of the commissioners were vain ; the sailors became more and more menacing in their demands, and were powerfully supported by the popular club. Comte d'Albert de Rions resigned, and was succeeded by the Commodore de Souillac ; but the mutiny and disorder still continued. At last the Baron de Menou brought up an absurd report, on behalf of the combined diplomatic, colonial, military, and naval committees, that the disturbances at Brest were entirely caused by the policy of the Comte de la Luzerne, Minister of Marine and the Colonies, and by the fact that the navy had not adopted the tricolour flag. Such a report was, as Mirabeau wrote to La Marek, absurd ; but the vote against the minister was only lost by thirty-seven votes, and on October 24 the Comte de la Luzerne was succeeded by the Comte de Claret de Fleurieu, a learned hydrographer but weak statesman. As to the adoption of the tricolour, it had only been deferred in the navy for fear of upsetting the whole system of signals, and because the colours red, white, and blue were used in different combinations, as in the English service,

to designate the rank of the flag officers on board. However, it was decreed by the Assembly on October 24, that a national flag with the tricolour in the corner should be adopted in the navy, and that for the future the sailors at night and morning, instead of shouting "Vive le Roi," should shout "Vivent la nation, la loi, et le Roi !" Such puerile decrees were not likely to have much effect in putting down mutiny, and on October 27 the Assembly had to submit, and both abrogated the clauses in the new penal code to which the sailors objected, and passed a vote of thanks to the popular club of Brest for its conduct. It can hardly be wondered at that, after these decrees, the fleet at Brest remained in a state of chronic disorder, for no officer dared to interfere with it, or act as Bouillé had done at Nancy. Souillac, and Bougainville his successor, resigned one after another, and the sailors were left to do pretty much as they liked. The Assembly ordered its naval committee to prepare a plan of a new naval constitution, and then calmly left things alone. Such neglect and want of support naturally incensed those naval officers who loved their service; if they did not emigrate, they left their ships without leave, and when Vice-Admiral Thévenard, the successor of Fleurieu, had a call of officers made on July 1, 1791, it was found that more than three-quarters of them were absent. Thus the ancient royal navy of France, which had won such glory in the American War of Independence, gradually dissolved like the monarchical army, and when war broke out once more with England, it was no wonder that the navy of France was found to be no longer able to rival the English, as it had done. The new naval organization had not time to be put into force any more than the new military organization, and if it had been it would have been found to have abounded in as many defects and as many unpractical recommendations; and the new national fleet, according to the naval constitution, would no doubt have been quite as unable to make any stand against Howe and Nelson as the republican fleet which Jean Bon Saint-André hastily patched up out of the remnants of the old royal navy.

It was not until after the riot at Brest that the Assembly seriously began to think of naval affairs, though it had established a naval and colonial committee when it constituted itself in June, 1789, and had separated the two branches and instituted two separate committees in March, 1790. There were not many naval officers among the deputies, not indeed more than ten, if such grandees as the Duke of Orleans, without any experience, are excluded, namely, the lieutenant-general of the fleet, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, who had been complimented for his gallantry by the court of inquiry held after the defeat of De Grasse on April 12, 1782; Commodore Lapoype-Vertrieux; Captains Latouche-Tréville, then known as Le Vasseur de la Touche, who came of a famous naval family, and had had a great part in drawing up the naval regulations of 1786, and who was now chancellor to the Duke of Orleans, and deputy for the noblesse of Montargis, De Rochegude, and La Galissonnière; Majors Nompère de Champagny, deputy for the noblesse of the Forez, and de Villeblanche; and Lieutenants De Perrigny, De Galbert, and La Coudraye.¹ Besides these officers, Malouet claimed to be an authority on naval matters from his long tenure of the office of intendant of the marine at Toulon, but the old feud between the naval and civil officers of the service prevented him from exercising any real influence upon them. Of the naval officers, only two showed any marked ability in the Assembly: Champagny, who was afterwards to become Duc de Cadore, and one of Napoleon's ministers, and who was the most assiduous worker in the naval committee, though prevented from making a figure in the Assembly by his weak voice; and La Coudraye, who was an officer of great experience, ability, and eloquence, and who, with a little more courage and genius, might have played the part which Dubois-Crancé did in the reorganization of the army, with regard to the navy. But the committee had the power of calling in officers to consult with them, one of whom, Gui Pierre de Coëtnempren, Comte de Kersaint, the son of the captain De Kersaint who had been killed on board the *Theseus* in Hawke's

¹ Guérin's *Histoire maritime de la France*, vol. v. p. 275.

battle with Conflans in Quiberon Bay, and who had distinguished himself in the last war by his capture of Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, wrote much on naval matters, and exercised a great influence over the committee. In the early days of the session of the Assembly, long before the troubles at Brest began, Kersaint had advocated the complete abolition of the system of specially educating officers for the royal navy, and argued that officers should be taken when wanted from the merchant service, and he had written a pamphlet, "What is the royal navy?" to which question he answered, "An army," and Malouet, "An administration." Meanwhile Champagny had been quietly working out the new naval penal code, which was promulgated in August, 1790, and had been the primary cause of the disturbances at Brest. These disturbances drew general attention to the state of the navy, and on December 29, 1790, the "Conseil de la Marine" was suppressed, and the separation of the departments of the marine and of the colonies was proposed, with the approval of the minister Fleurieu, who neither understood nor liked the administration of the colonies, but rejected after a speech of Moreau de Saint Méry, deputy for Martinique, who argued that the very existence of the colonies and their union with France depended upon the state of the navy, and that the two departments ought, therefore, to be in the same hands. In April, 1791, the Marquis de Sillery, the friend of Orleans, who, since the abolition of titles, was known as M. Brulart de Sillery, brought up the report of the naval committee of a plan for a new constitution of the navy. By it the maritime conscription, devised by Colbert de Seignelay and confirmed by De Castries, was to be maintained, and all merchant seamen, fishermen, and others connected with the sea, were to remain liable to be pressed into the royal navy if they were wanted. As to officers, it was proposed that the naval colleges should be abolished, and that the inferior officers in the royal service should be selected from the merchant service; but that, when once an officer had accepted the rank of lieutenant, he should be regarded as having definitely entered the service, and should be eligible for promotion, by

a mixed system of seniority and selection, to the grades of captain and then of admiral. By this scheme the committee believed they had proposed a fair compromise between the extreme views held by different naval authorities, and that they had flattered the new ideas of equality by making it possible for any cabin-boy on board a merchant ship to become a French admiral. The debates on the scheme were very spirited. Ricard and Louis de Mormeron, deputy for Pondicherry, who represented the ideas of Kersaint, declared that there should be no royal navy at all, only royal ships of war, which could be manned when necessary by merchant officers and seamen, and they pointed to the instances of the famous captains of the reign of Louis XIV., Jean Bart and Duguay-Trouin, as a proof that the merchant service would readily respond to the call. Lieutenant de Galbert and Lieutenant de la Coudraye defended the system of a royal navy, manned by seamen and commanded by officers bred expressly for the purpose of fighting at sea. "You demand too much!" cried La Coudraye, in an eloquent and convincing speech. "Do you think that officers of merchant ships, who do not need such knowledge, will take the trouble to master the principles of commanding fleets and directing naval battles in order that they may be efficient in case of war?" He then went on to point out that the merchant service had altered in character since the days of Louis XIV.; that in his time every merchant ship was an armed vessel, and indeed a corsair, which might have to fight pirates and corsairs at any moment, and that, therefore, both captains and men were all trained to war, and there was no difficulty in finding Jean Barts and Duguay-Trouins, but that in the latter half of the eighteenth century the condition of the sea was different; that merchant ships were simply ships laden with merchandise and quite unarmed, and that, therefore, the officers and men could not be suddenly expected to become efficient for naval warfare, which was, moreover, far more complicated than it used to be. The Assembly, however, could not or would not appreciate La Coudraye's arguments, and accepted the principle of the scheme proposed by the naval

committee. On April 29 it voted the continuance of the maritime conscription, and that officers should be selected from the merchant service by examination. The rank of *enseigne de vaisseau* was made indefinitely large, and all who were not actually employed in the service were permitted to command merchant ships, but without receiving any pay from the government. Any ensign who chose to pass the further examination, and received the commission of lieutenant, was, however, not allowed to command merchantmen, and had to confine himself to the royal navy. An establishment was then voted of three admirals, nine vice-admirals, eighteen rear-admirals, one hundred and eighty captains, eight hundred lieutenants, two hundred paid ensigns, fifty masters, and sixty master-gunners, and the old post of Admiral of France, then held by the Duc de Penthièvre, with its costly and useless establishment, was abolished. The Assembly was then satisfied that it had effectually disposed of the naval question, in spite of the want of officers and the riotous insubordination of the sailors.

Before, however, concluding this account of the naval policy of the Assembly, it must be recognized that it did not show itself wanting in respect for the greatest navigator France has ever produced, Laperouse de Galaup. He had sailed from Brest, on a voyage of exploration in the South Seas under special instructions drawn up by the king himself on August 1, 1785, with two ships, the *Boussole* and the *Astrolabe*, and had sent home the journal of his discoveries from different places. On February 7, 1788, he wrote his last letter to his friend Fleurieu from Botany Bay, and had never been heard of since. In December, 1790, Milet de Mureau, the future Minister for War, who had succeeded Comodore Lapoype-Vertrieux as deputy for the noblesse of Toulon in October, 1789, proposed that the journals of Laperouse should be printed at the expense of the State; and in 1791 a special expedition of two ships was voted, and placed under the command of Rear-Admiral d'Entrecasteaux, and ordered to go in search of the missing explorer.

It will be seen that both in the army and the navy the

spirit of disaffection to the king was manifesting itself in 1790, in spite of the ardently expressed attachment of the bulk of the officers of both services, and that the executive had been so weakened that it was unable to deal with the difficulties which had arisen. The Assembly had not improved matters by their new military and naval constitutions; and, by not supporting the officers, for fear they would use their power for the restoration of the royal authority, and not punishing mutineers, the deputies had utterly prevented any chance of the restoration of order. The old army and navy of the *ancien régime* were practically destroyed, and the new services, though decreed, were not created. With regard to both army and navy, and in reference to the mutinies at Nancy and Brest, Mirabeau had again shown how much greater a statesman he was than the majority of the Assembly. He alone recognized the fact that if the regular army and the regular navy, whether as royal or national services, were to be maintained at all, soldiers and sailors must be governed by a different code of laws, in order to keep up discipline, from ordinary citizens. Since this truth was not recognized, the French army and the French navy had both become disorganized, and would continue to remain in a state of disorganization until a great need for their services should arise, when all theories about the equality of man would disappear before the necessities of creating a disciplined army and navy, and when the men of the old monarchical services would show that it was not because they were bad soldiers or bad sailors that they had become insubordinate, and that their valour remained if their discipline was temporarily disturbed.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE DEATH OF MIRABEAU.

Mirabeau declares himself the advocate of the restoration of order, but not of the old order—His second great scheme—Duquesnoy's report of the topography of the Assembly—The oath of the clergy—Mirabeau's advice about the woman Lamotte—Chances of foreign interference—The diplomatic committee—The affairs of Avignon and the princes of the empire in Alsace—Mirabeau President of the Assembly and Director of the department of the Seine—The 1789, Monarchic, and Jacobin Clubs—The question of emigration—Departure of Mesdames of France—La Marck's visit to Bouillé—Affair of Vincennes, and of the chevaliers du poignard—Debate on the regency—Mirabeau's illness—Mirabeau's Death—Mirabeau as a statesman, as an orator, and as a man.

By the winter of 1790 Mirabeau became convinced that the court would never adopt his great plan for an appeal to the provinces, or trust him in any way,¹ and the delight which he had felt on first receiving the power of being of use to the queen by the secret communications through La Marek had been greatly diminished by the persistent manner in which the queen refused to take advice, and by his discovery of her correspondence with Bergasse. His plan for the formation of a Jacobin ministry, which should overthrow Lafayette and learn moderation by incurring responsibility, had also failed, and the new ministers who had succeeded Necker were all nominees of Lafayette himself, or as complete nonentities as their predecessors. Yet he did not despair of being able to save the monarchy from its perilous position, and worked out

¹ Bertrand de Molleville's *Mémoires*.

yet another scheme by which the court might regain its authority. A proof of his exact position is to be found in a letter to La Marck, dated October 22, 1790.¹ "What then! these stupid rascals, intoxicated with a chance success, tell you that they hope to carry out a counter-revolution, and believe that I would not thunder against them. In truth, my friend, I have no wish to surrender my honour to any one, or my head to the court. If I was a mere politician, I should say, 'I ought to make these people fear me.' If I was their servant, I should say, 'These people ought to fear me.' But I am a good citizen, who loves glory, honour, and liberty, before everything, and most certainly these reactionary gentlemen will find me always ready to crush them with the thunder of my voice. Yesterday I had it in my power to have them all massacred, and if they continue in this line they would force me to wish for this issue, were it not for my desire to save the few honest men among them. In a word, I am the advocate for the restoration of order, but not for the restoration of the old order." The new plan had taken a long time to develop, but was at last worked out and presented to the court in a very lengthy communication, dated December 23, 1790.²

The key-note of this plan rested on Mirabeau's absolute confidence in Montmorin, who was to have entire charge of the whole affair, and Mirabeau even goes so far as to prescribe the manner in which he is to spend each day. In fact, he recognized that Montmorin, from his well-known weakness of character, would become but a mere shadow of himself and report to him. The plan consisted of four distinct parts, all conducted by different people, who were to report weekly to Montmorin, and thus to himself. The two most important sections referred to his old idea of restoring the reputation of the monarchy in the provinces. There was to be established, firstly, a bureau of correspondence, which was to send agents paid by the king into all the provinces, with printed instruc-

¹ *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et La Marck*, vol. ii. p. 29.

² *Correspondance*, vol. ii. pp. 125-177, numbered "47th Note for the Court."

tions what to do. They were everywhere to impress upon the people of the provinces that the Assembly was neglecting their true interests, was encouraging disorder, and hurrying France to utter destruction. They were also to declare that the king was longing to restore order, and only desired their assistance; and, further, that the first thing the departments should do was to send up universal petitions requesting that the present Assembly should immediately dissolve itself. Mirabeau told La Marck that he had reason to believe that at least two-thirds of the departments would be ready to send up such petitions, and that the agents were to examine the local governments of the different departments, and report to Montmorin both the personal opinions and the characteristics of the local leaders, and the views with which they were regarded by the bulk of the populace. The agents were then to become intimate with the leaders, and report to the minister on whom he could depend in each department. They were to mingle with all classes, the country noblesse, the clergy, the bourgeois, the ouvriers, and the peasants, and were in every department to examine the influence of these different classes; and they were also to send to him a short biography and a sketch of the character of every influential man, describing his influence, his hopes, and his needs. After these reports Mirabeau believed that the minister would possess a thorough knowledge of the condition of opinion in the departments. Secondly, there was to be established a publishing committee, under the superintendence of the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre, which was to buy up as many authors as possible, and to pay them to write books and pamphlets in favour of the restoration of order and of the power of the king. These works were to be circulated throughout the provinces, and carefully arranged to suit the disposition of different classes. Thirdly, a system was to be established by which the leaders of the Assembly should be won over and prepared to support the motion for the dissolution of the Assembly itself. Once dissolved, the king could influence the elections to the second Assembly by means of his agents in the departments, and by

the works issued by the publishing committee. The task of inducing the present Assembly to consent to its own dissolution was extremely difficult, and it would therefore be necessary to take several of the leading politicians into the confidence of the court. He selected eleven influential deputies as best fitted for this purpose, chosen from different sections—from the right, the right centre, and even the left centre.¹ No group of party leaders were to be employed by the minister, in order that each individual might think himself the sole confidant of the minister's plans. The agent-in-chief of this prominent part of the scheme was to be Duquesnoy, whose ability for intrigue Mirabeau perceived, and who had shown himself ready to combine such a party as was contemplated. Duquesnoy was to have unlimited powers, and to report on the state of the Assembly every Friday to Montmorin and Mirabeau together. The other members to be taken into confidence were, for the right and right centre, the Marquis de Bonnay, the Abbé de Montesquiou, Cazalés the great orator, the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre, and D'André, who were not to hear any mention of Mirabeau's own name, or those of the other coadjutors. The members of the left who were to be similarly trusted were, of course, Talleyrand, whose power of intrigue was too formidable to allow him to be omitted; Emmery, the influential member of the military committee; and Le Chapelier and Thouret, as important members of the constitutional committee. But Le Chapelier and Thouret had some scruples, and therefore were not to be allowed to know that Mirabeau was in the scheme. The last individual to be won over was Barnave, the young deputy for Dauphiné, who was afraid he was going too far, and was getting dissatisfied with the position of mere spokesman for Duport and the Lameths. He had just the enthusiastic nature which would induce him to assist the court; but he was not to be taken into full confidence, and above all not to know that he would be acting under Mirabeau's inspiration. Duquesnoy was further to carefully examine the Assembly from week to week,

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. ii. p. 156.

and report to Montmorin the names of any other deputies who might be won over to the cause of order, and consent not only to the dissolution of the Assembly, but to use their influence in the elections to a new Assembly which must follow. The ~~last~~ ^{Y.} and most expensive part of the scheme referred to Paris. Paris had always had an immense attraction for Mirabeau, and he once said to Frochot, "Paris is the sphinx of the Revolution, but I will drag her secret from her."¹ Talon and Sémonville, who had formerly organized an efficient police system for Lafayette, and had kept him acquainted with the varying opinions of the city, were to be entrusted with the duty of watching Paris and reporting upon it. They were to establish a powerful police organization, which should watch every man, and report not only upon the state of feeling in the clubs, but on every subject discussed in the most insignificant café. They were also to pay special attention to the members of the National Guard and to the journalists. The National Guard was to be led, as far as possible, to distrust Lafayette, and the journalists were to be bought without compunction. Talon and Sémonville were to have two interviews with Montmorin on Tuesdays and Saturdays, and Montmorin was at once to report to Mirabeau.

Such was Mirabeau's last great scheme; and as it was deep-laid and complete in every detail, it was perfectly possible that it might have been carried out, had only the court decided to trust its contriver wholly. But the queen would do nothing of the kind. She was ready to establish all the committees which Mirabeau suggested, but, as will be seen, she would take no decided step. The committees were accordingly formed and the reports sent in; had they survived they would have been the best indication of the condition of France at the beginning of 1791. All of the reports of Duquesnoy would have been particularly interesting, but unfortunately only one is extant, which deserves some further attention.² That report is dated February 9, and begins by examining what

¹ Passy's *Frochot*, p. 72.

² *Correspondance*, vol. ii. p. 221.

Duquesnoy calls the topography of the Assembly. Unfortunately, in this report he analyzes the topography only of a very small portion of the Assembly, and the rest was probably reported on former and subsequent days. He begins by describing the position of D'André, who, he says, "has great talent, and that sort of merit necessary for the new party; for, like us, he hates the Jacobins, and, like us, he wishes to ruin them and restore a better order of affairs. It is impossible, and would be dangerous, to confide to him the whole of the great plan; but much could be entrusted to him, and, above all, little matters of daily detail. He is no stranger to ambition, and has great credit on the lower benches, and he rarely fails in any motion made before eleven o'clock. Success brings success, and the part of the Assembly in which he sits has the greatest confidence in him. I might here remark that it is of great importance to have men well distributed in the Assembly. D'André sits close to the tribune, and is always surrounded by the deputies for Paris. M. Desmeuniers sits a little further off, and shares much the same degree of favour. Then comes a group without a leader, but not friendly to the Jacobins. Towards the Palais-Royal begins the enthusiasm of the Assembly, and there exaggerated views reign; but the particular benches near the gallery where my friends sit are quiet enough. Then come the members of the Club of 1789, who are without energy or extended views, but of whom the majority are honest and wish to do good. They have perhaps no less ambition than the Jacobins, but their ambition is of a milder cast, if one may say so, and is less active and less perverse. They cannot be counted upon for action, but are full of prudence and good will. Next to the members of the 1789 Club comes a party in the Assembly almost without a leader, but in which sits M. Merlin, who is a thorough Jacobin, though not sold to the Jacobins. After him comes M. Beaumetz, who, without being a power, can help a power, because he has the reputation of being an honest man." Further on, Duquesnoy declares that the new party rather neglects men of personal influence, such as D'André, of whom he has just spoken

Emmery, Le Chapelier, above all Thouret and Beaumetz, who all have very great talents. The substance of this report of Duquesnoy shows in what manner Mirabeau hoped to obtain an ascendancy over the Assembly, and what class of men he hoped to attract into the new party of order.

It was Mirabeau's great aim to make the Assembly lose its prestige, and this it was which made him support the unpractical motion, that all the clergy should be obliged to take the oath to the constitution or else be prosecuted;¹ but his conduct in the debate, which ended on November 29, was much blamed by the court, and raised anew the old feeling of distrust felt towards him by both the king and queen. It will be remembered that the imposition of this oath was the necessary complement of the civil constitution of the clergy, and was only carried after an animated debate. The king did not give his consent to the measure until December 26, and then only after much pressure. The effect of the imposition of the oath was, as Mirabeau had expected, the outbreak of what was practically civil war in France between the constitutional and the unconstitutional clergy, or, in other words, between the priests *insermentés* and *assermentés*, and had he lived he might have drawn very great advantages for the cause of order from it; but, owing to his death, the king gained no advantage from this mistake of the Assembly.

The new year opened disastrously enough for the king and queen. It was well known that the woman Lamotte, who had played so great a part in the scandal of the diamond necklace,² was again in Paris, and it was believed that, under the influence of Orleans, she would appeal to the Assembly, and would make the queen still more unpopular by creating fresh belief in her immorality. But it seems that Orleans was not the real supporter of Lamotte, but rather Lafayette; for though the commandant of the National Guard of Paris knew well where the woman, who had been condemned by the law courts

¹ See chap. x. p. 302.

² See *Le Procès du Collier*, by Émile de Campardon, Paris, 1877; and Carlyle's *The Story of the Diamond Necklace*.

of France, was, instead of immediately arresting her, he asked for the direct authorization of the king, in order to make her arrest appear an act of private vengeance. In order to destroy any bad effect she might exercise over public opinion, Mirabeau recommended¹ that communications should be opened with Fréteau de Saint Just, a leading deputy of the left, who had been particularly active in the famous trial before the Parlement of Paris, and who for a consideration might undertake to destroy her cause in the Assembly, or else, with D'Ailly, the *doyen* of the Assembly, who was respected for his white hairs and his taciturnity, and who with a little management might be induced to attack a woman of such infamous character.

Yet the king, and above all the queen, had no idea of trusting Mirabeau, and the success of the motion for demanding the oath from the clergy had made the king turn more and more towards the expedient of foreign assistance. With regard to war, Louis XVI. held diametrically opposite opinions to Mirabeau. The king regarded civil war as the greatest of evils, but foreign war as a means by which he might regain a portion of his authority and ensure his own personal safety, and liberty to hunt in peace. Mirabeau, on the contrary, knew that while a foreign war would establish in the minds of Frenchmen the idea that the king and queen were in league with the Germans against their own people, and would alienate all patriotic men from them, in case of a civil war a great portion of the nation would declare itself on the side of the monarchical system. The king had hitherto discouraged all communications with the émigrés, and particularly with the Comte d'Artois, who was breathing fire and murder at Turin. He now endeavoured to discover what was the disposition of foreign courts towards himself. The queen had a personal reason for not desiring to trust herself to the émigrés, for the Comte d'Artois had taken into his confidence Calonne, the former prime minister, who spoke of nothing but restoring the ancient order of things, which even the queen knew to be

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. ii. p. 63.

impossible, and was seriously compromising the position of the royal family at Paris by his unpatriotic declarations. With the Prince de Condé, at Brunswick, she also refused to hold any communication, for she knew that no strength was to be found in the petty states of Western Germany. It was rather to her brother Leopold that she turned, and through the Baron de Breteuil, the three days' premier of July, 1789, she attempted to find out what reliance could be placed on Austrian help. It was in vain for Mirabeau to point out that no assistance could be expected from foreign powers. England looked with favour on the progress of affairs in France, and Pitt desired nothing better than peace with France in order to keep his hands free for dealing with Russian aggrandizement. The Emperor Leopold was busily engaged in quieting the discontent which had been aroused by the reforms of his brother Joseph, and had at that moment too much on his hands, with the pacification of Belgium and Hungary, to attempt to interfere with affairs in France. The Spaniards could do nothing, even if they wished; and the King of Prussia was too occupied with his own love affairs to do more than watch the progress of the Revolution with some uneasiness, and a hope that the weakness of France might turn to the advantage of Prussia.

It must not be forgotten that Mirabeau was still practically minister for foreign affairs through his influence over Montmorin. That influence had greatly increased since the previous September, and throughout the months of December, January, and February, Mirabeau communicated more with Montmorin even than with La Marck. He did not care for the Foreign Minister, and rather despised him, but he gave him credit for sincerity and attachment to the king's person. Mirabeau's management of foreign affairs was the more anxious and harassing, as he was now occasionally opposed in the diplomatic committee itself by Fréteau, who seems to have become particularly active during these months.¹ Nevertheless, from his extended knowledge of international law, he was regarded as an authority

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. ii. p. 59.

on foreign affairs, and his attention was particularly directed to the two great opportunities for a pretext for war with France afforded by the affairs of Avignon and of the princes of the Empire in Alsace and Lorraine. The Assembly had, to all intents and purposes, declared that Avignon belonged to France, because its inhabitants spoke the same language, and the people of the principality were of the same race. Such a declaration was a direct infringement of all international law, for the French people could not deny that Avignon had belonged to the popes for very many centuries; but the mere declaration might have been passed over had not a terrible local revolution broken out at Avignon itself, which made it necessary that some decision should be come to by the Assembly. It was therefore moved, on November 16, 1790, by Pétion de Villeneuve, that Avignon really belonged to France, and that France was only resuming her rights in taking possession of it. Pétion endeavoured to prove this by a long historical disquisition which, it need hardly be said, had no historical value. Mirabeau recognized the necessity for some interference with the affairs of Avignon,¹ and moved, on November 20, that French troops should be marched into the principality to restore order, but that no claim to the possession of Avignon should be inserted in the decree. His motion was carried, and thus Avignon nominally remained the territory of the pope for ten months more. In this affair Mirabeau managed to save appearances, and to keep the Constituent Assembly from openly declaring its disregard for international law and treaty obligations. The matter of the German princes in Alsace was far more difficult, because the interests involved were so numerous and so various; but Mirabeau managed to prevent a pretext being given for an appeal to the empire. He knew that Leopold was too much engaged in his own affairs to make actual war on France at the present time; but he feared that the Diet of the empire might take up the case, and that the emperor would be obliged to declare war as Emperor of Germany, however much he disliked it as an independent sovereign. The only way to prevent such a

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. ii. p. 85.

course of events was to allow no actual breach of treaties to be committed, and to delay the question as long as possible, until either the king regained his power and could act of his own will or until by lapse of time the matter should lose its importance. Mirabeau also did not fail to observe that the uncertainty caused by this affair of the German princes might be used as yet another incentive to thinking men to support a restoration of the royal authority.

But though incessantly occupied in the combination of his great plan and in his communications with Montmorin and Duquesnoy, Talon and La Marck, Mirabeau had yet sufficient energy, though his health was fast failing, to attend daily the two sessions of the Assembly and to speak on nearly every subject. He had, ever since the National Assembly had constituted itself, earnestly wished to be for one fortnight its president and spokesman, and it was with the deepest chagrin that he saw fortnight after fortnight pass without his election. For a long time the presidency was conferred alternately on deputies of the right and left by an agreement between their leaders, and both sides had agreed to reject Mirabeau. He had seen without much envy such men as Target and Thouret, Talleyrand and Treilhard, occupy the chair of the Assembly; but he felt hurt when he saw men whom he knew to be his inferiors, and who but seldom raised their voices in the Assembly, such as the Baron de Jessé and Bureaux de Pusy, who had no claims beyond their faithful adherence to Lafayette, preferred before him. There are numerous allusions in his correspondence¹ with La Marck, during the latter months of 1790, to his hopes of obtaining the presidency. But it was only on January 30 that he was actually elected, chiefly by the votes of the party he had been forming through Duquesnoy's agency, and partly through the votes of the deputies of the right, who had been indirectly asked to vote for him. He was immensely proud of his position, and proved himself an excellent president. He

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. ii. pp. 13, 195, 213; and Passy's *Frochot*, pp. 51-54. Mirabeau was suffering from ophthalmia during his presidency, and Frochot helped him in every possible way.

answered deputations with dignity and without passion, and presided with commendable impartiality over the Assembly. But the result of his presidency only proves what a mistake the Assembly had made in not electing a permanent president and permanent secretaries, instead of changing them every fortnight and thus often losing the services of the best men.

Besides attending regularly at the Assembly, the great statesman took a lively interest in watching the progress of the new system of local government which the Assembly had established under the new constitution. He perceived clearly enough, from the example of England, that it was a very good training for a statesman to have had some experience of local government before he was called upon to discuss national affairs, and, like many other leading deputies in the Assembly who desired the success of the new local institutions, he offered himself as a candidate for the new offices created by the constitution. He had been in December, 1790, elected an administrator of the department of the Seine, which was by far the most important department in France owing to the fact that it contained Paris; and, to his delight, he was on January 4 elected one of the eight directors of the department who really governed, and who had only to report to the administrators at their monthly meetings. The directory of the department had the complete charge of the police of Paris, and was intended to check the growing strength and the radical principles of the municipality or commune of Paris. Mirabeau then offered himself for the office of procureur-general-syndic of the department, the most important post in the local government. Lafayette used all his influence to oppose Mirabeau, whose rivalry he feared; and his nominee, Pastoret, was elected. Mirabeau was not even elected a substitute, though it is very doubtful whether he would have accepted the inferior office which was filled by Danton and Garnier. At the first meeting of the administrators he was proposed for the presidency, a post which conferred little actual power, but which was one of great dignity; but here again Lafayette interfered, and the Duc de la Rochefou-

could was elected, by twenty-three votes to Mirabeau's eight.¹ In spite of these checks Mirabeau was constant in his attendance, and did good service on many occasions during the month of January. Mirabeau also had the gratification of being elected commandant of the battalion² of national guards of his district, of which he had been a member ever since 1789. For this post, too, he was opposed by Lafayette, who spent much money to secure the election of his own candidate; and it is one of the many signs of Lafayette's decreasing influence with the National Guard that Mirabeau was elected in spite of all his efforts. Mirabeau did not care for this proof of his fellow-citizens' favour in itself, but thought only of its advantages in enabling him better to serve the court. He wrote to the court in his forty-ninth Note, "I have learned³ that the commandants have often the advantage of accompanying M. le Dauphin in his walks; for, after learning the duties of my new position, I wished also to learn its honours. Would not this occasion be very favourable for making appointments to meet, and giving those instructions which cannot be given in any other way, and which will now become so necessary?" Mirabeau was also very interested in the extraordinary power that the clubs of Paris were obtaining. These unique institutions had greatly developed during the year 1790, and the Jacobins were now an important force in public affairs. The growth and origin of the Jacobin Club, and how thoroughly it had come under the domination of Duport and the Lameths, has been noticed, and the various attempts to weaken the power of the Jacobins by the establishment of other clubs deserves some attention.

The most important of these attempts was⁴ the establishment of the "Club of 1789," in the May of 1790. This club was joined by all the chief deputies of the left centre, in contradistinction to the deputies of the extreme left, who ruled the

¹ *Tableaux de la Révolution française, publiés sur les papiers inédits du département et de la police secrète de Paris*, by A. Schmidt, vol. i. pp. 2-5. Leipzig: 1867.

² *Correspondance*, vol. ii. p. 199.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

⁴ *Passy's Frochot*, pp. 48-50.

Jacobins. It was supported out of the royal exchequer, and was joined by Bailly, Lafayette, Mirabeau, Talleyrand, Siéyès, Le Chapelier, and Pastoret, who, however, had not the energy to make it a really dangerous opponent of the Jacobins. Its first president, in the May of 1790, was Bailly, elected in order to recall his famous presidency of the Assembly, and the adherence of the new club to the principles then expressed by him. In June the Duc de la Rochefoucauld was president, and in July Mirabeau himself; but the club, as a factor of political importance, rapidly degenerated, and was only maintained as a very comfortable place of meeting. It rapidly declined into an ordinary social club or cercle, where the chief deputies of the left centre met to enjoy themselves together. Whatever political power it might have had was destroyed by Mirabeau's becoming president of the Jacobins in December, 1790. He became a candidate for this office, after he had drawn up his plan of selecting a ministry from the Jacobin leaders, and it was one of his pet schemes that the Jacobins should be recalled to a sense of the necessity of order by becoming infused with the principles of the more moderate deputies in the Assembly. Side by side with the "Club of 1789" had existed, though without much real power, the "Club des Impartiaux"¹ and the "Club Monarchique." The "Club des Impartiaux" had arisen out of what had been called the moderate central committee, which had been established on July 14, 1789. Its leaders were then Mounier, Lally-Tollendal, and Bergasse. After their resignation, in October, 1789, the club fell under the leadership of Malouet, Mgr. de la Luzerne, Bishop of Langres, and the Comte de Virieu. It had some importance in the October and November of 1789, and it was then declared that it could influence four hundred votes, though it is very doubtful whether it could really influence more than fifty. The "Club des Impartiaux" had, in the course of 1790, become the "Club Monarchique," and the chief meeting-place of the right centre, but its political importance had entirely disappeared. Clermont-

¹ See chap. vii. p. 208; and Malouet's *Mémoires*, vol. ii. pp. 28-60.

Tonnerre was the chief interpreter of its views in the Assembly, but as he always failed it is not necessary to examine them minutely. The cause of its failure and ultimate closing is, however, very curious. The club contained many very wealthy members, and during the famine which reigned in Paris in the winter of 1790, it was decided to raise a fund by which bread should be bought and distributed to the people. The Jacobins, and still more the deputies of the extreme left in the Assembly, became very jealous of the amount of popularity which the "Club Monarchique" thus obtained, and spread the report that the bread which was given away was poisoned. It need hardly be said that there was no foundation whatever for this report, but it caused serious riots in the neighbourhood of the club premises, which were definitely closed in the March of 1791. On the other hand, the Jacobins had not been idle in extending their power. Clubs were established in every important town and affiliated to them,¹ and by maintaining a voluminous correspondence the mother club in Paris educated the provinces up to its ideas.

In the month of February, 1791, arose for the first time the important question, which confirmed the French people in the cause of the Revolution, and brought about the outbreak of foreign war. This was the treatment of the émigrés. Besides the two great emigrations which had followed the days of July 14 and October 5 and 6, a large number of the courtiers and the nobility had left the country during the year 1790.² This emigration deserves to be called the "joyeuse émigration," for the émigrés all left France in very high spirits, and assembled at Turin and London, Brussels and Spa, where they danced and discussed how soon the Revolution would be over, and how quickly they would all return.

¹ See, for instance, for the club at Lorient and its affiliation, *Clubs et Clubistes du Morbihan*, by Philippe Muller, in the *Revue de la Révolution* for April, 1885.

² *Histoire générale des émigrés pendant la Révolution*, by H. Forneron Paris : 1884.

This joyous emigration of 1790 is a curious instance of the blindness of the nobility and courtiers, who looked upon their absence from France as a pleasant tour, which would soon be terminated by the king's victory over the Assembly. Each riot in Paris sent more of the nobility on tour, and the pillage of the Hôtel de Castries, for instance, was followed by the emigration of more than eleven hundred individuals, and soon after no less than seventy-five *berlines*, or travelling carriages, were leaving Paris every day.¹ It was doubtful whether any measures could be taken to put an end to this emigration, for undoubtedly people had a perfect right to distrust the course of the Revolution if they liked, and also had a perfect right to leave France. However, Le Chapelier, on February 28, brought up a proposal from the constitutional committee, that a committee of three should be appointed by the king, without whose leave no one should be allowed to leave France. The question had arisen because Mesdames Adelaide and Victorine, the aunts of the king, had attempted to leave France. They had left Paris on February 19, and it was reported to the Assembly that they had been stopped, first at Moret, near Fontainebleau, and finally by the municipality of Arnay-le-Duc.² Even Barnave admitted that these ladies ought to be allowed to go to Rome if they wished; but he hinted that some one else was wishing to leave France who certainly ought not to be allowed to go, and this remark was pointed at Monsieur, the Comte de Provence. The Assembly, therefore, passed a decree, ordering the municipality to allow the princesses to continue their journey; and the populace surrounded the palace of the Luxembourg, where Monsieur lived, and forced him to go to the Tuileries, where they thought he would be in greater safety, and where he was a very unwelcome guest. The proposal of Le Chapelier, which he himself acknowledged was contrary to all principles of justice and liberty, was warmly opposed by Mirabeau and Robespierre. Mirabeau declared that he would never obey

¹ Forneron, vol. i. p. 213.

² *Correspondance*, vol. ii. p. 230; Barthélemy's *Mesdames de France*.

such a law, and Robespierre argued that it would be contrary to the principles of liberty to pass any such measure, though it would in his opinion be advisable to pass a decree showing the intending émigrés the danger of such a proceeding to the country. The proposal was not carried, and the question was referred once more to the various committees.

Notwithstanding his new scheme of December 23, Mirabeau had not forgotten his old idea of the king's leaving Paris and appealing to the provinces, and on hearing that La Marck was about to escort his sister, the Princesse de Stahremberg, to the frontier, he pointed out that he might advantageously take a letter from the king to Bouillé, who still commanded the troops on the eastern frontier with his head-quarters at Metz, and make himself acquainted with Bouillé's disposition to help in a plan of escape. La Marck reached Metz on February 10, and at once sought an interview with Bouillé. Bouillé was at first very unwilling to open himself to La Marck, but, on reading the king's secret recommendation of the comte, he declared that he had never really trusted Lafayette, and would do all in his power to assist his Majesty if he left Paris.¹ La Marck, on his return, acquainted both the court and Mirabeau with the disposition of Bouillé, and it will be seen what advantage the king took of Bouillé's loyal declarations. Mirabeau was also pleased with the result, but could not see what advantage could be taken of Bouillé's offer at once, for he hoped that his plan of December 23 would obviate the necessity of an immediate resort to flight and force. He was particularly pleased with Bouillé's recommendation that the king should not try to escape from Paris secretly, but should leave it openly, escorted if necessary by his Swiss Guards.

The minds of the populace of Paris had long been exercised by the existence of the fortress of Vincennes, and they had more than once declared that it must be utterly destroyed like the Bastille. The fortress was still used as a state prison, and a rumour got abroad that the friends of the people were to be

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. i. pp. 167-172.

imprisoned in it. The left of the Assembly had proposed by the mouth of Barnave that the fortress should be demolished, and the prisoners sent to Orleans, where it was already arranged that the high court for the trial of prisoners for high treason was to sit; but matters advanced quickly, and on February 28, the very day on which Barnave spoke, the populace marched out to Vincennes. Lafayette followed with a body of national guards, but his influence would not have been able to disperse the mob had not Santerre, the brewer of the Faubourg St. Antoine and the adored idol of the populace, begged them to desist, and pledged his word,¹ which had far more weight than Lafayette's, that no friends of the people were imprisoned there. When the populace started for Vincennes, a report was spread in Paris that it was going to attack the Tuileries, and more than three hundred gentlemen who were living in Paris immediately made their way to the palace, and prepared to defend the king's life. For many months past gentlemen from the provinces, and especially from La Vendée, had come to Paris with the express purpose of defending the royal person, though they had as yet no opportunity of showing their valour and devotion. It is a curious fact that Marie Antoinette and her immediate suite declared that they recognized few faces among them; for the court noblesse had emigrated, and had left the duties of loyalty to the poorer gentlemen and the rich bourgeois who had remained in France throughout the progress of the Revolution. The king at once declared that he had no need of their assistance, and ordered them to give up their arms. These arms were principally daggers, from which arose the report that there were in Paris many thousands of "chevaliers du poignard," who were going to assassinate the leading revolutionists. When Lafayette returned to Paris he took possession of the weapons, which the king had ordered to be surrendered, and distributed them to his own national guards, an act not likely to encourage the confidence of the royal family in himself. But a far more serious blow was threatened

¹ Carro's *Vie de Santerre*, pp. 70-74, and in B.M.—F. 834 (2), 835 (11), and 837 (5).

to the royal cause by a motion of the Abbé Siéyès, on March 22. The abbé still believed in the idea of weakening and minimizing the royal power, and moved that in case of the death of the king the regent should be elected by the Assembly. This abandonment of the hereditary principle disgusted Mirabeau, who resisted the motion with all his might, and supported the old French custom that the nearest relative of the king should necessarily be regent during his minority. Mirabeau wrote to La Marck¹ that "nothing else was really intended than the utter destruction of the hereditary principle, that is, of the monarchy," and he concluded with a declaration in precisely the same words that Marat so frequently used in his journal, "O frivolous and thrice frivolous nation!" Yet Mirabeau managed to carry the question, not because the Assembly did not approve of the motion of Siéyès, but because there was much jealousy felt against the abbé himself.

During the whole debate on the regency Mirabeau's health was declining, but he did not allow himself any relaxation, and determined to use his utmost endeavours on the question of the rights of property in mines which was now being debated. The question was whether mines belonged of right to the state, or were the property of the owner of the soil. It was a very important question for La Marck, who through his wife was the owner of many mines near Valenciennes, and Mirabeau declared that he would win the battle for him. On March 27² he reached La Marck's house in a prostrate condition, and, in spite of all his friend's entreaties to remain, insisted on going to the meeting of the Assembly to support his cause. He then took two glasses of Tokay, and, collecting all his strength, spoke with such eloquence and effect upon the subject that his motion was nearly unanimously carried. But it must not be believed that he sacrificed his principles to his friendship, for he said,³ "If I do not join in the debate to defend true principles, without doubt there will be no more mines in France, and you as well will lose a principal part of your

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. ii. p. 252.

² *Ibid.*, p. 246.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

fortune." At three o'clock he returned from the Assembly, and threw himself on a sofa with the words, "Your cause is won, but I have got my death-blow." It must never be forgotten that, during all his efforts in 1790, Mirabeau's health was very bad indeed. He mentions a severe attack of jaundice in October, 1790, and he felt that the illness which was now growing on him would be fatal. On March 28 the famous Cabanis, who was also an intimate friend of Mirabeau, declared that he was almost without hope, because during the previous night his patient's pulse had nearly ceased to beat, although the voice was still strong. Mirabeau was slightly better on the following day, though he knew well that he would never recover. Cabanis gave him the best medical assistance, and after his death published an interesting pamphlet¹ on his last days. The first sign of a belief in his approaching dissolution, which many people exhibited, was a desire that Mirabeau's papers should be taken care of, and both Duquesnoy and Montmorin in particular were very desirous that the public should not be able to get any glimpse of the communications which had been going on with the court. Mirabeau understood this as well as they did, and, summoning La Marck, asked him to go through his papers with Pellenc. They did so, and after burning a large number took the rest to a place of safety in the charge of La Marck, and they have since been arranged and published.

Mirabeau knew perfectly well that he was dying, but he did not grieve for his own dissolution, but for the ruin which his death would bring upon the royal cause, and in striking words he said on the last day of his life, "I carry with me the ruin of the monarchy. After my death factions will dispute about its fragments." On the last day of his life, however, April 1, his thoughts were rather of his own condition than of the great political plans he was leaving unaccomplished. As he looked upon the sun, he declared, with a feeling which is older

¹ *Les derniers jours et la mort de Mirabeau*, by Cabanis. Paris: 1791; reprinted in *La Révolution française* for April, May, and June, 1882.

than any living religion, "If that is not God, it is at least His cousin." He looked upon his approaching death with perfect calmness and even liveliness, and when La Marck, who was fond of expressing his admiration of what he called beautiful deaths, came to see him, he remarked, "Well, my dear connoisseur in the art of dying, are you contented with me?"¹ He then set to work with perfect resignation to draw up his will. He told La Marck that he did not know what fortune he left behind him, for his family were all engaged in law-suits with him, but he said that he hoped some one would pay certain legacies which he wished to bequeath. La Marck at once said that he would take their payment on himself, and was named, with Frochot, one of his executors. In these last days his bedside was surrounded by the friends whom he had made during the last two years. Not only was La Marck by his side, but Frochot, who had been his chief lieutenant in the Assembly ever since October, 1780, never left him. Pellenc and, above all, Cabanis were with him night and day; but not even the care of one of the greatest chemists and physicians who ever lived could prolong the span of that suffering life, and at half-past eight on the morning of April 2, on a lovely spring day, after a terrible night of agony, during which he wrote, when he could not speak, upon a slate, "Sleep—I only wish to sleep," he died in La Marck's arms, and his death was indeed as the death of Achilles. Far more extraordinary than the devotion of his personal friends was the intense adoration which the lowest class of the people of Paris felt for him while he lay upon his death-bed. The populace no longer remembered "*la grande trahison du Comte de Mirabeau*;" they thought only of his great services. At each end of the street in which he lay dying they posted their sentries. No carriage was allowed to pass the door to disturb his last slumbers, and every one who was allowed to pass down the street was obliged to doff his hat as he passed the house of the great tribune. The sentiment of the populace was right; for however much he may have striven for the establishment of

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. i. p. 182.

the royal authority, it was only because through the existence of royalty alone he believed order could be maintained, and he knew that for a people to be happy and prosperous there must be order in every department of the state. With him, indeed, died the cause of the monarchy of the Bourbons, and something more than that—the only hope of a peaceful solution of the dangers and difficulties which were threatening France.

The character of Mirabeau appears in his actions far more than in his written speeches and articles. Though certain passages in his letters, speeches, and notes for the court are full of keenness of observation, which reveal the wonderful insight of the man, his acts testify best to his political sagacity. He was essentially a practical statesman, and that is the reason why his character is so little appreciated by Frenchmen. Believers in the *ancien régime* cannot pardon the man who struck such heavy blows at it, in the June and July of 1789; believers in the constitution of 1791 cannot see any merit in the orator who mocked at the constitution and laughed at its framers; and republicans who know of his communications with the court regard him as a traitor to the cause of the Revolution. It is ever a French habit to judge statesmen by their sentiments and not by their acts. The practical statesman never has any attraction for the enthusiastic mind. Had Mirabeau lived in the nineteenth century he would have been called, like Gambetta, an opportunist, and have been attacked accordingly by men whose political ideas are based on theories, and who cannot understand that there are very few theories, if any, which can ever be completely realized. He was a practical statesman both by education and by nature. He had learnt by experience that nothing in politics, or in anything else, can ever be absolutely perfect, and that the secret of true statesmanship is to make such compromises between conflicting ideas and conflicting principles as will best secure the cause of good government. Government exists for the good of the whole people, and not for the purpose of realizing any particular ideals. Theories and ideals were alike hateful to him, as obscuring the true reason for the existence of govern-

ment at all. To his mind the one aim of government was to maintain order. The only element of strength which he could perceive in France at that time was the royal power, and he therefore desired to restore it; but the royal power could have no strength unless it rested on the will of the people, and he may therefore be termed an adherent of democratic monarchy. This paradox would have seemed no paradox to him, for in paradoxes often lies the secret of good government. To examine minutely his views as a statesman and politician here would be but to rewrite the whole history of the first years of the Revolution, but it is necessary to make a few remarks on his character as an orator and a man.

The secret of the marvellous influence of his oratory rested on the enthusiasm of his nature. Whatever he touched he made his own, for he threw his ardent spirit into it. Much has been already said of the writers and thinkers who assisted him, and appear to have really done much of his work for him, but a remark which he made on Pellenc in a letter to La Marck indicates the originality of his views on every subject, whoever may have worked out the details for him. On March 19, 1791, he wrote, "The illustrious Pellenc, whose advice I have had the stupid weakness to accept for the first time without examining it, makes me loudly cry, 'Mea culpa,' and I declare that it shall never occur again."¹ The labour of other men was therefore really transformed by him into his own work, and his speeches can be read with the knowledge that they were written by various comparatively unknown writers, and yet be felt to be the real productions of Mirabeau. As a man of letters he was similarly always making use of other men's labour, but always so infused it with his own individuality as to make it really his own. As an orator he stands in quite a different category to the great teachers of the reign of Louis XIV., and to the speakers in the Convention. He had neither the exquisite style and polished smoothness of Bossuet and Fléchier, nor the extraordinary bursts of eloquence which

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. ii. p. 246.

distinguish the finest speeches of Vergniaud. His oratory resembles rather that of Danton in France, and Charles James Fox in England. His eloquence arose from his glowing powers of description, and the earnestness with which he advocated his cause. He seemed to throw his whole heart into every subject, however trivial, on which he had formed an opinion; and as he quickly formed an opinion on every subject, he made an admirable debater. He was, indeed, the only real debater in the whole Constituent Assembly, and in his facility far more resembled the great English parliamentary speakers than the more studied orators of the pulpit and the bar.

As a man, Mirabeau was always giving evidence of the same enthusiastic nature which made him an orator. He felt very keenly, and at the same time possessed a marvellous insight into men and things. His power of prognosticating the future seems to be perfectly wonderful, but it was really based upon the results of his wide experience and his knowledge of human nature. His faults arose from this same impetuosity of temperament. With the most turbulent passions, he never did anything small or mean; and though he sinned often, and, as he himself said, broke every commandment in the Decalogue, he was nevertheless a good as well as a great man. The best proof of greatness in a man is the number of enthusiastic admirers and disciples he has, and the best proof of real goodness the number of his devoted friends; and no man ever had more admirers and more friends than Honoré Gabriel Riqueti. His admirers were ready to sacrifice not only time, labour, and money, but far more, their fame and glory, like Reybaz, and were ready to literally spend their lives in his service, while the friends who loved him never deserted him, and were so absorbed in their friendship for him that they had room for no other intimates except those who also loved Mirabeau. His domestic relations were not happy. His father was jealous of his powers, and preferred his younger brother, Mirabeau-Tonneau, to him; while his wife also hated him while he was

alive, though she worshipped him after his death. He had all the qualities which might have made him a good and devoted son and husband. The tenderness with which he treated Madame de Nehra, who was merely a temporary companion, shows the capacity for love which he possessed, and could have bestowed, had he met with a woman worthy and willing to be his helpmate through life. It can never be too strongly asserted that Mirabeau was no Alcibiadés, proud of his immoralities and his sins, but a man who repented bitterly when he perceived how greatly his evil deeds had injured his chance of doing France good service. The great moral to be derived from the life of the great statesman and orator is that immorality of life will affect success in politics as in everything else—a truth which no career ever illustrated better than that of Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, Comte de Mirabeau.

CHAPTER XV.

THE FLIGHT TO VARENNES, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.

Effect of Mirabeau's death at the court and in the Assembly—Growing importance of Robespierre—History of the idea that the king should leave Paris—The insult to the king on April 18—The plan of escape—Preparations for escape—Bouillé's military preparations—The king leaves Paris on June 21, is stopped at Varennes, and returns to Paris—The state of Paris and the Assembly during the king's absence—The successful escape of Monsieur—Effect of the king's flight on the Assembly, Lafayette, and the people of Paris—The club of the Cordeliers draw up a petition for the king's dethronement—The massacre on the Champ de Mars on July 17—Effects of the massacre—Revision of the Constitution—Le Chapelier's motion against the clubs—Close of the Constituent Assembly—The great work done by the Constituent Assembly in spite of their mistakes.

THE death of Mirabeau destroyed the last chance of the establishment of a new constitutional monarchy in France under the Bourbons, but to contemporaries the event seemed rather the removal of an extremely ambitious intriguer. No one of his intimate friends really understood how great a work Mirabeau had undertaken, and how ably he had carried it on, still less that no one existed in France who could adequately succeed him. Louis XVI. alone seems to have had some conception of the real greatness of the statesman whom he had lost, for he said to the queen, who, from the very terms of his rejoinder, had been rejoicing over the death of the great man, whom she could not forgive even in his grave, "Do not rejoice over the death of Mirabeau; we have suffered a greater loss

than you imagine.”¹ The court, and especially the queen, were not, indeed, sorry to be freed from the earnest solicitations of one whom they both distrusted and feared, and when he was gone they turned themselves to counsels which pleased them better. There was sufficient similarity between the advice offered by some of the queen's most trusted friends and that of Mirabeau to make her think that she would be doing a very statesmanlike thing in deciding to leave Paris and to summon a new Assembly; but without Mirabeau such a departure from Paris could only bring the entire nation into arms against the king, for without some guarantee that the king would be faithful to the constitution, and would not call in the assistance of the Austrians, not a Frenchman, except the minority of the noblesse, would be found to support him, and as Mirabeau truly said, “A body of noblesse is not an army which can fight.”² Nevertheless, with the duplicity which is so often found in the wilful, Marie Antoinette continued to carry out her plan through two distinct channels of communication. As early as October, 1790, she had, by means of Mgr. d'Agoult, Bishop of Pamiers, consulted Bouillé on the expediency of the king's going to Metz,³ and had again in February, 1791, sent La Marck with a message to the general without divulging to him what had been done before, and she now continued side by side her negotiations through La Marck and the bishop with Bouillé. But the death of Mirabeau had deprived La Marck of the one supporter whose advice could have been of value to the court, and he found his own power of doing good greatly curtailed. He at first took Pellenc, Mirabeau's former secretary, to his own house; but Pellenc was quite unable to bear on his shoulders the mantle of Mirabeau.⁴ La Marck also consulted Cabanis, the great chemist, who had attended

¹ *Mémoires de la Duchesse de Tourzel*, edited by the Duc des Cars, vol. i. p. 247. Paris: 1883.

² *Correspondance*, vol. i. p. 258.

³ *Louis XVI., le Marquis de Bouillé et Varennes*, by the Abbé Gabriel, p. 15. Verdun: 1874.

⁴ *Correspondance*, vol. i. p. 183; and vol. ii. pp. 300-316.

Mirabeau in his last illness, and he too wrote a few notes for the court; but however great he may have been in his laboratory, he did not shine as a statesman, and his only expedient seems to have been that the king should summon all the chief speakers in the Assembly to the court, and ask them frankly to help him.¹ Even more than La Marck was the Comte de Montmorin injured by the death of Mirabeau. It was vain for him to attempt to hold the threads of the great plan by himself, and vain for him to have interviews with Talon and Sémonville and Duquesnoy, for he felt that none of these men were serving him as they had served Mirabeau, and that they were all plotting how they could all best get out of the affair. Meanwhile the queen continued her communications with Bouillé, and still hoped for the escape of the king and herself from Paris; but there was in her heart no wish for that constitutional rule which Mirabeau had longed for, and only a desire to be revenged on the whole of the Assembly which had brought down upon her so many insults.

In the Assembly the death of Mirabeau had left a gap which could never be filled, but, on the other hand, parties were becoming more and more marked. The closing of the Club Monarchique had, indeed, deprived the deputies of the right of their meeting-place; but they were now far better organized than they had been in 1789, and although they knew what had been done could not be undone, they yet hoped that eventually the majority of the Assembly would assist them in establishing the king's power more firmly. There were, indeed, a few members of the extreme right, such as Mirabeau-Tonneau, who had no such statesmanlike conceptions in their minds; but the bulk of the party, which still numbered nearly three hundred deputies, and which was led on the one side by Cazalés and Foucauld, and on the other by Montlosier and Malouet, really did not desire to overthrow the whole of the constitution, but rather to strengthen the royal prerogative. Meanwhile, on the left of the Assembly the difference between the chief groups had become accentuated. The great party,

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. ii. pp. 268-276.

which may be called the left centre, and which had really made the new constitution, was still wrapped up in its ideas of the good which could be done for France, and was still ready to vote for any measure which promised logical consistency, and was still unable to perceive the need of administrative efficiency. It is impossible to attribute leaders to this large party any more than to say that it had many chiefs, as in 1789. It abounded in little groups and cliques, all sitting round and admiring their own particular favourite, but none of them, such as the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt or D'André, Target, Le Chapelier, or Duquesnoy, were practical statesmen. The party which had been led, ever since 1789, by the triumvirate of Barnave, Duport, and the Lameths, was still the best organized of all. It had not yet perceived that the Assembly had gone too far on the road to anarchy, and its leaders were still afraid of the return of despotism. The power of the triumvirate mainly rested throughout the year 1790 in their complete command of the Jacobin Club and its auxiliary societies, and by the aid of the Jacobins they had been able to make Lafayette extremely unpopular all over France, if not with his own Parisian national guards. The death of Mirabeau had but little effect on these different parties. The thinking deputies of the right felt, indeed, that they had lost a powerful, though secret colleague; the deputies of the centre, who had so often been under the sway of his eloquence, knew that his equal was not to be found in the Assembly; and the triumvirate recognized that after Mirabeau's death, they could hardly define why, a more powerful adversary even than he would arise against them. And it was so. The "thirty voices" of February 28,¹ who had been silenced by Mirabeau on many an occasion, and defeated, owing to his eloquence, on many a division, was the party which gained most by his death. Though few in number, the members of the extreme left had been winning the affections not only of the Jacobin Club, but of the people of Paris, away from the triumvirate, and hardly was Mirabeau dead, ere the leaders of the

¹ *Correspondance*, vol. i. p. 165.

extreme left became the chief speakers and the most influential deputies in the Assembly. Robespierre had frequently spoken, and gained great popularity and reputation in the Jacobin Club during the year 1790, but it was not until after the death of Mirabeau that he made his mark as an independent revolutionary leader. Many of the most important motions which were now carried in the Assembly were moved by Robespierre, and he and his friends were, when the Assembly was dissolved, the most popular speakers and thinkers in France. It was against Robespierre that Duport now had to contend, and there was more than one controversy between the two. By the side of Robespierre appeared many other deputies, whose popularity and influence were only inferior to his own, notably, Pétion, deputy for Chartres; Buzot, deputy for Évreux; Rœderer, deputy for Metz; Rewbell, deputy for Colmar; Prieur, deputy for Châlons-sur-Marne; Dubois-Crancé, deputy for Vitry; Larevellière Lepaux, deputy for Anjou; Vadier, deputy for the Foix; Barère, deputy for the Bigorre; and Merlin, deputy for Douai. These were the men who profited by Mirabeau's death, and these were the leaders of France who were to succeed him. It was Robespierre who moved, on April 7, 1791, that for four years after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly none of its members could become ministers; it was Robespierre who tried to destroy, on April 29, the power of Lafayette by allowing all classes of citizens to enter the National Guard; and he it was also who, on May 9, eloquently defended the right of the people to petition, and finally, on May 10, carried the motion that no member of the Constituent Assembly could be elected to the forthcoming Legislative Assembly. He met his reward, and received proofs of his popularity in Paris by being elected, on June 9, public prosecutor to the new criminal tribunal of the Seine. Duport, who had been elected president of this new tribunal, at once resigned, and Pétion was elected in his place. But in the Jacobin Club, still more than in the Assembly, did the power of Robespierre increase. Night after night the triumvirate found the majority of this popular club leaving them, and that it was falling

under the sway of the deputies of the extreme left. Such was the condition of the Assembly, such was the advance made by the extreme left, when the king at last, after much hesitation, resolved to leave Paris, and to throw himself, contrary to Mirabeau's advice, upon the assistance of the army. V

The idea of appealing from Paris to the provinces has been noticed as early as July 14, 1789, and the king had afterwards remarked that that would have been the right time for joining his loyal subjects in the provinces before Paris had got possession of his person, and while the Revolution was yet in its infancy; and he said, further, that had it not been for the advice of Necker, and still more of his brother, Monsieur, the Comte de Provence, he would then have gone to Fontainebleau. On the night of October 5 it has been noticed that the king's carriage was brought out, and that he was only prevented from leaving Versailles by some national guards of that city insisting on the horses being unharnessed.¹ Mirabeau had urged flight ever since he had been permitted to advise the court, but had always failed, partly because the king would not believe the people of Paris were so badly disposed towards him as was stated, partly from his fear of bringing on a civil war, and partly from his inborn indecision and inability to come to a determination. That the famous flight, which is known as the flight to Varennes, was not undertaken in accordance with Mirabeau's plans, is best proved by its being kept a secret from La Marck, whose importance had indeed entirely disappeared, and who was distrusted by the queen, in spite of his connection with the Comte de Mercy-Argenteau, because of his past intimacy with Mirabeau. But the attempt would probably never have taken place at all had it not been for the riot of April 18, which forced the king to come to an immediate decision, and illustrates the condition of Paris, and especially the decreasing power of Lafayette at this time. The flight could hardly have been successful in any case, even without the curious train of events which brought about its failure, because the mass of the people were in 1791 pro-

¹ See chap. vii. p. 224.

foundly distrustful of the king, and still more of the queen, while the army was much too disloyal to afford any counterpoise to the disaffection of the people. The flight, if partially successful, must have ended in a retreat to German soil, and the events of 1814 and 1815, when foreign armies imposed a Bourbon king upon France, might have been anticipated twenty-three years before.

On April 18, 1791, the Monday in Passion Week, the king had wished to leave Paris for the Easter fortnight and go to Saint-Cloud, as he had done in the previous summer, in order to hear his Easter mass there, and ordered his carriages to be got ready. He had no idea that opposition would be made to his departure, and indeed he had been assured that Lafayette would permit it; but, to his surprise and disgust, when he and his family had got into the royal carriages, not only the populace of Paris assembled in the gardens of the Tuileries, but the national guards themselves, who were on duty, absolutely refused to allow the carriages to start. The chief reason of this change in the minds of the people, and of the national guards between the summer of 1790 and the spring of 1791, is to be found in the king's adherence to the cause of the clergy who had refused to take the oath. His conscience would not permit him to listen to the ministrations of a priest who had taken the oath, for he regarded them all as schismatics, and this refusal had been interpreted by popular opinion into a belief that he would not obey the other chief points of the constitution. The popular mind, which was entirely estranged from the Roman Catholic Church, could not understand the king's conscientious scruples as a man, and had throughout the spring of 1791 become more and more exasperated against him. Rumours had also got abroad of Mirabeau's scheme that the king should escape from Paris, and this may the more have induced the people not to allow him to go even as far as Saint-Cloud. Whatever the reasons were, a large mob surrounded the royal carriages. In vain did Bailly come down to the Tuileries and beg the people to allow the king to proceed. In vain did Lafayette appeal to

his "children," as he called the national guards, and threaten to resign his commission if his wishes were not obeyed. In vain did the directory of the department of the Seine send deputations to the Assembly and deputations to the people. They still refused to permit the king to start. The mob even pressed so closely on the royal carriages, that François Joseph Lefebvre, then first sergeant of the garde soldée, as the old Gardes Françaises were termed, and who became afterwards a marshal of France and Duke of Dantzic, was badly hurt in keeping the mob back. For more than twelve hours the king and his family remained in their carriages, alternately commanding and imploring Lafayette to make a way for them. But the general's power seemed to have gone, and the unfortunate king had to return once more to his palace-prison, where he determined that he would no longer submit to the restraint which was imposed on him, and that, if he were not allowed to leave Paris openly, he would escape secretly. On April 19 he came down to the Assembly and complained of the conduct of the mob. The Assembly passed resolutions, but did nothing more. Lafayette withdrew his resignation, and the directory of the department of the Seine, which had met to receive the report of the directory, suggested that the sections of Paris¹ should be assembled, and should each be separately consulted as to whether the king should be allowed to go to Saint-Cloud, or whether he should be thanked for remaining in Paris. This appeal to the sections did not help the king's cause, for Danton, who was the recognized leader of the section of the Théâtre Français, carried a motion that it was not a subject for the sections to deliberate upon, and six sections followed the lead thus given them. Too much importance cannot be attributed to the events of April 18. The king had hitherto been practically a prisoner, but had been respected in his imprisonment, until he now had conclusive proof how little real respect his position inspired.

The individuals chiefly concerned in concocting the plan for the king's escape from Paris were the Baron de Breteuil,

¹ Schmidt, *Tableaux de la Révolution française*, vol. i. p. 17.

Count Jean Axel de Fersen, and the Marquis de Bouillé.¹ That old intriguer, the Baron de Breteuil, had emigrated after the capture of the Bastille, and was now residing at Brussels, from which place he secretly communicated with the king and queen, and was trusted by them to undo the bad effects of the intrigues of Calonne, who was living with the Comte d'Artois, at the various courts of Germany. He strongly recommended a flight, and from his residence at Brussels was able, as will be seen, to give much assistance to Bouillé's plan. Count Jean Axel de Fersen was a handsome Swede,² who, after serving in America, had become colonel of the Royal Suédois regiment in 1784. He had before that lived a great deal in Paris, and had become a favourite with the queen. The voice of scandal had often associated their names, but Count Fersen was, throughout the period of the American war, engaged to a Miss Lyel, who afterwards married the fourth Earl Delawarr, and was subsequently enamoured of a certain Mrs. Sullivan, who had great vogue both in Paris and London at this period. Nevertheless, though almost certainly not in love with the queen himself, he was deeply interested in her falling fortunes, and showed a chivalrous

¹ The best authorities on the flight to Varennes are *Mémoires du Marquis de Bouillé*, with a valuable appendix in Berville and Barrière's *Bibliothèque des Mémoires*, 1829; *Histoire de l'événement de Varennes*, by the Comte de Sèze, Paris, 1843; *Relation fidèle sur la fuite du Roi Louis XVI. à Varennes*, by E. Bimbenet, 1884; *Essai sur la vie du Marquis de Bouillé*, by his grandson René de Bouillé, Paris, 1853; *La Vérité sur la fuite et l'arrestation de Louis XVI. à Varennes*, by E. A. Ancelon, Paris, 1866; the account in the *Mémoires de la Duchesse de Tourzel*, published by the Duc des Cars, Paris, 1883, vol. i. chap. xii. pp. 301-350; *Louis XVI., le Marquis de Bouillé et Varennes*, by the Abbé Gabriel, Verdun, 1874; *Le Comte de Fersen et la Cour de France*, by the Baron R. M. de Klinckowström, 1878; and the Secret History of the King of France, and his escape from Paris in June, 1791, by Quentin Craufurd, published in the *Bland Burges Papers*, edited by James Hutton, pp. 364-373, London, 1885.

² See *Le Comte de Fersen et la Cour de France, extraits des papiers du Grand Maréchal du Suède, Jean Axel de Fersen, publiés par son petit-neveu le Baron R. M. de Klinckowström*. 2 vols. Paris: 1877.

attachment for her, which Marie Antoinette herself returned.¹ He had been, during the year 1789 and the beginning of 1790, quartered at Valenciennes, and had there seen how impossible it was to trust in the French soldiers; but in July, 1791, he had come to Paris, and afterwards took various journeys to Brussels, where he had many discussions with Breteuil. He it was who planned the manner of the king's escape from his capital. In December, 1790, a Russian friend of his and Mrs. Sullivan's, the Baroness Korff, had ordered a large new berline, or travelling carriage, holding six persons, to be built for her in Paris, and this carriage was now destined for the royal family. As it was impossible to complete the scheme without a more thorough understanding with the Marquis de Bouillé, the general sent his eldest son, Comte Louis de Bouillé, to Paris, where he lived with young friends of his own age, who were violent revolutionists,² and at the same time communicated with the court. He had brought with him instructions from his father to advise the king as to his plans. The three cities suggested as cities of refuge were Besançon, Valenciennes, and Montmédy; but in Besançon there existed a strong revolutionary element which might imperil the success of the plan, and Valenciennes was within the command of Rochambeau and not that of Bouillé. Montmédy was therefore agreed upon. To Montmédy there were two principal routes, one by Rheims, the shortest and most direct, the other by Châlons, Sainte Menehould, and Clermont-en-Argonne. The two routes met at Sedan, which was within easy distance of Montmédy. Bouillé pressed for the route viâ Rheims; but the king would not go that way, because he believed that his face would be recognized from his having been crowned there, and it is probable that, in the humiliation of a flight, he did not care to

¹ On the other side see, however, the rumour in Lord Holland's *Souvenirs*, that Count Fersen was in the queen's bedchamber on the night of October 5, 1789; and the note of Mr. Craufurd in his account, that Fersen "is generally supposed to be the father of the present dauphin," in the *Bland Burges Papers*, p. 364.

² Abbé Gabriel, p. 25.

pass through the city which had seen him in all the glory of his old dignity. The Châlons route was longer and more dangerous, because the regular post-road led through Verdun, which Bouillé describes in one word as a "detestable" city¹ from its revolutionary tendencies. It was therefore decided that from Clermont-en-Argonne the royal party should proceed along a by-road viâ Varennes to Sedan; and it is a strange fact that, from the commencement of the negotiations, Bouillé seems to have had a presentiment that Varennes would ruin the project. Further, Bouillé begged the king not to travel in one great new conspicuous carriage, which would by its very appearance excite curiosity and discussion on the roads, and which would be slow, but rather to split up his party, and to escape with his daughter and sister, and allow the queen to go separately with the dauphin. All his arguments were in vain; the king declared that he would be saved with all his family or not at all.

The plan rapidly progressed to completion. The Baroness Korff obtained, through the Russian minister, M de Simolin, a passport² for herself and suite, which was intended for the use of the king and the royal family. The carriage was found to be ready, and it was only necessary to decide who should accompany the fugitives. Princess Elizabeth insisted on going as a matter of course, the Marquise de Tourzel also insisted on her right as governess of the children to accompany them,³ and the queen begged for two maids. Three Gardes du Corps were also taken into confidence, and entrusted with the important duty of arranging the changes of horses at the different stages. But the project was known to too many people not to get noised abroad. Count Fersen told it to Mrs. Sullivan, who returned to England and discussed it with the Prince of Wales, an intimate friend of hers.⁴

¹ Abbé Gabriel, p. 18.

² D'Hézacques' *Souvenirs d'un page de la cour de Louis XVI.*, p. 352.

³ This was the common belief at the time, as reported by Count Louis de Bouillé and the Comte d'Hézacques, but the accusation is positively denied by Madame de Tourzel in a note to her *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 302, 1885.

⁴ Abbé Gabriel, p. 92.

Through the Baroness Korff it became known to some other Russians, and the great preparation of travelling-dresses which the queen had insisted upon ordering before she would leave Paris made it obvious to the ladies about the court that something was about to happen. One of these ladies was attached to M. Gouvion, aide-de-camp to Lafayette, who informed his chief that a flight was being arranged in the Tuileries. Many other contrivances were necessary; for the national guards not only kept watch in the exterior of the palace, but also within, at the doors of the sleeping-rooms of the royal family, and to enable them to unite in secrecy private doors had to be made between the different apartments.

Bouillé's task was more difficult than that of Fersen, for the new Minister for War, Duportail, had cut down his command to the province of Lorraine and the three bishoprics, and had ordered away some of his most trusted regiments. Bouillé found it, further, very difficult to decide what troops he could rely upon, and determined to make use both of French and foreign soldiers. His best regiments were the cavalry, and he calculated that he could concentrate in the neighbourhood of Montmédy some six thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry. As a pretext for such concentration, he begged Breteuil to ask the emperor to make a movement of Austrian troops towards the Flemish frontier; and he himself spread the report with such assiduity that he was publicly thanked by the Minister for War for his able arrangements, and for getting in hand a sufficient number of troops upon the frontier to resist the Austrians if necessary. So far Bouillé's difficulties had not been great; but even to make these changes he needed money, and the king advanced him a million livres. A far more difficult undertaking was to fulfil the king's desire that posts of cavalry should be established in readiness to escort him in all the towns between Sainte Menehould and Montmédy. Bouillé in vain argued that the cavalry would cause great suspicion; but the king insisted, and the general accordingly took several cavalry officers, notably the Duc de Choiseul-Stainville, colonel of the Royal Dragoons, and Comte Charles

de Damas, colonel of the Monsieur Dragoons, into his confidence. He also spread a report that an important convoy of treasure was coming down from Paris, which needed strong escorts. As Bouillé had foreseen, these cavalry detachments, which were posted in seven towns and villages on the road, created much discussion; and still more did the arrival of the Duc de Choiseul's horses and carriages at Varennes, for it had been decided that, since there was no post-house at Varennes, the duke should have some horses there which should serve as a relay for the royal carriages.

At midnight, on June 20, the king and royal family managed, with much difficulty, to leave the Tuileries unobserved. Lafayette, who had some suspicion of what was going on, followed by Bailly,¹ passed close by the royal children, after being present at the coucher of the king, and it might have been suggested that he knew what was in contemplation, and hoped that if the king escaped, and he had the credit of bringing him back to Paris, he might, as after October 5 and 6, obtain fresh influence. If he did know he did not interfere, and Count Fersen drove the royal family safely in a hack cab to the barrier, which they passed in safety, and they then got into the new great travelling carriage which had just been built. The Count escorted them in his own carriage as far as Bondy, where he took a respectful farewell, and then afterwards travelled without any difficulty to Brussels. His last words were to beg that he might remain with them; and had he done so, there can be but little doubt that his assistance would have secured the escape of the king and queen. On the evening of June 20, after a last interview with the king, the Duc de Choiseul went forward to Pont de Somme-Vesle, with Léonard, the queen's hair-dresser, who was entrusted with a casket of her jewels. He reached Pont de Somme-Vesle in safety. There he found that a great danger had arisen from the presence of the hussars in that village, for the peasants were impressed with the idea that the soldiers had come to punish them, and they, therefore, had assembled in large

¹ Madame de Tourzel's *Mémoires*, vol. i. p. 306.

numbers and were threatening the troops. The progress of the royal carriage was so slow that Choiseul believed it was never coming, and at four o'clock on the afternoon of the 21st he sent off Léonard with one of his own servants to tell the officers stationed in the different towns that the treasure was not coming that day. Léonard, who was not possessed of a large portion of courage or brains, inspired each of the officers at the different posts with a belief that all was over, and further drew great attention by his passage; for he was a well-known character, and the passage of the royal hairdresser with one of Choiseul's servants seemed to be a proof to all the gossips in the different towns that something was on foot. At each town his arrival created much excitement. At Sainte Menehould, Captain d'Andoins of the Royal Dragoons, who had been much harassed by the populace, gave orders for his men to unsaddle; at Clermont-en-Argonne, the Comte de Damas of the Monsieur Dragoons did the same thing; while at Varennes, where a mere boy of eighteen, Lieutenant Rohrig, was in command, who knew nothing about the affair, the soldiers were dismissed and went to bed. At half-past five in the afternoon Choiseul ordered his men to saddle, and led them from Pont de Somme-Vesle at a gallop over the fields, thus exciting the natural disgust of the farmers and peasants by riding down their crops, and at the same time leaving the other posts without certain knowledge as to whether the king was coming or not. The royal carriage had gone extremely slowly, and had broken down in spite of its being quite new, and it did not reach Châlons till five in the afternoon. Here horses were changed without difficulty, though it has been asserted that the king was recognized by many individuals who took no notice of him. When they left Châlons, the royal fugitives believed they were at last safe, but on arriving at Pont de Somme-Vesle they found no escort awaiting them. Nevertheless they moved on as quickly as the cumbrous carriage would go, and reached Sainte Menehould at eight o'clock, after a journey of twenty hours. They had been preceded by M. de Valory, one of the Gardes du Corps, who

acted as courier, by only a few minutes. Captain d'Andoins had no time to command his men to saddle and get into order. On the king's arrival at the post-house of Sainte Menehould, therefore, he found the dragoons loitering about, and Captain d'Andoins was afraid of attracting attention by speaking to the fugitives. But a still greater danger was met with at Sainte Menehould. The postmaster there, Jean Baptiste Drouet, was an ex-dragon, and scented that something was in the air. He was paid by M. de Valory for the new post-horses with a newly struck fifty-franc assignat, and when the king, in his impatience, looked out of the carriage window, the postmaster at once recognized his resemblance to the portrait engraved upon the assignat. In the presence of the dragoons, who might have charged the people, Drouet kept silence, but as soon as the carriage had left the town, he spread the rumour that it contained the king, who was escaping, and with one companion, Guillaume, also an ex-dragon, at once mounted his horse and galloped along to raise the alarm throughout the country-side. The national guards and populace kept the dragoons at Sainte Menehould from saddling, and by offers of food and drink enticed the tired men from their duty. Nevertheless, as if to show what a single man of courage and resolution could do, the chief quartermaster of the Royal Dragoons, named Lagache, alone charged the confused mass of national guards and people, by himself fired his pistol when he was opposed upon the bridge, and galloped safely through in pursuit of the king. The action of this brave soldier proves how much could have been done by D'Andoins' thirty dragoons at Sainte Menehould, or Choiseul's forty hussars at Pont de Somme-Vesle. The later life of Lagache was in keeping with this brave action; he served throughout the wars of Napoleon under the name of "General Henry," and was created in 1812 a baron of the empire for his military services.¹ Meanwhile the royal carriage moved slowly on, and reached Clermont-en-Argonne at half-past nine. At Clermont the Comte de Damas had dismounted his 180 dragoons some hours before, and was startled when the first news of the king's arrival was the presence of Valory, who again only preceded

¹ Abbé Gabriel, p. 179.

the king by a few minutes. It was, of course, as impossible for Damas to saddle in a moment as it was for D'Andoins; but the king again managed to get his horses safely changed, and to start away at once. Unfortunately, when the new horses were put to the carriage, the postboy shouted, "*À Varennes!*" and thus showed Drouet, who was just behind, that the royal family were not going through Verdun, at which place he was hoping to stop them. So far, despite innumerable mistakes and misadventures, the royal family had got safely within reach of Bouillé and his army, and the great carriage rolled cumbrously along the by-road to Varennes. There were only sixty hussars stationed there, who, as has been said, were under the command of a boy-lieutenant; but the Marquis de Bouillé, in his uneasiness, had sent his second son, the Chevalier de Bouillé, and the Comte de Raigecourt to the little town to see that all went well there. These young officers were thoroughly disgusted at the arrival of Léonard, and absolutely refused to let him have any of Choiseul's horses; but he managed to get some in the town, and pursued his craven flight across the frontier. At Varennes a very serious mistake had been made by the Baron de Goguelat, an officer of engineers, who had been employed by the king and Bouillé to survey the route. Choiseul's horses had been stabled in a little inn called the *Bras d'Or*, on the outskirts of the town, where a change of horses might have been effected without much notice, but Goguelat had ordered them to be taken to the *Hôtel du Grand Monarque*, which stood on one side of the little "place" of Varennes. The Chevalier de Bouillé had been directed by his father to order the horses to be taken back as fast as possible, but he found there was so much curiosity in Varennes as to the use of these horses, that he was afraid to order their removal for fear of creating fresh commotion. The hour for the king's arrival was now greatly exceeded, and the young officers here, as elsewhere, at last allowed the soldiers to dismiss. However, with as little warning here as at the other towns, the royal carriage arrived at Varennes at 11 p.m., preceded by Valory, having spent twenty-three hours on the road. When the carriage did

arrive, the Chevalier de Bouillé and the Comte de Raigecourt had already left Varennes for the head-quarters of the general, who had advanced from Montmédy as far as Sedan, accompanied by the whole Royal-Allemand regiment under the command of Colonel Mandell.

Rumours that the carriage contained the King had already reached Varennes, for Drouet had galloped into the little town just before the arrival of the royal family. When, therefore, the faithful Gardes du Corps attempted to harness fresh horses, they were resisted by the people, who collected in large numbers and declared that the king should go no further. On the news of this excitement in the little "place," M. Sauce, a small grocer in the town, who was the procureur of the commune, came down in his official scarf and asked the king what was the matter. On his arrival, there were cries of "C'est le Roi !" The procureur insisted that the royal fugitives should alight from their carriage and enter his house, while he consulted with the rest of the municipal officers as to what their duty was in this case. The king indignantly asked why he was thus stopped, and demanded horses to go on to Montmédy; and when they were refused, consented to leave his carriage and rest at the house of the triumphant grocer and procureur. Meanwhile the rumour that the king was at Varennes spread through all the surrounding district, for Drouet had summoned the national guards of all the villages along the road. These national guards by dawn reached the number of three thousand, who all placed themselves under the command of Colonel de Signémont, a lieutenant-colonel in the royal army, and a knight of St. Louis, who held the office of commandant of the National Guard of Varennes. The national guards raised a barricade across the river Aire, in order to block the road to Sedan and to prevent any attempt of Bouillé's to rescue the king by force. The only hope now left to the royal family was the expectation that Bouillé would speedily come to their help; but they quite understood that if Bouillé attacked the town from without, they themselves would also be attacked. The Duc de Choiseul, with the Comte de Damas

and five other officers, who found themselves with the king, as well as the Gardes du Corps, made preparations to defend the house. The hours of the night passed very slowly ; no news of Bouillé was heard ; but at last, at five o'clock in the morning of June 22, Captain d'Eslon, who had been in command of the detachment of hussars stationed at Dun, appeared by himself at the house of the procureur. He entered alone, for it was impossible for his handful of hussars to charge the barricade which M. de Signémont had erected. In the morning also, at a debate of the municipal body, it was decided that M. Mangin, a surgeon of the town, should gallop post-haste to Paris with a letter from the municipal authorities, asking the National Assembly what they should do. When the king was informed of this result of the deliberations of the municipal body he knew that all was lost, and when, about an hour after the departure of Mangin, two horsemen arrived from Paris, he felt that they must bring bad news. They were M. Bayon, chief of a battalion of the National Guard of Paris, who had been sent by the municipality along the Montmédy road directly the news of the king's departure had become public, and M. Romœuf, an aide-de-camp of Lafayette's, who had been sent by the Assembly for the same purpose. They were followed by Palloy, who had fulfilled the contract for pulling down the Bastille, and made himself a name by sending models of it to all the departments. Bayon at once forced his way into the king's presence, and Romœuf was called upon to read the decree which he had brought from the Assembly. This decree was to the effect that the king had been carried off by traitors, and called upon every municipality and every National Guard to do their best to bring him back to Paris. But even yet the king would not give up hope. He begged for a few hours' rest. "Give me at least," he asked, "till seven o'clock." The queen was not so occupied with thoughts of her own misfortune, and her first question was, "Do you know if M. de Fersen is safe?" The king managed to linger yet another hour at Varennes by sleeping or pretending to sleep

but at half-past seven he felt that hope was at an end, and the royal carriage started on its return journey to Paris. Bouillé had received the news, brought to him by his son, the Chevalier, and De Raigecourt, near Stenay, and at once attempted to get his troops in hand. Colonel Mandell was ordered to saddle. The Nassau and Castella infantry regiments were ordered up, as well as two squadrons of the Chasseurs de Champagne. But there was a delay in saddling, a delay in marching, and the general only reached the town of Varennes at half-past nine on the morning of June 22, where he was met by Captain d'Eslon with the news that the king was already on his way back to Clermont-en-Argonne, and had left Varennes two hours before. In an excited manner Bouillé implored his generals, his officers, and his men to follow him and save the king. The attempt was desperate; he felt that if it failed, all was lost. He then galloped towards the frontier, when his officers doubted the practicability of pursuing the king, and at six o'clock that evening he bade farewell to his dragoons and hussars at Stenay, and at eleven he reached Orval, a large convent on the other side of the Belgian frontier, with Generals Klinglin and D'Hofflize, and some twenty other officers. There he passed the night of June 22, and when the morning of the 23rd broke, he remembered that it was the day of the Fête Dieu, on which day, if the flight of the king had been successful, he was to have been invested in the cathedral of Montmédy with the bâton of a marshal of France, surrounded by officers and soldiers, flushed with success, and hearing himself called on all sides the saviour of France. The after-life of the general was much saddened by this failure; he could never obtain any real command in the army of the émigrés, and had to serve as a volunteer. In England he was offered the chief governorship of San Domingo, but would not return to the scene of his previous exploits as a servant of his former foes, and he died in the year 1800 in London, leaving his name for ever associated with the failure of Varennes, and held up to the execration of all French Republicans in a well-known verse of their national anthem.

Even up to the last moment, when the horses' heads were turned towards Paris, the king had hoped that he might yet be saved by Bouillé, and get to Montmédy. But at last he recognized that hope was gone. Escorted by three thousand national guards, under the command of M. de Signémont and the leadership of the now famous postmaster, Drouet, he reached Clermont-en-Argonne at ten in the morning, and Sainte Ménehould at half-past one. There Drouet had not been idle, and he collected together, chiefly from Verdun, fifteen thousand men, who occupied themselves in hissing the royal family, and could hardly be kept from murdering the Gardes du Corps, and who did murder the Comte de Dampierre for trying to force his way through the crowd in order to pay his respects to the king. Châlons was reached at eleven o'clock at night, and there the king was received with much respectful sympathy. The girls of the city presented him with fresh flowers, and M. Roze, the procureur, who was an ardent Royalist, again offered to save the king; but he could only save him alone, and Louis would not desert his family.¹ On June 23, the Fête Dieu, the king heard mass at Châlons, and might, as well as Bouillé, have thought of the difference of the actual scene to what they had both hoped for. He then left for Epernay, and near Dormans the royal carriage was joined by Pétion, Barnave, and Latour-Maubourg, three deputies who had been sent to bring the king back to Paris, and Mathieu Dumas, one of the staff-officers of the Parisian National Guard, who had been sent to take command of the various detachments of national guards. Of the last stage of the journey back to Paris there is a minute and detailed account extant, written by Pétion, which however gives a more interesting insight into the character of the deputy than into the nature of the journey. He thought that the Princess Elizabeth cast looks of love upon him, and proudly plumes himself on his virtue in repulsing her;² for

¹ Abbé Gabriel, p. 314.

² See his account of this journey, printed in *Mémoires inédits de Pétion et Mémoires de Buzot et de Barbaroux*, edited by C. A. Dauban, pp. 189-204. Paris: 1866.

the man was at once too vain and too mean to perceive the dramatic side of the great misfortune which had happened to this unfortunate family. Barnave felt the sadness of the contrast between past greatness and present humiliation, and though it is not likely that the queen won him over to her side during the journey, there can be no doubt that his young and enthusiastic imagination was greatly impressed by the sad spectacle before him. On the night of June 23 the royal family slept at Dormans, and on the 24th at Meaux,¹ and they left the latter city at six in the morning for the last stage of their return journey. Every preparation had been made in Paris that the king should be received without disturbance. Instead of entering by the direct road, the city walls were skirted until the Champs Elysées were reached, and the carriage then passed slowly up the Champs Elysées and the gardens of the Tuileries to the palace. On every wall in Paris was affixed a proclamation, to the effect that "whoever applauds the king shall be flogged, and whoever insults him shall be hung;" but there is no record that any one either applauded or insulted him. He was received in gloomy silence, and felt from that moment he was severed for ever from the hearts of his people.

The consequences of the disastrous flight from Paris, which was checked at Varennes, were exactly what Mirabeau had prophesied from the first. He had always told the king that he must not fly towards the frontier, or else he would be suspected of an alliance with foreigners against his own country; that he must not depend upon the nobility, who were "an army which could not fight;" and that the only means by which he could rouse the provinces in his favour was by freely promising that the advantages which had been procured in the early days of the Constituent Assembly by the abolition of the relics of feudalism should be guaranteed to them. But the king, or rather the queen, had neglected all these necessary precautions. They did fly towards the frontier, and

¹ *Le Passage de Louis XVI. à Meaux au retour de Varennes le 24 Juin, 1791*, by Victor Modeste. Meaux : 1865.

were suspected of an alliance with foreigners; they did find how weak a support the nobility of France, as represented by the officers of Bouillé's army, was; and, instead of guaranteeing to France the advantages which had been won, the king left behind him a paper drawn up on that fatal evening of June 20, when he had determined on flight, formally declaring that all the decrees of the Constituent Assembly to which he had given his consent were null and void, because that consent had been given under pressure and when he was not personally free. The news of his departure, together with this ill-advised paper, was brought down to the Assembly on its meeting at nine o'clock, as usual, on the morning of June 21, and Alexandre de Beauharnais, who was at that time president, read it to the Assembly. Immediately, as at the time of the taking of the Bastille and of October 5, the Assembly declared itself "en permanence." Measures were promptly taken. A proclamation, the one which Romœuf read to the king at Varennes, was issued, ordering the municipality of any town into which the king might come to stop his Majesty until further orders, and to imprison those who had carried him off. Thus at this early stage appears the first sign of the affected belief of the Assembly that the king had been carried off, and did not leave Paris of his own free will. But the Assembly did not, in 1791, have to act alone, as it had done in 1789. It had relieved itself of its extraordinary powers by creating the new local authorities, and it now summoned the council-general of the department of the Seine to remain also "en permanence" in the next hall to itself, in order that it might advise with the Assembly on the measures deemed necessary to secure the safety of Paris. The municipality of Paris had at once reported the king's flight to the directory of the department, and the council-general of the department was summoned by the directors.¹ Three shots were fired to announce to the city that something of paramount importance had occurred. The sections requested leave to sit "en permanence," which was

¹ Schmidt's *Tableaux de la Révolution française*, vol. i. pp. 26-58, where the procès verbal of the permanent session of the council-general is printed.

granted. The municipality was ordered to seal up the Tuileries and examine the servants, and to do the same at the palace of the Luxembourg, from which Monsieur had likewise escaped. The gates of Paris were to be closed, and no one was to be permitted to go out or come in; letters were not to be distributed; patrols were to be increased in all the streets, and strangers were to be examined. Then came the invitation of the National Assembly, and the council-general of the department immediately complied with the request. The members marched solemnly through the streets. But of all the respectable gentlemen among them, one man, Danton, was the only member of the council-general who attracted the attention of the people in the streets. Attended by a volunteer guard of four armed men, he shouted to the people that there were traitors in Paris; that the people must not be afraid to demand an inquiry; that the king might go, and indeed that the people had best beware of him and of the Austrian Committee, which met at the Tuileries. This bold conduct of Danton, and the appeal which he had made to the passions of the people, disgusted the respectable gentlemen who were his colleagues, and they drew Danton into great peril during the following months. The city remained perfectly quiet, but the populace greatly troubled both the municipality and the authorities of the department by demanding arms. Some were served out, notably one thousand muskets and five hundred sabres to the market-porters. The actors of the Théâtre Français, or the Théâtre de la Nation, asked leave to reopen for the usual performance, and were told that they had never been ordered to close. A placard, condemning the king, which had been posted on all the walls by the radical club of the Cordeliers, was condemned as seditious and libellous. At last the surgeon Mangin, who had been sent off from Varennes, reached Paris, after fifteen hours' hard riding, with information that the king was stopped in his little town. At this news universal joy was expressed, and it was immediately sent round to all the sections by the president of the Assembly. The young medical students of the section Théâtre Français, which then stood on the site of

the present Théâtre d'Odéon, and in the Quartier Latin, asked leave to go to Varennes and bring the king safely back. This offer was refused, but ordered to be put upon record as an instance of the students' patriotism; and the section des Thermes de Julien, also on the west side of the river, asked leave to examine all suspected houses—a fact which is of importance when the examination of August, 1792, comes under notice. But at this period leave to search was refused. The next morning the authorities of the department were besieged by country people, who had brought in provisions on the previous day, and who now begged to be allowed to leave the city and go about their business; which was granted, as the crisis was now believed to be over. The Assembly at the same time sent off Barnave, Pétion, and Latour-Maubourg to escort the king to Paris, and Lafayette and Colonel d'Affry of the Swiss Guards were ordered to arrange for the peaceable entrance of the king. On June 24 the Cordeliers published a placard openly declaring their horror of the king, and demanding the convocation of the primary assemblies, and it was finally arranged that the king should enter Paris by the circuitous route of the Champs Elysées. On the 25th, as has been said, the unfortunate monarch did re-enter his capital. But he found that all the papers which had been left behind at the Tuileries had been carried off and put under seal in the Archives, that they might be examined in order to find out who had been employed in carrying off the king. On the 26th, Bailly, mayor of Paris, reported that he had discovered that a plot had existed in all the prisons, and that the prisoners were to have broken out on the 21st as soon as the king had departed; and this is also notable, as showing the firm belief of the populace that the departure of the king was a deep-laid plot, which had been communicated to all the Royalists. On the 27th the permanent sessions both of the Assembly and of the council-general of the department of the Seine broke up. It is especially interesting to notice the conduct of Paris at this juncture, for it was the turning-point of the progress of the Revolution. After it the word "republic" was first heard

in the streets of Paris, and if the king's dignity had gone on April 18, any chance of his regaining his authority was lost by his unfortunate attempt of June 21.

The successful escape of Monsieur, the Comte de Provence, and of his wife, who left Paris on the same night as the king, and safely reached the frontier, proves how much could be done by faithful servants, and how easily, if the king and queen had consented to travel separately, and had not insisted upon the useless parade of soldiers on their route, their journey might have been accomplished. Monsieur had bravely insisted on remaining at Paris to share his brother's dangers, until Louis himself informed him of his projected escape, and had allowed his mistress, Madame de Balbi, to go without him; but when he was told that the king himself was going to leave Paris, he decided to follow his example. He wisely left the arrangement of his escape to the Comte d'Avaray, his chamberlain,¹ and merely acted with the obedience of a child. He went to bed at his usual hour, but when his first valet de chambre, who slept in his room, left it for a few minutes, he managed to slip into the adjoining room, where d'Avaray awaited him, so adroitly that when the valet returned he had no idea that the bed-curtains had been moved, and went to sleep as usual.² Meanwhile, d'Avaray, who spoke English perfectly, and pretended to be an English lord on his way from Paris, taking with him a faithful English groom named Sayers, had dressed Monsieur as his other servant, and got him safely out of the palace. All had been skilfully arranged; but just when the prince had got outside the palace of the Luxembourg, "I remembered," he says, "my cane and second snuff-box, and wished to return for them." But d'Avaray stopped him, and with an exclamation of "Peste contre les princes!" thrust him into the carriage. The

¹ Louis XVIII. himself wrote an account of his escape, which was published in Paris in 1823, under the title of *Relation d'un voyage à Bruxelles et à Coblenz*, which is quoted in Forneron's *Histoire générale des émigrés*, vol. i. pp. 234-237.

² *Souvenirs d'un sexagénaire*, by A. V. Arnault the dramatist, and then a gentleman in the household of Monsieur, vol. i. p. 252. Paris: 1833.

journey was perfectly safe, and enlivened only by such interruptions as the breaking of a wheel, and the discovery that, as bread had been omitted from the store of provisions, they had to eat the pie-crust with their pâté. They beguiled the way with songs from comic operas, and reached Brussels on June 22, where they heard of the king's being stopped at Varennes; and where Bouillé handed Monsieur seven hundred thousand francs, the balance of one million which had been given to him to arrange for the escape of the king. The journey of the Comtesse de Provence was equally safe, and was entirely managed by one of her favourites, Madame de Gourbillon, wife of the postmaster at Lille. The excitement at Paris was so great at the flight of the king and queen that little attention was paid to the escape of Monsieur and Madame, though it afterwards gave rise to important political complications, and the chief feeling inspired by the account of its success is the proof afforded that the king and queen might have safely reached Montmédy had the affair been properly managed, though their arrival there would have been but of doubtful advantage to the king himself, and would have certainly driven France to civil war.

On the king's return to Paris, the first question for the deputies to decide was the manner in which to treat his flight. Should they venture to depose or try the king for leaving his own capital, or should they adopt the English maxim, that the king could do no wrong, and prosecute the men who had acted under his express orders? The latter was the course adopted, and it is an important fact in the history of the Constituent Assembly that it was at this juncture that the triumvirate, consisting of Duport, Barnave, and the Lameths, began to throw in their weight on the side of order, and determined to strengthen the executive. Three deputies of the Assembly were elected to examine the papers seized at the Tuileries, and their very names show with what intention they were elected, and what kind of report they would draw up. These commissioners were Adrien Duport, who had for a long time been regarded as the chief adviser of the Duke of Orleans; Tronchet, the famous jurist, who had had a very great share in drawing

up the new Constitution, and who now perceived that its provisions had made the position of the king quite unbearable; and D'André, deputy for Aix, who was mentioned in the memorable report of Duquesnoy as one of the most statesmanlike members of the Assembly. After the nomination of these commissioners, appears the first sign of a reaction in opinion among the deputies of the left, who had hitherto been known as the leaders of the Jacobins. It has been noticed that the triumvirate had been becoming less powerful and less popular ever since the death of Mirabeau, and that Robespierre and Pétion had succeeded the Lameths as the heroes of the people of Paris; and it is most probable that the change in their opinions was due not only to the conviction that they had themselves gone too far, but also to a feeling of pique at losing the ascendancy they had so long enjoyed. Their defection from the party of the advanced revolutionists had a more important effect than merely influencing the aspect in which the king's flight was regarded; it gave the party of order a real majority in the Assembly, and, with the majority of the Assembly on his side, Lafayette determined that he would make an attempt to check the advanced party in Paris. The immediate effect of the king's flight was to prove to the general that he could not be at one and the same time the hero of the populace and the idol of the National Guard; for the populace and the bourgeois, who formed the National Guard, had now developed distinctly different tendencies. The bourgeois had got all they could possibly expect to get. By the new Constitution all power was thrown into their hands, and they were now as a class beginning to be afraid, with a fear which the next few years thoroughly justified, that if some return towards good government were not made soon, their property would begin to suffer. This opposition between the bourgeois, who thought of their property, and the populace, whose leaders dreamt of a far more complete and thorough revolution, has been noticed as tacitly existing in 1789, and it was dwelt upon by Loustallot and Camille Desmoulins in their journals when discussing the decrees of the "trois journées de travail", and the "marc

d'argent ;" but it was not until this time that Lafayette perceived how wide the schism really was, and determined to throw all his weight on the side of the bourgeois. The result of this determination appeared on July 17, when open war practically broke out between the populace of Paris and the bourgeois, as represented by the National Guard.

The opposition between the party which still desired to maintain the king at the head of the administrative edifice and the extreme revolutionists appeared even more markedly in the clubs than in the National Assembly. The majority of the Assembly showed their new policy in a decree that Choiseul, Damas, Goguelat, and all those concerned in the king's flight should be arrested and sent for trial before the high court for cases of high treason at Orleans, after a long speech in opposition from Robespierre, who boldly declared that it was unjust to attack the accomplices and not the chief criminals. The club of the Cordeliers expressed the same opinion ; but Danton, who was all-powerful there, was not so much actuated by a desire to be just, as by the thought that the opportunity had at last come of establishing a new and strong government in the place of one patched up out of the theories of impractical idealists and the remains of the old monarchy. It was from this period that Danton must be recognized as the true successor of Mirabeau, though many of his political ideas were entirely different. Danton was now the one great man who perceived the necessity for a strong government to re-establish order, and thus ensure the end of strife and the happiness of France ; and he saw, quite as clearly as Mirabeau himself, that no strong government could be expected from the Constituent Assembly. However, he differed entirely from Mirabeau in one most material point. Instead of bolstering up and strengthening the monarchy, he wished entirely to wipe it out, and to establish a strong and efficient government by utterly destroying the chance of any compromise with the old order of things, which could only be done by founding a republic. The club of the Cordeliers readily agreed to the motion of Danton that the king should be dethroned, and regarded as having abdicated,

and that he should be tried like any other criminal. A petition demanding the king's dethronement and trial was therefore drawn up and laid for signature upon the altar of the nation, which had been erected on the Champ de Mars on the occasion of the federation of July 14, 1790. This brought matters to a crisis. Lafayette had hoped to profit by the flight to Varennes as he had profited by the events of October 5 and 6, and had expected that the bourgeois would once more turn to him and throw all power into his hands, in order that their property might be secured by the agency of the National Guard. He knew well that the dethronement of the king would inevitably result either in the establishment of a powerful republic, which would soon dismiss him from power and office, or else in the election of a new king in the person of the Duke of Orleans, who would allow no mayor of the palace near the throne, and he therefore intended to suppress the movement instituted by the Cordeliers against the king. Bailly, the unfortunate mayor of Paris, was now, as ever, strongly desirous of maintaining order in the city, and was completely subservient to Lafayette, and he at once issued a proclamation that no crowd would be allowed to assemble on the Champ de Mars, and that if one collected it would be immediately dispersed by force.

Nevertheless, the people of Paris did not for one moment believe that Bailly would dare to interfere, or that Lafayette and his national guards would dare to fire on them. Men, women, and children, therefore, flocked to the Champ de Mars on the morning of July 17, as they had flocked to the feast of the federation in the previous year, joyfully, and in the expectation of enjoying the humours of a Parisian crowd, and possibly of seeing something amusing. For some time the work of signing the petition went on quietly, until the mob discovered a barber and a retired soldier hidden under the altar of the nation, with some wine and provisions, inspecting the "well-made legs of the citizenesses."¹ The cry arose that

¹ *Grand récit de ce qui s'est passé hier au Champ de Mars et des assassinats qui s'y sont commis avec le nombre des morts et des blessés.* In British Museum.—F. 833 (24).

they had gunpowder, and were secreted there in order to blow up the altar, and in a moment they were torn to pieces, The mob then became greatly excited, and declared there was a great plot against their lives, and several messengers, sent both by Bailly and Lafayette to direct them to disperse, were hooted and stoned. Bailly at this news ordered the red flag to be hoisted at the Hôtel de Ville and waved in the streets, in accordance with the terms of the martial law which had been decreed on October 16, 1789, after the murder of the baker François; and Lafayette ordered the battalions of the National Guard on which he could best rely to assemble under arms and support the mayor. These battalions then advanced, with the mayor in their midst, to the Champ de Mars, where Bailly read over three times the proclamation ordained by the martial law, bidding the people disperse to their homes. The proclamation, it was afterwards asserted, was read in so low a voice that nobody could hear it, and it may well be believed that the hapless astronomer and man of science did not raise his voice enough at this critical juncture. The reading of the proclamation was received with loud laughter by the mob, and Lafayette ordered his men to fire. The national guards then fired a volley into the air, but, on being pelted with stones, they reloaded, and at the second discharge more than twenty sightseers—for they were little more—including several women, fell killed or wounded. More than were killed by the actual discharge of the muskets of the national guards were injured or crushed to death in the hurry with which the people attempted to get out of range, and, as more than three hundred persons were either killed or injured on that day, there was some excuse for the revolutionary journalists to write of it as the massacre of the Champ de Mars. Whether or not Bailly and Lafayette were too hasty, or whether their action was inevitable and due to an honest endeavour to maintain order, must always be disputed; but there can be no doubt that the effect of their proceedings on July 17 was disastrous, for it finally separated the bourgeois and the populace of Paris, and no quarter could be afterwards expected by the bourgeois

when the populace became supreme.† Bailly also had special reason to lament the part which he had played, when, two years afterwards, on his condemnation by the revolutionary tribunal, the people demanded that the author of the massacre should be executed on the spot where he had read the proclamation; when, one cold rainy day, he was kept shivering for hours on the Champ de Mars while the guillotine was being erected there, and when he was at last put to death on the very spot where he had exhibited his authority, amid the hisses and groans of men who had lost their brothers and perhaps their wives on July 17, 1791. The scene of bustle and gaiety had on that day been turned into mourning, and those who had caused the change were to suffer bitterly for their conduct.

The massacre of the Champ de Mars was the direct result of the flight to Varennes, and it was believed by the partisans of the new Constitution that it would for ever repress the extreme revolutionists, and would re-establish the power of the executive. But matters had gone too far. The Assembly had so weakened the monarchy that there was no strength left in it, and nothing could ever restore the power of the executive under a monarch whose helplessness had been demonstrated by his ignominious return from Varennes. For the moment there was an appearance of vigour. Lafayette was congratulated by the Assembly. The directory of the department of the Seine made preparations to prosecute Danton. Danton himself perceived that his time had not yet come, and left Paris for Arcis-sur-Aube. Camille Desmoulins discontinued his journal, and Marat decided to escape to England. For a moment it was believed that a strong government would be established; but it was vain to expect any real effective measure from the unpractical theorists who had for two years formed the majority of the Constituent Assembly. The only useful result of the vigour displayed on July 17 appeared in the revision of the Constitution, which took place in the month of August, for the conduct of the Assembly with regard to the actual massacre of the Champ de Mars was deplorably weak.

Salle, a doctor at Nancy and deputy for that bailliage, who was now a leader of the moderate left and afterwards a conspicuous member of the Girondin party, proposed that the authors of the petition drawn up for signature on the Champ de Mars should be arrested and sent before the high court of Orleans, with the accomplices in the flight to Varennes. His motion gave rise to a lively debate. Robespierre opposed it strongly, and declared that if the Assembly kept taking individual cases from the cognizance of the ordinary tribunals and laws, it would thereby destroy the authority and prestige of those new tribunals and laws. Lanjuinais, the celebrated Breton professor of law, was of the same opinion, and pointed out that exceptional laws, devised for special occasions, always had the effect of depreciating the influence of law in general; and after his speech the motion of Salle was defeated.

On August 5 Thouret brought up a report of the constitutional committee that the Constitution was complete, and it was decided that it should be read over to the Assembly, and revised where necessary. In the present temper of the majority it is hardly necessary to say that the alterations which were made were not of a revolutionary character. Most of the alterations were made in mere details, but in discussing them Barnave and the Lameths especially showed a desire to strengthen the executive. Only one important subject was discussed at great length. It had been decreed, on the motion of Siéyès, in January, 1790, that there should be complete liberty of the press, with the restriction only that every book or journal should contain the names of the printer, publisher, and editor, in order that any aggrieved individual might know against whom he could bring an action for libel. This arrangement was declared to be perfect by Robespierre; but the majority, and Barnave in particular, thought that there ought to be some more efficient control over the press. In vain did Robespierre point out that, under the regulations of the decree of Siéyès, any one who was libelled had his remedy at law; Barnave insisted that the punishment of an author, printer, or publisher in damages, or even in imprisonment, could never

sufficiently compensate a man who had been grossly libelled. Both Robespierre and Barnave were right. No adequate compensation can be made to an individual for a ruined reputation, and no compensation to a country for the existence of a censorship over its press. The work of revision was soon over, and on August 30 the Assembly decreed that, although by the terms of the Constitution a convention might be summoned to alter it, no change was to be made for thirty years. The foresight of the Assembly was once more at fault, and the deputies lived to see that no amount of decrees could prevent the people of France from altering an inefficient and unworkable Constitution. On September 3 the Constitution was declared to be complete, and a deputation of sixty members was elected to present it to the king. He received the deputation with courtesy, and promised to come down to the Assembly and swear fidelity to the new Constitution in the presence of all the deputies. The Assembly, overjoyed at his ready acquiescence, immediately decreed, on the motion of Lafayette, that the accomplices in the flight to Varennes should be amnestied, and, on the following day, on the motion of Beaumetz, that all prisoners for political offences committed during the last two years should be released and amnestied, because they were years of revolution, and that the law against the émigrés should be repealed. The king, delighted at the effect of his ready acceptance of the Constitution, came down to the Assembly on September 4, and swore solemnly to be faithful to the Constitution, and that he accepted it wholly and entirely. Loud were the shouts of "Vive le Roi!" both within and without the Assembly; the city was illuminated; the theatres were opened free; there was dancing in the Champs Elysées and the Place de la Bastille; and, amid salvos of artillery and blowing of trumpets, France was solemnly declared to have entered upon a new era, and the Revolution was declared to be over now that the Constitution was completed and accepted by the king. But on the very day on which these rejoicings took place, the Constituent Assembly, which had been prevented for so long by Mirabeau from

neglecting to respect the rules of international law, showed its contempt for treaties and international obligations by decreeing the annexation of Avignon to France without making any compensation to its lawful sovereign, the pope, or making any overture to obtain his consent. It was from without that the progress of the Revolution was now being threatened, and had the Constitution of 1791 been ever so good, foreign sovereigns must have interfered sooner or later with a country which refused to recognize its obligations to other nations. In the very same month of August, while the Constitution was being revised, the Emperor Leopold and King Frederick William of Prussia met at Pilnitz, in Saxony, and solemnly agreed, after discussing the state of France, to act in harmony if it should become necessary for foreign powers to interfere with the course of events in that country.

While deputies were being elected to the Legislative Assembly, in happy ignorance that it would be the only Assembly chosen according to the complicated rules laid down by the Constitution, the Constituent Assembly sat for another fortnight, and during that fortnight a very important decree was passed, which showed clearly enough that the majority of the deputies understood from what quarter at home danger was threatening their beloved masterpiece. On September 29 Le Chapelier moved that the affiliation of popular societies and clubs should be forbidden, and that, if they exercised any influence on elections or interfered with public affairs, they should be suppressed.¹ This motion was, of course, aimed at the Jacobins, and was strenuously opposed by Robespierre, Pétion, Priour, and the other deputies, who were now the heroes of that great club; but it was carried by a large majority. Le Chapelier two years later had good reason to repent his success, for it identified him and all the deputies of the left, who had changed their opinions and become more moderate since the king's flight, with the deputies of the right, and all alike were held up to execration as enemies of the Jacobins and of the people. That Le Chapelier felt this is shown by his answer to

¹ *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. xi. pp. 453, 454.

Duval d'Esprémesnil, who had been consistently and violently opposed to the Constitution and its makers, when they were both being carried to the guillotine upon the same cart, "Which of us is the people hooting?" asked D'Esprémesnil. "Both of us," answered the Breton deputy, tersely. And he was right. The populace of Paris and of all France only two years later hated and hooted the chief authors of the Constitution and the leading deputies of the Constituent Assembly, whom they had once worshipped, with as much bitterness as they did the Royalist deputies who had opposed them.

On September 30, the day after Le Chapelier's decree was carried, the Constituent Assembly met for its last session. Thouret, who presided, received the congratulations of the municipality of Paris, headed by Bailly; of the directory of the department of the Seine, headed by the Duc de la Rochefoucauld; and finally of the king himself. He then made a final speech, thanking the king for his promised loyalty to the Constitution, and extolling the liberties just won for France, and at four o'clock he declared that the Assembly had concluded its mission and was dissolved. Without, on the terrace of the Feuillants, an immense crowd had assembled. For whom did they wait? Maury and the Royalists were laughed at; Malouet was hissed; Duport, Barnave, and the Lameths were received with curses; and, with one accord and great enthusiasm, all the people crowned Robespierre and Pétion with laurel as the heroes of the Constituent Assembly. Strange indeed had been the fluctuation of popular applause during the two years' session of the Constituent Assembly. Idols had been cast down and new idols had been set up; but there must have been some deputies of the Assembly itself, and some, even many, of that cheering, enthusiastic crowd, who remembered the one great man, who will ever remain the true hero as well as the greatest statesman and greatest orator of the Constituent Assembly—the great Mirabeau.

The nature of the new Constitution, which had been completed after so much labour, and which was now regarded

with such high hopes, has sufficiently appeared during the history of the Constituent Assembly. The want of practical experience and the sad lack of statesmanship of the vast majority of the deputies has again and again been insisted upon, as well as their honest endeavours to do justice and to regenerate France, their mother country, which all the deputies, whether of the right, left, or centre, passionately loved. While the results of the labours of the Assembly may be condemned, and the faults and mistakes of the men who sat there may be clearly visible to modern eyes, yet all due credit must be given them for good intentions and a real longing to do what seemed to them right and just. Much that they did has never been undone. France can never again become a conglomeration of provinces, each with its own dialect and its own laws; and it was the Constituent Assembly which began the great work of making the inhabitants of France Frenchmen, and not Provençals or Picards, which first gave to all France one common system of laws, and one just repartition of taxes, and, above all, which guaranteed to every Frenchman of every class, as long as he did not break the laws, the priceless boon of personal freedom. It is natural, at the close of the history of such a famous Assembly, to look at the good it did rather than at the mistakes it made. Great good was done, and, amid much condemnation, there is yet room for much praise. Though to most eyes the aspect of the Convention, which upheld France in arms against Europe, and dauntlessly faced famine and want and discontent at home as well as hatred abroad, eclipses that of the Constituent Assembly in glory, yet some honour should be paid to the members of that Assembly, without which no Convention could ever have been called—the Assembly which had faced the court in all its seeming power at Versailles. It is true that the deputies had so weakened the executive power as to render it useless for purposes of government; true that they were possessed by a mania for election; true that they failed to recognize the power of religion as represented by the Church of Rome, and that they had no respect for international law;

yet it must be remembered that men are not born statesmen, and Englishmen, who know that the English constitution has slowly grown from a series of precedents, should not be hasty in condemning the earnest efforts of inexperienced politicians, who strove their best for two years to draw up a constitution which should ensure to Frenchmen the priceless boons of political liberty and personal freedom which Englishmen had then enjoyed for a century.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE PROVINCES AND THE COLONIES IN 1790 AND 1791.

The condition of the provinces in 1790—Riots at Senlis and in Corsica—Grégoire's report on the new "guerre aux châteaux"—Federations of National Guards—Mounier's failure to raise Dauphiné—Inevitable failure of an appeal to the provinces—Organization of the National Guards—Riots at Lyons and Marseilles—Effect of the Assembly's ecclesiastical policy—Religious riots at Nîmes and Montauban—Peace at La Rochelle—First federation of Jalès—Religious riots at Uzès—Second federation at Jalès—The new local authorities—Local disputes as to the new division into departments—Prosperity at the close of 1790—Peasant-rising in the Quercy—Riots at Douai and Aix—Disturbances at Avignon and in the county of the Venaissin—The affiliated Jacobin Clubs in the provinces—The French colonies—The Revolution in the colony of San Domingo, in the island of Martinique, in Guadeloupe, Saint-Lucia, Tobago, and French Guiana, in the Isle de France (the Mauritius), in the Isle de Bourbon (Réunion), and in the French settlements in India—General effect of the policy of the Constituent Assembly on the provinces and the colonies.

MIRABEAU had depended for the success of all his great schemes on the supposition that the provinces would support the cause of order and of the monarchy against Paris ; but Louis XVI. had never given the conception of the great statesman a fair trial, for in escaping towards Varennes he had appealed rather to the army than to the departments. Nevertheless, it is instructive here to examine how far Mirabeau's scheme would have prospered if it had been fairly tried. Undoubtedly there was a period towards the close of 1789 when the provinces were very discontented at the manner in which Paris absorbed a large portion of the national revenue for its own use and the

provincial deputies, when Anson kept reading out, in his report on the finances in December, 1789, item after item of expenses for the capital, cried out in disgust, "Encore Paris!"¹ but the history of the year 1790 shows a considerable change in the feeling of the provinces, and Mirabeau himself recognized, in his last great plan of December, 1790, that it was necessary to make a great effort to educate the minds of the inhabitants of the departments before they could be appealed to with confidence to support the king at a general election. So far, indeed, had his distrust gone, that instead of recommending the king to throw himself at once into the provinces with his Swiss Guard, he felt the necessity of acquiescing, in February, 1791, in La Marck's mission to Bouillé, and perceived at that time that the appeal to the provinces could not be safely carried out unless the king was surrounded by a powerful army. What, then, was the cause of this change in opinion? It may be asserted, firstly, that one great reason why the provinces were not so likely to assist the king against the Assembly at the beginning of 1791 as at the beginning of 1790, was that the harvest of 1790 had been particularly good. With their usual want of logic, the people, as a whole, attributed their fine harvest and the comparative cheapness of food to the labours of the Constituent Assembly, and were therefore more inclined to support the Assembly than the king. But other more logical and more deep-rooted causes were also at work. The sale of the Church lands had greatly benefited both the peasants and small farmers by enabling them to purchase land, and their great desire, at the end of 1790, was that their new purchases might be secured to them. The issue of assignats had also given to the towns and the town populations an appearance of fictitious prosperity, which, had peace continued and a strong government been established, might have been converted into real prosperity. An appearance of wealth always accompanies the first introduction of a paper currency and the commencement of a rage for speculation, and was perceptible in Scotland at the beginning of the Darien scheme, in England at the time

¹ *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. iii. p. 408.

of the South Sea Bubble, and still more in France when Law first undertook to manage the finances of France and proposed his Mississippi schemes. With this appearance of wealth there co-existed in 1790 a great appearance of order and internal tranquillity, for the establishment of the new local authorities in the towns and departments had delighted the bourgeoisie, and made them very anxious to show that their new powers should at once be exercised for the preservation of order. But before these causes had time to operate, that is, in the first months of 1790, disorder reigned once more in France as entirely as it had reigned in the summer months of 1789, before the irregular establishment of self-elected municipalities and of National Guards had produced an interval of order.

The interval of peace in the autumn of 1789 is the more extraordinary when the violence of the outbreaks which it preceded and succeeded is considered. The "war against the châteaux" commenced in July, 1789, ceased for a time, and comparative tranquillity existed both in towns and rural districts for the next six months. The towns felt secure with their new National Guards, and were not again scared, as they had been in the previous July and August, by rumours of brigands, while by the practice of federation various towns had combined together to unite their forces when necessary, and thus recognized that union was strength. The vigorous action of the National Guards, and of the new, though not yet legally authorized, municipalities had dispersed most of the bands of peasants, and stopped for a time the burning of châteaux. Both towns and country districts were occupied in combining with one another to make some preparation for the famine which the bad harvest of 1789 was sure to produce. In October, 1789, the ministers had said, in a memoir for the Assembly, "Roussillon refuses to help Languedoc, Upper Languedoc the rest of the province, and Burgundy the Lyonnais, while Dauphiné isolates itself, and Normandy keeps the corn specially bought for Paris;"¹ but the ministers spoke falsely, and without a correct knowledge of provincial feeling, for in

¹ *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. iii. p. 240.

December, 1789, the municipality of Dijon issued an interesting circular to the other cities of Burgundy,¹ asking their assistance in feeding the starving ouvriers of Lyons, while the great Flemish frontier towns discussed the impending famine at Lille, and M. de Brival declared at Tulle that the only thing wanted to pacify France was the establishment of National Guards and national granaries.² This better state of things appeared all over France, and the only important disturbances at the end of 1789 were those at Toulon, at Senlis, and in the little island of Corsica. The disturbance at Toulon was rather naval than civil, and was essentially the dispute of the workmen of the dockyard with Comte d'Albert de Rions,³ rather than a political insurrection or even a bread riot; and the disturbance at Senlis was still more significant of the comparative peace which existed in the towns, for it was the result of an act of personal revenge. There one Billon, a watchmaker, actuated by revenge, first shot M. Delorme, a knight of St. Louis and aide-major of the local National Guard, from his window as the National Guard was marching to the cathedral to have its banner blessed, and when the police, the national guards, and the populace broke into the murderer's house, he set fire to two barrels of gunpowder and blew himself up, together with fourteen national guards, three members of the *maréchaussée*, and seven other citizens of Senlis.⁴ In the island of Corsica the troubles were purely the result of local causes. Two parties had arisen in the island when the excitement caused by the capture of the Bastille spread to Corsica, namely, the Paolists, who hoped for the return of Paoli, and longed for the establishment of the absolute independence of the island, and who included all the Masserias, Pozzos di Borgo, Peraldis,

¹ *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. iv. p. 5.

² Seilhac's *La Révolution dans le Bas-Limousin*, p. 103.

³ Vol. i. chap. xiii. p. 400.

⁴ See two pamphlets, *Précis historique de l'attentat de Billon, horloger, arrivé à Senlis le 13 Decembre, 1789*, in B.M.—F. 833. (13.), and *Rélation de l'horrible événement arrivé à Senlis*, B.M.—F. 838. (15.), which gives a ridiculously false account of the affair, evidently the first which reached Paris.

Bonapartes, Ramolinis, and all the more famous families of the native aristocracy ; and the young Corsican party, of which Christophe Salicetti, then sitting in the National Assembly at Paris as deputy for the tiers état of Corsica, was the head, and which, while it desired local independence, yet saw the advantages of being united to so great a country as France. Both parties were, in 1789, equally desirous of obtaining the complete overthrow of the military government then existing in the island. The chief men of all parties united at Ajaccio, and demanded the election of a representative central committee and the establishment of a National Guard. The Minister for War, however, under whose control the government of the island was, refused, by the advice of M. Buttafuoco, deputy for the noblesse of Corsica, to listen to these demands, and M. Gaffori, father-in-law of Buttafuoco, marched into Ajaccio with troops, established a state of siege, closed the popular club, and dismissed the civic guard which was being raised, and took away their arms. The leading men of Ajaccio then met secretly on the night of October 31, 1789, in the Church of St. Francis, where Lieutenant Napoleon Bonaparte, who was on leave, read them a protest, which he had drawn up, couched in very strong language and attacking Gaffori, Buttafuoco, and the Minister for War, and it was unanimously agreed to and signed by all present.¹ This protest against military government was followed by two insurrections. Bartolommeo Arena, at the head of some mountaineers, seized on Ile Rousse, a post occupied by but few French soldiers, and established an independent commune there. At Bastia there was a more serious revolt ; the populace rose under Achille Murati, and, after two days' hard fighting, stormed the arsenal and established a National Guard. The Minister for War prepared to subdue the island again by military force, and ordered regiments to concentrate at Marseilles. But Salicetti cleverly prevented further bloodshed. He saw that the National Assembly and

¹ The best account of these troubles in Corsica is contained in *Bonaparte et son temps*, 1769-1799, by Th. Iung, colonel d'artillerie, vol. i. pp. 213-237. Paris : 1880.

not the ministry really governed France, and he therefore introduced the Corsicans, who had come up both from Bastia and Ajaccio to explain the discontent of the islanders, to Mirabeau and Volney, as two leading deputies in the Assembly, and left his country's cause with confidence in their hands. They deserved his confidence, for on November 30 Corsica was declared, on the motion of Volney, to be a province of France, with the same liberties and franchises as the other provinces, and not a dependency ruled from the War Office; while, on the motion of Mirabeau, a law of amnesty was passed, allowing Paoli, then an exile in London, and his friends to return to Corsica. These decrees ended for a time the disturbances in Corsica, and peace was restored there for a few months.

This peaceful condition of France, broken only by such purely local and isolated disturbances, was not, however, long maintained, and in the early months of 1790 the news came to the Assembly that the "guerre aux châteaux" had broken out in certain districts of France where it had not formerly existed. It was the Abbé Grégoire who, on February 9, 1790, as reporter of the corresponding committee of the Assembly, reported that riots had broken out in the provinces of Quercy, Périgord, the Bas-Limousin, and Rouergue, and in parts of Lower Brittany,¹ and that the peasants had followed the example set by Burgundy the year before, and were burning the lords' châteaux. Grégoire further reported that these riots and burnings were caused "(1) by ignorance of the French language, for the peasants understood the decrees of the Assembly, when read to them, to be orders for arrest; (2) by fear that the decrees of August 4 would not be carried out; (3) by false interpretations of those decrees; (4) by erroneous ideas implanted in the minds of the peasants by those who preferred slavery and anarchy to order and liberty; and (5) by the circulation of false and forged decrees, purporting to restore the old feudal customs."² He then went on to argue that the

¹ *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. iv. p. 316.

² See Grégoire's report in the *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. iv. pp 317, 318.

only way to induce the peasants to be quiet was to teach them what the decrees of August 4 really meant, because the feudal régime still flourished in spite of them in certain provinces. He instanced, as proofs of the success of such explanations, the tranquillity produced by the publication of a circular declaring the enfranchisement of the peasants which had been issued at Brives, and by the measures taken by a committee formed by the Bishop of Sarlat for the instruction of his flock. The news shortly after arrived that the volunteers of the Quercy had everywhere defeated the rioters of that province.¹ The report of Grégoire had much the same effect upon the Assembly as the report of Salomon had had in the previous August. The deputies at once dropped the work of constitution-making, and began to discuss what measures ought to be taken. It is a notable fact that in 1790, as in 1789, it was again rather the châteaux than their lords which were hated and attacked. Charles de Lameth and the Duc d'Aiguillon, both of whom were among the chief leaders of the left, declared that their châteaux in the Agenais had been burnt with the rest.² This of itself would seem to prove that the peasant-riots of 1790 were identical in character with those of 1789, and that the peasants in the disturbed provinces were rather trying to destroy all proofs of their former servitude than to wreak vengeance on the persons of their lords. Owing to the prompt measures both of the Assembly and the new municipalities, this second "guerre aux châteaux" was not of long duration. The municipalities everywhere determined to act by themselves with their own National Guards, and refused the assistance of the royal troops; and the municipality of Nantes, for instance, would not admit the authority of the Comte d'Hervilly, who had been sent by the king to form a flying camp for the suppression of the peasants in the neighbourhood,—an example which was followed by the other cities of Brittany.³ The cruel defeat of the peasants in the neighbourhood of Dôle, in Franche Comté, deserves particular notice.⁴ A certain Comtesse

¹ On February 18. *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. iv. p. 343.

² *Ibid.*, p. 344.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 397.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. v. p. 397.

de Brun had summoned troops and national guards from that city to punish her peasants for breaches of the game laws, and these soldiers and bourgeois, failing to recognize the fact that the peasants needed rather instruction than suppression, stormed their village, killing many and taking a hundred prisoners. It was by such cruel and ill-advised measures that the feeling of hostility between the peasants in the country and the bourgeois in the towns was fostered, and the conduct of the troops in this case explains of itself why so many hundreds of peasants assembled at the little village of Pont de Somme-Vesle on the arrival of the hussars there on June 21, 1791,¹ for it was believed that the soldiers who were intended to escort the king to Montmédy had come to punish them.

It was by means of the national guards that the second series of peasant-revolts in the provinces were suppressed, and they everywhere acted in perfect harmony with the local municipalities. But the bourgeois of the provinces went further, and knew that it was necessary, not only for each municipality to act in concert with the national guards of its own town, but for all municipalities and all local national guards to be united. One or two instances of this close union have been noticed, such as the federation of the towns of Franche Comté, and the circular sent round the cities of Burgundy to combine together for the relief of Lyons; and the idea of federation developed still further during the year 1790 among the national guards of different districts, but among the national guards, that is, the bourgeois, alone. One of the earliest and most important of these feasts of federation, as they were called, which cemented the union of the bourgeois of a district or province, took place on November 29, 1789, on the banks of the Rhône. Some twelve hundred national guards assembled there, and swore to be true to each other and to support the new Constitution, whenever it should be finished, and then concluded what was, to all intents and

¹ Abbé Gabriel's *Louis XVI., le Marquis de Bouillé et Varennes*, p. 122; chap. xv. p. 446.

purposes, an offensive and defensive alliance.¹ The importance of this organization of the bourgeois in the provinces cannot be overrated, for the national guards did more than swear oaths. Great fêtes always took place at these federations, and the national guards of the different towns became personal friends. They continued at intervals throughout the first months of 1790, and culminated in the great feast of federation at Paris on the anniversary of the capture of the Bastille. They were particularly numerous and enthusiastic in the eastern provinces of France. At Montélimart the representatives of 27,600 soldier-citizens assembled on December 31, 1789;² at Valence 9000 men assembled on June 3, 1790;³ at Nancy, on April 19, more than 5000, representing every national guard in the five departments of the Meurthe, Meuse, Moselle, Haute Marne, and Vosges;⁴ and at Lille more than 10,000 on June 6, representing the departments of the Nord, the Somme, and the Pas de Calais.⁵ These federations appeared to indicate the unity of action among different groups of towns and different provinces, and it is possible that even Mirabeau was misled by them into believing that these different towns might be induced to unite against Paris and the Constituent Assembly. But in reality, as the failure of Mounier proved, there existed among the provincial bourgeois no feeling of discontent with Paris at all, and the federations of the national guards were only signs of the need which the bourgeois felt of harmony amongst themselves, if they were to undertake the suppression of the peasants in the rural districts, and in case that the ouvriers in the towns themselves should attempt to become a political power and threaten their property.

From this point of view the failure of Mounier's idea of summoning the provincial Estates of Dauphiné to protest against the action of the National Assembly is particularly important, as it proves the entire absence of that provincial spirit on which Mirabeau relied. Immediately after the events

¹ *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. iv. p. 3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 393.

⁴ Cayon's *Histoire de Nancy*, p. 314.

⁵ *Histoire de Lille et de la Flandre Wallonne*, by Victor Derode, vol. iii. pp. 39-44. Lille: 1848.

of October 5 and 6, in disgust at the rejection of his plan of a constitution after the English fashion by the Assembly, Mounier had resigned his seat, and travelled down to Dauphiné with the Prince d'Hennin and Lally-Tollendal. On his arrival at Grenoble, the Intermediary Commission, as it was called, which had been sitting for the purpose of watching the progress of affairs in the Assembly, at his request summoned the Estates of Dauphiné to meet on November 2. This action on the part of Mounier might have caused a serious difficulty to the Assembly, for it was a direct attempt to infringe its power and damage its prestige, and was an appeal to the provincial spirit of independence. But it entirely failed. The bourgeois of the towns, on whom Mounier chiefly depended, declared their devotion to the Assembly; and in the important cities of Grenoble, Die, and St. Vallier, great meetings were held, in which the citizens signed a protest against the proceedings of Mounier, and a declaration of their adherence to all the decrees of the National Assembly.¹ The rapid promulgation of the new departmental organization, and the consequent splitting up of Dauphiné into the departments of the Isère and the Drôme, destroyed Mounier's last hope. The unfortunate statesman attempted to live on at Grenoble, but the citizens no longer honoured and respected him. They sympathized with the more advanced measures of the Assembly, and elected Barnave, the champion of the advanced party, to be their first mayor; and at last, in May, 1790, after he had been several times hissed and insulted in the streets, Mounier, the man who had really decided the character of the tiers état in the Constituent Assembly, and who had been the recognized leader of the Commons of France during the electoral period, retired from his native country in disgust, and, after taking refuge in Geneva for a time, eventually became tutor to the eldest son of the second Lord Hawke.

The failure of Mounier's attempt proved that the federations of national guards did not indicate any desire of the bourgeois of the provinces to combine together against Paris

¹ *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. iii. p. 279.

or the National Assembly in the early months of 1790. The idea of appealing to the provinces, which had been the principal feature of all Mirabeau's plans, which was the favourite project of the Feuillants in the Legislative Assembly, and which was the last desperate card played by the Girondins, was thus from the first doomed to failure; and the reason was that the towns had only really combined against the peasants and the ouvriers, and that, therefore, if the bourgeois of the towns supported any opinion or took up arms for any party, the opponents of that opinion or that party would have no difficulty in conquering them by calling to their assistance the more numerous classes of the rural populations and of the proletariat in the towns.

The hatred which the peasants felt against the bourgeois national guards, after the cruel suppression of the peasant revolts, was at least equalled by the bitter feeling of the ouvriers in the towns towards them. This marked opposition between the bourgeois and the populace is naturally to be observed chiefly in the large cities, and especially in the greatest manufacturing and the greatest commercial cities of France, in Lyons and in Marseilles, because in the smaller towns the ouvrier class did not feel itself strong enough to make an effort, while the bourgeois were not sufficiently numerous, rich, and powerful to venture on acts of insolence to the populace. The National Guards, also, of the various smaller towns which had ancient charters were based upon the old milices of the respective towns, which included many of the working classes in their ranks. It had also been the policy of the officers of noble birth, who had in nearly every town been elected commandants of the local National Guard,¹ to form, in addition to the ordinary bourgeois volunteers, a strong paid force, for the young bourgeois preferred playing at

¹ Vice-Admiral d'Estaing, commandant of the National Guard of Versailles, the Comte de Hamelin at Senlis, M. des Écherolles at Moulins, Lieut.-Col. de Signémont at Varennes, Baron Charles de Weitersheim at Strasbourg, the Comte de Valence at Le Mans, the Marquis de Chambonas at Sens, and the Duc de Duras at Bordeaux.

soldiers to the more serious work of patrolling the streets at night and such ordinary police duties, and it was found very convenient to have a paid guard, such as Lafayette had formed in Paris out of the Gardes Françaises, for police work. The idea of playing at soldiers, combined with the love of fine uniforms, caused the enrolment of many special corps in the different towns, which consisted only of the very richest bourgeois, such as the chasseurs of Limoges, the dragoons of Toulouse, the light horse of Strasbourg, and the marine battalion of Bordeaux.¹ Further, bodies of volunteers, similar to the "conquerors of the Bastille" in Paris, had been formed in nearly every town, who had no uniform and no legal status, but who were soldierly and well trained, and consisting, as they did nearly everywhere, of young men filled with military ardour, formed exceedingly important corps, from which the battalions of volunteers, which did good service on the frontier in 1793, were chiefly recruited.

Events at Lyons in the February of 1790 showed this opposition of the populace to the bourgeois,² and also to some degree foreshadowed the events which were to desolate the entire south. Mention has been made of the wealthy young bourgeois who had formed themselves into a guard, and who had headed the columns which left Lyons to destroy the unfortunate peasants who were burning châteaux in Dauphiné.³ These young muscadins had learnt their drill from the German sergeants of the Régiment de La Marck which was quartered at Lyons, and were thus in much better military condition than the volunteer forces of other cities. Consisting as they did of wealthy young men, they attached themselves exclusively to M. Imbert-Colomés, the premier échevin, or first magistrate, of the city of Lyons. He, being a vain man, prided himself on his guard of honour, as he called the muscadins,

¹ *Histoire complète de Bordeaux*, by the Abbé Patrice John O'Reilly, pt. ii. vol. i. p. 45. Bordeaux: 1863.

² Balleydier's *Histoire politique et militaire du peuple de Lyon pendant la Révolution*, vol. i. pp. 14-16; Morin's *Histoire de Lyon depuis la Révolution de 1789*, vol. i. pp. 92-111.

³ See vol. i. chapter vi. pp. 172 and 182.

and gave them every advantage in his power; not only did he feast them and give them entertainments, but he also gave them the duty of guarding the arsenal and powder magazine, which had formerly been under the charge of the regular troops. The populace murmured much at this, and declared that the muscadins could not form by themselves the whole National Guard of Lyons. So high did this feeling rise, that one day, when the muscadins were relieving guard at the arsenal, the people attacked them and drove them away, and afterwards went and smashed M. Imbert's windows. The muscadins and the whole bourgeois class were indignant at this riot, and a distinct breach was observable between the ouvriers and the bourgeois of Lyons. The muscadins even pretended to think themselves superior to the national guards of other cities, and absolutely refused to go to the great federation at Valence. In all this is perceptible the first sign of that separation between Lyons and both the neighbouring cities and the adjoining rural districts, which caused both the peasants of the Lyonnais and the national guards of the neighbouring towns to march cheerfully in 1793, at the bidding of Couthon, to assist in destroying the proud city which had scorned them, and in shooting down its bourgeois by hundreds in the streets.

Still more violent was the collision which took place in 1790, between the bourgeois National Guard, which had been formed by the Comte de Caraman at Marseilles in July, 1789, and the populace of the great Mediterranean port.¹ This Garde Bourgeoise—for the Marseillais would not call it the Garde Nationale—was hated by the people alike for its devotion to its founder, the Comte de Caraman, governor-general of Provence, and for the close union which it formed with the unreformed and antiquated corporation of the city. This feeling of opposition to the old corporation and to the Bourgeois Guard showed itself in a popular riot as early as August 20, 1789, in which a corporal of the Guard, named Garcin, was

¹ *Histoire de Marseille*, by A. Fabre, Paris, 1829; *Histoire de Marseille*, by A. Boudin, Paris and Marseille, 1852.

killed.¹ The magistrates then requested the Comte de Caraman to introduce more troops into the city. He willingly complied, and three of the leading revolutionary spirits in Marseilles—Rebecqui, Pascal, and Granet—were imprisoned in the Château d'If. This blow did not crush the spirits of the popular party, and perpetual quarrels took place between the people and the soldiery, in one of which Charles Jean Bernadotte, the future king of Sweden, who was then serjeant-major in the Régiment Royal Marine, distinguished himself, according to one account, by holding the procureur of the Commune on his shoulders while that official harangued the mob and implored them not to murder the Marquis d'Ambert, colonel of the regiment,² and according to another by saving the colonel's life himself.³ So high had the spirit of disorder risen, that the king sent D'André, the able deputy for Aix in the National Assembly, as royal commissioner to reorganize the government of the city. He established a new municipality after the fashion of the municipalities which had arisen all over the country, and in January, 1790, Étienne Martin, surnamed the Just, was elected mayor of Marseilles. D'André also ordered the immediate dissolution of the Bourgeois Guard and the formation of a really popular National Guard; but his order was not obeyed, and the Bourgeois Guard still remained under arms and formed a small organized body in opposition to the new National Guard. The city was only kept in subjection by fear of the Comte de Caraman's soldiers; but Mirabeau, who did not forget the honour which Marseilles had paid him in the time of the elections, at last procured the withdrawal of the troops. At 4 a.m. on the morning of April 30, 1790, the soldiers marched out, and in the afternoon the people collected together and impetuously stormed the Fort Notre Dame de la Garde,

¹ Boudin's *Histoire de Marseille*, p. 485.

² Guérin's *Histoire maritime de la France*, vol. v. p. 232.

³ *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de Charles XIV. Jean, Roi de Suède et de Norvège*, by Coupé de Saint-Donat and B. Roquefort, vol. i. p. 122. Paris: 1820; and *Histoire de Bernadotte*, by B. Sarrans, vol. i. p. 4. Paris, 1845.

the Citadel of St. Nicolas, and the Fort St. Jean, the three strongholds by which the city was commanded. The storming of these forts, on April 30, corresponds in the history of Marseilles with the taking of the Bastille at Paris on July 14, and was also unfortunately stained with bloodshed. The rumour spread among the people that the major of Fort St. Jean, M. de Beausset, had intended to blow up the fort after its surrender and when it was filled with the populace, and as the Parisians had murdered De Launay, so did the Marseillais on this occasion tear De Beausset in pieces.¹ This movement greatly resembled the capture of the Bastille, and just as the conquerors of the Bastille formed a volunteer battalion at Paris, so did the conquerors of the Marseilles forts form themselves into a strong battalion in addition to the National Guard. The new National Guard, reinforced by these volunteers, and recruited from the poor, and not the wealthy bourgeoisie, became extremely powerful, and by the month of July, 1790, when a great feast of federation was held, numbered more than twenty thousand men with cavalry and artillery; and their political tendency appears in their election as secretary-general of Charles Jean Marie Barbaroux, who was also editor of the chief Radical journal of Marseilles, the *Observateur Marseillais*. The National Assembly could not hear of the murder of M. de Beausset without taking some measures to punish the murderers, and sent the Duc de Crillon, a general officer and one of their deputies, to the city. He, however, did nothing, and for a few months the new National Guard worked in perfect harmony with the new municipality, and the popularity of the commandant Lieutard, and the secretary Barbaroux, was at its height. Lieutard was, however, at heart a violent Royalist, and on August 17, 1790, after a violent riot, he was driven from the city. The history of his intrigues to form a Royalist party, and to concentrate the power of the wealthy bourgeois, is the most important feature of the winter of 1790; but in the spring of 1791 the revolutionary party believed themselves sufficiently strong to arrest

¹ Boudin's *Histoire de Marseille*, p. 489.

their old commandant. He was tried for lèse-nation, but the judges connived at his escape from prison, disguised as a peasant, and he afterwards became a lieutenant in the Royal Body Guard at Paris. By the summer of 1791 the city was entirely in the power of the revolutionary party and was perfectly tranquil; but this peaceful condition was due not only to the harmonious action of the new municipality and National Guard, but also to the improvement in commerce which had followed the first issues of assignats. The capture of the forts round Marseilles had the same effect on the neighbouring cities of Provence and Languedoc as the capture of the Bastille had in the neighbourhood of Paris. To mention but a single instance, thirty young citizens of Montpellier made the Régiment de Bresse, at 2 a.m. on May 2, to all appearances without opposition, surrender the citadel of that famous city to them,¹ and from that time forward it was guarded not by soldiers but by national guards.

The keen interest with which the population of the provinces had followed the progress of every debate in the National Assembly had been intensified during the debates on the civil constitution of the clergy, and the legislation of the Assembly with regard to religion brought about in many cities the first symptoms of a religious war. Of all civil wars, Frenchmen who had any knowledge of the history of their country ought to have known well that those caused by religious differences are the most bitter, and the fear of provoking a war of religion ought to have made the Assembly particularly careful and prudent in its clerical legislation. But the Assembly was not prudent, and hurried on its measures with extreme rapidity. Religious riots broke out during the session of the Constituent Assembly at two distinctly different periods, the first series on the abolition of the religious orders and the assumption of Church property in May, 1790, and the second on the imposition of the oath to the new Constitution upon the clergy in January, 1791. The

¹ *Montpellier pendant la Révolution*, by J. Duval-Jouve, vol. i. p. 115.

first riots were not universal or very serious. In most of the cities of France and in all the country districts, the news that the property of the Church was to be seized and sold filled the minds of bourgeois, farmers, and peasants alike with joy. They rejoiced at the prospect of the large amount of land and other property which would come into the market, and even good Catholics could not find it in their hearts to blame the Assembly. But in certain cities in which Protestants still dwelt, and the remembrance of past feuds had not entirely died out, a sort of religious war broke out on the arrival of these decrees. It was in vain that the king in 1786 and the Constituent Assembly afterwards had granted the Protestants full civil rights. The Roman Catholics could not bear the idea that heretics should possess any political power, and feared retaliation for persecution in the past. It was, therefore, to be expected that the cities in which the most fervent Catholics existed would be those which contained a large proportion of Protestants, and that these would be the cities in which the sale of Church property would be opposed, and in which yet more open civil war would break out at the news of the oath imposed upon the clergy.

The ancient Roman city of Nîmes was undoubtedly the head-quarters of Protestant France. All the wealthy bourgeois manufacturers openly professed the faith of the Huguenots, and with the more sturdiness from the memory of that long war of the Cevennes, in which so many of their ancestors had braved and conquered the soldiers of Louis XIV. under the command of Jean Cavalier. Though no longer deprived of civil rights since the edict of 1786, these wealthy bourgeois yet lay under the disability of being able to fill no municipal office however humble, and had naturally welcomed the summons of the States-General. Their influence at the period of the elections had been so great, in spite of the numerical majority of the Catholics in the city, that not only was Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, the Protestant champion, and son of old Paul Rabaut, the preacher of the Cevennes, elected at the head of the eight deputies for the tiers état of the sénéchaussée of Nîmes, but Henri Voulland,

the future member of the Committee of General Security, and three other Protestants were elected as well. At Nîmes every measure passed by the National Assembly which tended to produce more perfect political equality was received with delight by the Protestants, who quickly formed a new municipality and a National Guard, and gained great influence over the soldiers of the Régiment de Guienne, which garrisoned the citadel. The Catholics, who formed the majority of the inhabitants of the city, but were all poor and belonging to the lowest class of citizens, were quickly worked upon by their priests, and by certain fanatical gentlemen who belonged to the families, which had always filled the municipal offices of the city, to resent the assumption of power by the Protestants. The sale of the Church property was used as a pretext to further excite them, and they walked about the city wearing large white cockades. The soldiers of the Régiment de Guienne became exasperated at this, and on May 2, when the Catholics had been particularly turbulent, a violent riot broke out in the streets, which ended in the soldiers being confined to their barracks. This riot gave a pretext to certain Catholic gentlemen, notably MM. Froment, De Folacher, and Descombiés, to form the Catholics of the city and the poor but fanatical country people of the neighbourhood, who went by the name of *cebets*, or onion-eaters, into certain companies of the Cross, who wore red poufs as white cockades were forbidden by the Assembly, and whose very existence was certain to produce civil war. The occasion was not long coming. June 13, 1790, was the day fixed for the election of the administrators of the district, and the city was crowded in expectation of a fight. It began by the Catholics refusing to allow the National Dragoons, who entirely consisted of wealthy Protestants, to mount guard at the bishop's palace. At the first discharge seven men were killed. The fight continued all that day, but on the next the Protestants received reinforcements from the neighbouring Protestant villages, and completely gained the upper hand. The convents of the Capucins and the Jacobins were sacked as well as M. Froment's house, and during these

two days, the events of which are known as the "Bagarre de Nîmes," more than three hundred Catholics lost their lives at the hands rather of the wild Protestant peasants of the mountains than of the bourgeois national guards of the city.¹ Order was at last restored by the arrival of strong detachments of national guards from the neighbouring cities; but the flame of religious war had been set alight at Nîmes as previously at Montauban, and in the sequel was to desolate the south of France.

Earlier in point of date, but not less markedly religious in character, were the disturbances at Montauban, which directly followed the decree of the National Assembly ordering the sale of Church property. In that city the Protestants did not form more than one-sixth of the population, but they were a wealthy and cultivated minority, monopolizing the manufacturing and commercial interests of the city. As at Nîmes, they welcomed the decrees of the Assembly, and when a National Guard was formed, it was filled with Protestants, who in particular entirely filled the corps of National Dragoons. They also formed a popular club, in which Jean Bon Saint-André, the Protestant pastor and future member of the great Committee of Public Safety, was the chief orator. At Montauban, as at Nîmes, there were plenty of Catholics in the National Guard, and even in the popular club; but these were all Catholic bourgeois, who were ready to live at peace with their Protestant neighbours, and were of too peaceful a nature to be fanatics. As at Nîmes, it was only the very lowest class of Catholics who were fanatics, and who were ready to rush to arms at the summons of their priests, and the fanatical gentlemen who came of the families which had hitherto absorbed municipal office, or lived in the neighbourhood. These Catholic gentlemen formed an opposition club to the popular society, under the title of the "Club des Noirs," of which the guiding spirit was the young Duc de la Force, colonel of the Régiment de Languedoc

¹ *Histoire de Nîmes*, by P. L. Baragnon, vol. iv. pp. 500-530, Nîmes, 1869; *Mémoires of Froment*, Paris, 1796; *Histoire des Conspirations royalistes du Midi sous la Révolution (1790-1793)*, by Ernest Daudet, chap. i. Paris, 1881.

quartered in the city, and one of the greatest lords of the province. This club at once perceived the necessity of arming and organizing their poor but devoted co-religionists to counterbalance the power of the National Guard. They found a pretext in the peasant risings in the neighbourhood of Montauban, and the Catholics marched out, under the command of M. Chaunac and the Abbé de Montdésir, and, according to their own account, won several victories and quieted the country, though the Protestants asserted that their success consisted in arresting ten drunkards. On their return Chaunac's Catholic legion claimed to be recognized as an organized force, similar to the companies of the Cross at Nîmes. The National Guard protested, and the matter was postponed until the election of the new municipality. For this election both parties made great preparations; but the Catholics, under the direction of their priests, and especially of the Abbés Mulot and Verdier, were completely successful, and not only the mayor, Cieurac, and the procureur of the Commune, Disses, but all the members of the municipality but one were Catholics. This municipality at once began, under the impulse of the Club des Noirs, to persecute the National Guard in every possible manner. It not only recognized the existence of the Catholic volunteers of Chaunac, and, when the National Assembly at Paris condemned them, formed them into independent companies of the National Guard, but it forbade the original national guards to hold a feast of federation with the soldiers of the Régiment de Languedoc for fear of too great an intimacy growing up between them, and finally demanded and obtained the keys of the arsenal in which the arms of the National Guard were stored. Under these persecutions the commandant of the National Guards, M. de Preissac, resigned, and a moderate Catholic, the Baron de Puy-Montbrun, a relation of Lafayette and the Noailles, was elected in his place. Nevertheless the opposition of the municipality to the Protestants continued to exist, and after the ardour of the Catholics had been excited by the Easter celebrations, the municipality gave notice that on May 10 it would proceed to carry out the decrees of the Assembly, and would take an

inventory in the convent of Cordeliers. This notice was unaccompanied by any attempt to control the rising of the Catholics which was inevitable, and after a morning spent in prayer and listening to fervid sermons, the Catholic mob refused to admit the municipal officers to the Church, and rushed out to wreak vengeance on the Protestants. The Baron de Puy-Montbrun was murdered in the streets, and the unarmed Protestant national guards, and especially the national dragoons, who had assembled in front of the Hôtel de Ville, were violently attacked. No attempt was made to save them, and indeed Disses, the procureur, forbade the *maréchaussée* to move to their help; and at last, when they had lost five killed and fifty-five wounded, they surrendered to the mob. The prisoners were treated with the greatest ignominy; they were stripped to their shirts and dragged, bound two and two, to the cathedral, where they were insulted and degraded, and were then thrown into the prisons of the Château Royal. At the news of this riot, and the indignities inflicted on the Protestants, the popular club, and especially the young men, of the great city of Bordeaux, in which indeed there were but few Protestants, but very many devoted adherents to the cause of order and the decrees of the Assembly, were greatly excited, and at the summons of Jean Bon Saint-André, the Protestant pastor,¹ the club decided it would open a register for the reception of the names of those who would march to the help of the distressed patriots at Montauban. The register was soon filled, and on May 17 an advanced guard of fifteen thousand men advanced towards Montauban.² The near approach of the Bordelais, and the arrival in the city of Mathieu Dumas, the special commissioner sent by the Assembly, frightened the Catholics, and the Protestant prisoners were released and order restored.³ The

¹ *Jean Bon St. André, sa vie et ses écrits*, by Michel Nicolas, p. 19 note. Paris, 1848.

² For the march of the Bordelais, see O'Reilly's *Histoire de Bordeaux*, vol. i. pt. ii. pp. 50-52.

³ For the measures taken by Dumas, see *Souvenirs du Lieutenant-Général Comte Mathieu Dumas, 1770-1830*, vol. i. pp. 471-475.

National Assembly was particularly exasperated at this result of its ecclesiastical legislation, and determined at once to check the outbreak of religious riots. The municipality had obviously connived with the Duc de la Force and the Catholics in oppressing the more revolutionary Protestants, and La Force was therefore suspended from his rank in the army by a decree of the Assembly, and the administrators of the department of the Lot were ordered to appoint a fresh municipality. Further, the Régiment de Languedoc was ordered, in spite of its mutinous protest, to be moved to Perpignan, and two other regiments, Royal Pologné and De la Touraine, were directed to take its place at Montauban. For a time there was quiet in the city, but in September the Assembly heard that the Protestants were again being insulted by the Catholic mob in the streets, and that the Minister for War had not sent the two regiments to Montauban, but only detachments of them; and this neglect of the Assembly's orders was one of the principal reasons for the condemnation and dismissal from office of M. de la Tour-du-Pin.¹

In bright contrast to these violent religious riots at Montauban and at Nîmes appears the history, during the early years of the Revolution, of the old Huguenot stronghold of La Rochelle, and before touching on the attempt made by the Catholics of the south to oppose the further progress of revo-

¹ Among many pamphlets on the riots at Montauban, the following, contained in the British Museum, are the most valuable: *Rélation de l'horrible aventure de Montauban et les causes qui l'ont préparé*, signed "Les citoyens patriotes de la Ville de Montauban," pp. 50, F. 837. (6.), and giving the Protestant view; *Rapport fait à l'Assemblée Nationale dans la séance du 22 Juillet dernier au nom du Comité des Rapports sur les troubles survenus dans la ville de Montauban*, par Pierre Jacques Vieillard, député du département de la Manche, 72 pp., F. 834. (3.); *Procès-verbal de la Municipalité de Montauban, envoyé à l'Assemblée Nationale, 10 Mai, 1790*, 32 pp., F. 835. (16.); *Manifeste de la Municipalité de Montauban*, 24 pp., F. 835. (5.); *Exposé sommaire de ce qui s'est passé à Montauban le 10 de Mai et des causes qui y ont donné lieu, d'après des pièces justificatives*, 16 pp., F. 835. (21.); *Adresse de la Municipalité de Montauban à l'Assemblée Nationale*, 16 pp., F. 838. (8.), on the part of the municipality; and *Récit des troubles survenus à Montauban le 10 Mai, 1790*, F. 833. (17.)

lutionary ideas, it is curious to observe the state of affairs in the Protestant capital of the west. At La Rochelle the Catholics were in such a minority that they never attempted to interfere with their fellow-citizens, and did not try to hinder the execution of the Assembly's decrees. Every stage in the great struggle at Paris was followed with warm interest, as the alteration of the title of the Place Barentin to the Place Necker clearly shows. A National Guard was formed as in other cities, and held feasts of federation with the garrison, consisting of the Régiment de la Sarre; but the first real victory of the Protestants over old prejudices was the discontinuance, for the first time since the capture of the city by Cardinal Richelieu, of the solemn religious procession which had hitherto been held in honour of that capture on November 1. This victory of sentiment was followed by a more material victory, in the election of two Protestants to the consulship, or chief magistracy of the city, for the first time since the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The suppression of the Roman Catholic see and seminary was a further source of delight to the people of La Rochelle, on whom they had long been a burden, and the sale of the property of the Church in that city not only caused no riot, but gave general satisfaction.¹

It has been said that it was in the cities, such as Nîmes and Montauban, which contained a proportion both of Protestants and Catholics, that the most terrible religious riots broke out; and the same fact is true of districts. The Protestants at Nîmes had called in the fierce Protestant peasantry of the Cevennes, the descendants of the Camisards, to their help, and it had been these wild fanatical peasants who had perpetrated the massacres which stained the "Bagarre de Nîmes;" and as a counterpoise the Catholic gentlemen of the Ardèche summoned the equally fanatical Catholic peasants of the Vivarais to the famous camp and federation of Jalès. This movement is

¹ *Journal de Jean Perry*, a bourgeois of La Rochelle, in the shape of notes on a copy of Arcéré's *Histoire de la Rochelle*, published in vol. viii. of the *Archives historiques de l'Aunis et Saintonge*, issued by the Société Académique of Saintes in 1880, pp. 316-319.

particularly important, for it clearly indicates the power and position of the Catholics of South-eastern France, and was the first of an interesting series of movements and revolts in the same district. The first federation of Jalès was distinctly due to the "Bagarre de Nîmes." After that terrible event the Catholic companies of the Cross had been disarmed, the municipality had been reorganized, the prisons had been filled with Catholics, and a camp of Protestant national guards from the villages of the Cevennes had been formed at Boucoiran, on the banks of the Gardon. To oppose this vigour on the part of the Protestants, certain Catholic gentlemen and priests of the Vivarais, of whom the chief were Louis Bastide de Malbos, mayor of Berrias, Claude Allier, prior of Chambonas, and the Abbé de la Bastide de la Molette, determined to hold a great federation of Catholic national guards, to protest against the imprisonment of the Catholics of Nîmes and to show their power, and summoned a preliminary assembly of deputies from the various communes which they could depend upon to meet at the Château of Bannes, the seat of the Comte du Roure, on August 1, 1790.¹ At that meeting the deputies of nearly one hundred communes were present, who fixed the federation for August 18, on the plain of Jalès, within the commune of Berrias, and elected the Comte du Roure general of the camp, and M. de la Bastide, a knight of St. Louis and an ex-captain in the Régiment de Penthievre, commandant-general. Accordingly, on August 18, a body of between thirty and forty thousand Catholic national guards, representing one hundred and eighty parishes in the departments of the Ardèche, the

¹ The most interesting account of the various Catholic movements connected with the federation of Jalès is Ernest Daudet's *Histoire des conspirations royalistes du Midi*, Paris, 1881, written from a revolutionary point of view, as its title indicates; but the most valuable historically is contained in Simon Brugal's articles on the *Camps de Jalès, première fédération*, and *deuxième fédération*, published in the *Revue de la Révolution*, November and December, 1884, and May, June, and July, 1885, treating the movements from a royalist point of view. But see also the *Guerres du Vivarais*, by Andéol Vincent, and the *Camp de Jalès*, by Marius Talon.

Gard, the Lozère, and the Haute Loire, assembled on the plain of Jalès and heard mass, and then sat down to rest and eat, while their chiefs assembled at the Château of Jalès, the headquarters of the valuable commandery of Jalès, belonging to the order of Malta, which had been held by the famous Bailli de Suffren. This meeting of leaders was most stormy. The more ardent spirits proposed an immediate attack, first on the camp of Boucoiran, and then on the city of Nîmes, the release of the Catholic prisoners, and the overthrow of the Protestants; but, after a sharp debate, the more moderate proposals of Bastide de Malbos were adopted, that petitions should be forwarded demanding the release of the Catholic prisoners at Nîmes, permission for the Catholics there to arm, the removal of the Régiment de Guienne, and the payment of compensation for damage done to churches and private property during the troubles at Nîmes. The news of this decision of their leaders disgusted the national guards, who had at the very least expected to march on Nîmes, and it was only through the personal influence of Bastide de Malbos that the great gathering was induced to dissolve at five o'clock in the afternoon. The news of the federation of Jalès caused great excitement all over France. Sabin Tournal, the editor of the *Courrier d'Avignon*, a journal with a large circulation in the south, used all his imagination in attacking it, and described the Abbé de la Bastide de la Molette as riding up and down the ranks urging the national guards to advance on Nîmes. The National Assembly ordered its Comité de Recherches to examine the matter, and on the report of the Marquis de Sillery, who, since the abolition of titles, had become M. Brulart, decreed on September 7, 1790, that the deliberations of Jalès were unlawful, that the Catholic Federative Committee was unconstitutional, and dissolved, and that the magistrates should take proceedings against the authors of the federation. Nevertheless, the Catholic Committee of Federation continued to meet in secret, and no legal proceedings were taken, and the Catholics of the Vivarais felt the satisfaction of possessing a strong organization which could at any time combine them against

the Protestants, as was done in the second federation of Jalès after the disturbances at Uzès. Finally, this first federation of Jalès was essentially a religious movement, and not political; the political element came in later. The Vivarais in many respects resembled La Vendée. It was a province not possessed by a few great lords, but, like La Vendée, owned by a number of poor country gentlemen, who lived like peasants on their small properties, and, to quote the words of its last historian, "played bowls with the village youths on Sundays on the village green."¹ The clergy were, like the clergy of La Vendée, extremely poor, and all the more beloved by their parishioners. The neighbourhood of Nîmes and of the Protestants of the Cevennes kept this poor peasantry and poor nobility as fanatical as the vicinity of La Rochelle kept those of La Vendée; and with such material at his disposal it was no wonder that Bastide de Malbos could assemble over thirty thousand national guards on the plain of Jalès, and when once the machinery was in existence, it was no wonder that the Assembly's civil constitution of the clergy turned these ardent Catholics into equally ardent Royalists from sheer opposition to the Assembly's ecclesiastical policy.

The Catholic Committee of Federation, of which the leaders were still Bastide de Malbos, mayor of Berrias, Claude Allier, prior of Chambonas, and the Abbe de la Bastide de la Molette, canon of Uzès, remained in close communication, and only hoped for a pretext to again exhibit the strength of the Catholics of the Vivarais as the policy of the Assembly became more marked, and especially at the news of the imposition of the oath upon the clergy. These leaders had not been idle, and at this news they assembled, on February 13, 1791, to the number of forty, at the Château de Malbos, to discuss matters,² and to arrange for a new federation and the striking of a decisive blow. They had been greatly encouraged and confirmed in their political and royalist ideas by a message,

¹ Simon Brugal, in the *Revue de la Révolution* for December, 1884, p. 486.

² Ernest Daudet's *Conspirations royalistes du Midi*, p. 53.

which had reached them from Paris in the previous October, in spite of the arrest of the bearers, Charles de Polignac and the Marquis de Castelnau, at Joyeuse, that "their Majesties thanked the Fédérés of the Vivarais for their zeal, and warned them that events would soon occur when perhaps their assistance would be needed."¹ Such a message greatly increased the watchful vigour of Louis Bastide de Malbos, the chief of the Catholic leaders, and he determined to make use of the feeling roused by the oath imposed on the clergy for political as well as religious purposes. The pretext he wanted was afforded on the very day of his dinner at Malbos by the outbreak of a riot at Uzès. Uzès is a little town about twenty miles north of Nîmes, and contained, in 1789, a population of about six thousand, of whom one third were Protestants. The revolution had been at first welcomed there as everywhere else, and a popular club had been formed, which included the Protestants and the moderate Catholic bourgeoisie, and a National Guard enrolled under the command of a Catholic, M. Voulland, a knight of St. Louis. The quietude was, however, disturbed by the intrigues of the Abbé de la Bastide de la Molette, canon of the cathedral of Uzès, who founded a monarchical club at the bishop's palace, where the *Ami du Roi* was read and plans of counter-revolution discussed. The two clubs for many months remained in silent opposition, and while the one invoked the aid of the Catholic committee of Jalès, the other sent messages to the Protestant villages, which had come to the help of the Protestants of Nîmes, to be ready to help them. The authorities also were in opposition to each other, for while the municipality of the city of Uzès was Catholic and reactionary, the directory of the district was distinctly in favour of the Revolution. The latter had gained an important success in obtaining the removal of the Régiment de Bresse,² which was under the influence of the municipality, and the substitution of a squadron of the patriotic Dragoons of Lorraine in its

¹ Simon Brugal, *Les Camps de Jalès*, in *Revue de la Révolution*, May, 1885, vol. v. p. 412.

² Ernest Daudet, *Les Conspirations royalistes du Midi*, p. 52.

stead. The decrees for the sale of the property of the Church had been executed without disturbance, but the decree for the imposition of the oath, and still more the news of the suppression of the bishopric of Uzès, the diocese of which, as well as that of Alais, was merged, according to the ecclesiastical system of the Assembly, into the one diocese of the department of the Gard, with its seat at Nîmes, roused the spirit of fanaticism. A pretext was given for its display by a tavern brawl on February 13, 1791, after which a soldier, named Bouffard, paraded the streets, crying "À bas la nation! au diable la nation!"¹ This of itself was enough to cause a riot, and the company of the National Guard which happened to be on duty, and which was composed almost entirely of Catholics, fired on the Protestants, while the Catholic mob attacked in the streets M. Voulland, commandant of the National Guard, and M. Meyniel, president of the popular club, although they were both Catholics. The directory of the district then ordered the National Guard and the soldiers under arms; but the Catholic national guards formed and encamped round the Bishop's palace, and the Catholic mob refused to let the dragoons get at their horses. At 7 p.m. the Catholics rang the tocsin, while the directory sent off messages for help to the directory of the department and to the Protestant villages. During the night both parties remained under arms, but on the 14th the Protestant villagers arrived, and began to burn and pillage, and the Catholics retired in a body to the neighbouring village of Valabrix, where they murdered a Protestant farmer, named Pellier. On the same day, however, 280 soldiers arrived, and on the 16th the Maréchal-de-Camp d'Albignae, who commanded in the department of the Gard, made his appearance with 300 national guards of Nîmes and 50 more soldiers, and he speedily restored order in the little town.

This riot at Uzès gave Bastide de Malbos the excuse he wanted. The Catholic exiles from Uzès arrived at Berrias

¹ *Récit des événements arrivés à Uzès le 13 et 14 Février, 1791, et jours suivans jusqu'au 22*, in B.M.—F. 833. (16.), which is more trustworthy than the account in Daudet, founded on the *Mémoires* of Dampmartin.

on the 14th, full of wrath against the Protestants, and the mayor, relying on them to rouse sympathy, hurried on the preparations for the federation which had been fixed for that day. Accordingly, when the deputations from the Catholic villages assembled, they found the exiles there, and when they had been excited by the recital of their woes, they agreed to Bastide de Malbos' proposals to welcome and lodge the exiles; to form a cordon of national guards from Banne to Saint Sauveur, and from Saint Sauveur to Chauzon, to hold the Protestants in check, of which MM. de Sauveplanne, de Chabannes, and Nadal were to be commandants; to hold an assembly at Jalès on February 20; to force the Protestants to give up their arms; and to form a permanent camp of Catholic national guards at Saint Ambroix. If the first federation of Jalès caused excitement in the neighbourhood, the second roused all the provinces of the south and nearly brought about a religious war. That such a war did not break out was mainly due to the energy of one man, the Maréchal-de-Camp d'Albignac, acting in conjunction with the directory of the department of the Gard. D'Albignac saw the necessity of crushing the movement at Jalès at once and arresting its leaders, because every day added to the chances of civil war. He drew up the plan of an advance upon the plain of Jalès from three points simultaneously—from Alais, Pont-Saint-Esprit, and Nîmes, with three columns of soldiers and national guards—and his plan was accepted in a council of war held at Nîmes on February 22. Meanwhile, however, the measures for the formation of the great camp and of the military cordon had not been proceeding at all to the satisfaction of the Catholic committee. Bastide de Malbos, the Abbé de la Bastide de la Molette, Claude Allier, and the other priests and gentlemen had not taken into consideration the essentially bourgeois character of the national guards. These bourgeois had no objection to meet for a feast of federation, to sign petitions and to enjoy a day's holiday, but they had no desire to leave their little shops, farms, and businesses for any length of time, and to abandon their homes for weeks to indulge, not in a war-

like pastime, but in real fighting. Their Catholic and religious sentiments were strong enough to induce them to receive the exiles from Uzès kindly, but not to make them take part in proceedings which might put their own lives and properties in danger. This was first seen in the little town of St. Ambroix, where the national guards of the town of Largentière had concentrated on February 20; and on the 21st, the day before the council of war held at Nîmes, the battalion of Largentière, under the guidance of its commandant, M. Chastenier de Burac, a retired officer of the royal navy, who rightly dreaded the outbreak of civil war, returned home. Their example was followed everywhere, and when, on February 23, the column from Alais reached St. Ambroix, they found no Royalist and Catholic army to fight. The great Royalist and Catholic army, of which so much had been said, had quietly dispersed. On the 27th D'Albignac reached Jalès, but found no enemy there, and retired, after arresting the heart and soul of the whole enterprise, Bastide de Malbos. The National Assembly was delighted to hear of this speedy disappearance of what threatened to have been the commencement of a civil war, and ordered the authors of the second federation of Jalès to be prosecuted. All, however, escaped, except the unfortunate Louis Bastide de Malbos, whose dead body was found on the rocks below the citadel of Pont-Saint-Esprit, where he had been confined. Whether he had fallen in an attempt to escape, or had been murdered in his prison, will never be known, but his death marks the close of the second federation of Jalès.¹ This easy dispersion of the Catholics of Jalès proves entirely the peaceful disposition of the national guards, that is, of the bourgeois of the south of France, and that the Catholics, however much they might be incensed by the ecclesiastical decrees of the Assembly, were not prepared to take up arms on behalf of their religion; and this of itself is a further proof of the

¹ Ernest Daudet's *Conspirations royalistes du Midi*; Simon Brugal's articles in the *Revue de la Révolution*, on the "deuxième fédération" of Jalès; and *Histoire des Révolutions d'Uzès et de Nîmes*, by Adolphe de Pontécoulant. Paris, 1827.

real tranquillity which reigned in the provinces of France in 1791.

It has been remarked that one very great cause for the peaceful state of France in 1791 is to be found in the establishment of the new local authorities, which at first worked well. All the ablest men in the country were seized by a passion for taking part in public affairs, and there was therefore no difficulty in getting the best men—men really longing to do all in their power to make France free, contented, and happy—to hold public offices. The order in which the new local institutions came into legal operation was first the establishment of new municipalities, then the authorities of the districts and departments, and lastly the new law courts. As far back as the July and August of 1789 temporary municipalities had sprung up everywhere, under the influence of the “great fear,” either superseding the old close corporations or in the place of the royal magistrates. The task of the Assembly in this direction was, therefore, not difficult; it had merely to legalize and reduce to a system the temporary municipalities already in existence. The first legal and elected municipalities consisted nearly everywhere of the men who had done good service in 1789, and in very many instances the mayors, who had been chosen by the popular voice in 1789, were, like M. Daniel de Kervégan, at Nantes for instance, regularly elected in February, 1790. This legalization by the decrees of the National Assembly, however, greatly increased the real power of the municipalities, which they exerted successfully in putting down the second series of peasant riots in the February and March of 1790. The delightful and novel sensation of electing their authorities gave extraordinary interest to these first elections, and there was as much competition for the post of substitute to the procureur of a small country town as there was for the election of a deputy to a National Assembly in after years. These new municipalities invariably included the real notables of the communes, and the chief fault to be found with them was their over-officiousness. The first municipal officers so longed to display their

newly acquired authority that they insisted on doing the most illegal things, and the National Assembly had to become a sort of court of appeal, to which complaints were perpetually being forwarded. Sometimes, as in the case of the arrest of the king's aunts by the municipality of Arnay-le-Duc, the officiousness of the local authorities was hardly palatable to the Assembly, while, on the other hand, the arrests of the king at Varennes, of Bonne-Savardin at Châlons-sur-Marne,¹ and of Charles de Polignac and the Marquis de Castelnau at Joyeuse,² were acknowledged with thanks, and occasionally the National Assembly had to waste its time in discussing the seizure of the Duc de Duras' plate by the municipality of Valenciennes,³ and the arrest of the Vicomte de Mirabeau at Castelnaudary,⁴ for stealing some of the insignia of his own regiment. Next in order to the municipalities, the councils-generals, directories, procureurs-syndic, and procureurs-general-syndic in the districts and departments were elected all over France in April, 1790, and for these places and offices also the best men were generally chosen by the electors. Finally, in the December of 1790, the judges of the new tribunals and the new justices of the peace were elected, and it has already been noticed that in most instances the ablest lawyers were elected for the important posts, and competent lawyers for those of less importance.⁵ It may safely be affirmed that this happy state of

¹ *Procès-verbal authentique de l'arrestation de M. de Bonne-Savardin à Châlons-sur-Marne le 28 Juillet, 1790*, in B.M.—F. 837. (18.)

² Simon Brugal, *Les Camp de Jalès*, in *Revue de la Révolution* for May, 1885, vol. v. pp. 408–411.

³ *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. iii. p. 283.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. vi. p. 298.

⁵ Chapter ix. p. 287. The controversy as to the competency of elected judges has lately been very keen in France, where the advanced Radicals demand the revival of the system. From their point of view, see *De l'organisation du pouvoir judiciaire sous le régime de la souveraineté nationale et de la République*, by J. C. Colfavru, Paris, 1882; and *La Magistrature—La justice de pays par le pays*, by Victor Jeanvrot, Paris, 1883, who has also contributed a valuable series of articles to the magazine *La Révolution Française*, in the numbers from April to November, 1883, examining the competency and previous career of the judges elected during the Revolution in certain departments.

things would not have continued; for the best lawyers, when once the period of political excitement was over, would prefer their independence, and would practise at the bar rather than hold a judgeship for two, or even six, years at the mercy of an electoral assembly. These new judicial and administrative institutions had a great effect in quieting France, and to their establishment may be largely attributed the fact that the year 1790 closed very quietly, except in certain cities and districts, where special causes for discontent existed.

The new departments and districts were not, however, formed without a fresh outburst of local jealousies. Every city wished to be the capital of a district at least, if not of a department, and to have the advantage of being the seat of the departmental or district court of law. In many departments the capital was selected without trouble by the committee of local deputies appointed by the Assembly, but occasionally, where it was difficult to choose, the question was referred to the electors of the department. Thus the electors of the department of the Aisne were assembled at Chauny to decide between the rival cities of Laon and Soissons, and it was only after a pamphlet war and an animated debate, in which a young man of twenty-two, named Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, first made himself conspicuous, that Laon was selected.¹ Still more violent was the discussion in the departments of the Haute Marne,² and the Puy de Dôme,³ where the cities of Chaumont and Langres, Clermont-Ferrand and Riom, were the rival candidates, and in both cases the issue was settled in the same way, Chaumont and Clermont-Ferrand becoming the administrative capitals of the respective departments and the seats of the departmental tribunals, while Langres and

¹ *Histoire de la Révolution dans le Département de l'Aisne*, 1789, by Alfred Desmasures, pp. 105-114, Vervins, 1869; and Hamel's *Histoire de Saint-Just*, vol. i. pp. 78, 79. Brussels, 1879.

² *Histoire de la ville de Chaumont*, by Émile Jolibois, p. 269. Chaumont and Paris, 1856.

³ *Chroniques et Récits de la Révolution dans la ci-devant Basse Auvergne. Formation et Organisation du Département du Puy de Dôme*, by Francisque Mège. Paris, 1874.

Riom became the ecclesiastical capitals, and the seats of the departmental bishoprics. Sometimes the largest city in the department was selected as its capital, as in the cases of Lyons¹ and Arras² in the departments of the Rhône et Loire and the Pas de Calais, although by no means central or convenient; while in other instances, as in the departments of the Nord³ and the Indre,⁴ the largest cities, Lille and Issoudun, were rejected, and the comparatively small towns of Douai and Châteauroux chosen, because of their central position. In the department of the Charente Inférieure no less than four cities of nearly equal size and importance disputed the honour of being the capital, La Rochelle, Rochefort, Saintes and Saint Jean d'Angély. The Assembly tried to solve the difficulty by ordering the three last to act as capital alternately; but this scheme did not work well, and on June 20, 1790, the electors of Rochefort and Saint Jean d'Angély combined together, and out of jealousy for La Rochelle secured the selection of Saintes as capital of the department.⁵ Equally violent were the disputes between smaller towns, which desired to be capitals of districts. Serious riots accompanied the election of Vervins over Guise in the department of the Aisne,⁶ and the local historian of Roye quotes a contemporary account of the reception of the news in that town, that its rival, Montdidier, had been selected as capital of the district, which says that "the citizens rushed into each other's arms, their wives shared their sorrow, and shed tears, when they looked upon their children."⁷ The new ecclesiastical division of the country

¹ Balleydier's *Histoire du peuple de Lyon pendant la Révolution*, vol. i. p. 19.

² Lecesne's *Arras sous la Révolution*, vol. i. pp. 87-89.

³ Derode's *Histoire de Lille et de la Flandre wallonne*, vol. iii. p. 23.

⁴ *Histoire de Déols et de Châteauroux*, by Fauconneau-Dufresne, vol. i. pp. 495, 496. Châteauroux, 1873.

⁵ *Histoire de la ville et du port de Rochefort*, by J. T. Viaud and E. J. Fleury, vol. ii. pp. 273-276. Rochefort, 1845.

⁶ Desmasures' *La Révolution dans le département de l'Aisne*, p. 110, and *Histoire de la ville de Guise*, by the Abbé Pécheur, vol. ii. pp. 278-287. Vervins, 1851.

⁷ *Histoire de la ville de Roye*, by Émile Coët, vol. p. 434. Paris, 1880.

was completed at the same time as the administrative division, and the regulation that each department was to form a single diocese, brought about a reduction in the number of bishops, from 131 to 83, and caused much discontent in many of the episcopal cities, which, like Uzès, Castres, and Boulogne, lost their bishops. The capital of the department was not necessarily the seat of the new constitutional bishop's see, and Saint Omer, to quote but one instance, was chosen as ecclesiastical capital of the Pas de Calais instead of Arras. These local disputes are well worth notice as evidences of the strong local feeling which animated the France of 1790; but the new arrangements did not succeed in permanently alienating the affections of the people from the Constituent Assembly, as many royalists had expected, and really paved the way for that substitution of national for provincial patriotism, which was one of the most important results of the Revolution.

A second great cause for the tranquillity of the provinces and the peaceful attitude of the peasants is to be found in the sale of the Church lands. The general financial and primary economical results of this measure have been noticed, but it was rather the social and political advantages to the peasant which did so much for the maintenance of order. The same peasants who had, in 1789 and the beginning of 1790, occupied themselves in burning their lords' châteaux, and the pews in the parish churches, had in 1791 a distinct interest in the maintenance of order, as owners of their own little plots of ground, and were far too busy in commencing the cultivation of their new purchases to care to go about burning other people's property. By their possession, further, of Church lands the peasants and farmers had a distinct interest in the continuance of the Revolution, and would not be likely to take any part in a movement which might restore the power of the king and the monks. The issue of assignats did for the ouvriers in the towns very much what the sale of the Church lands did for the peasants. After the issue of paper money, and before it depreciated in value, every capitalist seemed to have very much more command of

capital than he had had before, and great enterprises were accordingly entered into. In every town the bourgeois began to build new houses, establish new manufactories, or enter into new speculations; and this employment of capital meant increased employment of labour, and increased employment of labour meant a rise in wages. Therefore, though for particular and generally religious reasons riots still occurred in certain towns and districts, the close of the year 1790 showed upon the whole a marked increase in the tranquillity and prosperity of both town and country, and as this state of things was believed to be due to the measures of the Constituent Assembly, the inhabitants of the provinces felt themselves bound to support the Assembly and its new Constitution, and were very unlikely in 1791 to risk their lives and property on behalf of the king.

The only province in which the peasants rose in insurrection, and in which châteaux were burnt during the winter of 1790, was the province of Quercy, where some 4500 peasants assembled, under the leadership of one Joseph Linard, and burnt some thirty châteaux in the month of December.¹ The ringleader, obviously a man of ability and no mere peasant, defeated the troops sent against him, and occupied the town of Gourdon. He then threw open the prison there, and wrote to the directory of the department of the Lot at Cahors that he had constituted himself the protector of the people against the tyranny of the directors of the district of Gourdon. His domination there did not last long, for after he had burnt the château of Clarac and murdered its owner, M. Escairat, in January, 1791, the authorities collected a force consisting of the infantry regiments of Languedoc and Noailles, and the cavalry regiment of Poitou, and completely suppressed the insurrection.² This solitary instance of a peasant revolt is a yet further proof, if one were needed, that the measures of the Assembly had effectually either checked the "guerre aux châteaux" or prevented a third outbreak by ordering the sale of the Church lands.

¹ *Histoire Parlementaire*, vol. viii. p. 263.

² *Ibid.*, p. 351.

The riots in towns were also far fewer in number during the winter of 1790, and the spring of 1791, than before, and only one of them is of much interest owing to the eminent ability of one of the victims of the fury of the populace. But before describing the lamentable riot at Aix, in which Pascalis lost his life, it is worth while to notice a less important riot at Douai, if only to show that the readiness of the mob to murder and riot was not confined to the south of France. On March 15, 1791, the mob of Douai attacked an unpopular shopkeeper, named Nicollon, under the pretext that he broke the corn laws, and dragged him to the Hôtel de Ville. The mayor ordered him to be taken to prison to save his life, and he was conducted there with difficulty through the mob by a detachment of national guards, commanded by a painter and advocate, named Derbaix. He was safely consigned to prison, when the anger of the mob, and especially of the soldiers in the town, one of whom asserted that he had been wounded, turned against Derbaix, who was hunted through the town, and finally hung on the lamp-iron in front of the guard-house. Two days afterwards, not satisfied with the death of Derbaix, the rioters broke into the prison and dragged out the unfortunate Nicollon, and hanged him also.¹ Such riots were obviously not due to political causes, and do not deserve to be dwelt upon in detail; but it is otherwise with the great riot which took place at Aix, in Provence, near Marseilles, on December 13, 1790.

If the organization of the new administrative authorities and the sale of the Church property had tranquillized the provinces, and attached the inhabitants to the Assembly in preference to the king, there had also been a far more important force at work, which had really converted the provincial towns to the cause of the Revolution, and the party of the Radical deputies at Paris, and done the very work which Mirabeau had intended his provincial agency to do, and that was the system of the Jacobin Club at Paris in affiliating provincial clubs to

¹ *Douai pendant la Révolution*, by Louis Dechristé, pp. 229, 230. Paris and Douai, 1880.

itself. This idea of affiliation had spread during the year 1790 to such an extent, that the Jacobin Club decided to publish a journal to circulate among its branches instead of the former written correspondence, and the first number of the *Journal des Amis de la Constitution* appeared on November 30, 1790. The first editor was the old favourite of the club, Choderlos de Laclos, and in his second number he published a list of no fewer than 121 societies in provincial towns in affiliation with the mother-club in Paris. It was through this system of affiliation that the provinces were kept aware of the wishes of the revolutionary leaders in Paris, and it was by its means that the Terror of 1793 and 1794 was organized and maintained, and that the plan of the Girondin party for raising the provinces was frustrated. It must not be supposed that the royalist and reactionary party in the provinces neglected to follow this example, and though they had no great mother-club at Paris to establish a connection with, they founded their clubs in every provincial town, and affiliated themselves with each other. The establishment of these royalist clubs in opposition to the popular ones had given rise to riots in many towns, such as Montauban, Uzès, and Perpignan,¹ and was the direct cause of the riot at Aix. The royalist club in that city took the name of the "Amis de la Paix," and was joined by all the judges of the ci-devant Parlement of Aix, and the officers of the regiment quartered in the city, the Régiment de Lyonnais. It was against these officers that the revolutionary mob was most incensed, and on leaving their cercle on the evening of December 12, 1790, a party of them were hooted, stoned, and fired at. They heard, when they reached their barracks, that their major and six other officers were arrested and at the Hôtel de Ville. They then formed their men and prepared to rescue the imprisoned officers; but the municipality forbade them to advance, and the next day the directory of the department of the Bouches-du-Rhône ordered the regiment to leave the

¹ *Rapport des événemens arrivés à Perpignan le 5 Décembre, fait au nom du Comité des Rapports en la séance du mardi 21 Décembre par Mosquet, député de la Haute Saône*, in B.M.—F. 839. (8.)

city.¹ The mob, furious at the escape of their victims, and no longer restrained by the presence of the troops, seized Etienne Pascalis, the great jurist, who had been elected procureur-général-syndic of the Bouches-du-Rhône, and crying out that he was an aristocrat, hung him on one of the trees in the great square of Aix, and afterwards murdered two other gentlemen, MM. de Guiraman and La Roquette. What Mirabeau felt when he heard that the citizens of the city for which he sat as deputy had hanged their greatest lawyer may be imagined, and he begged the king to send him as special commissioner to restore order. He even went so far as to get his congé from the Assembly to go to Provence,² but the necessity of superintending his great scheme in Paris prevented him from starting, and the murderers of Pascalis were never punished. The causes of this riot were as distinctly political as those of the riot at Douai were not, and both are typical of other riots which occasionally occurred, though seldom accompanied with loss of life.

Before leaving the provinces of France to discuss the progress of the Revolution in the French colonies, it is necessary to dwell for some time on the events which occurred in a county and a city in France, in the near neighbourhood of Nîmes, Marseilles, and Aix, which did not own the rule of the King of France, namely, the Venaissin and the ancient city of Avignon. The county of the Venaissin had belonged to the pope ever since 1228, and it was at Avignon, which Pope Clement VI. had bought in 1348, that the popes had spent the seventy years of exile; but for many years no pope had visited France, and the county and city had been ruled by cardinal vice-legates and rectors, who had generally ruled extremely well. As in all other territories belonging to the popes, there was great poverty and much misery in the rural districts, but that poverty and misery arose rather from ignorance of economical principles than actual tyranny or over-taxation,

¹ *Mémoires historiques des événemens arrivés à Aix le 12 Décembre, 1790, publié par les officiers du Régiment de Lyonnais.* B.M.—F. 837. (2.)

² *Correspondance entre Mirabeau et La Murch,* vol. ii. p. 179.

and was balanced by the prosperity of the city of Avignon. For many years the citizens of Avignon had prided themselves on being the subjects of the pope, but when they heard of the great events happening in Paris, and of the freedom which the French people were winning for themselves, they felt their French hearts rising within them, and longed to share the advantages of revolutionary France. Their feelings were so well known, that on the night of August 4, 1789, mention had been made of the expediency of uniting Avignon to France; but the matter had gone no further, and Avignon was not again mentioned in the Assembly until it was known that the city was having a revolution on its own account in imitation of the great French Revolution. As early as March 28, 1789, a food riot had broken out in the city, which was only suppressed by the firmness of the Duc de Crillon,¹ and, as in the other cities of France, the fear of brigands had brought about the establishment of a National or Bourgeois Guard, of which the vice-legate, Cardinal Casoni, was elected general, and the consuls lieutenant-generals. During the latter months of 1789 there were frequent riots, and the leaders of the popular, or, as it called itself, the French party, Lescuyer, Peyre, Mainvielle, Duprat, and Sabin Tournal, editor of the *Courrier d'Avignon*, began to steadily pursue their purpose of obtaining a union with France. Their attacks were at first directed against the old local government, and on February 22, 1790, the consular government, which Avignon had, like the other cities of southern France, preserved ever since the Roman period, was so humiliated by a mob at the Hôtel de Ville, that the consuls resigned. After an interregnum a general assembly was called, which drew up a scheme of municipal government on the French model, and induced the vice-legate to consent to it. On April 18, 1790, the new municipal government was installed with great pomp, but it was not destined to last long without opposition, for on April 23 a bull of the pope was issued annulling the consent of the vice-legate, and the peace which

¹ *Histoire de la Révolution d'Avignon et du Comté Venaissin en 1789 et années suivantes*, by Charles Soullier, p. 9.

seemed about to be established was again disturbed, while the presentation of a magnificent banner by the National Guard of Orange to the National Guard of Avignon seemed to show from what quarter the French party at Avignon would receive help. At the same time, it is a notable fact that this French party did not exist in any strength in the county of the Venaissin, and that on May 27, 1790, the assembly of the three orders of the province assembled at Carpentras passed the following resolution: "We, the freely elected deputies forming the representative assembly of the county of the Venaissin, declare that the unanimous desire of the people of this province is to remain under the sway of the Holy See, and that in making this declaration we fulfil a sacred duty. Therefore we reiterate our protests of November 25 and March 12, and appeal to the tribunal of nations against every decree infringing on the rights of our august monarch, which rest on the firm foundations of the faith of treaties, long prescription, and the consent of the people of the Venaissin."¹ This declaration of the assembly of the Venaissin did not at all discourage the French party at Avignon, which had been elected to the chief offices in the new municipality, and which intended soon to show its power. On May 27 these new rulers, who, like all new rulers, were extremely sensitive to ridicule, were disgusted to find that an effigy, in the costume of a municipal officer, had been hung in the Place des Saintes, and that a proclamation attacking them had been posted up all over the city. They at once began arresting suspected persons, and since the National Guard could not be depended upon by them, the worst of them, such as Peyre, introduced a body of fierce, bloodthirsty peasants into the city on the night of June 7, under the command of a waggoner named Jourdan, who had received the surname of Coupe-Tête, from his boasts that he had cut off the head of De Launay, the governor of the Bastille. These peasants created such terror among the bourgeois national guards that they concentrated at the Hôtel de Ville, and a sharp engagement took place on June 10, in which neither party

¹ Soullier's *Histoire de la Révolution d'Avignon*, vol. i. p. 53.

was successful, and the peasants retired to their quarters. However, on June 11 they broke into the prison where the accused of the affair of May 27 were confined, and led out and hanged the Marquises de Roche-gude and D'Aulan, the Abbé d'Offray, and an artisan named Aubert. The news of the affair of the 10th had, however, reached Orange, and on the afternoon of the 11th the National Guard of that city marched into Avignon, and after driving out the peasants and quieting the city, took away twenty-three prisoners, against whom the popular party still vowed vengeance, to keep them safe in the prisons of Orange, and departed on June 13. On the same day the cardinal vice-legate, who had vainly implored mercy for the victims of June 11, retired to the strong castle of Carpentras, the capital of the still faithful Venaissin. His retirement was rendered necessary by the action of the French party in Avignon, who called a general meeting of the citizens on June 12, which solemnly declared Avignon united to France, and elected four of the most revolutionary members of the municipality—Tissot, Peyre, Duprat, and Lescuyer—deputies for the city to the National Assembly. This action was warmly applauded in the city, and after the performance of a solemn *Te Deum* in the cathedral, the mob proceeded to tear down the papal arms everywhere, and to substitute those of France. Such was the history of the events which Camus described to the Assembly in an elaborate report of June 17, and the deputies of the extreme left desired that the act of union should be at once ratified by the king and the Assembly. Mirabeau, however, perceived the danger of thus violating international law, and compromised the matter by securing the election of an Avignon committee, which consisted of Barnave, Tronchet, Charles de Lameth, Bouche, Desmeuniers, and himself. This committee, under Mirabeau's skilful management, took no decisive step, and on August 24 Tronchet reported that it had received three petitions, one from Avignon, begging for ratification of the union, one from the municipality of Orange, asking what was to be done with the prisoners they had taken from Avignon, and one from the prisoners themselves. Mirabeau

prevented the Assembly from coming to any conclusion, except that the prisoners were to be released from prison, but confined to the city of Orange; but on November 16, 1790, Pétion, enraged at the delay, made a long speech on his own account on the position of affairs. His speech abounded in false history and bad political philosophy, and any effect which it might have had was destroyed by Mirabeau's tart declaration that its conclusions were by no means those of the Avignon committee. Mirabeau thus again averted the danger of sanctioning the union; but the continued disturbances in Avignon obliged him to recommend that the king should be requested to send two regiments to maintain order in the city for the pope, without assuming any rights of sovereignty. The people of Avignon, and especially the revolutionary party, were much disgusted at the delay of the Assembly in acquiescing in the union; but they were still more wroth at the persistent refusal of the people of the Venaissin to send in a petition to the same effect, to which they attributed the delay of the Assembly. Accordingly, in the April of 1791, part of the National Guard of Avignon, together with some of the mob, and some seventy soldiers of the regiments of Penthievre and the Soissonais, calling themselves the army of the Vaucluse, marched out under the command of Patrix, an ex-officer of the French army, who had Jourdan Coupe-Tête, Pierre Mainvielle, and the son of a wealthy innkeeper, who called himself the Marquis de Rovère, under him as lieutenants, and laid siege to Carpentras, the capital of the Venaissin, on April 6. The siege did not last long, for on May 6 the garrison burst out of the castle and killed many of the besiegers, after which defeat the army murdered its general and returned in confusion to Avignon. Mirabeau had been able to prevent the Assembly from making the great mistake which he had so consistently opposed; but his successors in political influence were not so prudent, and on the news of the siege of Carpentras the Assembly nominated three commissioners, the Abbé Mulot, M. Lescenè-Desmaisons, and M. de Verninac, to go to Avignon and report upon the disposition of the populace. They

were naturally influenced by the French party and reported in favour of union, and recommended that French troops should be at once sent to the city to put an end to the feverish excitement which had reigned there so long, and was sure to end in bloodshed. The commissioners were more than justified in their recommendations by a riot on August 21, 1791, when the first municipality was overthrown, as it was now too moderate to please the advanced party, whose accession to power and extreme opinions were at once shown by the selection of Jourdan Coupe-Tête to be commandant of the National Guard. The report was adopted by the Assembly, and on September 13, not only Avignon, but the county of the Venaissin, which was contented with the rule of the pope, were, on the motion of Barnave, declared united to France without any mention being made of compensation or apology to the lawful sovereign. This decree was received with great rejoicings at Avignon on September 17, but by the unaccountable and most culpable delay of De Lessart and Duportail, the Ministers for the Interior and for War, the troops, which were to restore order to the city, did not arrive until the beginning of November, after the hearts of the deputies to the Legislative Assembly and of all Frenchmen had been saddened by the terrible story of the massacre of the Glacière of Avignon.¹

At Avignon, as in every other city, town, and even village in France, the progress of the local revolution had been the work of the popular club. It was in these branch societies or clubs "*des amis de la Constitution*" that the men of energy of any city who, either from principle, ambition, or mere desire for change, hoped for yet more startling political convulsions, met together, and by union gained greater power than any class or clique of their fellow-citizens. The leaders

¹ For the troubles at Avignon, see the *Histoire de la Révolution d'Avignon et du Comté Venaissin en 1789 et années suivantes*, by Charles Soullier, 2 vols., Paris and Avignon, 1844-45; *Histoire de la Révolution avignonnaise*, by J. F. André, 2 vols., Avignon, 1844; and the innumerable pamphlets published at the time, of which there are over ninety in the British Museum, in volumes F. 594 to F. 601

and rulers of these provincial clubs were never artisans, ouvriers, or members of the very poorest class of society, but were lawyers, bourgeois, gentlemen, or even priests and ministers, like Jean Bon Saint-André, the Protestant pastor and president of the popular society of Montauban; but they had broken away from their class, and felt that they depended upon the populace to support them and give them power. It is a very curious fact that in no instance were the leaders of the popular clubs ignorant and uneducated workmen; they were invariably men of education, who often deliberately assumed the language and manners of the lowest class to gain influence over them. Their power was already great, as appears in the stories of the riots at Nîmes, Montauban, Perpignan, Uzès, Aix, and now at Avignon; and as the more moderate bourgeois began to tire of the clubs and their endless motions, these more ambitious or more enthusiastic members of their own class assumed the leadership in them, which eventually led to the real government of the towns, when once they had armed their poor partisans and were able to set them in motion against the national guards. The leaders of the Jacobin Club in Paris at the close of the Constituent Assembly, Robespierre and Pétion, Danton and Choderlos de Laclos, felt at that moment how greatly their power depended on their close connection with their provincial branches; for not only did the majority of the bourgeois of Paris, as represented by the national guards, hoot at the Jacobin Club as they passed down the Rue Saint Honoré on their way from the slaughter of the Champ de Mars, but their old orators, Duport, Barnave, and the Lameths, had seceded from the club after that day, and, with the majority of the deputies of the left, had founded a new club in the neighbouring convent of the Feuillants. Had it not been for the new blood introduced by the deputies to the Legislative Assembly, who came from their country towns and villages full of admiration and respect for the mother-club and at once flocked to it, the Jacobin Club at Paris might have lost its pre-eminence. It was the provinces of France which at this time restored

vigour to the mother-club at Paris—a vigour which was to be returned in double strength in the course of 1792. The key-note of the strength and the success of the Jacobin Club is to be found in its provincial branch societies, and if the provincial history of 1789 is marked by the outbreak of châteaux-burning and the establishment of national guards, and of 1790 by federations and the election of the new administrative authorities, the year 1791 is chiefly noteworthy as the year in which the Jacobin Club spread its network over France and attained thereby a predominant strength, which made it the greatest political power, not only at its headquarters in Paris, but over the whole country.

The history of the Revolution in the colonies, or rather of the influence of the Revolution in France upon the French colonies, presents some curious contrasts to that of the Revolution in the provinces, and deserves somewhat careful attention. The unpractical policy of the Constituent Assembly with regard to them has already been noticed, as an instance of the absence of political knowledge which characterized the deputies,¹ but the history of the effect of that policy in the colonies themselves has now to be seen. The colonies in the West Indies were the most wealthy which France possessed, and the success of the French in the War of American Independence had borne its greatest fruits there, and had made France the most powerful European nation in that quarter. The French West Indies were in 1789 ruled on a dual system by royal officers, who commanded the troops, exercised the civil government and maintained order, and by intendants who had complete control of the finances, with the natural result that there were perpetual disputes between them. There were two governors-general, one of the French portion of the island of San Domingo, and the other of the islands, who resided in Martinique and ruled over the other islands, namely, St. Lucia, Tobago, Mariegalante, Desirade, and the Saintes, with the exception only of Guadeloupe, which had its own independent governor and intendant.

¹ Vol. i. chap. ix. pp. 273, 274.

There were, further, supreme colonial councils in each island, which advised the governor and formed a court of appeal. The garrison of these colonies consisted of eight colonial regiments of infantry, recruited in Paris by the lieutenant of police in the most unjustifiable manner from the criminal classes,¹ five brigades of the colonial regiment of artillery, and some undisciplined militia, consisting partly of half-castes, partly of freed slaves, which force was supplemented when necessary by sailors from the ships on the West Indian station.

By far the wealthiest and most important of these colonies was that of San Domingo, which comprised two-thirds of that fertile island, and contained a population in 1789 of 55,252 whites, 31,785 mulattoes or half-castes and freed slaves, and 405,560 negro slaves;² and these slaves were in every way inferior to the slaves in the English colonies of Jamaica and Barbadoes, of which they were to some extent the refuse, for the English merchants, who possessed the entire control of the slave trade, only brought the slaves whom they could not sell elsewhere to San Domingo. The white colonists were divided into two distinct classes—the planters, who dwelt, when they were in the colony and not revelling in the gaities of Paris, in feudal state on their plantations; and the wealthy merchants, who exported sugar and rum to their correspondents at Nantes and Bordeaux, and imported the necessaries of life, and who dwelt in the two cities of Port-au-Prince and Cap Français. These two parties naturally opposed each other for commercial reasons, because, while the planters wished for free trade, so as to get the best price for their produce and to get their European necessaries as cheaply as possible, the merchants, from their close connection with the merchants of Nantes and Bordeaux, were in favour of stringent protection. The opposition between these parties had appeared in the elected colonial assembly, granted to the colony in 1787, when the provincial assemblies were instituted, in which also the

¹ See Sillery's speech, quoted in vol. i. chap. xiii. p. 379.

² *Histoire maritime de la France*, by Léon Guérin, edition of 1863, vol. v. p. 523.

action of the Comte de la Luzerne, who in that year returned to France to take up the ministry of the marine, in abolishing the supreme council of Cap Français and centralizing all government at Port-au-Prince, was violently attacked. In 1789 the governor-general of San Domingo was the Marquis de Chilleau, and the intendant was Barbé-Marbois, one of the wisest colonial administrators France ever possessed, who was in favour of modified free trade in the shape of a reciprocity treaty with America, and the two officials, as was invariably the case, were declared enemies. It has been mentioned that in July, 1789, shortly after the National Assembly had been recognized by the king, the Marquis de Gouy d'Arcy and five other Seigneurs de Saint Domingue, who had been elected by a group of colonists who happened to be in Paris and in the habit of meeting at the Hôtel de Massiac, had been admitted to the Assembly as deputies for San Domingo; and the Messieurs de la Martinique had similarly chosen Moreau de Saint Méry, Arthur Dillon, the lieutenant-governor of Tobago, with Galbert and Curt of Guadeloupe, as their deputies. The events of the Revolution in Paris were followed with the keenest interest in San Domingo, especially by the merchants, who sympathized with their brother-bourgeois in the National Assembly, and the tricolour was publicly worn both at Cap Français and at Port-au-Prince in the October of 1789. The planters were not so enthusiastic; most of them were noble, and therefore did not admire the success of the National Assembly, and as slave-owners they especially feared the action of the Société des Amis des Noirs, which openly declared its purpose of securing the abolition of slavery; but some of them soon conceived the idea of forming a constituent assembly in the colony which should secure colonial independence, and might then pass some free-trade measures. But both parties were equally determined to allow no concessions to the mulattoes or the slaves; a mulatto was promptly hanged at Port-au-Prince for asking for the rights of man from the colonial committee established there, and Ferraud de Baudières, a planter and sénéchal of Petit Goave, was assassinated for

drawing up a petition from the mulattoes demanding those rights.¹ In the midst of this ferment the Governor-General, De Chilleau, went home to France, and was succeeded by the Comte de Peynier, a commodore in the royal navy; and on October 27, Barbé-Marbois, who was the special object of the planters' detestation, was sent home to save his life. Meanwhile an individual, named La Chevalerie, had started a provincial assembly for the province of the north, and a municipality at Cap Français, and had endeavoured in vain to frighten Lieutenant-General de Vincent, who commanded in the province, and the Baron de Courbefort, colonel of the regiment of Cap, into surrendering all power to him;² but the energy of these officers and the disinclination of the merchants of the city to be his tools soon caused him to leave the city. He then pursued his intrigues in the province of the west, which contained no important city, and was therefore entirely a planters' province, and in conjunction with Larchevêque-Thibault, the Marquis de Borel, and others, summoned what they were pleased to call a general assembly of the colony, which met at Leogane, near Saint-Marc, and declared that San Domingo was a crown colony, that the decrees of the National Assembly had no authority in it, and that it would draw up a constitution which would only need the king's sanction to be effective. The provincial assembly at Cap regarded this rightly as a serious move on the planters' part, and warmly welcomed Peynier, the new governor, who marched, with the colonial regiment of Cap Français and the National Guard of that city, against Leogane. The general assembly there soon found it would be impossible to resist Peynier, and the leaders, therefore, embarked on board the mutinous ship, the *Léopard*, which had declared in their favour, and sailed for France on August 8, 1790. Meanwhile disturbances had broken out at Port-au-Prince, chiefly owing to the violent measures of the Chevalier de Mauduit du Plessis,

¹ Guérin's *Histoire maritime de la France*, vol. v. p. 249.

² See the description of the *Scène des Masques* in Guérin, vol. v. p. 252.

colonel of the colonial regiment of Port-au-Prince, who was an ardent Royalist, and who, on August 29, disarmed the national guards of that city, arrested the whole colonial committee formed there, and formed a corps of planters and other Royalist volunteers, who were called the *pompons blancs*, from the white tufts which they wore in their hats in lieu of cockades. The arrival of the *Léopard* at Brest, with the deputies of the assembly of Leogane on board, again raised the question of San Domingo in the Constituent Assembly, and also caused an insurrection in the fleet; but the Assembly, on the report of its colonial committee, which it had elected in March, 1790, condemned these deputies, passed votes of thanks to Peynier, Vincent, and Mauduit du Plessis, and directed that two regiments should be sent to reinforce the authorities of the colony. Long before these troops, whose departure was delayed by the mutiny in the Brest fleet, could start, a new danger had arisen in the colony. The mulattoes, who formed an important class, and who were proud of the European blood in their veins, insisted on petitioning that they should be allowed the same rights and privileges as the white citizens; and when their petition was contemptuously rejected by the provincial assembly of Cap Français and by the whole white population, they burst into open insurrection, under the command of Vincent Ogé, a young mulatto who had been educated in Europe, and held the rank of lieutenant-colonel in Germany. Ogé's two hundred men were easily defeated by Vincent and the Baron de Courbefort, and the defeated mulattoes escaped into the Spanish portion of San Domingo. Even there the leaders were not safe from the vengeance of the colonists; Vincent Ogé and his brother were surrendered, and broken on the wheel on March 9, 1791. All these troubles were too much for the Comte de Peynier, who resigned his governor-generalship in November, 1790, and was succeeded by M. de Blanchelande, a former lieutenant-governor of the island of Tobago. The danger of the mulatto rising was hardly past, when the merchants of the cities saw new peril in the discontent of the

class known as the "mean whites." This class comprised the adventurers of every description who had left France for the colonies, and was largely recruited from the deserters and time-expired soldiers of the colonial regiments. The mean whites of Port-au-Prince were for a time kept in subjection by the firm conduct of the Chevalier de Mauduit du Plessis and his royal volunteers; but on the arrival of the regiments of Normandie and Artois, which at last landed on March 2, shouting "Vive la liberté!" the soldiers of the colonial regiment of Port-au-Prince felt themselves strong enough to mutiny, and on March 4 Mauduit du Plessis was murdered by his own grenadiers. After this murder the merchants of Port-au-Prince began in terror to return to France, and the once prosperous city became the prey of the mean whites.¹ This news from San Domingo brought on a long and animated debate in the Constituent Assembly. Mirabeau was dead, and there was no one left to combat the fanaticism of humanity which possessed the majority of the deputies, and on May 15, 1791, the Assembly decreed, on the motion of Grégoire, that every man, whether black or white, who lived on French soil was a free citizen and had all the rights of citizenship, and that slavery was abolished. The frantic protests of merchants, planters, and every one who had ever been connected with the colonies had at last, but too late, some influence with the more thoughtful deputies, and on September 23, just before the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, an attempt was made to evade the effect of the decree of May 15. On that day, on the motion of Barnave, the Assembly decreed that while the mother-country reserved the right to order all external relations, each colony should be allowed to regulate its own interior affairs. There could be no doubt that slavery would then have been re-established.

¹ For these events, see *Histoire de la Révolution à Saint Domingue*, by A. M. Delmas, 2 vols, Paris, 1814; *An Historical Survey of the French Colony in the Island of San Domingo*, by Bryan Edwards, M.P., London, 1797; and *Lettre à M. B. Edwards en réfutation de son ouvrage, par Venant de Charmilly*, London, 1797.

But Barnave's motion came too late. The mulattoes, who could not forget the execution of Ogé, had told the negroes that they were all free; and the news arrived at Havre, on October 17, that the slaves in the province of the north, to the number of fifty-five thousand, had burst into insurrection, and were burning the plantations and murdering the planters. It was further reported that Captain Affleck, of H.M.S. *Triton*, had saved many lives, but that both French and English colonists demanded that assistance should at once be sent to the governor, or else the contagion of murder and rebellion would spread through all the West India Islands. When it became a question of life and death between whites and blacks, the mulattoes, cruelly as they had been treated, did all they could to help the whites and to defend the cities against the slaves. By the end of September, 1791, the once flourishing plantations of San Domingo were in ashes; but the towns held out, and on September 11 a regular treaty of peace was made between the insurgent negroes and the mean whites and mulattoes, who now ruled in Port-au-Prince, for the merchants and planters were all murdered or out of the colony. The only redeeming features in the outbreak of this fatal slave war are to be seen in the gallant manner in which the mulattoes held by their half-brothers the whites, and in the intrepid attempts of the sailors of all nations, English, French, Spanish, and American, to save some of the victims of the ill-considered and ridiculous policy by means of which the Constituent Assembly had brought disaster and ruin upon the most flourishing French colony.

Next in importance, if not in size, to the colony of San Domingo was the French island of Martinique, in which the governor-general of all the smaller islands, except Guadeloupe, resided. In contained, in 1789, a population of between 10,000 and 11,000 whites, between 4000 and 5000 mulattoes and freed slaves, and about 73,000 slaves;¹ and there, too, as in San Domingo, the governor-general, the Comte de Vioménil, and the intendant, Foullon d'Écotier, son of the Foullon murdered

¹ Guérin's *Histoire maritime de la France*, vol. v. p. 523.

at Paris on July 16, were at issue. On the news of the taking of the Bastille, there was an outburst of joy among the white inhabitants of Saint-Pierre, the capital, who at once adopted the tricolour; but Vioménil disgusted them all by publicly embracing a negro, as a proof of his belief in equality and fraternity. The order of events in San Domingo was then exactly followed in Martinique. A colonial assembly, which claimed to be a constituent assembly, consisting almost entirely of planters, met in the town of Fort Royal, and, after an inquiry into the conduct of the governor-general, reported him to the king. Meanwhile the merchants of Saint-Pierre had formed an assembly and established a National Guard, and as they also attacked the governor-general, Vioménil was recalled and replaced by Lieutenant-General the Vicomte de Damas. When the new governor-general reached Martinique he found civil war raging between the cities of Fort Royal and Saint-Pierre, and that the latter had sent for help to the neighbouring colonies of Guadeloupe, Saint-Lucia, and Tobago. In command of the volunteers from Guadeloupe, arrived Coquille Dugommier, a veteran officer of the American war,¹ who speedily patched up a peace, and all remained quiet until Saint-Pierre declared itself a free port, when Damas, with a force of soldiers, volunteers, and mulattoes, marched against it. Again help came from the neighbouring islands, but when Captain de Clugny, governor of Guadeloupe, retired after making a fresh peace, Damas seized the city and made the leaders prisoners. In June, 1790, the mulattoes of Saint-Pierre began a riot in the streets for the rights of man, but they did not go so far as Ogé in San Domingo, and were very roughly handled by the soldiers, the national guards, and the sailors of the French fleet, who killed fourteen of them. There was then comparative peace till September 1, 1790, when the soldiers of the colonial regiment of Martinique, who garrisoned Fort Royal and Fort

¹ *Documents relatifs à la Révolution française, extraits des œuvres inédits de A. R. C. de Saint-Albin, publiés par son fils aîné, H. de Saint-Albin, p 229-231. Paris: 1873.*

Bourbon, which commanded the town of Fort Royal, mutinied and expelled the governor-general, the colonial assembly, and their officers from the town. The Vicomte de Damas then established himself on an impregnable height, called the Gros Morne, where he collected round him all the troops he could muster, and thoroughly organized the planters, who came to him as volunteers. On September 25 Dugommier marched out to attack the Gros Morne, but was utterly defeated; and in February, 1791, Damas, who had received reinforcements, laid siege to Saint-Pierre. The siege lasted three months, during which Dugommier gave proof of the powers of organization and of the military ability which he was to display in the great European wars of the French Republic. The siege was only terminated and the civil war ended by the arrival, in June, 1791, of two commissioners from the National Assembly, who recommended that Damas should be recalled and a general amnesty issued. Dugommier himself had with difficulty escaped from the island, but had the satisfaction to learn in France, a few months later, that Martinique had elected him a deputy to the Legislative Assembly. Martinique, like San Domingo, felt the evil effect of the abolition of slavery by the decree of May 15, 1791; for on October 17 a slave insurrection broke out, which, if not so terribly destructive as that of San Domingo, ruined much property and cost many lives.

The important colony of Guadeloupe, of which Captain de Clugny was governor, with its population of 13,000 to 14,000 whites, 3000 mulattoes, and 85,000 slaves, was saved from the excesses of Martinique and San Domingo by the prudent conduct of the governor, and by the departure of the more warlike planters to join the camp of Damas at the Gros Morne, and of the more warlike bourgeois to join Dugommier at Saint-Pierre. The absence of the colonists, however, caused a negro revolt, which was speedily suppressed, and all was quiet until the bourgeois merchants of Basse Terre, the capital of Guadeloupe, began to suspect De Clugny of an alliance with Damas. They then drove him out, and he established himself at Point-à-

Pitre, as Damas had done at the Gros Morne; but he did not attempt to attack Basse Terre, and remained quiet until the outbreak of a slave war, after the decree of May 15, caused all the whites and mulattoes to forget their differences and combine for defence. The island of Saint-Lucia, however, with its 2300 whites, 1000 mulattoes, and 17,000 slaves, remained, owing to the prudent rule of Captain Laroque-Montels, free from disturbances, though it too sent volunteers to Martinique to the help of both Damas and Dugommier. The little island of Tobago, with its 400 whites, 200 mulattoes, and 13,000 slaves, was not so fortunate. This conquest of Bouillé's, which had been ceded by England to France by the treaty of 1783, was garrisoned by five companies of the colonial regiment of Guadeloupe, and, on the election of Arthur Dillon to the National Assembly, M. Jobal had been appointed lieutenant-governor. There, too, a colonial committee formed itself and tried to induce the soldiers to mutiny, but in vain; and the lieutenant-governor, catching the three leaders as they were trying to escape to Martinique, deported one of them, a lawyer, named Bosque, to Trinidad. At this strong measure the soldiers really did mutiny, but were feasted by Jobal, and for a time returned to their duty. Meanwhile the merchants of the town of Port Louis had formed a National Guard, and a body of these volunteers sailed, under the command of M. Saint-Leger, to aid Dugommier at Martinique. Jobal's foolish manner of treating the soldiers had only increased their audacity, and they at last demanded the life of one of their officers, Captain Blosse. He escaped with difficulty, and the mutinous soldiers continued to terrify the island, until eventually they set fire to and nearly totally destroyed the flourishing town of Port Louis. Then at last Jobal induced the soldiers, who were mere brigands rather than the defenders of the colony, to go on board ship with Saint-Leger as a hostage, and return to France. On their arrival the Assembly ordered them to be imprisoned, but, after long inquiry, released them, awarded an indemnity of six thousand livres to Captain Blosse, and recommended that Jobal should be recalled for his treat-

ment of Bosque. Very similar was the course of events at Cayenne, the capital of French Guiana.¹ There, in accordance with the Assembly's decree of March, a colonial assembly had been elected on August 26, 1790; but when it showed too strong a tendency to thwart and criticize him, M. Bourgon, the governor, promptly arrested the seven leaders and sent them home to France. In French Guiana, it may be added, there was only one unimportant insurrection of the slaves.² The slaves were few, owing to the policy of the intendant, Lescallier, and so were the planters and the merchants; and as the native tribes had been consistently conciliated and not subdued, they exhibited no tendency to rise in insurrection. So peaceful, indeed, did the state of the colony remain, that when the directory wished to get rid of its adversaries, and yet not to guillotine them, it could find no colony so suitable as French Guiana. This account of the effects of the progress of the Revolution in France upon the colonies shows at once how far-spreading was the enthusiasm which welcomed the first movements in Paris, and the utter incompetence of the Constituent Assembly to deal with colonial matters. In every colony the news of the capture of the Bastille was received with delight, but the attempts of the inhabitants of the cities to imitate the behaviour of the French provincial towns, and to institute assemblies and national guards, led everywhere to disturbance. The planters, who were the natural opponents of the merchants, opposed them by force of arms, and though in San Domingo one governor-general took the side of the citizens, those of Martinique and Guadeloupe supported the planters, and open civil war among the colonists was the result. It was, however, in the decree of May 15, 1791, that the Constituent Assembly committed its greatest act of folly, by declaring all slaves free citizens of France, with the natural result that the slaves rose in insurrection to obtain

¹ On the state of French Guiana and the policy pursued there, consult the *Mémoires* of Malouet, who was intendant from 1776 to 1779.

² *Notice historique sur la Guyane française*, by H. Ternaux-Compans, p. 113. Paris: 1843.

their freedom, and that France lost her largest and most prosperous colony for ever.

Passing over the French settlements on the west coast of Africa, Senegal, Senegambia, and Goree, which had been restored to France in 1783, and which were maintained solely for the purpose of exporting negro slaves, and therefore ruined by the decree of May 15, it is next necessary to mention the effect of the events of the French Revolution in the French settlements in India and in the colonies in the Indian Ocean, of which the most valuable were the Isle de France, now known by its Dutch name of the Mauritius, and the Isle de Bourbon, now known as Réunion. There existed two opposite schools of colonial politicians in the Indian Seas, the main aim of one of which was to conquer the English East India Company in India and develop the wealth of the peninsula; while the other, which regarded the Isle de France as the real centre of French interests in the Eastern seas, already cast longing glances at the great island of Madagascar. The overthrow of the plans of Dupleix, and the successive defeats of Lally and Bussy, had discredited the former school, and in 1786 Lieutenant-General the Comte de Conway, a nobleman of Irish descent, was appointed to succeed Charpentier de Cossigny as governor-general of the dominions of the new French East India Company. He was the acknowledged leader of the party which coveted Madagascar, and at once recommended the absolute withdrawal of all troops from India to the Mauritius, and that the seat of government for all the French possessions to the east of the Cape of Good Hope should be placed there. His views were adopted, and in September, 1789, he was himself appointed governor-general of the Isles de France et de Bourbon. He was naturally popular in the beautiful island, of which the scenery has been immortalized by Bernardin de Saint-Pierre in his "Paul and Virginia;" and as absolute free trade existed, no differences between the merchants and the planters appeared when he summoned a colonial assembly to meet on April 27, 1790. But intriguing politicians soon made their presence felt, who harassed the governor into

resigning his office to Charpentier de Cossigny, who was now lieutenant-governor of the little island of Bourbon. A far greater danger than the words of a few intriguers existed in the mutinous behaviour of the soldiers of the regiments of Isle de France and of Pondicherry, who bitterly hated the commodore of the fleet on the station, the Comte de Macnamara, and who eventually murdered him on November 4, 1790, at Port Louis. This foul murder aroused the colonists, who eventually took courage to arrest and deport the leaders of the mutineers to the islets of Rodrigues. The result of this vigorous measure was to restore absolute quiet, and under the able administration of M. de Malartic, who came out as governor-general in 1792, absolute tranquillity was maintained in the Mauritius, while France was tormented by civil and foreign wars.¹ Similar good order was maintained by Colonel Thénon, who succeeded De Cossigny as governor of the island of Bourbon, or Réunion, where a colonial assembly met as early as March 25, 1790, and where the soldiers and other radicals were kept in order by a powerful club, the "Société des Amis de l'Ordre," and the only trouble he experienced was with his unruly garrison of three hundred men belonging to the colonial regiment of Pondicherry.²

The French settlements in India itself comprised the five towns of Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Mahé, Karikal, and Yanaon, and certain "comptoirs" or factories in other cities. Of the towns, Pondicherry was by far the most important, and in 1789 the French inhabitants were disaffected towards the government, both for deciding to withdraw the troops to the Mauritius, and for establishing a new East India Company in 1785, which had secured a monopoly of the trade with France, and ruined the independent merchants. The news of the revolution of Paris, as it was called, arrived by the same ship which came to take away the last detachment

¹ See *Statistique de l'île Maurice suivi d'une notice historique*, by the Baron d'Unienville. 2 vols. Paris: 1838.

² *Histoire de l'île Bourbon depuis 1643, jusqu'au 20 Decembre, 1848*, by Georges Azéma. Paris: 1862.

of European troops, and the inhabitants at once rushed to arms and declared that they too would have a revolution, and would not allow the troops to start. They then formed a colonial assembly, which became so noisy that, in August, 1790, the Chevalier de Fresne, governor of Pondicherry, deported the three chief ringleaders. This was the source of infinite future trouble, and led to the final division of parties in the settlement, which made it easy for the English to take possession of the former capital of Dupleix, in April, 1793.¹ At Chandernagore things went even worse. The colonial assembly of that little settlement refused to acknowledge the authority of either the colonial assemblies or the governors of Pondicherry or the Mauritius, and speedily imprisoned its own governor, Colonel de Montigny, who was, however, released and kindly received by the English governor-general, the Marquis Cornwallis, at Calcutta.²

The policy of the Constituent Assembly had, therefore, been as disastrous in the French colonies as it was possible to be, owing to its humanitarian and unpractical projects. Not only the mulatto rising under Ogé in San Domingo, but the disastrous slave war which followed, can be distinctly attributed to the decrees of March, 1790, and May, 1791; and the decree of March, 1790, constituting colonial assemblies, had everywhere embarrassed the executive authority in the colonies. Just as the Constituent Assembly had failed to understand that special laws must exist for the maintenance of an army or a navy, so it did not see the need of special regulations for different colonies, but wished to extend the doubtful privileges of the Declaration of the Rights of Man to every land where the French flag waved. Still more fatal was their decree for the abolition of slavery. It was not the act itself, but the unpractical manner of doing it, which did the

¹ See a series of articles by H. Castonnet-Desfosses, called *La Révolution et les Clubs dans l'Inde française*, in the *Revue de la Révolution* for March, April, May, and August, 1883.

² Cornwallis's despatch of November 17, 1790, in the *Cornwallis Correspondence*, edited by Ross, vol. ii. pp. 54, 55. London: 1859.

mischievous; and with regard to both the provinces and the colonies of France, the only wonder is that the anarchy caused by the Assembly's decrees did not open men's eyes to the mistakes of its policy, and that all Frenchmen should have indulged in a boundless delight at their new-born freedom, to the forgetfulness of murder and rapine, with an intensity best described in the lines of Wordsworth—

“ Another time,
That was, when I was here long years ago,
The senselessness of joy was then sublime ! ”¹

¹ Wordsworth's sonnet, dated Calais, August 15, 1802, in “Sonnets dedicated to Liberty.”

APPENDIX I.

MINISTERS FROM 1783 TO SEPTEMBER, 1791.

CONTROLLERS-GENERAL OF THE FINANCES.	MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.	MINISTERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD.	MINISTERS FOR WAR.	MINISTERS FOR THE NAVY AND COLONIES.	KEEPERS OF THE SEALS.
C. A. de Calonne, 1783—April 8, 1787. Mgr. E. C. Loménie de Brienne, Archbishop of Toulouse, May 1, '87—Aug. 25, '88. Jacques Necker, Director General, Aug. 25, '88—July 12, '89. E. Foulon de Doué, July 12—15, '89. Jacques Necker, Director-General, July 15, '89—Sept. 4, '90.	Comte de Vergennes, 1774—Feb. 1787. Comte de Montmorin, Feb. '87—July 12, '91. May 1, '87—Aug. 25, '88. Duc de la Vauguyon, July 12—15, '89. Comte de Montmorin, July 15, '89—Nov. 27, '91.	Baron de Breteuil, 1783—1787. Laurent de Villedeuil, '87—July 12, '89. Baron de Breteuil, July 12—15, '89. Comte de Saint Priest, Aug. 3, '89—Aug. 9, '90. * MINISTERS OF THE INTERIOR. Comte de Saint Priest, Aug. 9, '90—Jan. 25, '91. A. de Valdec de Lessart, Jan. 25, '91—Nov. 29, '91.	Maréchal de Ségur, 1780—1787. Comte Loménie de Brienne, Sept. '87—Aug. '88. Comte de Puysegur, Aug. '89—July 12, '89. Maréchal de Broglie, July 12—15, '89. Comte de Puysegur, July 15—Aug. 7, '89. Marquis de la Tour- du-Pin, Aug. 7, '89—Nov. '90. G. Dnportail, Nov. 16, '90—Dec. 5, '91.	Maréchal de Castries, 1780—Aug. 25, 1787. Comte de Montmorin (<i>ad interim</i>), Aug. 25—Dec. 24, '87. Comte de la Luzerne, Dec. 24, '87—July 12, '89. A. de Laporte, July 12—15, '89. Comte de la Luzerne, July 15, '89—Oct. 24, '90. Comte de Claret de Fleuryeu, Oct. 24, '90—May 16, '91. Vice-Admiral Antoine de Thevenard, May 16, '91—Sept. 18, '91. A. de Valdec de Lessart (<i>ad interim</i>), Sept. 18—Oct 20, '91.	Hue de Miromesnil, 1774—April 7, 1787. Lamoignon de Basseville, April 7, '87—Aug. 25, '88. François de Paule de Barentin, Aug. 25, '88—July 15, '89. Mgr. J. M. Champion de Cice, Archbishop of Bordeaux, Aug. 3, '89—Nov. 21, '90. M. L. F. Duport du Tertre, Nov. 21, '90—April 27, '91. MINISTER OF JUSTICE. M. L. F. Duport du Tertre, April 27, '91—Mar. 23, '92. April 27, '91—Mar. 23, '92.
* MINISTER OF PUBLIC CONTRIBUTIONS. L. H. Tarbé, May 18, '91—Mar. 23, '92.					

* The Breteuil ministry was only named on July 12, but the ministers had not time to come into office before the taking of the Bastille caused the immediate recall of Necker (see chap. III, p. 91).
 * The Ministry of the Household was changed to the Ministry of the Interior by a decree of August 7, 1790.
 * Ministries of Public Contributions and of Justice were created in place of the Controller-Generalship of the Finances and the Keepership of the Seals, by the decree of April 27, 1791, regulating the functions of the ministers.

APPENDIX II.

PRESIDENTS OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, JUNE 17, 1789, TO SEPTEMBER 12, 1791.

The presidents were elected by the absolute majority every fortnight, and were eligible for re-election.

	Elected	
1. Jean Sylvain Bailly	June 17, 1789	
2. The Duc d'Orleans (refused to take office)	July 3	"
3. Mgr. Lefranc de Pompignan, Archbishop of Vienne	July 3	"
4. The Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt	July 20	"
5. Isaac Gui René Le Chapelier	Aug. 3	"
6. The Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre	Aug. 17	"
7. Mgr. de la Luzerne, Bishop of Langres	Aug. 31	"
8. The Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre (second time)	Sept. 14	"
9. Jean Joseph Mounier	Sept. 28	"
10. Emmanuel Marc Marie Fréteau de Saint Just	Oct. 12	"
11. Armand Gaston Camus	Oct. 28	"
12. Jacques Guillaume Thouret	Nov. 12	"
13. Mgr. de Boisgélin de Cucé, Archbishop of Aix	Nov. 23	"
14. Emmanuel Marc Marie Fréteau de Saint Just (second time)	Dec. 7	"
15. Jean Nicolas Desmeuniers	Dec. 22	"
16. François Xavier Marc Antoine de Montesquiou-Fézensac, Abbot of Beaulieu	Jan. 4, 1790	
17. Gui Jean Baptiste Target	Jan. 18	"
18. Jean Xavier Bureaux de Pusy	Feb. 2	"
19. Mgr. Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Bishop of Autun	Feb. 16	"
20. François Xavier Marc Antoine de Montesquiou-Fézensac, Abbot of Beaulieu (second time)	Feb. 28	"
21. Jean Paul Rabaut de Saint-Étienne	Mar. 13	"
22. The Baron de Menou	Mar. 28	"
23. The Marquis de Bonnay	April 12	"
24. The Comte de Virieu	April 27	"
25. Jean Louis Gouttes, curé of Argilliers	April 29	"

	Elected
26. Jacques Guillaume Thouret (second time)	May 10, 1790
27. Bon-Albert Briois, Chevalier de Beaumetz	May 27 "
28. Emmanuel Joseph Siéyès	June 8 "
29. Michel Lepelletier de Saint-Fargeau	June 21 "
30. The Marquis de Bonnay (second time)	July 5 "
31. Jean Baptiste Treilhard	July 17 "
32. Antoine Balthazar Joseph d'André	Aug. 1 "
33. Pierre Samuel Dupont de Nemours	Aug. 16 "
34. The Baron de Jessé	Aug. 30 "
35. Jean Xavier Bureaux de Pusy (second time)	Sept. 12 "
36. Jean Louis Claude Emmery	Sept. 26 "
37. Philippe Antoine Merlin de Douai	Oct. 9 "
38. Antoine Pierre Joseph Marie Barnave	Oct. 25 "
39. Charles Antoine Chasset	Nov. 9 "
40. The Chevalier Alexandre Victor de Lameth	Nov. 20 "
41. Jerome Pétion de Villeneuve	Dec. 4 "
42. The Marquis de Bonnay (third time)	Dec. 20 "
43. Antoine Balthazar Joseph d'André (second time)	Dec. 22 "
44. Jean Louis Claude Emmery (second time)	Jan. 4, 1791
45. Henri Grégoire, curé of Embermesnil	Jan. 18 "
46. The Comte de Mirabeau	Jan. 31 "
47. Adrien Duport de Prélaville	Feb. 14 "
48. The Vicomte de Noailles	Feb. 26 "
49. The Marquis de Montesquiou-Fézensac	Mar. 14 "
50. François Denis Tronchet	Mar. 30 "
51. Charles Chabroud	April 9 "
52. Jean Rewbell	April 25 "
53. Antoine Balthazar Joseph d'André (third time)	May 9 "
54. Jean Xavier Bureaux de Pusy (third time)	May 25 "
55. Jean Dauchy	June 6 "
56. The Vicomte Alexandre de Beauharnais	June 18 "
57. The Comte Charles Malo François de Lameth	July 3 "
58. Joseph Defermon des Chapellières	July 19 "
59. The Vicomte Alexandre de Beauharnais (second time)	July 31 "
60. The Prince de Broglie	Aug. 14 "
61. Théodore Vernier	Aug. 29 "
62. Jacques Guillaume Thouret (third time)	Sept. 12 "



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